■7\ 


SEYMOUR 
VANDELEUR 


^^jir?^;;^ 


LIEUTENANT   VANDELEUR.  D.S.O.. 
SCOTS  GUARDS 

As    A    BlMBASHl    OF    THE    EGYPTIAN    ArMV.  OmDIRMAN.    I  Sy.'^ 


SEYMOUR 
VANDELEUR 

THE  STORY  OF  A  BRITISH  OFFICER 
BEING  A  MEMOIR  OF  BREVET-LIEU- 
TENANT-COLONEL VANDELEUR,  D.S.O., 
SCOTS  GUARDS  AND  IRISH  GUARDS, 
WITH  A  GENERAL  DESCRIPTION  OF  HIS 
CAMPAIGNS 

BY  COLONEL  F.  I.  MAXSE 

C.B.,  D.S.O.,  COLDSTREAM  GUARDS 
WITH  WATER-COLOUR  ILLUS- 
TRATIONS BY   NICO  JUNGMANN 


LONDON:    THE  NATIONAL  REVIEW 
OFFICE,   23  RYDER  STREET,  ST.  JAMES'S      MCMV 


The  Author  begs  to  acknowledge  permission 

GIVEN       BY      the      EDITOR      OF      THE      "NATIONAL 

Review"    for    certain    chapters   which    ap- 
peared IN   that  Review  to  be  incorporated 
IN  this  Volume 


PRINTED  AT  THE  BALLANTYNE  PRESS. 
LONDON;  WATER-COLOURS  REPRODUCED 
BY     THE     MORTIMER  -  MBNPES      PRESS 


LLSS 


■-1 


-1 


'^ 


TO 
SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR'S 
BROTHER-  OFFICERS 

OF  THE  BRIGADE  OF  GUARDS 
I  DEDICATE  THIS  MEMOIR  OF 
THEIR  COMRADE  AND  FRIEND 
IN  THE  HOPE  THAT  IT  MAY 
REMIND  THEM  OF    HIS    STRENUOUS 


^"^^  LIFE     AND     HELP     OTHERS      TO 

FOLLOW      IN      HIS      FOOTSTEPS 
F.    I.    M. 


211397 


CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

I.  Early  Life  ^ 

II.  The  Story  of  Uganda  26 

III.  Soldiering  in  Uganda  46 

IV.  The  Story  of  Nigeria  68 
V.  The  Acquisition  of  British  Nigeria  94 

VI.  England  on  the  Nile  122 

VII.  The  Egyptian  Army  at  Work  146 

VIII.  On  the  Atbara  185 

IX.  Omdurman,  September  1898  211 

X.  Another  Year  in  the  Sudan  239 

XI.  In  the  Boer  War  254 

XII.  The  End  282 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

Factn? 
page 

Lieutenant  Vandeleur,  D.S.O.,  Scots  Guards  Frontispiece 

Cahiracon,  Vandeleur's  Home  on  the  Shannon,  Ireland  14 

The  Victoria  Nyanza  34 

Masai  Warriors  48 

Road-Making  in  a  Uganda  Forest  62 

On  the  March  in  Nigeria  106 

A  Water-Wheel  on  the  Nile  126 

Lord  Kitchener  in  1890  156 

A  Soldier  of  the  qth  Sudanese  184 
Maxwell's    Brigade    at    the    Commencement   of   the   Action, 

Battle  of  Omdurman,  1898  222 

9TH  Sudanese,  Guard  of  Honour  at  Omdurman.  1898  250 
The    Boer    Laager    at    Paard-eberg   on   the    Morning    of   the 

Surrender  264 

"  On  Trek  "  in  South  Africa  274 

Brevet    Lieut.-Colonel    Seymour    Vandeleur,    D.S.O.,   Irish 

Guards,  1901  282 

MAPS 

i,  somaliland  24 

2.  Uganda  and  East  Africa  66 

3.  Nigeria  and  W.  Africa  120 

4.  Plan  "  Battle  of  the  Atbara  "  208 

5.  Plan  "Battle  of  Omdurman"  232 

6.  Egyptian  Sudan,  No.  i  238 

7.  Egyptian  Sudan,  No.  2  252 

8.  Africa  in  1884  Endo/book 

9.  Partition  of  Africa  1902  „ 


SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 


CHAPTER  I 
EARLY     LIFE 

Cecil  Foster  Seymour  Vandeleur^  the  subject  of  this 
memoir,  known  to  his  friends  as  Seymour  Vandeleur, 
was  born  in  London  on  July  ii,  1869,  the  eldest  child 
of  Hector  Stewart  Vandeleur,  Esq.,  of  Kilrush  and 
Cahiracon  in  county  Clare.  His  mother  was  a  daughter 
of  William  Orme  Foster,  Esq.,  of  Apley  Park,  Shrop- 
shire. His  father  is  at  present  Lord-Lieutenant  of 
county  Clare. 

The  Vandeleurs  are  of  Norman  origin  and  have  been 
settled  in  Ireland  since  1660.  They  seem  ever  to  have 
been  a  race  of  soldiers  and  Seymour  did  but  follow 
the  traditions  of  his  family  in  his  life  of  active  service 
abroad.  Of  his  five  great-uncles,  four  attained  the 
rank  of  general  officer  and  figured  conspicuously  in 
the  campaigns  of  their  day.  Thus,  General  Sir  John 
Ormsby  Vandeleur,  K.C.B.,  born  in  1763,  commanded 
a  Light  Cavalry  brigade  at  Waterloo.  General  Paken- 
ham  Vandeleur  fell  at  Delhi.  Crofton,  another  brother, 
died  in  Antigua.  The  fourth,  also  General  Vandeleur, 
held  the  command  at  Cape  Town  during  the  Kafir 
War  of  1801.  Frederick,  the  fifth  brother,  did  not 
live  to  gain  the  distinction  won  by  the  others,  for  he 
was  killed  in  action  while  still  a  captain  at  the  battle 
of  Vittoria. 


2  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

In  describing  a  life  which  still  touches  our  own 
times  so  closely  and  whose  incidents  are  familiar  to 
many,  it  is  better  to  avoid  personal  description  and 
allow  the  plain  narrative  of  a  soldier's  service  to  tell 
its  own  tale.  Yet  no  life  of  this  type  of  officer  would 
be  complete  which  omitted  to  give  some  idea  of  his 
character  and  personality,  inasmuch  as  it  was  through 
them  that  he  achieved  success. 

His  short,  brilliant  career  was  not  the  outcome  of 
lucky  chance  or  outside  influences  :  each  step  in  rank, 
every  decoration,  was  the  reward  of  hard  work  and 
steady  efficiency,  tested  in  the  only  adequate  way — 
on  active  service  under  various  commanders  and  in 
various  places.  With  him  there  were  no  spasmodic 
efforts  with  alternate  fits  of  idleness  and  energy  : 
from  boyhood  the  trend  of  his  life  was  even  ;  he 
worked  because  it  was  his  nature  to  work,  and  he 
worked  well  because  it  was  not  in  him  to  do  things  by 
halves.  His  diary,  begun  at  the  age  of  fifteen  while 
at  Eton  and  continued  without  the  break  of  a  day 
until  his  death,  gives  an  insight  into  his  consistency 
of  purpose  and  a  clue  to  his  character  such  as  no  other 
record  could  convey.  Indeed,  the  zeal  with  which 
he  played  and  worked  and  the  variety  of  his  employ- 
ments are  sometimes  bewildering,  though  he  himself 
obviously  regarded  them  as  a  matter  of  course.  Some 
men  have  a  craving  for  physical  exercise  which  turns 
their  existence  into  a  round  of  drudgery  and  their 
minds  into  narrow  grooves,  without  contributing  to 
their  happiness ;  others  are  much  tied  to  indoor 
pursuits,  but  Seymour  never  made  "  heavy  weather  " 
over  anything  he  undertook.  His  happy  nature 
prompted  him  to  do  things  without  expecting  reward 
or  striving  after  effect  ;  work  was  as  congenial  as 
play,   play  as  absorbing    as  work,  so  much  so   that 


EARLY  LIFE  3 

one  is  led  to  inquire  what  he  himself  reckoned  as 
leisure  ? 

I  recollect  well  that  in  1898  he  took  over  command  of 
the  depot  of  my  battalion  at  Omdurman,  whilst  it  was 
absent  on  an  expedition  in  which  Vandeleur  would 
have  been  dehghted  to  join;  it  was,  in  fact,  escorting 
Major  Marchand  and  his  French  "  mission "  from 
Fashoda  to  the  Abyssinian  border.  Meanwhile,  work 
at  the  depot  entailed  the  drilling  of  Sudanese  recruits 
and  a  goodly  dose  of  what  may  be  termed  the  drudgery 
of  soldiering.  Yet  so  heartily  did  he  do  it,  though 
actually  an  officer  of  another  corps,  that  long  after 
he  left  the  native  officers  and  men  would  ask  affec- 
tionately after  Bimbashi  Vandeleur,  and  he  would 
write  and  inquire  about  them  ;  moreover,  the  sound 
work  he  put  into  some  400  recruits  was  amply  tested 
when  they  subsequently  joined  for  duty.  It  was  this 
power  of  throwing  himself  heart  and  soul  into  what 
he  was  doing  that  made  him  a  delightful  companion 
on  service  and  a  refreshing  contrast  to  those  who  have 
a  habit  of  grumbling  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of 
every  campaign.  His  sense  of  humour  and  cheerful 
pluck  forebade  him  to  indulge  in  the  privilege  of  many 
good  Britishers — namely  **  to  grouse."  Truly,  thirty- 
two  years  of  such  a  life  were  worth  more  both  to  himself 
and  to  those  who  loved  him  than  the  three-score  and 
ten  allotted  to  some  of  us. 

To  return  to  his  early  years.  Seymour  at  ten 
began  school  life  at  Farnborough  in  the  private  estab- 
lishment of  the  Rev.  A.  Morton.  Three  years  later 
he  went  to  Eton,  to  the  Rev.  Edmund  Warre's  house, 
and  on  Dr.  Warre  succeeding  to  the  headmastership, 
Seymour  was  transferred  with  others  to  the  house  of 
the  Rev.  Stewart  Donaldson,  Mr.  Impey  being  his 
classical    tutor.     At    Eton    he    seems    to    have    been 


4  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

thoroughly  happy  without  entirely  wasting  his  time. 
Boys  like  him  of  energetic,  manly  tastes  enjoy  to  the 
full  the  varied  occupations  and  interests  of  a  big 
school,  and  are  popular  with  masters  and  boys 
alike.  In  fact,  he  was  just  the  sort  of  boy  for  Eton, 
possessing  sufficient  strength  of  character  to  avoid 
being  spoiled,  yet  worthy  ahke  of  its  traditions  and 
associations. 

Nevertheless,  a  careful  study  of  his  hfe  does  not 
enable  one  to  attribute  his  advancement  to  the  training 
or  instruction  he  received  at  school,  and  the  fact  that 
he  was  a  public-school  boy — as  are  most  men  of  his 
class — cannot  be  cited  in  favour  of  our  system  of  educat- 
ing average  boys.  Great  Britain  is  apparently  enter- 
ing on  a  period  of  strenuous  competition  in  all  spheres 
of  enterprise  and  in  all  parts  of  the  world,  and  it  is 
questionable  whether  the  traditional  education  which 
until  now  has  qualified  Englishmen  to  compete  with 
other  Englishmen,  will  in  future  enable  them  also  to 
compete  with  better  equipped  Americans  and  Germans. 
Our  public-schools  are  not  merely  or  even  chiefly 
"  seats  of  learning,"  but  surely  the  hours  allotted  to 
study  might  at  least  be  devoted  to  some  useful  purpose. 
As  to  what  is  or  is  not  useful,  I  would  merely  remark — 
with  the  respect  due  to  our  appointed  teachers — that 
neither  headmasters  nor  their  assistants  are  really 
qualified  judges.  They  conscientiously  teach  up  to 
the  standard  in  vogue,  but  even  within  its  narrow 
limits  they  are  never  taught  the  difficult  art  of  impart- 
ing elementary  instruction.  They  are  usually  public- 
school  boys,  nurtured  on  the  old  curriculum.  From 
school  they  pass  through  a  university  and  take  a 
degree,  after  which  they  settle  down  for  life  to  educate 
boys  for  the  various  professions.  I  have  no  desire  to 
criticise  individuals  or  a  class,  but  can  it  be  truthfully 


EARLY  LIFE  5 

said  that  our  slip-shod  plan  of  selecting  and  training 
schoolmasters  does  provide  a  suitable  education  for  the 
soldiers,  lawyers,  business-men,  politicians,  and  civil- 
servants  of  the  British  Empire  ? 

In  truth,  we  have  none  of  us  received  at  school  any 
solid  groundwork  of  practical  instruction,  and  those 
who  desire  to  acquaint  themselves  with  the  world 
in  which  they  live  have  to  pick  up  the  elements  of 
history,  geography  and  money  matters  after  their 
school-days  are  over.  By  this  method  we  usually 
remain  amateurs  in  all  the  walks  of  life,  unaccustomed 
to  sustained  mental  effort  and  constantly  displaying 
ignorance  of  rudimentary  facts. 

Our  public  schools,  enthroned  amidst  the  traditions 
of  past  centuries,  form  each  a  society,  a  little  world 
of  its  own,  in  which  the  social  grades,  the  unwritten 
laws,  the  standards  of  public  opinion  are  preserved 
and  upheld  with  the  enthusiasm  of  youth.  The  result 
is  in  many  ways  excellent,  producing  a  high  standard 
of  honour  as  between  boy  and  boy,  an  innate  sense  of 
justice,  fair  play  and  straight  dealing,  an  esprit  de 
corps  and  a  self-sacrifice  for  the  common  good,  which 
have  richly  endowed  Englishmen  in  all  parts  of  the 
world.  Such  advantages  are  not  lightly  to  be  bartered 
in  exchange  for  mere  knowledge  ;  but  the  drawback 
lies  in  the  fact  that  the  school  world  is  exclusive,  that, 
instead  of  being  a  means  to  an  end,  a  threshold  across 
which  to  enter  upon  life,  it  degenerates  into  being  an 
end  in  itself.  Many  boys,  and  parents  too,  consider 
school  success  in  work  or  games  as  the  ne  plus  ultra 
of  ambition  and  those  who  obtain  it  are  surrounded 
with  so  transcendant  a  glory,  that  they  may  well 
believe  themselves  absolved  from  further  effort.  They 
feel  they  can  never  be  such  "  swells  "  again  and  are 
content  to  rest  on  a  past  which  ended  at  nineteen. 


6  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

Who  has  not  known  several  such  in  his  school-days  ? 
Brilliant  demi-gods,  whose  after-life  has  been  marked 
by  no  ambition,  whose  abilities  have  never  lifted  them 
above  obscurity  ?  On  the  average  boy,  too,  school 
opinion  makes  a  lasting  impression,  and  he  uncon- 
sciously models  himself  on  the  hues  thus  laid  down. 
In  our  youth  the  best,  the  only  thing  was  to  be  a 
"public-school  boy,"  and  we  remain  pubHc-school  boys 
all  our  days.  Look  where  you  will,  in  the  Army,  in 
Parliament,  in  the  leading  professions,  in  our  railways, 
and  in  our  business  houses,  you  will  see  a  number  of 
^excellent  amateurs  struggUng  ineffectually  with  techni- 
cal problems.  They  make  admirable  subordinates  and 
shine  most  especially  in  their  behaviour  to  native 
populations  in  India,  the  Sudan,  Egypt  and  other  places. 
But  when  it  becomes  necessary  to  excel  in  a  particu- 
lar line,  to  go  one  better,  to  get  out  of  a  groove  and  be 
something  of  a  speciahst,  the  Enghshman  is  disincUned 
to  leave  the  beaten  track.  Such  ideas  were  dis- 
countenanced in  the  old  school-days  as  cranky  and 
tending  to  divide  a  boy  from  his  fellows.  He  was 
trained  to  be  a  gentleman,  not  an  expert,  and  it  does 
not  occur  to  him  to  try  to  be  both.  Moreover,  he 
lacks  the  necessary  groundwork  of  modern  history, 
languages,  geography  and  science,  which  are  painfully 
acquired  after  the  age  of  twenty-five.  So  he  sticks 
to  the  school  standard  which  was  good  enough  for  him 
and  his  compeers.  Thus  it  comes  to  pass  that 
mediocrity,  if  it  but  bear  the  accepted  hall-mark, 
passes  muster  amongst  us  and  is  promoted  to  positions 
which  demand  capacity  and  special  training.  There 
are  of  course  exceptions ;  men  endowed  with  a 
strength  of  character  which  breaks  through  tradition. 
Such  was  Seymour  Vandeleur,  who  became  prominent 
amongst  his  contemporaries  not  by  reason  of  his  public- 


EARLY  LIFE  7 

school   training,   but   independently   and    perhaps    in 
spite  of  it. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  Seymour  threw  himself  with 
energj^  into  the  life  at  Eton.  He  elected  to  be  a 
"  dry  bob,"  and  was  indefatigable,  according  to  the 
season  of  the  year,  at  fives,  cricket,  and  football,  all 
of  which  he  played  for  his  house.  The  diary  contains 
regular  accounts  of  runs  with  the  beagles  and  the  sport 
they  showed.  He  was  a  keen  volunteer,  being  pro- 
moted sergeant  in  1886,  and  complains  with  sadness 
of  the  poor  attendance  of  the  corps  at  field-days  ;  in 
fact,  it  was  not  then  the  fashion  to  be  a  volunteer. 
He  represented  the  school  at  rifle  shooting  as  one  of 
the  members  of  the  team.  His  vigour  at  games  and 
cheerfulness  on  all  occasions  made  him  many  friends, 
several  of  whom  passed  into  Sandhurst  and  joined  the 
Brigade  of  Guards  with  him.  He  was  steady  at  book- 
work,  devoting  fixed  hours  every  day  to  "  extras," 
and  consequently  passed  straight  from  Eton  into  Sand- 
hurst— fifty-second  out  of  ninety  candidates — without 
going  to  any  crammer.  He  was  fond  of  reading, 
especially  military  books,  and  naturally  quick  at  pick- 
ing up  foreign  languages  in  spite  of  inadequate  school 
teaching.  His  holidays  were  often  spent  in  France, 
and  he  took  regular  lessons  from  a  Monsieur  Cauvet, 
who  taught  him  enough  French  to  enable  him  to  enjoy 
plays  at  the  Theatre  Fran9ais — no  mean  test.  At 
Dinard  he  took  to  sketching,  a  subject  in  which  he  was 
afterwards  most  proficient.  In  Switzerland  we  find 
him  mountaineering  ;  and,  as  all  pursuits  were  entered 
into  with  enthusiasm  and  were  encouraged  by  a  father 
and  a  mother  who  devoted  themselves  to  his  holidays,  he 
entered  the  Royal  Mihtary  College  (Sandhurst)  on  Sep- 
tember 1, 1887,  with  a  larger  stock  of  special  and  general 
information  than  is  usually  found  in  our  boys  of  eighteen. 


8  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

The  practical  work  at  Sandhurst,  particularly  the 
surveying  and  military  sketching,  was  congenial,  and 
at  the  end  of  one  year  he  passed  out  forty-fourth  out 
of  138,  with  special  certificates  in  topography  and 
riding.  From  Sandhurst,  too,  dates  his  first  acquaint- 
ance with  polo  which  ever  afterwards  remained  his 
favourite  amusement.  He  played  it  wherever  he 
went,  often  in  places  where  it  had  never  been  seen 
before,  such  as  Uganda,  Nigeria  and  parts  of  the  Sudan, 
and  when  he  could  not  get  enough  players  for  a  game, 
he  would  spend  an  hour  knocking  a  ball  about  alone. 
Within  a  few  weeks  of  his  first  handhng  a  polo  club 
we  find  him  playing  for  Sandhurst  against  the  i8th 
Hussars  and  getting  handsomely  defeated  in  the 
attempt.  But  he  soon  developed  a  better  game 
and  ended  by  playing  in  many  first-class  matches  at 
Hurlingham. 

After  Sandhurst,  a  happy  spell  of  shooting  and 
hunting  at  Apley,  his  grandfather's  place  in  Shropshire, 
occupied  him  till  February,  1889,  when  he  joined  the 
2nd  Battalion  Scots  Guards  in  Dublin,  as  a  second 
lieutenant.  Now,  there  is  a  certain  amount  of  mis- 
conception prevalent  regarding  the  so-called  ordeal 
of  joining  a  regiment  ;  but  it  is  in  no  sense  a  formidable 
undertaking,  as  those  who  have  had  to  go  through 
with  it  are  well  aware.  A  self-conscious  boy  who  is 
just  beginning  to  be  a  man  no  doubt  feels  shy  and 
awkward,  but  this  soon  wears  off,  and  my  civilian 
readers  should  dismiss  from  their  minds  any  phantom 
horrors  which  may  have  been  conjured  up.  The 
truth  is,  that  the  standard  of  general  conduct  and 
military  efficiency  amongst  the  captains  and  subalterns 
of  the  British  Army  is  a  high  one ;  in  none  is  it  higher 
than  in  the  Brigade  of  Guards  ;  and  one  purpose  of 
this  memoir  will  be  amply  fulfilled  if  it  should  succeed 


EARLY  LIFE  9 

in  doing  justice  to  a  body  of  officers  of  whom  Vandeleur 
was  but  a  type.  All  ranks  have  recently  been  assailed 
by  floods  of  amateur  criticism,  excusable  and  useful 
as  regards  certain  regrettable  incidents  in  the  conduct 
of  military  affairs  ;  for  the  Army,  like  the  nation,  has 
for  years  been  run  on  amateur  lines,  the  product  of 
our  amateur  schools,  and  will  continue  to  be  so  run 
until  we  "  enter  "  boys  as  military  cadets  on  some  plan 
similar  to  that  recently  adopted  by  the  Admiralty. 
But  meanwhile,  amidst  the  welter  of  indiscriminate 
fault-finding,  it  is  satisfactory  to  recognise  that  no 
case  has  been  established  against  the  junior  officers, 
captains  and  subalterns,  in  actual  command  of  men  in 
the  field.  The  regimental  officer  was  highly  tested 
in  the  late  war  ;  he  was  not  found  wanting  ;  and  his 
men  relied  on  him  with  confidence. 

This  good  result,  if  closely  examined,  must  chiefly 
be  attributed  to  the  efficiency  of  the  regimental  system, 
which  is  based  less  upon  official  regulations  than  upon 
time-honoured  traditions  of  duty  and  conduct. 
Through  long  periods  of  peace  and  short  periods  of 
war,  in  the  various  climates  and  garrisons  of  the 
British  Empire  a  high  standard  has  been  maintained, 
not  by  repeating  copybook  maxims  and  attending  to 
grandmotherly  effusions  in  the  press,  but  by  a  system 
of  discipline  which  has  had  the  merit  of  being  effective 
in  its  results.  It  is  based  upon  a  sound  moral  code 
amongst  the  officers,  handed  down  from  generation 
to  generation,  a  code  to  which  the  newly-joined 
subaltern  must  learn  to  conform.  As  a  rule  he  is  only 
too  anxious  to  do  so  and  be  admitted  to  full  member- 
ship of  the  society  of  his  brother  officers,  for  the  un- 
written laws  of  a  mess  are  no  hardship  to  a  manly 
young  fellow.  A  certain  number  of  boys  are,  however, 
thrust  into  the  Army  without  regard  to  their  suit- 


10  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

ability  or  qualifications  for  soldiering,  and  some 
parents  seem  to  think  that  the  regimental  code  should 
be  modified  in  order  to  admit  these  square  pegs  into 
round  holes.  For,  strange  as  it  may  seem  to  those 
who  imagine  that  any  youth  will  become  a  good  officer, 
I  venture  to  say  there  are  some  temperaments  to 
whom  it  is  positively  wicked  to  entrust  the  lives  of 
good  soldiers.  Such  men  may  be  endowed  with  first- 
rate  ability  for  other  work,  though  there  is  no  use 
for  them  in  the  Army,  and  it  would  certainly  be  a 
kindness  to  remove  them  whilst  still  young  to  more 
suitable  spheres  of  occupation  ;  but  their  relatives 
have  endowed  them  with  a  so-called  military  educa- 
tion, have  paid  for  a  military  uniform  and  wish  to 
keep  them  in  the  Army,  unless  some  serious  offence 
can  be  proved  against  them.  Unfortunately,  it  is 
extremely  difficult  to  frame  a  specific  charge  against 
a  young  officer  who  is  not  by  nature  suited  to  com- 
mand even  a  corporal's  guard  ;  and  if  several  such 
should  congregate  in  a  battalion,  they  form  a  coterie 
amongst  themselves,  a  clique  of  dissentients  which 
holds  itself  aloof  from  the  accepted  code  and  is 
thoroughly  bad  for  the  discipline  of  the  corps.  Perhaps 
the  commanding  officer,  if  he  be  a  good  judge  of  boys 
and  an  exceptionally  strong  man,  may  be  able  to  get 
rid  of  the  nuisance  through  the  official  channel ;  but 
he  will  find  it  no  easy  task  unless  he  be  supported  by 
his  superiors  and  protected  from  pubhc  annoyance 
by  the  inefficient  boy's  relatives. 

Surely,  when  we  realise  the  general  advantages  of 
permitting  officers  to  enforce  their  own  standard  of 
conduct  and  recollect  how  rarely  they  have  abused 
this  privilege,  we  are  led  to  the  conclusion  that,  instead 
of  endeavouring  to  curtail  their  power  of  ejecting  black 
sheep,  we  should,  in  our  wisdom,  confer  on  regimental 


EARLY  LIFE  ii 

officers  increased  and  authorised  facilities  for  eliminat- 
ing those  who  are  unable  to  command  the  respect  of 
their  men. 

To  Seymour  Vandeleur  at  any  rate,  joining  the 
Scots  Guards  was  an  unmixed  pleasure.  He  found 
his  Sandhurst  friend,  Cecil  Lowther,  just  arrived,  and 
ten  days  later  we  find  him  installed  at  the  Commanding 
Officer's  whist-table,  an  unheard-of  proceeding  in  any 
Continental  army,  yet  a  sufficient  illustration  of  the 
tone  which  pervades  a  good  British  battalion.  During 
the  next  five  years  he  stuck  closely  to  regimental  duty 
in  Dublin,  London,  Pirbright  and  Windsor,  and 
realised  that  soldiering  in  these  desirable  quarters 
entailed  a  deal  of  hard  work  ;  for,  during  the  first 
three  years  of  his  service,  an  officer  of  the  Guards  is 
kept  steadily  at  duty  without  any  relaxation  in  the 
form  of  leave.  The  theory  is  that  youth  is  the  age  for 
education  and  improvement,  but  also  the  age  in  which 
slovenly  habits  are  easily  acquired  and  perpetuated. 
Consequently  the  youngest  officers,  without  exception, 
are  taught  all  they  can  be  taught  and  given  no  oppor- 
tunities of  being  slack,  either  on  or  off  duty.  They 
are  kept  continuously  busy  under  the  supervision  of 
the  adjutant  from  early  morn  till  late  in  the  afternoon, 
in  the  hope  that  the  groove  of  doing  their  work 
thoroughly  and  energetically  may  be  persevered  in 
afterwards — an  expectation  which  is  fulfilled  or  not 
according  to  the  disposition  of  the  individual.  Shirk- 
ing and  loafing  are  alike  tabooed. 

When  Vandeleur  joined.  Colonel  the  Hon.  J. 
Vanneck  was  commanding  officer  and  Mr.  Erskine 
adjutant,  of  the  2nd  Battalion  Scots  Guards.  Attached 
to  the  Left  Flank  company  in  February,  Seymour 
passed  in  company  drill  in  March  and  entered  on  his 
daily  round  of  duty,  going  on  guard  at  the  Castle, 


12  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

coming  off  guard  to  do  a  picquet,  attending  three 
battalion  parades  daily  and  gradually  learning  the 
interior  economy  of  his  company.  June  and  July  were 
spent  at  musketry  in  the  Curragh  Camp  ;  in  September 
the  battalion  moved  to  Chelsea  Barracks,  London  ; 
and  Vandeleur  went  on  the  Queen's  Guard  at  St. 
James's  Palace  for  the  first  time — always  a  memorable 
episode  in  a  young  Guardsman's  soldiering,  but  one 
which  loses  its  charm  after  a  four  months'  spell  of 
winter  guard-mounting  has  entailed  two  nights  out  of 
bed  in  each  week — the  intervening  days  being  filled 
in  with  picquets,  drills,  winter  schemes,  war  games, 
route-marches,  lectures,  judging  distance  practices 
and  "  shouting "  drill.  A  month  of  duty  at  the 
Depot  (Caterham)  under  Major  Crabbe  completed  his 
first  year  of  service,  during  which  his  main  relaxation 
had  been  an  occasional  game  of  racquets  at  Prince's 
Club. 

Owing  to  his  proficiency  in  military  mapmaking, 
he  was  selected  to  instruct  a  class  of  non-commissioned 
officers  in  topography,  and  the  first  months  of  1890 
were  spent  at  this  work,  usually  on  Epsom  Downs,  at 
a  season  of  the  year  when  they  can  scarcely  be  called 
a  popular  resort.  In  March  he  rode  in  the  winning 
team  of  the  Brigade  of  Guards  point-to-point  race, 
and  during  next  summer  enjoyed  a  full  polo  season 
at  Hurlingham,  being  now  of  a  calibre  to  play  in  first- 
class  matches  and  with  such  crack  players  as  the  three 
Peats,  Toby  Rawlinson,  Lord  Harrington,  John 
Watson,  Major  Peters  and  others.  It  was  his  habit 
to  buy  ponies  more  or  less  in  the  rough,  train  them 
to  the  game  with  infinite  care  and  trouble,  and  with 
excellent  results.  There  were  other  and  more  excep- 
tional amusements  this  summer,  such  as  an  ascent 
in  a  balloon  from  the  Military  Exhibition  with  Lord 


EARLY  LIFE  13 

Edward  Cecil,  of  the  Grenadiers,  but  the  diary  gives  no 
details  of  this  expedition  save  that  the  balloon  de- 
scended harmlessly  in  a  field  near  Chelmsford,  and  that 
the  half  share  of  the  costs  amounted  to  £5  15s. 

In  August  ensued  the  usual  musketry  course  at 
Pirbright  Camp,  after  which  the  2nd  Battahon  Scots 
Guards  moved  to  Windsor  and  Seymour  obtained  five 
days'  leave,  his  first  holiday,  every  moment  of  which 
was  devoted  to  cub-hunting  and  partridge  shooting. 
Windsor  offers  facilities  for  a  good  deal  of  sport  of  a 
kind,  what  with  the  Household  Brigade  Drag  (to 
which  he  occasionally  acted  as  whip  and  had  the  usual 
quota  of  falls),  Mr.  Garth's  foxhounds,  and  the  Queen's 
staghounds,  now  suppressed  ;  but  the  winter  of  1890 
was  unusually  severe,  the  Thames  being  frozen  over 
for  weeks,  so  skating  took  the  place  of  hunting,  and 
the  long  days  on  guard  at  the  Castle  were  spent  in  the 
splendid  library  to  which  the  officers  have  access. 

The  summer  of  1891  saw  a  new  departure  in  Vande- 
leur's  mihtary  life,  as  he  was  selected  to  be  trained  at 
Aldershot  in  the  newly  formed  (provisional)  Mounted 
Infantry  Regiment  for  three  months,  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  (now  General  Sir  Edward)  Hutton  ;  he  was 
attached  to  the  company  composed  of  the  Black 
Watch,  Seaforth,  Cameron  and  Gordon  Highlanders, 
and  amongst  other  officers  in  the  regiment  may  be 
mentioned  poor  Roddy  Owen,  who  afterwards  died 
on  service  in  the  Dongola  Expedition,  and  Mr.  (now 
Lieutenant-Colonel)  Jenner,  D.S.O.  Here  he  was 
kept  busier  than  ever  at  Mounted  Infantry  work  in 
the  camp  at  Bourley  Bottom,  scouting,  long  field  days 
and  autumn  manoeuvres,  and  it  was  always  a  satis- 
faction to  him  to  recollect,  when  employed  during  the 
South  African  War  in  General  Hutton's  Mounted 
Infantry   Brigade,  that   he  was  in  the  first  batch  of 


14  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

officers  thus  trained,  and  Sir  Edward  has  several  times 
expressed  the  very  high  opinion  he  entertained  of 
Seymour  Vandeleur. 

Seymour  was  promoted  Lieutenant  in  May  1892, 
and  was  then  ordered  to  go  through  the  School  of 
Musketry  at  Hythe,  where  he  spent  most  of  the 
summer  and  passed  out  with  a  special  certificate. 
Taking  time  by  the  forelock,  and  as  though  conscious 
that  future  years  would  find  him  fully  occupied,  he 
at  once  set  to  work  to  pass  the  examination  for  pro- 
motion to  the  rank  of  captain  and  devoted  a  portion 
of  his  winter  leave  to  the  necessary  book- work.  He 
managed,  however,  during  the  autumn  to  attend  the 
cavalry  manoeuvres  at  Frensham. 

The  year  1893  witnessed  an  ever-increasing  desire 
to  learn  about  things  in  general  and  to  acquire  the 
most  varied  accomplishments.  Often  in  the  course 
of  a  single  afternoon  we  discover  Seymour  passing 
through  the  hands  of  three  instructors  ;  Peall,  the 
great  professional,  gave  him  billiard  lessons  ;  Saunders 
of  Prince's  Club  taught  him  tennis  ;  a  corporal  of 
the  Scots  Guards  band  gave  him  flute  lessons  ;  he 
spent  a  month  in  Berlin  with  a  tutor  to  brush  up 
colloquial  German  and  then  competed  for  an  inter- 
preter's certificate  ;  and  no  sooner  was  this  examina- 
tion completed  than  we  see  him  tackling  Spanish 
with  a  Signor  Veda.  Meanwhile,  May  was  spent  at 
Aldershot  undergoing  a  veterinary  class  and  examina- 
tion. As  all  this  extra  work  was  undertaken  in  addition 
to  his  regimental  duty,  we  get  a  glimpse  of  Seymour's 
firm  resolve  to  qualify  himself  for  whatever  might  be 
required  of  him. 

August  and  September  were  taken  up  with  man- 
oeuvres on  a  somewhat  larger  scale  than  had  previously 
been  attempted,  and  a  complete  Guards  brigade  of  four 


CAHIKACON.  VANDELEUK'S  HOME  ON   THE  SHANNON. 

IRELAND 


EARLY  LIFE  15 

battalions  assembled  at  Frensham  and  operated  on 
Swanley  Downs  where,  at  the  termination  of  hostilities, 
15,000  men  marched  past  Field-Marshal  H.R.H.  the 
Duke  of  Connaught. 

By  this  time  a  long-cherished  plan  had  matured 
itself  in  the  minds  of  the  two  friends,  Cecil  Lowther 
and  Seymour  Vandeleur,  and  they  obtained  four 
months'  leave  of  absence  to  travel  in  Somaliland  and 
shoot  big  game.  Rarely  were  two  companions  more 
suited  to  such  an  enterprise  or  more  worthy  of  its 
pleasures  and  opportunities.  To  Seymour  it  meant 
more  than  a  mere  shooting  trip,  for  he  had  made  up 
his  mind  not  only  to  penetrate  beyond  the  explored 
country,  but  also  to  map  the  whole  route  ;  he  con- 
sequently prepared  himself  for  this  work  by  taking 
a  course  of  lessons  in  the  use  of  the  sextant  at  the 
Royal  Geographical  Society,  and  so  greatly  did 
he  profit  by  this  instruction  that  on  his  return  he 
presented  a  map  to  the  society,  which  is  still  the 
main  source  of  information  for  that  part  of  Somah- 
land. 

The  friends  quitted  London  on  December  i,  1893, 
en  route  for  the  Dark  Continent,  which  was,  with  brief 
intervals,  to  absorb  the  remainder  of  Seymour's  Hfe. 
Travelhng  as  rapidly  as  possible  via  Paris,  Marseilles, 
Port  Said  and  Suez,  they  disembarked  at  Aden  on 
December  13.  Here  Lowther  waited  in  order  to 
purchase  provisions  and  bring  on  the  baggage  which 
had  started  by  the  all-sea  route,  whilst  Vandeleur 
embarked  on  a  coasting  steamboat  for  Berbera  (the 
capital  of  British  Somahland)  where  be  began  to 
organise  a  camel  caravan  for  the  march  into  the  interior. 
Big  changes,  as  we  know,  have  been  wrought  in 
Eastern  lands  since  Europeans  first  discovered  India, 
but  one  reform  has  never  been  accompHshed,  namely, 


i6  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

to  instil  activity  into  stray  native  retainers.  They 
regard  energy  as  a  palpable  blot  on  the  character  of 
the  white  man  and  treat  it  with  amiable  tolerance. 
Lowther  found  the  same  notion  prevalent  in  Aden, 
so  they  both  learned  the  necessity  of  patience  in  Eastern 
travel  and  the  insufficiency  of  four  months'  leave. 
The  latter  they  provided  for  by  telegraphing  home  for 
an  extra  month. 

At  last,  on  January  5,  1894,  all  was  ready,  and  the 
caravan  of  thirty  camels,  four  ponies,  two  donkeys, 
four  sheep  and  twenty-seven  men  set  out  for  the 
interior,  across   a  barren  desert  called  the  Hand.* 

The  nineteen  days'  march  from  the  coast  can  be 
described  in  a  few  lines.  The  great  charm  of  the  journey 
lay  in  its  absolute  isolation  from  anything  resembling 
a  beaten  track  and  the  delightful  uncertainty  of  what 
might  be  in  front.  Each  day  presented  fresh  problems, 
yet  every  detail  had  to  be  arranged  without  advice 
from  experienced  hands.  The  tourist  in  Europe, 
who  fusses  with  telegrams  to  hotels  to  have  his  bed- 
room retained  and  his  dinner  ordered,  has  no  more 
notion  of  the  real  pleasures  of  travel  than  a  cuckoo 
understands  the  rearing  of  a  nest  of  young  birds. 
But  a  traveller  with  an  African  caravan  learns  and 
enjoys  many  things.  After  a  cool  night,  the  early 
rise,  the  bustle  of  packing  tents  and  provisions  on 
unwilling  camels,  the  hurried  breakfast  in  the  dark, 
these  unavoidable  troubles  vanish  directly  he  mounts 
his  pony  and  rides  forth  in  the  delicious  atmosphere 
of  Africa's  early  morn.  Dawn  has  appeared,  nature  is 
awakening,  freshness  is  in  the  air  and  a  hundred 
buzzings  and  cooings  proclaim  the  rising  sun.  Indeed, 
'tis  good  to  make  the  most  of  his  rising,  for  by  noon 
he  will  have  subdued  us  all,  man,  beast,  trees,  convert- 

*   See  map  facing  page  24. 


EARLY  LIFE  17 

ing  nature  into  a  sort  of  brazen  image  of  stifled  life 
till  evening. 

Vandeleur  and  Lowther,  during  the  daily  march, 
scoured  the  country  on  both  flanks  for  game  and 
bagged  some  koodoo,  oryx  and  dig-dig — the  latter 
a  pretty  little  animal  like  a  miniature  deer.  Thus  they 
hardened  themselves  for  future  work  and  accustomed 
themselves  to  the  ways  of  their  respective  shikaris. 
The  natives  they  met  with  were  friendly  but  in  dire 
distress,  owing  to  the  lateness  of  the  rains  and  the 
frequency  of  Abyssinian  raids  from  across  the  border  ; 
and  as  the  caravan  pushed  further  inland  the  servants 
became  somewhat  alarmed,  and  the  cook  even  sug- 
gested he  should  be  served  out  with  a  gun  on  the  line 
of  march,  "  because  he  did  not  wish  to  be  like  a  woman, 
without  a  weapon."  His  whim  was  not  gratified,  and 
he  was  requested  to  devote  more  attention  to  the  menu, 
of  which  the  following  is  a  common  sample  : 

Diner  du  Jour. 

Potage — Koodoo. 

Poisson — Sardines  f rites. 

Rot — Boeuf  corne  (corned). 

Entremet — Cabin  Biscuit  a  F apricot  jam. 

Crossing  the  Hand  entailed  five  days'  marching  with 
water  carried  on  camels  ;  the  country  consisted  of  a 
"  wilderness  of  small  trees  and  thorn  bushes,  followed 
by  eight  miles  of  open  plain  without  a  vestige  of  any- 
thing on  it  but  stones,  and  then  again  the  same  wilder- 
ness of  bushes  ;  and  it  will  give  you  some  idea  of  the 
sort  of  country  if  I  mention  that,  when  we  reached 
the  watering-place,  only  four  camels  could  be  watered 
every  hour,  as  water  did  not  trickle  through  the  sand 
any  faster." 

However,  when  they  got  to  the  Awari  pools  they 


i8  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

found  them  deep  and  full  of  water,  and  consequently 
the  resort  of  game  from  the  drier  districts  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood. In  fact,  on  the  very  night  of  their  arrival 
a  lion  was  heard  roaring  close  to  the  zariba  and  tents 
at  2  A.M.,  and  was  actually  seen  in  an  open  space 
on  its  way  to  water.  Intense  excitement  prevailed 
amongst  the  men  and  camels  and  at  daybreak  Lowther 
and  Vandeleur  started  off  on  its  tracks. 

"  After  walking  three  hours  through  wooded 
country,  checking  at  two  or  three  bits  of  high  grass 
and  brush,  Nur  (my  shikari)  and  I  were  going  through 
a  thick  place,  when  we  suddenly  saw  him  thirty  yards 
to  our  left,  looking  at  us.  It  took  me  a  little  time  to 
make  sure  of  my  aim,  as  the  undergrowth  was  thick 
and  he  was  exactly  the  colour  of  the  grass.  I  fired 
with  the  .500  bore,  and  the  bullet  went  in  under  his 
eye,  smashing  up  the  left  side  of  his  head.  He  turned 
over  and  I  think  this  bullet  really  was  enough.  How- 
ever, he  made  such  a  row  I  fired  again,  breaking  his 
neck.  Lowther  was  about  150  yards  to  my  left  and 
had  rather  an  exciting  moment,  as  he  could  not  see 
anything,  though  he  heard  the  animal  in  the  grass 
after  I  shot.  It  was  a  really  splendid  male  with  lovely 
mane,  and  our  guide,  the  son  of  a  local  sheik,  says  this 
particular  lion  has  been  weU  known  for  a  long  time  in 
the  district,  and  has  killed  thirty-four  natives,  including 
one  of  his  relatives.  It  measures  just  under  ten  feet 
from  end  of  tail  to  nose,  and  I  am  quite  satisfied  at 
having  come  now,  whatever  else  I  may  get  or  not,  as 
one  might  come  year  after  year  and  not  get  one  like 
him." 

This  was  his  first  lion,  and  the  above  is  an  extract 
from  a  letter  written  home  the  same  day.  To  celebrate 
the  occasion  they  split  a  bottle — no,  a  pint  of  cham- 


EARLY  LIFE  19 

pagne  at  the  evening  meal.     Again  on  January  28, 
he  wrote  : 

"  This  was  a  record  day  altogether.     I  left  camp 
at  six  and  walked  north-west  for  two  hours  and  then 
got  on  to  some  fresh  rhinoceros  tracks,  which  I  followed 
up  for  nearly  five  hours,  sometimes  going  very  fast 
over  open  ground,  and  then  creeping  silently  through 
dense  jungle.     (I  must  first  tell  you  that  these  rhi- 
noceros feed  at  night,  travelling  immense  distances, 
and  hide  and  sleep  during  the  day  in  thick  dark  places 
in   the   jungle,   making   their   way   through   it   in   an 
astonishing  manner.)     At  length  we  heard  a  rustHng, 
and  there  stood  two  of  them,  under  a  tree,  not  thirty 
yards  off !     I  fired  with  the  ten-bore,  and  away  they 
went  hke  lightning.     We  ran  three  or  four  hundi'ed 
yards  as  fast  as  we  could,  blood  being  visible  on  the 
ground  ;    and,  after  going  through  some  high  grass, 
there  they  were  to  my  dehght,  standing  in  the  open. 
I  fired  at  the  wounded  one  and  was  glad  to  see  him 
sink  gradually  on  his  knees  and  turn  over.     I  now- 
noticed  the  other  was  much  smaller  and  should  have 
let  him  off,  but  he  turned  nastily  on  me  and,  being  too 
big  to  be  a  pleasant  customer,  had  to  be  settled  too. 
The  first  one  turned  out  to  be  a  '  whopper,'  \\dth  splendid 
tusk,  so  I  sent  a  pony  for  camels  and  carried  his  head 
into  camp,  and  you  shall  judge  of  his  size  for  yourself 
when  we  return.     It  is  a  great  piece  of  luck,  as  it  is 
generally  very  difficult  to  get  near  them.     On  reaching 
camp  I  found  Lowther  returned  with  two  lionesses, 
which  he  had  tracked  for  some  distance  southwards 
and  shot  with  success.     The  excitement  in  camp  at 
night  was  great ;    the  men  had  a  sort  of  war  dance, 
whilst  we  spht  another  pint." 

It  will  not  be  necessary  to  follow  day  by  day  the 


20  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

indefatigable  and  enthusiastic  sportsmen  during  the 
ups  and  downs  of  their  month  in  this  district,  nor  to 
enter  into  the  details  of  their  bag,  which  totalled  four 
rhinoceros,  seven  lions  and  numerous  smaller  game. 
After  several  failures,  they  found  the  plan  of  sitting 
up  for  lions  at  night  in  a  tiny  zariba  near  a  tied-up 
donkey  an  unprofitable  amusement,  owing  to  the 
numerous  hyaenas  and  swarms  of  mosquitos.  In  fact, 
so  accustomed  were  they  to  the  fruitless  results  of  these 
night  watches  that,  on  one  dark  night  when  Lowther 
was  really  visited  by  five  lions,  he  mistook  them  for 
hyaenas  and  drove  them  away  with  stones  and  bad 
language  !  After  this  they  gave  up  the  tied  donkey, 
so  dear  to  the  heart  of  native  sportsmen,  and  stalked 
their  game  in  broad  daylight  over  miles  and  miles  of 
country,  through  thick  bush  and  jungle  and  over 
scrub-covered  plains. 

Towards  the  end  of  February  they  were  contem- 
plating a  speedy  return  to  civilisation  when  they 
received  news  from  the  coast  that  a  reply  to  their 
telegram  for  more  leave  had  arrived,  and  an  extension 
to  April  30  had  been  granted.  This  meant  another 
month  of  shooting  in  the  best  of  the  season,  and  great 
was  their  joy  thereat.  Their  stay  in  the  Awari  and 
Milmil  districts  had  been  interesting  from  other  points 
of  view  than  shooting — especially  as  at  that  time  the 
country  was  supposed  to  be  under  British  jurisdiction. 
The  inhabitants  were  far  from  being  in  the  enjoyment 
of  Pax  Britannica,  and  were  at  the  mercy  of  alternate 
parties  of  Abyssinian  and  Ogaden  Somali  raiders. 
The  latter  numbered  about  300,  and  spent  their  time 
looting  camels  and  killing  any  villagers  who  resisted 
their  depredations.  The  Sheik  of  Milmil  held  a  diffi- 
cult "  official  "  situation.  He  represented  the  British 
Government,  but  was  also  in  the  pay  of  the  Abyssinians 


EARLY  LIFE  21 

for  whom  he  levied  tribute  and  collected  sheep  from 
the  members  of  his  own  tribe,  and  thus  robbed  his 
people  for  the  benefit  of  strangers  and  himself.     Raids 
and  inter-tribal  warfare  were  so  prevalent  that  sheep 
and  camels  were  becoming  scarce,  so  men  were  sub- 
stituted in   their   stead,   and   the   prisoners   captured 
were  held  up  to  ransom.     In  former  days  the  tariff 
for  one  man's  ransom  had  been  a  hundred  camels, 
but  competition  and  scarcity  had  reduced  the  value 
of  human  hfe  by  about  go  per  cent.,  and  ten  camels 
was  now  held  to  be  a  fair  price.     The  unfortunate 
prisoners  were  chained  in  the  villages  till  their  tribe 
produced  the  equivalent  in  camels  ;    and,  when  the 
available  chains  were  all  in  use,  the  following  barbarous 
device  was  instituted  to  expedite  matters.     Strips  of 
damp  camel-hide  were  sewn  tightly  round  a  prisoner's 
legs  just  above  the  ankle,  and,  as  the  hide  gradually 
dried  up  and  contracted,  the  victim  usually  lost  the 
use  of  his  legs  within  about  a  month.      This  was  not 
an  edifying  spectacle  of    the  majesty  of    British  law 
and  order,  but  our  prestige  was  sufficiently  acknow- 
ledged to  prevent  Abyssinians  and  others  from  shooting 
at  British  officers.     One  night  a  party  of  four  Abys- 
sinians  (not  hyaenas  !)  did  surround  Lowther,  as  he 
sat  in  a  zariba  waiting  for  lions,  and  things  looked 
a  bit  nasty  till  they  discovered  they  were  dealing  with 
a  white  man   and   quietly   departed.      Indeed,   there 
occurred  several  minor  incidents  which  required  firm- 
ness and  tact  on  the  part  of  the  young  officers  to 
prevent  molestation.     Yet,  on  the  whole,  they  were 
well  treated ;    the  meat   of  the   animals  they  killed 
proved  a  great  boon  to  some  of  the  hungry  inhabitants 
and  frequently  procured  them  a  friendly  reception. 

On  quitting  Milmil  they  preferred  to  trust  their 
own  observation  rather  than  native  reports,  regarding 


22  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

localities  for  game  and  water  and  the  distances  to  be 
traversed  ;  so  they  made  up  their  minds  to  skirt  the 
inner  edge  of  the  Hand  in  a  north-westerly  direction, 
and  march  on  the  Abyssinian  hills  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Harar.  They  thus  journeyed  through  a  land 
inhabited  by  tribes  who  had  never  beheld  a  white 
man  though  nominally  under  British  protection,  and 
they  received  several  applications  for  assistance  against 
Abyssinian  persecutors,  which  they  wisely  dechned  to 
entertain.  Some  years  later  the  Haud  and  district 
south  of  it  was  handed  over  to  King  Menelik  by  the 
British  Government. 

The  country  presented  a  totally  different  aspect 
as  they  ascended  higher  and  higher  up  the  southern 
spurs  of  the  mountains,  and  the  scenery  in  places  was 
magnificent,  with  views  away  eastwards  across  an 
open  plain  to  Jigjiga,  northward  over  wooded  hills 
towards  Harar,  and  westward  overlooking  barren 
lands  which  extended  to  the  foot  of  the  mountains 
of  Abyssinia.  Turning  gradually  north  and  east  they 
descended  into  the  Jigjiga  vale,  after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  rains,  and  devoted  many  a  lengthy  tramp 
to  the  fresh  elephant  tracks  which  they  struck  but 
could  make  nothing  of.  The  elephants  were  ap- 
parently travelling  rapidly  through  this  country,  and 
when  an  elephant  is  "  making  his  point  "  he  does  not 
tarry  by  the  wayside,  so,  as  Seymour  put  it,  *'  the 
covers  were  all  drawn  blank,"  except  for  lion,  lesser 
koodoo  and  smaller  game. 

It  was  now  time  to  think  of  the  return  journey  to 
the  coast,  and,  on  studying  the  map  which  he  had 
carefully  constructed  from  daily  notes,  Seymour 
decided  to  march  straight  for  Hargeisa  near  the 
Khamsa  district,  thus  completing  a  circle  of  several 
hundred  miles'  length  round  the  northern  Haud  and 


EARLY  LIFE  23 

into  the  interior.  To  his  intense  satisfaction  on  arriv- 
ing at  Hargeisa  he  found  his  map*  closed  on  this  point 
almost  without  error,  and  was  thus  amply  rewarded 
for  the  tedious  work  of  marking  up  his  daily  course 
and  taking  correct  noonday  observations,  in  spite  of 
the  sun's  high  altitude. 

They  received  news  at  Hargeisa  of  a  serious  accident 
having  befallen  Lord  Delamere,  who,  with  his  friend 
Mr.  Mure,  was  shooting  beyond  the  Hand.  A  wounded 
lion  charged  him  ;  he  missed  it  with  both  barrels  ; 
and  the  brute  seized  his  foot  as  he  fell  backwards. 
His  two  shikaris,  with  magnificent  courage,  hurled 
themselves  on  the  lion's  back,  and  distracted  its  atten- 
tion from  Lord  Delamere.  Their  devotion  saved  his 
life,  but  all  three  were  severely  mauled,  though  they 
afterwards  completely  recovered  from  their  injuries. 
Reassured  by  a  satisfactory  message  regarding  this 
accident,  our  friends  found  time  for  several  more  days' 
shooting,  and  the  following  is  Seymour's  graphic 
account  of  their  last  exploit  in  Somaliland  : 

"  Soon  after  marching  from  Arror  to  return  to  the 
coast  we  found  tracks  in  the  plain,  and  half  a  mile  or 
so  further  on,  whilst  we  were  all  walking  together  and 
not  the  least  expecting  it,  a  lioness — the  remaining 
Arror  one — broke  cover  from  some  bush  in  front  and 
made  off.  Lowther  and  I  ran  on  as  hard  as  we  could  : 
I  saw  him  take  a  tremendous  toss  over  a  hole  and  land, 
digging  his  rifle  into  the  ground.  The  pace  was  too 
good  to  stop  to  inquire,  and  he  came  on  again  at  once. 
I  think  we  must  have  covered  four  or  five  miles  over 
the  plain  in  the  shortest  time  on  record,  the  lioness 
being  still  some  way  in  front. 

"  My  syce  (groom)  *  Aden,'  who  had  gone  back  for 

*  His  map  is  reproduced  facing  page  24. 


24  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

a  pony,  arrived  at  full  gallop,  taking  one  good  cropper 
also  ;  he  went  on  in  front  and  rounded  up  the  beast 
in  some  scrub  most  gallantly,  all  by  himself  on  the 
pony,  just  before  she  reached  cover  the  other  side  of 
the  plain.  She  made  for  him  no  less  than  ten  times. 
We  heard  him  shouting  at  her  and  came  up  as  quick 
as  we  could,  Lowther  on  the  right  of  the  bushes  and  I 
on  the  left.  I  caught  sight  of  her  head  in  the  bush 
and  fired,  missing  her.  She  went  off  with  a  growl  to 
the  right,  and  Lowther  had  two  or  three  shots,  hitting 
her  once  high  up  in  the  shoulder. 

"  I  thought  there  were  going  to  be  *  ructions,'  and, 
sure  enough,  out  she  came,  and  went  straight  for 
Lowther,  and  his  two  shikaris^  who  were  standing  in 
the  open,  sixty  or  seventy  yards  off.  She  did  not  see 
me,  as  I  was  behind  a  small  bush,  and  passed  me  at 
about  ten  yards,  going  top  speed.  I  did  my  best  to  stop 
her,  but  aimed  a  little  too  far  in  front  and  hit  her  in 
the  shoulder,  under  Lowther's  shot.  This  did  not  hurt 
her  much,  though  it  made  an  awful  mess  of  her  shoulder, 
and  must  have  stopped  her  spring.  On  she  went, 
straight  for  Lowther,  but  he  stepped  aside  into  a  thorn 
bush,  and  killed  her  dead  with  a  shot  in  the  spine  just 
as  she  seized  his  second  shikari  by  the  wrist.  It  was 
lucky  killing  her  on  the  spot.  The  shikari  is  not  much 
injured.  Nur  and  I  were  nearly  shot  by  Lowther's 
other  man,  who  blazed  away  several  times  through  a 
cloud  of  dust  after  the  lioness  was  dead." 

This  dramatic  incident  fittingly  closed  the  SomaH- 
land  shooting  trip,  during  which  the  total  bag  com- 
prised thirteen  lions,  four  rhinoceros,  three  big  koodoo, 
thirteen  lesser  koodoo,  five  hartebeest  and  numerous 
oryx,  aul,  gerenuk  and  digdig.  The  expedition  had 
also  developed  the  spirit  of  self-rehance  and  initiative — 


EARLY  LIFE  25 

both  of  them  useful  quahties  in  an  officer.  The  map 
which  Vandeleur  compiled  from  his  own  data  is  repro- 
duced on  the  opposite  page  and,  as  the  country  traversed 
afterwards  became  the  scene  of  some  fighting  with  the 
Somahland  Mullah,  the  survey  was  of  use  some  years 
later.  Meanwhile  the  President  of  the  Royal  Geogra- 
phical Society  was  so  well  satisfied  with  the  accuracy 
of  the  work  that  he  wrote  Vandeleur  a  letter  of  hearty 
congratulation  and  mentioned  the  circumstance  in  his 
annual  address  to  the  Society. 

The  two  young  officers  rejoined  the  Scots  Guards 
for  duty  in  April,  but  Vandeleur  was  so  bitten  with  the 
life  and  opportunities  which  are  granted  to  energetic 
men  in  Africa  that  he  volunteered  for  a  period  of 
service  with  the  Uganda  Rifles.  His  application  was 
granted,  and  on  August  10,  1894,  at  the  age  of  twenty- 
five,  he  set  out  from  London  on  a  career  of  usefulness 
which  was  to  lead  him  over  thousands  of  miles  of  the 
African  continent  and  bring  him  distinction  wherever 
he  went.  One  of  the  secrets  of  his  success  was  the  care 
he  took  to  study  at  the  Royal  Geographical  Society's 
library  the  work  of  previous  explorers  and  soldiers 
in  each  country  he  visited.  He  also  took  with  him 
every  obtainable  book  which  treated  of  the  problems 
he  was  to  deal  with,  and  read  them  on  the  journey  out. 
In  this  way  he  acquired  a  remarkable  knowledge  of 
Africa,  especially  its  geography  and  history,  and  then 
used  his  opportunities  to  supplement,  instead  of 
merely  repeating,  the  experiences  of  others. 

On  the  same  principle  I  propose  to  devote  a  chapter 
to  the  story  of  Uganda,  before  I  introduce  the  reader 
to  the  duties  which  Vandeleur  and  others  performed 
in  that  interesting  kingdom. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE   STORY  OF  UGANDA 

See  map  facing  page  66 

The  country  for  which  Seymour  Vandeleur  was  now 
bound  and  in  which  he  was  to  gain  a  first  experience 
of  active  service,  was,  in  1894,  a  new  province  of  the 
British  Empire.  Although  much  had  been  written 
about  Uganda  and  East  Africa  in  the  newspapers 
and  periodicals  of  the  day,  it  was  mostly  of  a  contro- 
versial nature,  for  at  that  date  our  people  were  not  ahve 
to  the  necessity  of  British  expansion  on  the  African 
continent.  Men's  minds  were  being  swayed  by  two 
diametrically  opposed  views,  propounded  respectively 
by  the  enterprising  and  the  over-cautious  ;  those  who 
had  penetrated  beyond  the  coast-line  and  seen  for 
themselves  the  great  possibilities  of  equatorial  Africa 
endeavoured  to  persuade  our  politicians  to  undertake 
a  forward  movement ;  whereas  those  who  habitually 
stayed  at  home  and  conducted  the  ordinary  affairs  of 
the  British  Isles  persuaded  themselves  and  others  to 
discredit  all  travellers'  tales  and  to  refuse  "  supplies  " 
for  enterprises  which  might  entail  future  responsibility. 
Several  years  were  thus  spent  in  hesitation,  during 
which  France  and  Germany  were  actively  acquiring 
"  colonies  "  which  we  had  originally  discovered  :  the 
average  Cabinet  Minister,  of  both  political  parties, 
considered  the  African  continent  a  "  bore  "  and  an 
interruption  to  the  accepted  game  of  party  politics  ; 


THE  STORY  OF  UGANDA  27 

the  average  newspaper  reader,  confused  by  unfamiliar 
African  names  and  by  the  heat  engendered  between 
rival  controversalists,  was  unable  to  form  a  decided 
opinion. 

What  was  specially  wanted  by  those  who  were 
inchned  to  consider  an  old  problem  from  a  new  point 
of  view  was  definite  information  regarding  the  chmates, 
populations  and  products  of  these  countries  ;  the 
controversalists  were  found  to  lay  stress  only  on  those 
points  which  best  illustrated  their  particular  arguments, 
and  thus  made  it  more  difficult  for  a  man  who  had 
never  been  in  Africa  to  understand  the  problem. 

At  that  time  Mr.  Chamberlain  had  not  yet  initiated 
his  countrymen  into  his  statesmanhke  pohcy  of  develop- 
ing backward  dependencies  on  sound  business  hues. 
Nigeria  was  but  a  dim  possibiUty,  an  unrecognised 
Mohammedan  Empire.  A  hostile  South  Africa 
threatened  the  very  existence  of  Greater  Britain.  The 
British  Empire  itself  had  been  but  recently  *'  dis- 
covered." But  fortunately  there  appeared  in  1892  the 
now  well-known  work,  entitled  "England  in  Egypt," 
by  Sir  Alfred  Milner.  This  book  ran  into  five  editions 
in  eighteen  months  and  revealed  to  men  of  all  parties 
how  a  bankrupt  and  undeveloped  country  had  become 
prosperous  and  solvent  under  steady  control  by 
British  officials.  The  facts  and  figures  were  so  lucidly 
put,  the  difficulties  encountered  and  the  way  they 
were  overcome  so  fairly  stated,  that  even  partisans 
of  the  Little  England  school  were  bound  to  admit 
that  Lord  Cromer  was  accomplishing  a  great  work  on 
the  banks  of  the  Nile.  From  warm  approval  arose  an 
honourable  desire  to  persevere  in  the  work  and  extend 
its  benefits  to  the  Sudan,  and  it  thus  gradually  dawned 
on  our  minds  that  British  rule  could  be  a  real  blessing 
to  African  races,  in  spite  of  the  drawback  of  our  being 


28  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

obliged  first  to  establish  it  with  the  aid  of  maxim 
guns. 

Now,  the  ancient  kingdom  of  Uganda,  at  the  time 
of  Vandeleur's  arrival,  had  not  yet  been  blessed  by 
the  process  of  being  "  Egyptianised  "  [administered 
by  native  officials  controlled  by  a  handful  of  honest 
Englishmen],  though  that  has  since  followed  in  due 
course.  Nor  was  very  much  known  about  its  history 
and  general  conditions  except  from  the  reports  of  ex- 
plorers, who  hurried  through  the  various  territories  of 
East  Africa.  But  in  the  year  1902  appeared  an  admir- 
able work,  "  The  Uganda  Protectorate,"  by  Sir  Harry 
Johnston.  From  it  and  other  sources  I  now  propose 
to  set  forth  such  facts  as  may  help  the  reader  to  an 
understanding  of  what  had  taken  place  in  this  province 
prior  to  the  year  1894.  We  will,  therefore,  first  embark 
on  a  short  resume  of  what  is  known  of  the  native  history 
and  origin  of  the  people,  describe  in  a  few  words  the 
work  of  the  first  white  men  who  explored  the  country  ; 
and  then  follow  in  detail  the  doings  of  Vandeleur 
during  his  year  and  a  half  in  Uganda  and  Unyoro. 

The  Protectorate  lies  around  the  northern  shores 
of  the  Victoria  Nyanza,  and  extends  from  them  in  a 
westerly  and  northerly  direction  to  the  Great  Congo 
Forest,  to  Lake  Albert,  to  the  vast  marshes  south  of 
Fashoda  (Egyptian  Sudan),  and  to  the  shores  of  Lake 
Rudolph,  on  the  Abyssinian  border.  This  region, 
which  is  governed  from  the  administrative  capital, 
Entebbe,  on  the  Victoria  Nyanza,  contains  a  greater 
variety  of  climates  and  a  more  diversified  landscape 
than  are  to  be  found  in  all  the  countries  which  adjoin 
the  Mediterranean  seaboard  :  it  is  inhabited  by  popu- 
lations who  vary  from  one  another  in  appearance, 
habits,  language  and  spiritual  development  as  greatly 
as  vary  the  mountaineers  of  Switzerland  and  the  peas- 


THE  STORY  OF  UGANDA  29 

ants  of  Italy  from  the  fishermen  of  Malta  and  the 
grandees  of  Spain,  while  animal  and  vegetable  life 
is  simply  bewildering  in  its  profusion.  The  mountains 
of  Ruwenzori  (20,000  ft.  high)  contain  glaciers  which 
rival  those  of  the  Alps  ;  the  dismal  swamps  of  the 
Nile  Valley  cover  ten  thousand  square  miles  of  land  ; 
and  between  such  extremes  the  type  of  inhabitant  and 
species  of  plant  is  necessarily  of  the  greatest  variety. 
There  are  large  areas  within  the  temperate  zone,  at  alti- 
tudes between  six  and  seven  thousand  feet,  where  a  mag- 
nificent country  and  healthy  climate  will  some  day  afford 
a  home  to  perhaps  half  a  million  white  inhabitants  from 
Europe;  although  the  first  settlers  may  suffer  from 
fevers  and  other  hardships,  these  will  in  course  of  time 
be  overcome  by  industry  and  applied  knowledge.  For 
it  may  be  fairly  claimed  as  a  scientific  fact  that  the 
lengthened  residence  of  white  inhabitants  tends  to 
sanitate  a  virgin  soil  and  banish  injurious  microbes 
from  it  :  it  is  on  record  that  fevers  and  agues  were  rife 
in  Great  Britain  when  this  country  was  as  undrained 
as  are  the  uplands  of  Uganda  ;  and  the  experience  of 
India  has  shown  that  whereas  in  the  eighteenth  century 
British  soldiers  died  like  flies,  in  the  nineteenth  we 
maintained  an  army  of  72,000  white  men  there  in 
healthy  conditions. 

Sir  Harry  Johnston*  in  his  careful  study  of  the 
natives  (they  beheld  a  white  man  for  the  first  time  in 
1862)  gives  cogent  reasons  for  believing  that  the  abo- 
riginal inhabitants  were  the  pygmies,  whose  descend- 
ants still  lurk  in  parts  of  the  Great  Congo  Forest  and 

*  To  readers  who  would  investigate  the  numerous  charms  and 
drawbacks  of  a  residence  in  Uganda,  Sir  H.  Johnston's  entertaining 
descriptions  may  be  warmly  recommended — see  his  "  Uganda  Protec- 
torate" (two  vols.),  published  by  Hutchinson  &  Co.,  Paternoster  Row, 
in  1902,  and  profusely  illustrated. 


30  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

other  remote  spots.  These  dwarfs  appear  to  be  as 
closely  related  to  the  chimpanzee  monkey  as  it  is 
possible  for  human  beings  to  be,  and  the  affinity  is 
so  far  recognised  by  the  chimpanzee  of  the  present 
day  that  there  are  stories  current  of  pygmy  women 
being  carried  away  by  male  monkeys  and  destroyed 
by  their  jealous  wives. 

In  course  of  time  the  original  monkey-like  pygmies 
were  absorbed  by  intermarriage  into  a  race  of  black 
people,  which  apparently  spread  itself  over  the  whole 
of  equatorial  Africa.  The  theory  is  that  these  negroes 
were  driven  by  famine  and  the  encroaching  sands  of 
the  Sahara  desert  from  the  north-west  corner  of  the 
continent  :  and  there  is  little  doubt  that  at  a  remote 
period  of  the  past  the  Sahara  was  a  fertile  and  thickly 
populated  land,  instead  of  the  howhng  wilderness  of 
sand  which  it  has  since  become.  But  there  are  no 
indications  by  which  we  can  compute  even  the  approxi- 
mate date  of  this  displacement  of  pygmies  by  negroes, 
and  all  that  can  be  averred  is  that  it  must  have  occurred 
in  the  dim  ages  before  the  rise  of  Ancient  Egypt.  What 
is  very  interesting  is  that  certain  small  colonies  of 
pygmies  have  survived  into  the  twentieth  century, 
and  that  we  have  got  into  personal  relations  with  them. 

The  centuries  succeeded  one  another,  and  in  course 
of  time  Egypt  and  Abyssinia  became  the  abode  of  a 
semi-white  population  of  Caucasian  extraction,  which 
settled  down  amidst  the  local  blacks  and  intermarried 
with  them.  A  superior  race  was  thus  produced  on 
the  banks  of  the  Nile,  designated  Ancient  Egyptians, 
and  in  the  mountains  of  Abyssinia,  called  Galas.  By 
the  light  of  recent  research  we  are  able  to  trace  the 
history  of  the  Ancient  Egyptians  back  through  sixty 
centuries  from  the  present  time,  and  there  is  evidence 
to  show  that  the  Galas,  who  still  preserve  a  distinct 


THE  STORY  OF  UGANDA  31 

nationality,  are  descended  from  the  same  stock.  There 
is  also  good  reason  to  believe  that  an  offshoot  of  these 
Galas  moved  southwards  to  the  Victoria  Nyanza 
by  way  of  Lake  Rudolf,  and  settled  themselves  as 
masters  over  the  mixed  race  of  negroes  and  pygmies 
already  alluded  to.  Such  is  the  conjecture  which  may 
be  hazarded  as  to  the  origin  of  the  kingdom  of  Uganda 
and  the  aristocracy  which  rules  it,  and  it  may  be 
interesting  to  mention  here  in  a  few  words  such  evi- 
dence as  is  available  to  support  the  theory.  On  the 
Ancient  Egyptian  bas-reliefs  are  depicted  a  type  of 
man  which  exactly  resembles  the  pygmies  already 
mentioned,  and  resembles  no  other  Hving  type  :  these 
same  old  bas-rehefs  also  reproduce  the  chimpanzees 
of  equatorial  Africa  with  marked  fidelity  ;  and  it  is 
not  assuming  too  much  to  suppose  that  the  powerful 
dynasties,  which  ruled  Egypt  sixty  centuries  ago  and 
under  whose  rule  science  and  commerce  flourished 
in  a  high  degree,  were  capable  of  sending  expeditions 
up  the  Nile  in  search  of  knowledge  and  trade.  There 
is  indeed  no  doubt  that  the  builders  of  the  Great  Pyra- 
mids and  Temples  of  Egypt  were  well  acquainted  with 
the  Nile  sources  and  with  many  other  things  which  were 
rediscovered  in  the  nineteenth  century.  At  any  rate 
the  domestic  animals  and  the  few  imported  plants  which 
now  flourish  in  Uganda  can  be  distinctly  traced  to 
Egyptian  originals  ;  the  remarkable  long-horned  cattle 
of  the  lake  regions  might  have  stood  last  year  for  their 
portraits  on  the  Egyptian  frescoes ;  the  musical 
instruments,  especially  the  harps,  of  the  Bahima 
aristocracy  of  Uganda,  are  exactly  Hke  those  engraven 
on  the  ancient  monuments  :  the  idea  of  the  "  planked  " 
canoe  seems  also  to  have  been  borrowed  from  the  same 
source,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  rivers  and  lakes  of 
central  Africa  require  boats  of  different  construction 


32  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

to  those  employed  on  the  Nile  below  Assouan  ;  and 
finally  we  can  see  for  ourselves  the  close  resemblance 
between  the  faces  and  complexions  of  the  Bahima 
of  Uganda  and  the  present  Fellaheen  of  Egypt,  the  type 
so  accurately  sculptured  on  the  temples. 

In  course  of  time  the  purer  blooded  Bahima  women, 
perhaps  owing  to  the  change  of  climate,  ceased  to  bear 
children,  and  the  original  Gala  blood  was  grafted  on 
the  indigenous  black  stock.  This  blend  of  pygmy, 
negro  and  Gala  evolved  in  course  of  time  a  race  of  men 
who  organised  Uganda  and  the  adjacent  States  into 
powerful  kingdoms.  The  race  enjoyed  a  life  of  culture 
and  progress  in  comparison  with  the  existence  of  the 
naked  folk  around  them — steeped  in  the  degradations 
of  the  stone  ages.  The  known  genealogy  of  the  Uganda 
sovereigns  includes  thirty-seven  consecutive  rulers, 
and  we  may  fairly  assume  that  the  kingdom  and  its 
neighbours  have  been  settled  communities  for  over 
five  centuries  under  dynasties  of  Gala  origin. 

But  though  superior  to  their  neighbours  let  it  not 
be  supposed  that  law  and  order  predominated  ;  on 
the  contrary,  massacres  of  every  sort  were  the  rule 
rather  than  the  exception,  and  it  is  quite  likely  that 
whilst  Agincourt  (1415)  was  claiming  a  death-roll  of 
over  11,000  men  killed,  an  equally  bloody  though 
unrecorded  battle  may  have  been  taking  place  between 
Uganda  and  Unyoro.  Such  contests  were  the  rule 
with  short  intervals  until  Pax  Britannica  put  a  stop 
to  them  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

However,  one  sign  of  the  superiority  of  the  Baganda 
compared  with  their  neighbours  was  their  habit  from 
time  immemorial  of  clothing  themselves  in  long 
garments  made  with  great  skill  from  the  bark  of  the 
birch  tree — an  art  which  they  must  have  acquired  for 
themselves,  as  they  had,  up  to  1850,  no  knowledge  of 


THE  STORY  OF  UGANDA  33 

the  outer  world  beyond  a  vague  legend  of  their  Abys- 
sinian descent.  To  them  the  universe  was  comprised 
within  the  region  bordered  by  the  Great  Congo  Forest, 
the  Nile  marshlands,  the  heights  of  Mount  Elgon,  the 
Nandi  and  Mau  plateaus,  and  Lake  Tanganika  ;  nor 
had  even  a  whisper  of  their  existence  reached  Europe 
until  after  Queen  Victoria  had  been  twenty  years  on 
the  throne.  We  now  know  that  during  the  first  half 
of  the  nineteenth  century  some  enterprising  Muskat 
Arabs  traded  in  saiHng-boats  between  British  India 
and  the  Zanzibar  coast ;  that  some  of  them  pushed 
caravans  into  the  interior  in  pursuit  of  new  markets 
for  their  goods  ;  and  that  in  this  manner  they  dis- 
covered Lake  Nyassa  and  the  country  of  Unyamwezi — 
known  to  Herodotus  (b.c.  450),  by  hearsay,  as  the  Land 
of  the  Moon,  now  situated  in  German  East  Africa.  The 
Arabs  appear  to  have  reached  the  south-eastern  shores 
of  the  Victoria  Nyanza  during  the  forties  and  there 
heard  rumours  of  negro  kingdoms  to  the  north  but, 

"  the  first  stranger  from  the  outer  world  to  penetrate 
into  Uganda  was  a  Beluch  soldier  from  Zanzibar, 
named  Isa,  who  fled  from  his  creditors,  first  to  the 
Arab  trading  settlements,  and  finally  to  the  court  of 
Suna,  King  of  Uganda,  where  he  arrived  about  1849- 
1850.  His  handsome  face  and  abundant  hair  and 
beard  won  him  royal  favour.  Known  as  The  Hairy 
One,  he  became  a  power  in  Uganda,  and  possessed  a 
harem  of  three  hundred  women.  Through  Isa  the 
Beluch,  Uganda  first  heard  of  a  world  of  Arabs  and 
white  men  beyond  their  own  borders.  Suna  sent  word 
to  the  Arab  traders  inviting  them  to  his  court.  Sheikh 
Snay  bin  Amir  was  the  first  to  accept.  In  1852  this 
Arab  trader  stood  in  the  presence  of  the  most  powerful 
king  of    the  best-organised   East  African  State    then 

c 


34  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

existing,  untouched  by  Arab  or  European  influence. 
He  remained  some  time  with  Suna,  gave  him  much 
information  about  the  world  outside  the  Victoria 
Nyanza,  and  even  beyond  the  coast  of  Africa.  From 
him  Suna  and  the  Baganda  had  confirmation  of  the 
stories  of  Isa.  They  learned  that  there  really  were 
white  men.  The  Bahima  who  had  formed  the  aris- 
tocracies and  dynasties  of  these  regions  remembered  in 
their  traditions  a  time  when  they  were  of  much  lighter 
complexion  and  of  longer  hair  than  they  possessed 
since  their  lingering  with  the  negresses  of  the  subject 
races.  They  were  much  struck  by  these  stories  of 
white  men,  and  regarded  them  as  the  stock  from  w^hich 
they  themselves  had  sprung.  They  therefore  mani- 
fested a  certain  fear  lest  the  white  men  from  the  lands 
of  their  forefathers  might  be  coming  to  conquer  these 
fertile  countries  from  the  grasp  of  their  blackened 
descendants.  Snay  bin  Amir  brought  back  with  him 
full  accounts  of  this  organised  and  civilised  negro 
kingdom.  This  news  spread  rapidly  amongst  the 
trading  Arabs  of  the  Zanzibar  hinterland,  and  came 
to  the  ears  of  the  German  missionary,  Krapf,  who  with 
Rebmann  was  doing  much  to  bring  to  our  knowledge 
the  names  and  features  of  inner  East  Africa."* 

In  consequence  of  these  reports  Captain  (afterwards 
Sir  Richard)  Burton  proceeded  to  the  discovery  of 
Lake  Tanganika,  accompanied  by  Captain  Speke ; 
and  the  latter,  with  more  enterprise  than  Burton, 
headed  an  ill-equipped  expedition  and  discovered  the 
great  lake  which  he  named  Victoria  Nyanza.  Speke 
at  the  same  time  gathered  certain  information  about 
Uganda  and  Unyoro,  which  prompted  him  a  few 
years  later,   accompanied  by  Grant,   to  undertake  a 

*  "  Uganda  Protectorate." 


<: 
< 

z 

O 

O 


THE  STORY  OF  UGANDA  35 

famous  journey.  They  made  their  way  without  diffi- 
culty to  the  Victoria  Nyanza,  then  round  its  western 
shore,  and  thus  reached  Uganda  in  1862.  Suna  was 
dead  and  his  son,  Mutesa,  had  been  five  years  on  the 
throne.  He  received  Speke  and  Grant  with  great 
cordiahty  and  took  such  a  Hvely  interest  in  their 
desire  to  discover  the  sources  of  the  Nile  that  he 
volunteered  to  show  them  the  spot  where  that  river 
issues  out  of  the  Victoria  Nyanza  at  the  Ripon  Falls. 
This  was  accordingly  done,  and  Speke  was  so  favour- 
ably impressed  by  the  hospitality  of  the  black  king 
and  the  intelligence  and  veracity  of  the  Baganda 
generally  that  he  planned  his  further  route  upon  the 
information  they  gave  him.  Subsequent  exploration 
has  confirmed  what  the  Baganda  told  Speke,  who 
followed  the  Nile  downstream,  cut  off  a  bend  of  the 
river  which  otherwise  would  have  led  him  into  the 
Albert  Nyanza,  and  reached  Gondokoro  without 
discovering  that  lake.  There  he  met  Baker  and  his 
plucky  wife  travelling  in  the  opposite  direction  whilst 
he  continued  his  homeward  journey  down  the  Nile 
to  Khartoum.  Speke  seems  throughout  his  travels 
to  have  possessed  a  happy  gift  of  rightly  understanding 
the  geography  of  the  areas  he  crossed,  though  critics 
declared  he  took  too  much  for  granted.  His  assump- 
tions were  subjected  to  some  destructive  criticism, 
especially  by  his  rival  Burton,  whose  hostile  pen 
reduced  the  Victoria  Nyanza  to  an  unwholesome 
marsh  and  supported  Livingstone's  wild  theory  of  the 
sources  of  the  Nile.  So  Speke  was  unrewarded  by  the 
British  Government,  though  later  research  has  re- 
established his  reputation  and  private  enterprise  has 
erected  a  memorial  to  him  in  Hyde  Park.  His  com- 
panion Grant  was  given  a  C.B.  in  recognition  of  some 
small  services  rendered  in  connection  with  the  abortive 


36  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

Abyssinian  expedition,  and  a  Knighthood  was  very 
properly  bestowed  on  Baker,  who  discovered  the  lake 
which  Speke  just  missed. 

Baker's  explorations  in  Unyoro  should  be  read  at 
first  hand  in  his  fascinating  volume  "Ismailia  ";  he  and 
his  wife  were  nearly  killed  by  order  of  the  king  of  that 
country,  who  was  by  no  means  so  friendly  as  the 
Uganda  king  had  shown  himself  to  Speke  and  Grant. 
During  the  dozen  years  which  followed  the  events 
just  narrated  European  interest  in  the  Nile  sources 
was  concentrated  on  livingstone's  theories  and  work 
in  the  Congo  country.  He  clung  obstinately  to  the 
idea  that  the  sources  of  the  River  Congo  were  the 
sources  of  the  Nile,  and,  after  being  gallantly  rescued 
by  the  new  explorer,  Mr.  (afterwards  Sir  Henry)  Stanley, 
at  once  returned  to  Lake  Bangweolo,  where  he  died. 

The  impression  left  on  men's  minds  by  the  antago- 
nistic theories  of  Burton,  Speke,  Baker  and  Living- 
stone, was  one  of  apathetic  indifference  until  Stanley 
appeared  on  the  scene.  No  one  in  the  history  of  modern 
exploration  in  Africa  has  surpassed  this  great  man 
in  the  qualities  of  courage,  intelligence  and  tenacity 
of  purpose  ;  and  it  is  sincerely  to  be  hoped  that  the 
petty  controversies  which  for  a  time  raged  round  his 
name  are  by  now  forgotten.  We  are  gradually  learning 
that  the  kid-gloved  gentry  who  have  so  much  to  say 
about  everything  in  these  islands  are  not  the  sort  who 
usually  conduct  great  enterprises  to  successful  issue 
in  Africa  or  elsewhere  ;  and  Stanley  will  be  remem- 
bered for  what  he  did,  not  for  what  was  said  of  him. 
He  was  employed  by  the  proprietors  of  the  New  York 
Herald  and  the  London  Daily  Telegraph  to  solve  the 
problems  which  were  in  doubt — was  there  really  a 
Victoria  Nyanza  ?  and,  if  so,  did  the  Nile  flow  out  of 
it  ?     Were  there  several  lakes  or  only  some  marshes  ? 


THE  STORY  OF  UGANDA  37 

Were  the  headstreams  of  the  Nile  identical  with  those 
of  the  Congo  ?  Such  were  the  questions  which  the 
two  newspaper  proprietors  sent  Stanley  to  solve,  and 
he  did  solve  them.  That  a  geographical  problem  of 
such  magnitude  should  be  settled  through  the  enter- 
prise of  two  daily  newspapers  is  an  honourable  record 
in  the  liistory  of  journalism. 

Stanley  followed  Speke's  old  road  through  Unyam- 
wezi  to  the  Victoria  Nyanza,  where  he  put  together 
a  boat  and  circumnavigated  the  inland  sea. 

"  In  1875  he  reached  Uganda,  to  be  received  by 
the  same  Mutesa  who  had  received  Speke.^  Mutesa 
was  puzzled  about  religious  matters.  Stanley's  con- 
versations inclined  him  favourably  towards  Christianity. 
At  this  opportune  moment  there  arrived  in  Uganda 
one  of  Gordon's  messengers,  or  (if  one  may  say  so 
without  unpleasantness)  spies — Linant  de  Belief onds, 
a  Belgian,  who  in  reality  had  come  to  see  whether 
Uganda  was  worth  the  conquering,  and  whether  it 
was  too  tough  a  job  to  tackle.  Stanley  resolved  to 
write  his  famous  letter  to  the  Daily  Telegraph  inviting 
English  missionaries  to  proceed  to  the  evangelisation 
of  Uganda.  He  had  no  means  of  sending  this  letter 
back  to  Europe  save  by  way  of  the  Nile,  and  Linant 
de  Bellefonds  volunteered  to  take  it.  As  the  unfortu- 
nate Belgian  was  traveUing  down  the  Nile  in  the  vicinity 
of  Gondokoro,  his  expedition  was  attacked  by  the 
Bari,  who  had  suffered  great  wrongs  at  the  hands  of 
Nubian  slave-traders.  Linant  de  Bellefonds  was 
murdered  and  his  corpse  thrown  on  the  bank,  to  he 
there  rotting  in  the  sun.  An  Egyptian  expedition, 
sent  to  inquire  into  the  cause  of  this  attack  and  to 
punish  the  Bari,  recovered  Linant  de  Bellefonds'  body, 

*  "  Uganda  Protectorate." 


5>^  -%  r^rv 


^97 


38  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

and  removed  therefrom  the  long  knee-boots  which  he 
was  wearing  at  the  time  of  his  death.  In  one  of  the 
boots — he  had  tucked  it  between  boot  and  leg  at  the 
time  of  the  attack — was  found  Stanley's  famous  letter 
to  the  missionaries.  This  was  sent  on  to  Gordon 
Pasha  at  Khartoum  and  forwarded  by  him  to  the 
Daily  Telegraph,  with  an  explanation  of  the  circum- 
stances under  which  it  had  been  found. 

"  The  letter,  when  published,  met  with  an  immediate 
response.  Before  many  months  were  over  (perhaps 
less  than  a  year  after  Stanley  had  issued  the  appeal 
from  far  Uganda,)  the  first  party  of  Anglican  mis- 
sionaries of  the  Church  Missionary  Society  had  started 
in  two  sections  for  Uganda.  One  half  went  by  way  of 
Zanzibar,  the  other  went  up  the  Nile.  Both  met  in 
Uganda,  and  the  establishments  of  the  Church  Mission- 
ary Society,  which  were  destined  after  extraordinary 
vicissitudes  to  result  in  an  immensely  successful 
propaganda,  commenced  their  work  in  1877.  Truly 
Stanley's  letter,  the  blood-stained  sheet  of  paper  found 
in  the  boot  of  the  murdered  de  Bellefonds,  was  big  with 
fateful  results  for  the  kingdom  of  Uganda. 

''  The  excitement  caused  by  this  bold  step  on  the 
part  of  the  Anglican  propaganda  roused  attention  at 
Rome,  or  rather,  struck  the  imagination  and  intelli- 
gence of  a  remarkable  prelate  of  the  Roman  Catholic 
Church — Bishop  (afterwards  Cardinal)  Lavigerie  who, 
as  Bishop  of  Algiers,  had  founded  the  Mission  of  the 
White  Fathers,  a  body  of  ardent  missionaries  who 
were  to  imitate  the  Arabs  in  their  dress,  to  lead  in 
many  respects  an  Arab  life  and  thus  convert  Northern 
Africa  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  Sahara  to  the  Chris- 
tian faith.  The  views  of  Cardinal  Lavigerie  were 
perhaps,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  as  much  political 
as  religious,  and  he  yearned  to  acquire  fresh  territory. 


THE  STORY  OF  UGANDA  39 

not  only  for  his  Church,  but  for  his  own  nation,  France. 
Resolved  that  the  British  missionaries  should  not  have 
it  all  their  own  way  in  Central  Africa,  he  despatched 
his  White  Fathers  to  the  Victoria  Nyanza  and  Uganda 
on  the  one  hand,  to  the  Zanzibar  coast  and  Tanganika 
on  the  other." 

The  White  Fathers  of  course  came  into  rivalry, 
both  religious  and  political,  with  the  Anglican  mission- 
aries already  established,  and  on  one  occasion  had  a 
quarrel  at  Divine  worship — when  King  Mutesa  is 
reported  to  have  exclaimed  :  "  Go  !  And,  when  you 
white  men  have  decided  on  the  true  religion,  it  will  be 
time  enough  to  come  and  teach  it  to  us." 

He  died  in  1884  and  was  succeeded  by  his  son 
Mwanga,  a  youth  of  such  vicious  tastes  that  even  the 
Mohammedans,  who  are  not  too  particular,  joined 
with  the  native  Christians  to  expel  him.  Mwanga 
fled  across  the  lake,  took  refuge  wdth  the  White  Fathers, 
declared  himself  a  Catholic  convert,  and  by  this  means 
regained  his  throne  some  years  later. 

Meanwhile  a  more  direct  route  from  the  coast  was 
discovered  by  Joseph  Thomson  who,  starting  from 
Mombasa  with  an  expedition  organised  by  the  Royal 
Geographical  Society,  made  his  way  to  the  north-east 
corner  of  the  Victoria  Nyanza.  He  discovered  the 
snow  mountain  Kenya,  Lake  Baringo  and  Mount 
Elgon  and  traversed  the  country  through  which  the 
railway  now  runs.  During  these  years  Great  Britain 
was  fortunately  represented  at  the  Court  of  the  Sultan 
of  Zanzibar  by  Sir  John  Kirk,  who  was  ahve  to  the 
probable  future  value  of  the  countries  we  are  dealing 
with.  He  exerted  his  influence  to  keep  the  coast 
and  its  hinterland  towards  the  great  lakes  open  to 
Arab  and  British  enterprise,  although  he  was  unable 


40  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

to  remove  the  apathy  which  appears  inherent  in  British 
Governments,  he  persuaded  the  Royal  Society  and 
British  Association  to  combine  to  send  a  scientific 
expedition  to  Mount  Kihmanjaro.  This  expedition 
was  commanded  by  Mr.  (now  Sir  Harry)  Johnston, 
who  conchided  "  treaties  which  very  nearly  brought 
the  whole  of  that  mountain  within  the  British  sphere 
and  which  at  any  rate  were  the  basis  from  which  the 
Imperial  British  East  Africa  Company  sprang." 

By  this  time  the  partition  of  Africa  amongst  the 
great  Powers  of  Europe  was  in  full  swing,  and  Great 
Britain,  in  spite  of  the  enterprise  of  her  sons  in  their 
individual  capacity,  was  being  left  completely  out  of 
the  scramble,  because  the  politicians  by  whom  we  were 
ruled  were  unaware  that  foreign  Governments  had 
deliberately  set  to  work  to  acquire  and  enclose  vast 
slices  of  the  continent.  This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss 
the  general  policy  of  successive  Governments  on  the 
question  ;  nor  what  might  have  been  the  result  of 
more  forethought  on  their  part.  The  general  impres- 
sion left  on  the  mind  of  a  student  is  that  British 
Cabinets  had  no  policy  at  all,  but  allowed  matters  to 
drift  and  muddle  along  until  some  influential  news- 
paper vehemently  goaded  them  into  action.  Then 
a  spasmodic  effort,  usually  too  late,  was  made  on  behalf 
of  our  legitimate  interests  ;  and  thus  Uganda,  Nigeria, 
the  Sudan,  Nyassaland  and  the  Transvaal  each  in 
turn,  and  each  without  due  forethought,  became  for 
a  brief  period  a  "  Vital  British  Interest." 

There  were  already  many  international  jealousies 
regarding  the  allotment  of  East  Africa.  Our  friends 
the  Germans  viewed  with  considerable  jealousy  any 
transference  of  the  Egyptian  Sudan  or  Uganda  to 
the  British  sphere  of  influence.  When  Stanley  was 
about    to    start    on    his    famous    journey    in    relief 


THE  STORY  OF  UGANDA  41 

of  Emin  Pasha  on  the  Upper  Nile,  the  Germans 
positively  refused  permission  for  his  expedition  to  pass 
through  their  territory.  As  the  route  via  Mombasa 
and  Uganda  was  at  that  time  unsafe,  Stanley  was 
obliged  to  take  the  Congo  route  to  Equatoria.  He 
brought  away  Emin,  discovered  Ruwenzori  and  Lake 
Albert  Edward  and  in  a  measure  increased  the  British 
claims  to  consider  these  territories  within  a  British 
sphere  of  influence  :  but  his  expedition  suffered 
ghastly  hardships  in  consequence  of  the  German 
attitude. 

In  June,  1890,  an  Anglo-German  Convention  fixed 
the  boundaries  of  the  respective  spheres  of  influence, 
and  the  British  East  Africa  Company,  under  Sir 
WiUiam  Mackinnon,  pushed  its  officials  inland  to  make 
treaties  with  the  chiefs  of  the  country  within  the 
British  sphere.  That  a  convention  signed  by  the 
highest  authorities  in  London  and  Berlin  was  necessary 
and  timely  will  be  denied  by  no  one  who  has  made 
himself  acquainted  with  the  incident  of  Dr.  Karl 
Peters.  He  was  a  go-ahead  German  traveller,  not 
employed  by  his  Government,  but  ready  for  any  enter- 
prise during  his  travels.  In  1889  Mr.  F.  J.  Jackson, 
an  official,  was  to  the  north  of  the  Victoria  Nyanza 
engaged  in  negotiations  with  the  King  of  Uganda 
regarding  a  British  Protectorate.  The  negotiations 
came  to  nothing,  so  he  went  to  Mount  Elgon,  leaving 
his  standing  camp  and  servants  to  await  his  return 
in  the  British  sphere.  Meanwhile  a  bundle  of  letters 
arrived  for  Mr.  Jackson  from  the  coast.  At  this 
juncture  Dr.  Karl  Peters  marched  into  the  camp, 
obtained  the  letters,  opened  and  read  them,  and  at 
once  determined  to  steal  a  march  on  Jackson  by  going 
himself  to  Uganda  and  forestalling  the  British  Protec- 
torate over  that  country.     He  so  far  succeeded  that 


42  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

he  drew  up  a  treaty  with  the  aid  of  the  French  CathoUc 
priests  and  procured  for  Germany  a  Protectorate  over 
Uganda.  This  treaty  was  afterwards  disavowed  by 
the  German  Government  and  had  no  effect.  One 
does  not  blame  the  attempt  of  a  German  to  secure  a 
German  Protectorate — an  enterprise  quite  as  defensible 
as  the  similar  attempts  of  Englishmen ;  but  that 
the  opening  and  reading  of  another  man's  corre- 
spondence is  unscrupulous,  few  will  be  found  to  deny. 

During  the  year  1890  Captain  (now  General  Sir 
Frederick)  Lugard  went  up  as  the  accredited  agent  of 
the  Company  and  most  thoroughly  did  he  justify  his 
selection  for  the  post.  He  was  met  on  arrival  in 
Uganda  by  a  serious  situation,  needing  firmness  and 
promptitude  to  deal  with  it.  The  native  government 
of  the  country  was  at  a  standstill,  owing  to  the  ini- 
quities of  Mwanga.  Civil  war  was  raging  between  the 
Anglicans  and  Catholics,  and  this  was  further  com- 
plicated by  frequent  incursions  of  Mohammedans. 
Lugard  first  ensured  his  position  by  arranging  a  treaty 
with  Mwanga,  declaring  Uganda  to  be  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Chartered  Company.  He  then  very 
wisely  built  a  fort  near  the  capital,  and  it  was  no  sooner 
finished  that  it  was  attacked  by  Mwanga's  adherents. 
He  repulsed  this  attack,  but  also  realised  that  nothing 
could  be  done  by  him  or  any  one  else  without  a  reliable 
military  force  at  his  back.  He  therefore  resolved  on 
the  bold  project  of  proceeding  to  the  west  of  Lake 
Albert  and  taking  over  all  the  remaining  Sudanese 
soldiers  of  Emin's  province.  In  this  he  was  com- 
pletely successful,  and  obtained  some  400  professional 
soldiers  who  were  independent  of  local  factions,  and 
thus  laid  the  foundation  of  the  force  which  enabled 
us  later  on  to  start  British  rule  in  the  country.  These 
Sudanese  became  the  Uganda  Rifles  which  performed 


THE  STORY  OF  UGANDA  43 

such  useful  service  during  a  number  of  years  and 
ultimately  became  merged  into  the  King's  African 
Rifles,  lately  on  active  service  in  Somaliland.  By 
thus  retrieving  the  scattered  bands  of  Sudanese,  under 
their  own  officers,  Lugard  imported  an  element  of 
power  which  only  needed  careful  control  and  judicious 
handling  to  be  the  effective  instrument  of  civilised 
government.  To  have  left  them  to  roam  the  country 
and  prey  upon  its  inhabitants  would  have  produced 
great  disorders  in  the  near  future,  and  the  fact  that 
these  troops  mutinied  in  1897,  under  great  provocation, 
should  not  detract  from  our  appreciation  of  Lugard' s 
decision  to  employ  them.  He  could  do  nothing 
without  some  military  force  :  to  have  used  the 
Protestant  converts  against  the  Cathohcs,  or  the 
Mohammedan  Baganda  against  their  Christian  fellow 
countrymen,  would  have  been  a  direct  encouragement 
to  civil  war  :  and  at  the  period  we  are  considering 
it  would  not  have  been  possible  to  transport  an  Indian 
battahon  to  the  interior.  It  was  Lugard  who  really 
made  Uganda  a  possible  British  possession,  and  did 
it  with  inconceivably  small  resources.  It  is  well  to 
emphasise  his  feat,  and  to  recollect  that  England  does 
not  always  recognise  the  sons  who  serve  her  best.  His 
personal  influence  over  the  natives  had  been  such  that 
when  Mr.  Grogan  made  his  journey  from  the  Cape 
to  Cairo  in  1899,  he  found  he  could  get  the  natives 
of  Toro  to  do  anything  for  him  because  he  knew 
Kapelh,  the  local  name  for  Lugard.  "  They  asked 
all  kinds  of  questions  about  Kapelli,  and  wanted  to 
know  why  he  had  never  come  back,  and  had  the 
Enghsh  deserted  their  country  after  promising  to 
protect  them  ?  To  have  left  a  name  in  Africa  that 
opens  all  hearts  is  the  finest  monument  to  his  exploits 
that  a  man  can  have." 


44  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

Lugard  was  not  only  successful  in  laying  the  first 
firm  foundation  upon  which  a  British  administration 
of  the  country  could  be  started  ;  but  he  also  succeeded 
in  the  far  more  difficult  task  of  persuading  Mr.  Glad- 
stone's Cabinet  to  consider  the  whole  East  African 
problem  from  an  Imperial  point  of  view.  It  is  true 
that  this  Cabinet  did  not  definitely  establish  a  pro- 
tectorate ;  but  it  refused  to  abandon  what  had  been 
gained  for  the  Empire,  and  consented  to  send  out  a 
Commission,  under  Sir  Gerald  Portal,  to  "  report  and 
advise." 

Now,  the  question  really  at  stake,  when  shorn  of 
its  various  side-issues,  was  whether  the  British  Govern- 
ment or  the  Chartered  Company  should  build  a  railway 
from  the  coast  to  the  Victoria  Nyanza  ?  for  this  railway 
must  inevitably  be  built  whether  Uganda  remained  a 
commercial  sphere  of  influence  or  became  a  protec- 
torate. To  attempt  to  hold  and  administer  on  a 
permanent  basis  a  country  to  which  every  load 
must  be  carried  800  miles  on  men's  heads  was  out 
of  the  question  ;  in  fact  we  shall  see  when  we  deal  in 
detail  with  Vandeleur's  work  how  hazardous  the  task 
was  during  the  years  the  railway  was  in  course  of 
construction. 

Sir  Gerald  Portal's  Commission  of  Inquiry  practi- 
cally took  over  the  government  of  Uganda  ;  Sir  Gerald 
himself  unfortunately  died  of  typhoid,  and  Colonel 
(now  Major-General  Sir  Henry)  Col  vile  acted  as  Com- 
missioner and  concluded  the  treaty  which  created  the 
Uganda  Protectorate. 

]\Ieanwhile,  the  Chartered  Company  decided  that 
it  could  not  afford  to  build  the  railway  ;  it  therefore 
announced  its  intention  of  surrendering  its  Charter 
and  retiring  from  East  Africa.  After  much  hesitation 
and  delay,  the  Imperial  Government  resolved  to  take 


THE  STORY  OF  UGANDA  45 

over  the  country  and  construct  the  railway  at  British 
expense.  Those  of  us  who  are  convinced  that  in 
Uganda  we  have  laid  solid  foundations  upon  which 
in  due  time  a  great  Negro  State  will  arise,  must  applaud 
this  decision  ;  the  initial  cost  has  been  heavy  for  rail- 
way construction  and  civil  and  mihtary  adminstration 
and  there  is  up  to  the  present  no  return  on  the  outlay  ; 
in  fact  a  further  small  annual  expenditure  by  Great 
Britain  will  be  necessary  for  ten  years.  The  figures 
had  better  be  faced,  and  they  are  faced  by  Sir  Harry 
Johnston  in  his  chapter  on  commercial  prospects. 
He  computes  the  total  amount  of  money  which  will 
have  been  spent  by  the  British  taxpayer  in  East  Africa 
and  Uganda  between  the  years  1894  and  191 1  at  the 
round  sum  of  £10,500,000.  For  this  sum  he  is  con- 
vinced that  we  shall  have  started  a  great  Negro  State, 
or  a  series  of  smaller  Negro  States  on  a  self-supporting 
basis ;  and  he  most  properly  urges  that,  as  they 
become  prosperous  under  our  rule  and  through  the 
agency  of  our  railway,  the  capital  sum  expended  on 
them  should  be  consolidated  into  a  national  debt  upon 
which  interest  should  be  paid  to  the  mother  country. 
If,  as  is  quite  hkely,  both  Uganda  and  East  Africa 
develop  into  wealthy  communities  they  could  easily 
shoulder  the  debt  which  has  been  contracted  on  their 
behalf  by  Great  Britain,  and  thus  a  great  impetus 
will  be  given  to  the  statesmanhke  policy  of  pledging 
British  credit  to  develop  other  backward  possessions. 


CHAPTER  III 

SOLDIERING   IN   UGANDA 

See  map  facing  page  66 

The  intention  in  the  last  chapter  was  to  place  before 
the  reader  some  account  of  the  chief  events  in  the 
history  of  Uganda  up  to  the  moment  when  Lieutenant 
Seymour  Vandeleur  and  other  officers  began  their  task 
on  behalf  of  the  British  Government.  Strictly  speak- 
ing, the  name  "  Uganda  "  belongs  only  to  one  of  the 
dozen  nations  within  our  sphere  in  East  Africa  ;  where- 
as "  Uganda  Protectorate  "  is  the  official  title  of  the 
several  provinces  (including  Unyoro)  which  cluster 
around  the  shores  of  the  great  lakes.  That  part  of  the 
country  through  which  the  railway  passes  from  the 
coast  of  the  Indian  Ocean  to  the  Victoria  Nyanza  is 
called  the  "  East  African  Protectorate."  These  two 
British  protectorates  are  under  separate  administra- 
tions, now  controlled  by  the  Colonial  Office  in  London. 
When  Colonel  Colvile  was  appointed  Commissioner 
a  certain  number  of  young  officers  were  selected  to  go 
out  and  command  the  Sudanese  soldiery  under  him, 
and  Seymour  Vandeleur  was  one  of  them.  He  reached 
Mombasa  on  September  6,  1894,  in  company  with 
Mr.  Jackson  and  Captain  Ashburnham,  6oth  Rifles. 
The  walls  of  the  fort,  thirty  feet  high  and  dating  back 
to  1594,  still  mounted  the  ancient  guns  which  remind 
the  world  of  Portugal's  adventurous  colonists  of  the 
sixteenth  century.     A  steam  launch  landed  the  party 


SOLDIERING  IN  UGANDA  47 

at  a  spot  ten  miles  up  the  river,  where  they  prepared 
for  their  eight  hundred  miles  tramp  to  the  Victoria 
Nyanza.  It  was  the  middle  of  the  dry  season  and  the 
necessity  of  carrying  water  for  the  caravan  of  four 
hundred  porters  for  the  journey  across  the  Taru  Desert 
added  considerably  to  the  difficulties  of  the  march. 

On  September  25,  they  reached  a  station  of  the 
Scottish  Industrial  Mission,  a  dehghtful  spot  3070  feet 
above  sea  level,  where  they  perceived  what  a  Scotsman 
can  do  to  a  swamp  in  Africa.  By  artificial  means  it 
had  been  transformed  into  a  clear  stream  of  water 
flowing  through  a  garden  growing  all  kinds  of  plants 
and  vegetables.  Dr.  Charters  was  the  head  of  this 
station,  and  his  friend  Mr.  Colquhoun  was  paying  him 
a  visit.  Accordingly  next  day  these  two  gentlemen 
accompanied  Vandeleur's  caravan  six  miles  along  their 
forward  march,  said  good-bye  and  branched  off  to 
their  shooting  camp  which  had  been  arranged  for 
previously.  From  that  day  to  this  they  were  never 
again  seen  or  heard  of,  dead  or  alive.  Numerous  causes 
have  been  hazarded  to  account  for  their  disappearance, 
such  as  hons,  dearth  of  water,  Masai  warriors  ;  but  the 
matter  still  remains  a  mystery,  and  the  curious  thing 
is  that  Dr.  Charters  was  perfectly  well  acquainted  with 
the  country  and  had  been  to  the  same  spot  to  shoot 
on  a  former  occasion.  The  caravan  under  Mr.  Jack- 
son's leadership  proceeded  on  its  way,  and  on  October  5 
arrived  at  a  station  named  Machakos,  5400  feet  above 
the  sea  and  situated  in  the  highlands  of  East  Africa, 
where  the  days  are  clouded  and  cool  and  it  is  a  pleasure 
to  live. 

At  last  they  descended  into  the  district  bordering 
the  Victoria  Nyanza,  and  Vandeleur  beheld  for  the 
first  time  the  blue  waters  of  the  great  inland  sea  which 
it  had  long  been  his  ambition  to  reach.     The  country 


48  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

was  rich  in  magnificent  banana  plantations  and  a 
numerous  population  clothed  in  bark  cloth.  The 
journey  of  800  miles  came  to  an  end  on  November  28, 
when  they  reached  Entebbe,  the  headquarters  of  the 
Administration  and  reported  themselves  to  Colonel 
Colvile,  who  had  built  a  charming  house  on  a  cliff 
overhanging  the  lake. 

At  the  date  of  Vandeleur's  arrival  the  mail  from 
London  to  Entebbe  took  over  three  months  :  it  now 
takes  less  than  one.  Here  he  met  Major  (now  Colonel) 
Cunningham,  C.B.,  D.S.O.  who  became  his  command- 
ing officer  and  remained  his  intimate  friend  during  the 
rest  of  his  life.  They  were  to  be  much  thrown  together; 
first  on  active  service  in  Uganda,  next  in  Nigeria  and 
finally  in  South  Africa.  Their  first  duty  was  to  pro- 
ceed to  Unyoro  and  undertake  a  reconnaissance 
across  Lake  Albert  and  down  the  Nile  to  its  furthest 
navigable  point. 

Fever  was  prevalent  amongst  the  Europeans  at 
this  time  and  Vandeleur  had  frequent  bouts  of  it  ; 
Cunningham  was  also  down,  but  he  pluckily  decided 
to  march  on  December  19,  and  they  accordingly 
started  for  Unyoro,  taking  their  ponies  with  them. 
These  horses  were  the  first  to  make  the  journey  and 
it  was  doubtful  whether  they  would  reach  the  end  of  it. 
Swamps  were  the  main  difficulty,  for  at  that  time 
they  were  not  crossed  by  the  causeways  and  bridges 
which  have  since  been  constructed  under  British 
supervision.  Vandeleur's  pony  most  frequently  got 
into  trouble,  as  it  lost  its  head,  plunged  madly  into  the 
reeds  and  sank  up  to  its  neck  in  water.  But  even  to 
a  man  who  does  not  lose  his  head,  the  Unyoro  road 
presented  features  which  one  would  not  select  for  an 
afternoon  stroll.  Now  clutching  hold  of  the  papyrus 
at  the  side,  now  stepping  from  one  lump  of  vegetation 


/ 


/ 


MASAI  WARRIORS 
British  East  Africa 


SOLDIERING  IN  UGANDA  49 

to  another,  one  tries  in  vain  to  save  oneself  from  sink- 
ing deeper  into  the  quagmire  of  mud  and  water.  Yet 
in  spite  of  these  gymnastics  under  a  tropical  sun, 
perhaps  in  consequence  of  them,  both  Cunningham 
and  Vandeleur  were  quite  fit. 

At  the  end  of  three  days  they  reached  Fort  Ray- 
mond, where  Captain  Dunning,  D.S.O.,  commanded  ; 
and  eight  days  later  (January  i,  1895)  arrived  at  Fort 
Hoima,  the  headquarters  in  Unyoro,  where  they  stayed 
only  a  week.  As  they  proceeded  towards  Lake  Albert 
the  country  became  more  open  until  suddenly  from 
the  edge  of  a  precipitous  escarpment  1200  feet  high 
they  beheld  the  great  sheet  of  water,  bordered  by  a 
strip  of  yellow  sand. 

The  diminutive  expedition  embarked  in  a  twenty- 
foot  steel  boat  which  had  been  carried  in  sections  by 
porters  from  the  coast  ;  the  two  officers,  eight  Sudanese 
and  eight  Zanzibaris  with  tents,  baggage,  one  maxim, 
the  sail  and  eight  oars,  filled  up  the  boat,  so  that  cross- 
ing the  lake  in  a  squall  required  careful  trimming. 
After  reaching  the  western  shore  in  safety  and  skirting 
it  for  a  whole  day,  they  came  to  the  village  of  Amat, 
where  Lake  Albert  narrows  to  600  yards  and  becomes 
the  White  Nile.  The  following  day  was  spent  in  rowing 
and  sailing  down  the  river,  which  soon  became  so 
rapid  that  the  boat  drifted  at  a  goodly  pace  and  its 
occupants  realised  that  they  would  be  in  a  nasty 
predicament  if  attacked  and  compelled  to  retreat 
against  the  stream.  At  Wadelai  they  encamped  on 
the  site  of  Emin  Pasha's  old  fort,  now  completely 
overgrown  by  vegetation.  Dervishes  were  reported 
at  the  Dufile  cataracts,  and  it  would  have  been  a  sad 
day  for  Cunningham  and  Vandeleur  if  they  had  been 
captured  and  sent  to  Omdurman  to  join  Slatin  Pasha 
and  the  other  prisoners  of  the  Khalifa,  especially  as 

D 


50  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

there  was  at  that  time  no  prospect  of  a  British  advance 
into  the  Sudan  ! 

On  January  14  the  old  fort  at  Dufile  was  reached, 
situated  above  the  Cataract,  with  parapet  and  ditches 
still  distinctly  traced  and  some  lemon  trees  and  cotton 
bushes  the  only  remaining  signs  of  Egyptian  occupa- 
tion. Cunningham  and  Vandeleur  were  the  first  white 
men  to  revisit  this  spot  since  its  abandonment  in 
November,  1888.  In  that  month  the  Dervishes  pene- 
trated into  the  station  after  three  days'  fighting  and 
a  successful  night  attack,  as  described  by  Cassati  (an 
Italian),  who  was  present.  Cunningham  concluded 
a  treaty  with  the  local  chief,  who  reported  the  Dervishes 
to  be  in  possession  of  the  country  beyond  the  rapids  ; 
and  the  British  flag  was  hoisted  on  both  banks  of  the 
Nile.     It  now^  flies  on  the  right  bank  only. 

The  expedition  had  reached  the  furthest  navigable 
point.  Below  the  Cataract  the  river  is  a  seething 
torrent,  fifty  yards  broad,  be^^ond  which  foaming  rapids 
succeed  one  another  at  intervals  to  Lado,  120  miles 
from  Dufile.  From  Lado  to  Khartoum  are  900  miles 
of  open  water-way,  now  navigated  by  modern  steamers 
under  the  British  and  Egyptian  flags.  After  verifying 
native  reports  of  the  Dervish  strength  and  surveying 
the  course  of  the  Nile,  the  two  officers  had  accom- 
plished all  that  was  expected  of  them  ;  they  accordingly 
returned  to  Unyoro  in  order  to  take  up  more  pressing 
work  in  that  province. 

In  one  way  Vandeleur  was  fortunate  in  the  date 
of  his  arrival  on  the  waters  of  the  Upper  Nile,  which 
were  destined  during  the  five  ensuing  years  to  be 
opened  up  from  the  north,  south  and  west.  At  the 
date  of  his  journey  the  Khalifa  was  still  in  full  power 
at  Omdurman  and  the  people  of  Great  Britain  had 
hardly  realised  that  there  was  work  to  be  done  on 


SOLDIERING  IN  UGANDA  51 

the  African  continent.  It  was  Vandeleur's  privilege 
to  take  an  active  part  in  all  this  work,  but  he  was 
also  a  thinker ;  and  this  is  what  he  wrote  in  1897  (the 
date  is  important)  concerning  the  Upper  Nile : 

"It  is  towards  Fashoda  that  French  expeditions 
are  now  hurrying,  both  from  the  French  Congo  on  the 
west,  a  journey  of  2000  miles  via  the  Ubangi  and 
Mbomu  rivers,  and  from  Abyssinia  on  the  east.  Two 
years  ago  (1895)  Semio,  an  advanced  post  on  the 
Mbomu  river,  was  occupied  ;  and  latterly  a  further 
advance  has  been  made  across  the  watershed  between 
the  Congo  and  the  Nile,  to  Dem  Zibehr,  a  distance 
of  180  miles,  and  a  small  post  established  at  Tambura 
(under  M.  Liotard)  on  the  Sue  river  170  miles  to  the 
east,  without  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  natives. 
The  post  is,  of  course,  isolated,  and  necessary  supplies 
have  to  be  transported  all  this  long  distance  from  the 
base,  but  the  fact  remains  that  the  French  are  now 
on  the  watershed  of  the  Nile,  and  they  need  find  no 
difficulty — except  in  the  matter  of  transport  and  food 
— in  establishing  themselves  at  Meshra-el-Rek,  even  if 
they  have  not  reached  that  place  already.  Junker 
journeyed  from  the  latter  place  to  Dem  Zibehr  by  Jur 
Ghattas  in  nineteen  days,  through  the  country  inhabited 
by  the  Dinkas.  It  is  reported  that  a  large  and  well- 
armed  expedition,  composed  of  men  of  the  Foreign 
Legion  and  tirailleurs  Senegalais,  all  starting  from 
Semio  under  Captain  Marchand — supported  by  four 
other  officers — is  to  co-operate  with  that  under  M. 
Liotard  at  Dem  Zibehr,  and  is  carrying  a  small  steel 
gun-boat  with  it.  The  difficulties  in  the  way  of  trans- 
porting such  a  vessel  a  distance  of  over  300  miles  are 
very  great,  as  we  have  seen  in  trying  to  transport  a 
steamer  in  sections  to  the  Victoria  Nvanza  from  the 


52  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

east  coast.  Although  the  Bahr-el-Ghazal  province 
is  peopled  by  some  of  the  most  warlike  races  in  the 
Sudan  and  supplies  the  best  recruits  for  the  Sudanese 
battalions,  there  is  no  cohesion  among  them  and  they 
recognise  no  single  ruler  or  head.  This  fact  will  make 
the  French  advance  easier,  as  no  organised  opposition 
on  a  large  scale  will  be  met  with.  The  majority  of 
the  natives  are  not  fanatical  Mohammedans.  The 
other  expedition  from  the  east,  under  the  Marquis  de 
Bonchamps  who  is  taking  with  him  an  escort  of  armed 
Abyssinians,  had,  in  July  1897,  reached  Gore,  close 
to  the  place  where  Captain  Bott6go  was  killed  four 
months  before,  joining  here  an  expedition  under 
another  Frenchman,  Captain  Clochette,  who  has  since 
died.  They  went  on  from  here  to  the  Didessa  river, 
which  flows  into  the  Blue  Nile.  Besides  experiencing 
transport  difficulties  they  were  beginnng  to  suffer 
from  desertions  on  the  part  of  their  men. 

"  One  can  but  admire  the  enterprise  of  these  French 
officers  in  leading  their  perilous  expeditions  ;  but  what 
does  it  all  mean,  and  why  should  the  French  be  pushing 
on  with  such  speed  into  what  is  clearly  regarded  as  the 
Anglo-Egyptian  sphere  of  influence  in  the  Nile  valley, 
remote  as  it  is  from  their  own  territories  in  Africa  ?  " 

The  above  quotation,  which  so  prophetically  fore- 
told what  was  actually  to  happen  at  Fashoda  in 
August,  1898,  is  taken  from  Vandeleur's  book,  ''  Cam- 
paigning on  the  Upper  Nile  and  Niger"  ;  there  is,  how- 
ever, reason  to  believe  that  he  had  put  the  case  even 
more  plainly  in  his  original  manuscript,  the  proofs 
of  which  were  submitted  to  the  Foreign  Office  before 
publication.  But  what  has  been  quoted  above  is  after 
all  sufficient  to  show  that  our  Foreign  Office  had  ample 
warning  of  impending  events  ;   and  it  is  futile  to  plead 


SOLDIERING  IN  UGANDA  53 

on  its  behalf  that  there  was  no  reUable  evidence  of  the 
aggression  with  which  the  French  menaced  us  on  the 
Upper  Nile.  But  a  deaf  ear  was  turned  to  the  warning, 
with  the  result  that  130  black  soldiers  under  Major 
Marchand  caused  the  British  Empire  to  mobilise  its 
fleets  and  prepare  for  war  in  all  parts  of  the  world,  no  in- 
significant performance  for  a  major  of  marines  and  a 
handful  of  blacks.  The  French  gave  way  directly  they 
realised  that  our  Government  and  people  meant  busi- 
ness in  the  Fashoda  incident,  but  why,  one  asks,  did 
not  the  French  Government  realise  beforehand  that 
we  should  stand  firm  and  hold  by  our  rights  on  the 
Nile? 

The  reply  seems  to  be  that  British  Governments 
had  shirked  imperial  responsibilities  for  so  many  years 
that  the  French  had  every  reason  to  believe  we  should 
give  way  on  the  Nile,  as  we  had  done  at  other  places. 
European  nations  were  all  equally  surprised  at  the  firm- 
ness we  displayed  after  we  found  Marchand  at  Fashoda. 
It  was  a  revelation  to  them  to  see  us  give  up  pusil- 
lanimity and  maintain  our  rights  ;  and  yet  it  is  surely 
the  business  of  a  wise  diplomacy  to  enlighten  continen- 
tal Cabinets  as  to  the  questions  we  deem  vital  to  our 
interests,  and  to  do  this  before  instead  of  after  the 
mobilisation  of  the  Channel  Fleet.  On  the  other  hand 
it  may  fairly  be  claimed  that  our  menace  of  war  had 
a  more  potent  effect  than  any  diplomatic  representa- 
tion';. 

However  that  may  be,  let  us  at  any  rate  recognise 
that  the  French  officers  in  Africa  did  not  muddle  along 
and  trust  everything  to  chance.  Every  detail  of  their 
adventurous  scheme  was  carefully  thought  out  and 
arranged  for :  it  took  them  about  three  years  to 
organise  the  expedition  from  the  west  coast  and  the 
expedition  from    the  east  coast  which  were  to  meet 


54  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

at  the  confluence  of  the  Sobat  river  and  the  Nile.  The 
expedition  from  Abyssinia  was  numerous  and  well 
armed,  but  Menelik  refused  to  entrust  it  to  any  com- 
mander but  an  Abyssinian.  Two  Frenchmen  and  an 
officer  of  the  Russian  Guards  accompanied  it  and  gave 
advice  ;  but  the  Ras  commanded,  and  being  a  true 
son  of  the  highlands,  he  would  have  nothing  to  do  with 
boats  of  any  sort.  The  Abyssinians  consequently 
suffered  frightful  hardships  in  the  Sobat  marshes  and 
many  died  in  the  unaccustomed  climate  ;  nevertheless 
they  reached  the  junction  of  the  Nile  and  Sobat  in 
July,  1898,  and  planted  the  Abyssinian  flag.  But 
the  Ras  was  furious  because  he  did  not  find  Marchand 
and  the  French  waiting  for  him  at  the  rendezvous,  as 
had  been  promised,  so  he  at  once  retired  to  Abyssinia, 
in  spite  of  the  entreaties  of  his  three  European  friends. 
All  they  could  do  under  such  circumstances  was  to 
write  a  letter  explaining  the  cause  of  their  retreat, 
place  it  in  a  bottle,  and  tie  the  bottle  to  a  long  pole 
which  they  erected  at  the  place  of  rendezvous.  The 
Abyssinians  would  not  consent  to  wait  even  one  day 
for  their  allies.  Only  ten  days  later  Marchand  arrived 
from  the  west,  found  the  letter  in  the  bottle  tied  to 
the  pole  and  at  once  sent  Captain  Baratier  in  the 
steamer  Faidherbe  up  the  Sobat  to  bring  back  the 
Abyssinians.  But  the  current  was  strong,  progress 
against  it  was  slow,  and  the  Abyssinians  had  been  in 
a  desperate  hurry  to  get  home.  Owing  to  the  marshes 
along  the  Sobat  they  moved  at  a  considerable  distance 
from  the  river  ;  so,  though  Baratier  accomplished  a 
remarkable  journey  of  250  miles  up-stream,  he  never 
came  in  touch  with  those  he  was  seeking.  This  was 
a  bitter  disappointment  to  Marchand,  as  the  scheme 
of  uniting  French  and  Abyssinian  territory  on  the  Nile 
was  the  essential  feature  of  his  plan  for  severing  the 


SOLDIERING  IN  UGANDA  55 

Eg3/ptian  Sudan  from  Uganda  and  cutting  the  Cape 
to  Cairo  line  for  ever. 

It  may  perhaps  interest  my  readers  to  know  that, 
as  soon  as  Marchand  quitted  our  territory  in  1898,  I 
traced  the  routes  both  of  the  Abyssinians  and  of 
Baratier  up  the  Sobat  and  am  in  possession  of  a 
"  letter  of  protection  "  bestowed  by  the  French  officer 
on  one  local  chief  and  of  a  silk  Abyssinian  flag  which 
was  forced  on  another  chief.  This  digression  into  the 
Fashoda  incident,  and  the  admirable  forethought 
which  Vandeleur  brought  to  bear  on  it  before  the  event, 
will  illustrate  better  than  pages  of  biography  how 
intimately  he  was  acquainted  with  events  in  Equatorial 
Africa.  We  will  now  return  to  the  year  1895  and  to  the 
practical  work  in  which  he  was  engaged. 

On  reaching  the  fort  at  Hoima,  news  arrived  that 
Kabarega,  King  of  Unyoro,  was  on  the  warpath  with 
1200  men,  raiding  the  country  for  slaves  and  loot ; 
and  that  one  or  two  Arab  caravans  were  importing 
arms  and  ammunition  for  various  predatory  local 
chiefs.  The  curious  thing  was  that  the  natives  were 
generally  in  league  with  these  caravans,  although  the 
result  of  importing  arms  was  invariably  to  cause 
slave-raids  on  a  large  scale,  with  the  usual  loss  of  hfe 
and  liberty  to  themselves  !  Even  in  kingdoms  Hke 
Unyoro  and  Uganda,  which  had  been  more  or  less 
organised  for  centuries,  the  people  had  no  collective 
interests  :  one  tribe  would  attack  its  neighbour  solely 
because  it  felt  strong  enough  to  ensure  success  :  a 
village  would  likewise  prey  upon  another  village  of 
the  same  tribe.  Amid  this  welter  of  strife  there  could 
be  no  mutual  confidence  between  man  and  man,  nor 
an  organised  party  hostile  to  slavery  :  it  was  only  when 
some  exceptionally  capable  man  arose  in  the  shape  of 
a  king  or  witch-doctor  that  the  natives  banded  them- 


56  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

selves  together  for  concerted  action  :  and  this  was 
usually  brought  about  with  the  object  of  enslaving 
the  neighbourhood.  Such  were  the  normal  conditions 
of  society  previous  to  the  advent  of  Englishmen,  and 
the  numerous  expeditions  sent  against  Kabarega  and 
others  arose  from  the  necessity  of  stopping  slave  raids. 
In  these  expeditions  the  backbone  consisted  of  the 
Sudanese  soldiers,  organised  into  companies  under 
their  own  native  officers.  To  this  backbone  of  regulars 
were  added  temporary  local  levies  ;  the  whole  force 
being  controlled  by  a  handful  of  young  British  officers. 
There  was  an  immense  amount  of  work  to  be  done 
in  many  parts  of  a  wide  territory,  entailing  arduous 
marches  in  single  file  along  faint  tracks,  through 
tropical  forests  and  across  frequent  swamps  :  the 
British  officers  were  too  few,  and  these  few  were  too 
frequently  changed.  Owing  to  the  difficulty  of  convey- 
ing goods  from  the  coast,  the  troops  were  generally 
without  clothing  and  often  in  arrears  of  pay  and 
yet  were  not  allowed  to  loot. 

The  expedition  against  Kabarega  started  in  two 
columns  on  February  20,  1895,  with  the  maxim  gun 
detachment  commanded  by  Vandeleur  and  was  com- 
posed of  four  and  a  half  companies  of  Sudanese  and 
some  2000  irregular  Baganda  and  Bunyoro  levies. 
It  marched  through  Northern  Unyoro  to  the  Victoria 
Nile  and  encamped  on  an  island  opposite  the  enemy's 
position.  The  river  was  here  iioo  yards  broad,  and 
the  masses  of  "  sudd "  on  either  side  rendered  the 
crossing  difficult.  Every  opening  in  the  vegetation 
on  the  enemy's  bank  was  defended  by  stockades  and 
entrenchments,  and  these  had  to  be  attacked  from  the 
island,  under  cover  of  a  maxim  gun  fusillade. 

The  attack  was  timed  for  dawn  on  March  2,  and  the 
intervening  days  were  devoted  to  the  construction  of 


SOLDIERING  IN  UGANDA  57 

a  raised  platform  at  the  edge  of  the  water,  on  which 
the  maxims  were  posted.  It  was  a  cold  misty  dawn 
when  the  five  canoes  carrying  the  Sudanese  under 
Cunningham,  Dunning  and  Ashburnham  pushed  out 
and  proceeded  along  a  narrow  channel  in  the  weeds 
to  the  edge  of  the  open  water,  where  they  were  to  wait 
for  daylight.  Meanwhile  Vandeleur  was  straining 
his  eyes  from  the  platform  to  get  a  glimpse  of  the 
opposite  shore.  At  last  the  air  cleared,  the  canoes 
paddled  out  into  the  stream  and  the  maxims  opened 
fire  ;  but  the  enemy  were  prepared.  They  opened  a 
heavy  fusillade  on  the  advancing  canoes,  upset  two  of 
them,  and  completely  repulsed  the  attack.  Cunning- 
ham and  Dunning  were  severely  wounded  ;  Ashburn- 
ham had  a  narrow  escape  from  a  bullet  in  his  helmet  ; 
several  of  the  men  were  killed  and  wounded.  The 
care  of  the  wounded  officers  being  now  the  main 
consideration,  it  was  decided  to  withdraw  to  Hoima. 
Dunning,  shot  through  the  chest,  was  in  a  critical 
condition,  but  there  was  no  medical  man  to  attend  on 
him,  and  all  that  was  known  of  the  nearest  available 
doctor  was  that  he  had  "  started  from  the  coast  in 
November,"  and  might,  therefore,  by  now  have  reached 
Hoima. 

The  melancholy  procession  accordingly  quitted  the 
feverish  camp  on  the  island,  escorting  the  wounded 
officers  through  undergrowth  and  swamps  which  sorely 
impeded  the  bearers,  and  constantly  harassed  by 
natives  flushed  with  victory. 

"  On  March  9  [wrote  Vandeleur]  a  black  came  up 
in  haste  to  the  front  of  the  column  to  fetch  me,  and  on 
going  back  a  short  way  I  found  poor  Dunning  quite 
unconscious.  His  litter  had  been  placed  on  the 
ground,   and  the  bearers   were  standing  round  in   a 


58  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

helpless  manner.  I  made  every  effort  to  restore  him, 
but  in  vain,  and  at  length  the  sad  conviction  stole  over 
me  that  he  was  dead.  I  had  striven  hard  not  to  believe 
that  this  was  the  case,  and  must  confess  to  giving  way 
altogether,  in  grief  of  the  loss  of  a  brave  and  gallant 
comrade  and  realising  the  utter  sadness  of  such  a 
death  in  this  far-off  savage  land.  .  .  .  Ashburnham 
and  I  were  anxious  about  Cunningham,  and  he  was 
not  informed  of  Dunning's  death  till,  on  reaching 
Hoima,  the  fact  could  no  longer  be  concealed.  Here, 
to  our  dismay,  there  was  still  no  doctor,  and  Dr. 
Mackinnon  did  not  arrive  till  March  30.  However, 
Cunningham,  with  rest  and  care,  improved  gradually 
and  was  soon  able  to  get  about  on  crutches." 

Such  are  the  risks  which  British  officers  incur  on  distant 
expeditions,  when  the  proverbial  "  corporal's  guard  " 
is  called  upon  to  secure  a  province.  To  criticise  is 
easy,  but  we  should  recollect  that,  unless  during  three 
centuries  we  had  secured  provinces  with  corporal's 
guards,  we  should  now  have  but  few  provinces  in  the 
Empire. 

Every  effort  was  made  to  collect  a  stronger  force 
and,  by  April  20,  Cunningham  was  well  enough  to  take 
command  of  the  following  men  assembled  at  Mruli, 
on  the  Victoria  Nile  :  six  companies  Sudanese  (500 
men)  ;  20,000  Baganda,  under  the  Katikiro  (general 
of  the  Uganda  army) ;  two  Hotchkiss  guns,  three 
maxim  guns,  and  the  following  British  officers — 
Ternan,  Ashburnham,  Madocks,  Vandeleur,  Dr.  Mac- 
kinnon. 

Kabarega  and  his  men  had  moved  further  east, 
and  were  in  larger  numbers  in  the  Wakedi  country 
opposite  Mruli,  spending  busy  nights  in  digging  en- 
trenchments   and    hammering    at    stockades    on    the 


SOLDIERING  IN  UGANDA  59 

cliffs  of  the  Nile  bank.  By  day  our  maxims  harassed 
them  continually  from  across  the  river.  On  the  22nd 
Mr.  Grant  arrived  with  a  fleet  of  canoes  and  delivered 
a  successful  attack,  covered  by  a  heavy  fire  from  the 
Hotchkiss  and  maxims.  The  canoes  crossed  the  river 
to  the  barrier  of  "  sudd/'  where  their  occupants  waded 
ashore  and  carried  the  stockade  by  storm.  This 
decided  the  day,  and  in  a  few  moments  the  enemy 
could  be  seen  flying  over  the  hill,  pursued  by  the 
Baganda.  They  had  fought  well,  as  the  dead  found 
in  the  trenches,  forty-three  in  number,  showed. 

The  next  three  days  were  occupied  by  the  force  in 
crossing  over  the  Nile,  with  the  exception  of  a  detach- 
ment under  Ashburnham,  sent  along  the  left  bank  to 
prevent  Kabarega  from  crossing  back  into  Unyoro.  The 
main  body  advanced  along  the  right  bank,  supported  by 
the  canoes,  one  of  which,  called  the  flag-ship,  was  hewn 
out  of  a  single  tree  and  easily  held  fifty  men  and  a 
maxim.  Kabarega  retreated  through  the  Wakedi 
country,  whose  inhabitants  are  a  primitive  and  naked 
people,  armed  with  spears,  bows  and  poisoned  arrows, 
a  race  of  small  men,  formidable  on  account  of  their 
boldness  and  agility.  They  are  famed  for  night 
attacks,  in  which  they  had  frequently  routed  our  allies 
the  Baganda  in  times  past  and  they  inspired  consider- 
able dread.  However,  our  policy  was  one  of  friendliness 
to  the  Wakedi,  with  whom  we  had  no  quarrel,  and 
strict  orders  were  issued  that  their  villages  were  not 
to  be  molested  ;  but  their  hostihty  to  the  Baganda 
prompted  them  to  spear  both  men  and  women  from 
the  cover  of  the  high  grass,  and  their  agility  enabled 
them  to  escape  unhurt  ;  consequently,  the  Baganda 
could  not  always  be  restrained  from  retaliating  on  the 
villages. 

The  pursuit  of  Kabarega  by  a  ponderous  column 


6o  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

surrounded  by  unfriendly  Wakedi  evidently  had  but 
slight  chances  of  success,  so  Cunningham  sent  forward 
a  flying  column  of  two  companies  Sudanese,  one  maxim, 
7000  Baganda  under  Madocks  and  Vandeleur.  This 
force  started  in  the  lightest  possible  order  ;  marched 
at  a  rapid  pace  the  whole  of  one  day,  and  was  off  again 
at  dawn  the  following  morning  ;  the  tracks  of  the 
enemy's  cattle  became  fresher  each  hour  ;  there  even 
seemed  a  chance  of  coming  up  with  Kabarega's  main 
body.  The  pace  grew  faster  and  faster,  and  the 
Baganda  scouts  were  hke  hounds  in  full  cry.  Un- 
luckily, a  halt  at  noon  was  absolutely  necessary  to 
enable  the  porters  carrying  ammunition  to  come  up, 
as  the  Wakedi  threatened  to  rush  the  rear.  At  3  p.m. 
an  immense  quantity  of  cattle  were  captured,  with  a 
loss  to  us  of  ten  killed  and  wounded.  But  the  pace 
had  been  too  fast,  our  men  were  too  tired  to  move 
further  that  day,  and  so  Kabarega  eluded  pursuit. 
A  zariba  was  formed  and  watch  kept  against  a  night 
attack  by  the  Wakedi,  to  whom  the  captured  cattle 
formed  an  overwhelming  temptation.  Next  day  the 
flying  column  rejoined  the  main  body  in  safety. 

The  result  of  the  campaign  was  that  forts  and 
administrative  posts  were  established  in  northern 
Unyoro  and  along  the  Victoria  Nile  ;  that  some  250 
women  and  children,  w^ho  had  been  raided  in  past 
years,  were  restored  to  their  homes  ;  and  that  Kaba- 
rega, though  he  eluded  capture,  suffered  a  severe  loss 
of  cattle,  was  driven  from  the  country  and  his  sphere 
of  iniquity  considerably  diminished.  He  had  finally 
to  be  dealt  with  by  another  expedition  a  few  years 
later. 

Vandeleur  returned  to  Hoima,  and  found  they  had 
been  having  exciting  times,  as  the  following  entries 
in  the  diar}^  of  Mr.  Foster,  will  show  : 


SOLDIERING  IN  UGANDA  6i 

"  April  19. — Lion  visited  camp  during  night  and 
carried  off  woman. 

"  April  20. — Lion  came  again  and  took  another 
woman. 

"  April  21. — Lion  carried  off  a  man.  Seen  by 
patrols  and  fired  at.  He  visited  cattle-house  and  was 
wounded  by  guard. 

"  April  22. — Section  went  out  to  look  for  lion  and 
found  him  near  river.  Badly  wounded,  but  very 
fierce  !     Was  killed  and  brought  to  camp. 

"  April  24. — Another  lion  (probably  lioness)  visited 
camp  during  night  and  carried  off  child.  Was  seen 
by  patrols  and  fired  at. 

"  April  25. — Lioness  came  again  and  went  to 
cattle-house,  where  guard  fired  at  and  wounded  her. 
One  of  the  shots  struck  house  at  considerable  distance 
and  entered  thigh  of  woman,  where  it  still  remains. 
Woman  apparently  httle  the  worse. 

"  May  3. — Askari  (soldier)  broke  out  of  camp  at 
night  in  drunken  state  and  fired  six  shots  at  sentries. 
Attempts  made  to  capture  him,  but  without  success." 

And  yet  some  people  think  life  in  Africa  must  be 
so  dull ! 

Vandeleur's  stay  in  this  exciting  spot  was  brief, 
as  in  two  days  he  was  sent  on  an  expedition,  this  time 
in  command.  Disturbances  had  been  rife  in  Southern 
Unyoro  owing  to  Arab  caravans  bringing  arms  and 
gunpowder  into  the  country  in  exchange  for  slaves 
and  ivory.  Cunningham  was  down  with  blackwater 
fever,  so  Vandeleur  was  ordered  off  with  two  com- 
panies Sudanese,  one  maxim  and  the  Baganda  irregu- 
lars ;  total,  250  men.  The  httle  force  pushed  forward 
as  quickly  as  pouring  rain  and  difficult  tracks  allowed. 
The  country  was    entirely  unmapped  and  it  was  not 


62  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

easy  to  obtain  information  as  to  the  whereabouts  of 
the  Arab  station — the  objective  of  the  expedition. 
By  good  luck,  however,  it  was  located  on  the  further 
side  of  two  big  swamps  and  a  river.  These  crossed, 
a  road  led  to  the  station,  and  owing  to  the  high  grass 
surrounding  it,  Vandeleur  and  his  men  surprised  and 
captured  it  successfully.  Eighteen  prisoners  were 
taken  and  several  slaves,  besides  a  quantity  of  cloth, 
ivory,  silks,  guns  and  gunpowder,  but  the  leaders 
themselves  escaped  into  the  bush. 

It  is  curious  that  this  station  had  existed  so  long 
without  being  discovered  and  shows  the  difficulty  of 
ascertaining  what  goes  on  in  this  wilderness  of  high 
elephant  grass  and  river  swamps.  Kalfan,  the  leading 
Arab,  had  been  in  Unyoro  two  years  and  employed  a 
number  of  subordinates  who  conducted  caravans  to 
and  from  the  coast  through  German  territory.  It 
must  have  been  a  lucrative  trade,  as  the  price  of  slaves 
was  not  high.  One  woman  said  she  had  been  bought 
for  three  goats,  with  an  extra  goat  thrown  in  for 
her  child.  Another  woman  had  been  sold  for  a 
load  of  beads,  and  others  for  guns.  Apparently  there 
was  a  demand  for  fat  ladies,  as  there  were  four  Baganda 
slaves  of  such  mountainous  proportions  that  they  could 
hardly  move  about. 

On  the  return  journey  Vandeleur  resolved  to  follow 
a  different  road  and  was  rewarded  with  a  piece  of 
great  good  fortune.  His  scouts  warned  him  that  a 
caravan  was  approaching,  having  chosen  this  very 
route  in  order  to  avoid  him,  and  sure  enough  the  Arab 
leaders,  strolling  at  the  head  of  their  men,  walked 
straight  into  the  arms  of  an  ambush  concealed  in  the 
high  grass.  Some  escaped ;  but  the  leaders,  many 
prisoners  and  all  the  loot  of  the  caravan  fell  into  the 
hands  of  Vandeleur's  delighted  Sudanese.     As  a  result 


KOAD  MAKING    IN    UGANDA    FORESTS 
Crossing  a  Swamp 


SOLDIERING  IN  UGANDA  63 

of  this  expedition  the  local  chiefs  came  in  to  make  their 
peace  with  the  British,  communications  were  opened 
and  confidence  restored,  and  by  July  i,  Vandeleur  was 
back  at  Hoima  with  his  captured  loot,  prisoners  and 
slaves.  His  men  were  granted  two  months'  pay  as  a 
gratuity  for  their  services  ;  he  himself  received  a  letter 
of  warm  congratulation  from  the  headquarters  of  the 
Protectorate,  and  his  reputation  as  a  successful  leader 
of  men  was  established  in  Uganda. 

Shortly  afterwards  he  received  orders  to  march 
with  a  detachment  of  Sudanese  to  fake  part  in  an 
impending  expedition  against  the  Nandi  tribe,  and  he 
thus  quitted  Unyoro  for  ever. 

During  his  nine  months'  stay  there  he  collected 
the  material  for  the  first  authentic  map  of  the 
country ;  and  so  excellent  and  accurate  was  his  geo- 
graphical work  that  he  was  subsequently  awarded 
the  Murchison  Grant  by  the  Royal  Geographical 
Society,  one  of  the  highest  compliments  which  could  be 
paid  to  an  officer  who  was  not  an  engineer  by  trade, 
and  whose  duties  were  as  numerous  as  Vandeleur's. 

Space  forbids  any  but  a  cursory  description  of  the 
Nandi  expedition,  the  troops  for  which  consisted  of 
400  Sudanese,  a  maxim,  and  a  contingent  of  30  Baganda. 
Such  a  force  proved  inadequate  to  the  task  imposed 
on  it,  as  the  country  was  mountainous  and  it  was 
impossible  to  ascertain  anything  concerning  it,  for  the 
surrounding  natives  held  the  Nandi  in  such  dread  that 
they  refused  to  act  as  guides.  A  desultory  and  harass- 
ing campaign  was  the  result  ;  the  little  expedition 
advanced  far  into  the  mountains,  finally  attaining  an 
altitude  of  9000  feet  ;  only  on  two  occasions  did  the 
Nandi  attack  in  strength,  but  sniping  was  a  matter  of 
daily  occurrence,  and  every  night  the  force  packed  itself 
into  a  zariba,  the  sentries  calling  out  the  numbers  of 


64  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

their  posts  monotonously  and  incessantly  throughout 
the  night  to  ensure  keeping  awake.  The  officers 
learned  afterwards  from  prisoners  that  this  precaution 
had  saved  them  from  night  attacks,  a  method  of 
warfare  especially  favoured  by  the  Nandi. 

One  day,  when  the  expedition  had  chmbed  over 
several  mountains  without  seeing  an  enemy,  heavy 
firing  in  front  announced  that  the  patrol  was  engaged. 

"  The  column  prepared  for  action  ;    and  none  too 
soon.     Only  a  few  natives  were  visible  on  the  ridge, 
and  it  was  with  astonishment  we  saw  a  crowd  of  about 
500  coming  over  the  top  of  the  hill  at  great  speed, 
apparently  well  organised  and  formed  in  three  sides 
of  a  square,   above   which  a   dense   thicket   of  long- 
bladed  spears  flashed  in  the  sunlight.     Wheeling  to 
the  left  by  a  common  impulse,  on  they  came,  in  spite 
of  the  maxim,  and  charged  down  with  great  dash  on 
our  force,  which  closed  up  to  face  the  attack.     It  was 
a  critical  moment,  but  the  Sudanese  stood  firm,  and 
as   the   mass   of   natives   approached   our   heavy   fire 
began  to  tell.     Nearer  and  nearer  they  came  and  it 
almost  seemed  that  they  would  overwhelm  my  com- 
pany, which  had  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  attack  ;   but 
at  last,  wavering  before  the  leaden  hail  which  they  had 
never  before  experienced,  their  ranks  broke  and  they 
scattered  in  all  directions,  leaving  many  of  their  num- 
ber on  the  ground.      It  was  a  splendid  charge,  and,  if 
continued  for  thirty  yards  more,  would  have  been  a 
successful    one.     Fourteen    of    our    men    were    killed. 
This  charge  was  a  revelation  to  us  after  fighting  the 
cautious  Bunyoro  and  Arabs,  and  at  once  accounted 
for  the  reputation  and  prestige  which  the  Nandi  en- 
joyed amongst  other  East  African   tribes.     They  are 
a  fine-looking  race,  very  black,  strong  and  muscular." 


SOLDIERING  IN  UGANDA  65 

Two  nights  afterwards  they  attempted  a  desperate 
night  attack,  which  hkewise  failed,  the  flame  from 
the  rifles  causing  more  panic  to  the  Nandi  than  their 
heavy  losses  the  day  before.  After  this  they  attempted 
no  further  attacks,  but  operations  dragged  on  profit- 
lessly  enough  for  another  month  and  when,  on  New 
Year's  Day,  1896,  the  expedition  returned  to  Uganda, 
it  left  the  Nandi  cowed,  but  by  no  means  subdued. 
In  fact  so  intolerable  did  their  depredations  become, 
much  after  the  fashion  of  the  Scottish  Highlanders 
of  old,  that  in  1900  a  strong  force  was  sent  to  subdue 
them.  After  six  months'  fighting  had  taught  them 
our  power,  they  sued  for  peace,  became  our  good  friends 
and  some  of  their  "  young  bloods  "  are  now  members 
of  the  Uganda  Constabulary,  the  guardians  of  law 
and  order. 

Vandeleur  had  now  but  a  few  months  to  spend  in 
East  Africa,  for  in  April  he  embarked  for  England  at 
Mombasa.  Reviewing  his  work  it  may  truthfully 
be  said  that  he  never  spent  an  idle  moment,  that 
at  twenty-six  he  had  laid  the  foundation  of  a  good 
military  reputation  and  that  his  services  were  highly 
appreciated  by  his  superiors. 

As  regards  himself  the  years  spent  in  Uganda 
marked  out  the  trend  of  his  after  life.  Africa  laid  her 
hold  on  him  as  she  does  on  other  men,  and  hence- 
forward service  abroad  became  the  one  thing  worth 
living  for.  It  was  not  merely  from  love  of  fighting 
or  from  a  vague  feeling  that  soldiering  at  home  was 
not  good  enough  that  he  was  drawn  away.  The 
African  country,  the  natives,  the  work  and  all  the 
circumstances  of  life  in  a  land  of  spacious  areas 
attracted  him. 

He  was  delighted  to  return  to  home  ties  and  friends 
and  his  regiment  and  regarded  such  times  as  a  holiday, 

E 


66  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

but  his  real  interest  lay  elsewhere.  Indeed,  he  did 
his  best  to  pass  straight  from  Uganda  to  another  sphere 
of  African  warfare.  The  Dongola  Expedition  was 
about  to  start,  and  Seymour  broke  his  journey  at 
Cairo  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  employment  in  it. 
There  were,  however,  no  vacancies,  so  he  lost  his  com- 
fortable P.  &  O.  berth  for  nothing,  and  had  to  put  up 
with  a  disagreeable  passage  in  the  cabin  of  a  cargo 
boat.  During  the  next  few  months  he  thought  of 
going  out  to  the  Matabele  War,  but  was  again  dis- 
appointed, so  began  reading  for  the  Staff  College 
and — with  Egypt  still  in  his  mind — embarked  on  the 
study  of  Arabic. 

Despite  these  pre-occupations,  Seymour  thoroughly 
enjoj^ed  his  London  season  and  cultivated  new  friends 
some  of  whom,  like  himself,  had  their  thoughts  centred 
on  African  topics.  His  stock  of  information  was  already 
considerable  and,  though  very  modest  about  it,  he 
was  not  too  self-conscious  to  discuss  things  with  men  of 
greater  experience.  He  was  elected  a  Fellow  of  the 
Royal  Geographical  Society,  became  a  regular  atten- 
dant at  their  meetings  and  read  a  paper  on  Uganda. 
At  Liverpool  he  also  gave  a  lecture  to  the  British  Asso- 
ciation on  his  journey  down  the  Nile  to  Dufile. 

His  maps  of  the  Nandi  country  and  Unyoro 
attracted  attention  at  the  War  Office  and  were  adopted 
by  the  Intelligence  Department  as  the  official  surveys 
of  those  territories,  giving  Vandeleur  much  hard  work 
to  complete  them.  After  he  rejoined  his  battalion 
in  London  a  reward  for  his  services  reached  him  in  the 
shape  of  the  D.S.O. — a  decoration  which  was  not  then 
so  much  worn  as  it  is  now.  He  received  the  announce- 
ment with  unbounded  delight  and  records  in  his  diary 
a  few  days  later  that  he  was  on  the  Queen's  Guard 
with  Captain  Pulteney  and  "  feels  sure  that  it  is  the 


4 


UGANDA    &    EAST  AFRICA   PROTECTORATE. 


,    -i^/naitjf^         ^      Zi^ut'VtaideleursMarch-ijvred 
«a  <iiSi'.„,       I       ■  dolted.Unes,6f-Sai;tSMtir2SfJrf.m96. 


J 


Stan/brt£s   Geog'-  Eatai^  Lorudon. 


SOLDIERING  IN  UGANDA  67 

first  time  that  two  D.S.O.s  have  been  on  guard 
together." 

He  received  the  decoration  from  the  hands  of  the 
Queen  at  Windsor  just  at  the  time  when  the  wish  of 
his  heart  was  granted,  in  that  he  obtained  Sir  George 
Goldie's  offer  of  six  months'  special  service  in  the  Niger 
Protectorate.  Thus  he  set  forth  again  at  the  end  of 
November,  within  seven  months  of  his  return  to 
England. 

However,  before  we  follow  his  footsteps  any  further 
it  will  be  advisable  to  acquaint  ourselves  with  the  story 
of  Nigeria. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  STORY  OF  NIGERIA 

See  map  of  Africa  at  end  of  hook 

The  intention  of  this  chapter  is  to  afford  the  reader 
some  insight  into  the  general  history  of  the  States  of 
the  interior  of  northern  Africa,  and  especially  of  those 
which  are  called  British  Nigeria.  To  make  the  subject 
clear,  we  are  necessarily  taken  far  back  into  past 
centuries  and  moved  to  chronicle  the  enterprises  of 
energetic  men  whose  names  are  unfamiliar  to  English- 
men, unless  they  happen  to  be  acquainted  with  African 
history.  It  is  a  story  full  of  adventure  and  curious 
incident,  and  one  which  is  hkely  to  attract  more  and 
more  attention  in  these  islands,  now  that  Great  Britain 
has  occupied  her  share  of  the  Continent  and  become 
responsible  for  many  millions  of  its  inhabitants.  Under 
a  wise  government  Nigeria's  future  prosperity  is  likely 
to  be  prodigious  :  its  history,  meanwhile,  is  wondrously 
interesting. 

We  should,  however,  bear  in  mind  that  the  modern 
term  "  Nigeria "  is  a  European  colloquialism  which 
bears  but  slight  resemblance  to  the  native  subdivision 
of  the  country,  though  it  is  an  apt  expression  to  desig- 
nate the  region  over  which  King  Edward  VII.  rules. 
Its  frontiers  have  been  arbitrarily  arranged  between 
ourselves  and  France  and  Germany,  and  they  neces- 
sarily cut  in  twain  ancient  native  kingdoms  and 
settled  areas  which  happen  to  lie  on  the  border.  For 
the  sake  of  a  peaceful  solution  to  the  European  partition 


THE  STORY  OF  NIGERIA  69 

of  Africa,  we  must  abide  by  our  treaties  and  train  our 
subjects  to  acquiesce  in  their  altered  landmarks,  which, 
on  the  whole,  are  not  likely  to  prove  a  difficulty. 

A  glance  at  the  maps  of  Africa  will  put  the  reader 
in  possession  of  the  respective  French,  German,  and 
British  spheres,  to  which  we  need  not  again  refer  in 
retaihng  the  local  history.  He  will  see,  too,  the  whole 
course  of  the  Niger  river,  rising  behind  the  coast 
mountains  of  Sierra  Leone,  sweeping  in  a  magnificent 
semi-circle  through  populous  regions,  and  (with  its 
only  important  tributary,  the  Benue)  traversing 
3000  miles  of  Africa  on  its  journey  to  the  Atlantic. 
Yet  this  mighty  river  was  first  seen  by  the  Scotsman, 
Mungo  Park,  in  1796,  and  first  traced  to  its  mouth  by 
Richard  Lander  in  1830 — so  carefully  were  its  hundred 
mouths  concealed  in  mangrove  swamps  and  intricate 
channels. 

But,  although  authentic  confirmation  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  Niger  only  came  to  us  a  hundred  years  ago, 
the  river  had  been  discovered  by  the  Roman  explorer 
Juhus  Maternus,  who  crossed  the  Sahara  Desert  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Christian  era ;  he  was  followed  in 
37  A.D.  by  the  Roman  General  C.  Suetonius  Paulus, 
who  wrote  a  description  of  negroland  which  is  quoted 
by  Pliny.  These  explorers  had  no  incentive  beyond 
their  individual  enterprise,  no  financial  backing  save 
that  of  a  few  personal  friends  and  their  labours  con- 
sequently bore  no  permanent  results ;  for,  to  success- 
fully explore  and  map  a  continent  requires  for  its 
accompHshment  a  great  deal  more  than  the  geographer's 
curiosity  or  the  traveller's  desire  to  collect  incredible 
tales. 

With  the  disappearance  of  the  Roman  Empire 
and  the  events  which  followed  we  are  not  concerned, 
but  the  eighth  century  saw  a  revolutionising  change 
in  the  conditions  of  northern  Africa,  brought  about 


70  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

by  the  first  Arab  conquest  and  the  spread  of  a  revealed 
religion.  In  640  a.d.  a  certain  Amru  Ibn  el  Aasse 
invaded  Egypt  with  4000  Arabs  ;  and,  following  them, 
wave  upon  wave  of  Moslem  immigrants  poured  into  the 
northern  coastlands,  bearing  aloft  the  torch  of  Islam, 
inculcating  a  new  spiritual  life,  introducing  everywhere 
progressive  methods  of  agriculture,  commerce,  trade, 
industries  and,  above  all,  instituting  a  system  of 
government  which  proved  suitable  to  the  backward 
state  of  the  country.  Europe  was  swept  out  of  the 
continent,  including  the  remnants  of  that  remarkable 
crowd  of  80,000  Goths  who  crossed  over  from  Spain 
under  Genseric  in  480  a.d.  and  settled  about  Carthage, 
where  they  maintained  themselves  against  Rome  for 
a  century. 

These  Arab  conquerors  were  no  mere  land-grabbers 
and  plunderers  ;  they  set  systematically  to  work  to 
regenerate  the  country  and  henceforth  identified 
their  interests  with  it.  Cities  were  built  and  the  natives 
raised  above  their  condition  under  the  decayed  Empire 
of  Rome.  Thus  they  altered  the  destiny  of  the  in- 
digenous populations,  founded  states,  developed  a 
commercial  activity  more  extensive  than  that  of 
ancient  Carthage,  introduced  the  camel  into  Africa, 
instituted  regular  caravan  routes  across  the  continent 
and  protected  them,  so  that  merchandise  could,  for  the 
first  time,  be  transported  for  journeys  of  a  thousand 
miles  by  land.  To  assert  that  they  converted  and  ruled 
by  the  sword  alone  is  to  misrepresent  a  shrewd  race 
of  governors.  Education  and  industrial  development 
were  features  of  their  administrative  system,  without 
which  it  could  not  have  lasted  during  nine  centuries. 
Every  village  had  one  or  more  schools  where  Arabic 
reading  and  writing  were  taught  to  the  offspring  of 
the  Arabs  as  well  as  to  the  children  of  the  soil,  and 


THE  STORY  OF  NIGERIA  71 

where  the  Mohamedan  laws  of  the  Koran  were  ex- 
pounded and  learnt  by  heart.  These  Arabs  were  a 
prolific  race  and  did  not  disdain  marriage  with  the 
women  of  the  country,  so  class  distinctions  became 
gradually  attenuated  and  therefore  less  irksome  to  the 
governed  ;  slaves  and  eunuchs  could,  and  frequently 
did  rise  to  positions  of  power  and  responsibility. 

Arab  geographers  explored  the  continent  in  every 
direction  ;  historians  recorded  the  reigns  of  the  kings 
and  emperors  of  the  more  powerful  dynasties.  Streams 
of  pilgrims  poured  across  the  continent  to  Mecca,  and 
kept  up  a  continuous  intercourse  between  the  various 
States  through  which  they  passed.  When  we  look 
back  and  consider  the  times  and  the  general  state  of 
the  world  in  the  Middle  Ages,  and  reflect  upon  the 
inaccessibility  of  interior  Africa  and  the  difficulties 
the  Arabs  encountered,  we  must  admit  that  they 
accompUshed  a  great  work  of  civilisation  in  the  regions 
they  ruled. 

It  would  appear  from  the  records  that  the  religion 
of  Mohamed  first  crossed  the  Sahara  in  the  tenth 
century,  and  by  the  end  of  the  fourteenth  had  taken 
root  among  the  indigenous  negroes  of  the  Niger  region 
where  it  continues  to  spread  in  our  own  times.  Some 
of  the  Arab  explorers  were  men  of  considerable  mental 
attainments  and  understood  the  science  of  geography, 
such  as  El  Bekri,  who  lived  at  the  time  of  our  William 
the  Conqueror,  and  Idrissi  (1154),  to  whose  maps  and 
writings  we  are  indebted  for  a  first  ghmpse  of  the 
country  about  Lake  Chad  and  the  various  races  of 
Nigeria. 

In  1352,  a  man  who  rejoiced  in  the  name  of  Ibn 
Batuta  of  Tangier  was  commissioned  by  the  Sultan 
of  Morocco  to  undertake  an  expedition.  This  remark- 
able   explorer    journeyed    from    Fez    to    Timbuktu, 


72  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

descended  the  Niger  to  Gogo,  pushed  southwards  and 
eastwards  across  the  whole  continent,  emerged  near 
Zanzibar  and  returned  to  Morocco  through  the  eastern 
Sudan.  Unfortunately  his  book  of  travels  has  not  been 
preserved,  with  the  exception  of  a  portion  found  in 
Cairo,  though  it  is  hoped  that  careful  research  may 
ultimately  discover  a  copy.  Another  envoy  of  the 
court  of  Morocco  to  the  Sudanese  kings  was  Hassan 
el  Wasas,  known  in  Europe  as  Leo  Africanus,  whose 
"  Description  of  Africa,"  written  in  Arabic  in  1526, 
has  been  translated  into  Latin,  Italian,  French  and 
English.  There  were  numbers  of  other  historians  and 
explorers  at  work,  but  sufficient  indication  has  been 
given  to  show  how  widespread  was  Arab  influence 
and  how  extensive  the  territory  it  embraced.  It 
probably  attained  its  highest  development  in  the  six- 
teenth century,  since  when  it  has  been  either  stationary 
or  retrograde. 

All  along  the  Mediterranean  coast  the  fiery  zeal 
of  the  followers  of  the  Prophet  compelled  Berbers, 
Romans,  Greeks,  Goths  and  others  to  merge  their 
distinctions  and  become  Moslems  or  perish,  but  in 
the  course  of  centuries  this  ruthless  fanaticism  died 
down,  and  a  milder  procedure  than  that  of  exter- 
minating the  recalcitrant  was  employed  in  propounding 
the  faith  to  the  tribes  of  negroes  further  south.  Progress 
was  slower,  and  to  this  day  many  of  these  tribes  remain 
pagan,  but  the  ruling  families  of  negroland  embraced 
the  religion  of  the  Koran  with  avidity  ;  it  was  suited 
to  their  stage  of  mental  development,  it  appealed  to 
their  highest  instincts,  it  added  dignity  to  their  lives, 
and  many  of  them  became  zealous  missionaries  of 
Islam  amongst  their  unconverted  brethren. 

Negroland  suffered  no  such  incursion  of  Arab 
hordes  as  occurred  in  the  north.     Nature  in  the  form 


THE  STORY  OF  NIGERIA  73 

of  the  Sahara  interposed  a  belt  of  a  thousand  miles 
of  desert  between  the  fertile  shore  of  the  Mediterranean 
and  the  still  more  productive  districts  of  the  Sudan  ; 
the  desert  stretched  across  the  continent  from  the  Red 
Sea  to  the  Atlantic  and  was  the  determining  factor 
in  moulding  the  destiny  of  Nigeria.  In  this  connection 
it  is  instructive  to  look  along  the  13th  degree  of  north 
latitude,  which  roughly  divides  the  region  of  efficient 
rain  from  that  of  scanty  rain,  and  therefore  indicates 
the  temperate  rain-zone  of  northern  Africa.  It  divides 
populations  whose  wealth  consists  of  cattle,  from  those 
whose  wealth  is  camels  ;  it  has  an  average  elevation 
above  the  sea  of  1000  to  2000  feet ;  and  has  been  the 
scene  of  the  greatest  Arab  activity,  from  the  tenth 
century  down  to  the  Baggara  empire  of  the  Dervishes, 
which  recently  held  the  Egyptian  Sudan  in  an  iron 
grip. 

If  we  except  the  Abyssinian  highlands  (6000  feet 
average),  there  are  on  this  thirteenth  parallel  a  series 
of  powerful  negro- Arab  States,  adjoining  one  another 
across  the  full  breadth  of  the  continent.  These  ancient 
kingdoms  are  named  :  (i)  Senaar  (on  the  Blue  Nile)  ; 
(2)  Kordofan  (near  the  White  Nile)  ;  (3)  Darfur  (in 
the  British  sphere)  ;  (4)  Wadai  (in  the  French  sphere)  ; 
(5)  Bagirmi  (in  the  French  sphere)  ;  (6)  Bornu  {British)  ; 
(7)  Sokoto  (British)  ;  (8)  Gando  {British)  ;  (9)  The 
Songhay  Empire  {French)  ;  (10)  The  Melle  [Mandingo] 
Empire  {French)  ;  (11)  Bambara  {French)  ;  and  (12) 
Senegambia  {French).  Of  these  Senaar  at  one  time 
was  an  enlightened  and  powerful  nation  of  blacks, 
Darfur  can  produce  a  hst  of  reignmg  Sultans  which 
carry  us  back  to  the  remote  past ;  Wadai  was,  and  still 
is  the  home  of  an  unconquered  Mohamedan  people; 
Bornu,  now  decadent,  was  formerly  the  seat  of  an 
empire  which  governed  the  whole  region  around  Lake 


74  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

Chad  ;  Sokoto  and  Gando  are  two  divisions  of  the  empire 
of  the  Fulani  and  Hausas,  which  ruled  the  Western 
Sudan  through  the  nineteenth  century  ;  the  Songhay 
Empire  attained  its  zenith  in  the  sixteenth  century  ; 
the  Melle  Empire  in  the  fourteenth  century.  All  these 
states,  and  others  beside  them,  have  enjoyed  wide 
dominion  or  dwindled  into  mere  vassals,  according  to 
the  individual  capacity  of  their  sultans  and  viziers, 
their  success  in  suppressing  turbulent  factions  within 
and  beating  off  the  incursions  of  envious  neighbours 
from  without.  As  soon  as  a  community  became 
prosperous  under  an  enhghtened  ruler,  it  also  became 
a  tempting  prize  to  some  member  of  his  unruly  family, 
or  to  a  neighbouring  sultan,  and  sooner  or  later  fell 
a  prey  either  to  internal  revolution  or  external  attack. 
Thus  it  comes  about  that  the  continent  is  strewn  with 
the  remains  of  destroyed  cities,  each  surrounded  by 
signs  of  a  once  prosperous  agriculture,  but  now  the 
home  of  nothing  but  jackals,  for  it  is  a  traditional 
custom  with  Mohamedan  princes  not  to  rebuild  a 
fallen  city. 

Having  briefly  considered  the  general  trend  of  the 
Arab  conquest  of  the  whole  Sudan,  we  will  turn  our 
attention  to  those  states  with  which  we  have  recently 
become  more  intimately  connected,  namely  Sokoto, 
Gando  and  Bornu,  which  lie  within  the  borders  of 
Nigeria  and  are  administered  by  British  officials. 

Sokoto  and  Gando  are  really  two  unnecessary  sub- 
divisions of  the  Hausa  States,  which  until  recently 
formed  part  of  the  Fulani  Empire  and  deserve  special 
attention.  The  Hausa  race  is  said  to  have  originated 
in  the  oasis  of  Air  in  the  midst  of  the  Sahara,  whence 
in  the  eighth  century  it  was  driven  south  in  the  course 
of  the  Arab  invasion.  Under  the  leadership  of  seven 
capable  brothers,   the  offspring  of   a  certain   Berber 


THE  STORY  OF  NIGERL\  75 

mother,  this  black  tribe  spread  itself  eastwards  and 
westwards  along  the  southern  margin  of  the  desert 
and  founded  seven  states,  which  prospered  owing  to 
the  fertility  of  the  soil,  the  industry  of  the  population 
and  the  policy  pursued  by  the  seven  brothers.  In 
course  of  time  the  Hausas  so  increased  that  seven 
additional  provinces  were  added,  and  these  are  jocosely 
called  the  upstart  states  by  the  inhabitants  of  the  more 
ancient  settlements.  Hausaland  was  visited  and  de- 
scribed by  Leo  Africanus  at  the  end  of  the  fifteenth 
century,  when  only  its  rulers  professed  the  Mohamedan 
faith  :  the  bulk  of  the  people  were  then  snake-worship- 
pers, and  remained  pagans,  with  a  slight  admixture 
of  Islamic  rites,  until  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  point  of  interest  in  their 
history  that  they  so  long  escaped  conversion  to  the 
ruling  rehgion,  especially  as  they  inhabited  a  country 
which  lay  alongside  one  of  the  principal  highways  of 
Arab  migration.  However,  when  at  last  they  were 
converted  by  the  Fulani,  they  embraced  Mohame- 
danism  with  complete  satisfaction,  and  have  remained 
its  devoted  adherents  ever  since.  Their  religion  had 
a  most  vivif3ang  effect  on  the  race,  as  it  has  invariably 
had  on  the  negroids  of  Africa,  whose  too  susceptible 
natures  require  the  restraint  of  a  fixed  ritual  and  the 
discipline  of  a  strict  code  of  laws. 

The  Hausa  is  distinctly  the  business-man  of  Africa  ; 
his  looms  and  dye-pits  produce  the  chief  articles  of 
internal  trade  and  are  often  in  use  as  currency  in 
adjusting  a  deal  or  setthng  a  bargain  ;  his  language  is 
the  language  of  commerce  throughout  the  Western 
Sudan.  He  has  no  political  ambitions  and  is  not  a 
governing  personahty,  being  of  a  cheerful,  happy- 
go-lucky  disposition,  good-humouredly  contemptuous 
of  liis  pagan  customers  but  without  desiring  to  convert 


76  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

them.  To  quote  Mr.  Morel  :  "  His  manufacturing  skill 
is  not  only  remarkable  for  Africa  ;  it  puts  Europe  to 
the  blush.  For  closeness,  durabihty  and  firmness  of 
texture,  the  products  of  his  looms  and  dye-pits  eclipse 
anything  that  Manchester  can  produce.  In  a  land  of 
reputed  indolence,  his  activity  is  as  conspicuous  as  his 
enterprise.  He  makes  an  ideal  commercial  traveller, 
peddling  his  wares  over  enormous  distances,  and 
seldom  failing  to  secure  a  considerable  profit  on  his 
transactions."  It  is  unfortunate  that  the  original 
history  of  Hausaland,  which  was  written  in  Arabic 
characters  and  included  the  period  from  the  sixteenth 
to  the  nineteenth  centuries,  was  deliberately  destroyed 
by  the  conquering  Fulani  in  order  to  effectually 
obliterate  all  evidence  of  Hausa  independence. 

But  who  are  these  Fulani  of  whom  we  so  frequently 
read  ? 

The  answer  to  this  question  takes  us  back  through 
the  centuries  to  the  story  of  the  remote  past  of  ancient 
Egypt,  and  the  year  2136  B.C.,  a  story  which  is  full 
of  interest,  but  can  only  be  briefly  sketched  in  these 
pages.*  In  the  year  named  several  hordes  of  Asiatic 
shepherds  invaded  the  land  of  Egypt  and  drove  into 
the  fertile  valley  of  the  Nile  their  herds  of  hump-backed 
cattle  and  blob-tailed,  roman-nosed  sheep.  Whether 
they  abandoned  their  Asiatic  homes  through  drought 
or  by  reason  of  land-hunger  in  an  over-populated 
area  is  unknown,  at  any  rate  their  incursion  was 
stoutly  resisted  by  the  local  inhabitants,  and  a  long 
and  sanguinary  conflict  arose  in  the  land,  converting 
the  nomadic  shepherds  into  warriors  and  statesmen 
fighting  for  their  existence.  In  the  end  the  invaders 
established  their  supremacy,  and  are  recorded  in  history 

*  It  is  very  well  told  in  "  Affaiis  of   West  Africa,"  by  E.  D.  Morel. 
Heineraann.     1902. 


THE  STORY  OF  NIGERIA  'j^ 

as  the  "  Shepherd  Kings  "  whose  dynasty  endured  for 
five  centuries.  They  appear  to  have  ruled  with  wisdom 
what  was  undoubtedly  the  greatest  state  of  the  then 
civilised  world. 

However,  in  the  year  1636  B.C.  they  were  over- 
thrown by  the  ancient  Theban  dynasty,  and  had  again 
to  migrate  with  their  herds  in  search  of  pastures  new. 
They  struck  southwards  up  the  Nile  into  the  Sudan 
["  The  land  of  the  blacks/']  and  wandered,  some  along 
the  Blue  Nile  into  the  Abyssinian  mountains  where 
they  became  the  ancestors  of  the  Galas  and  Bahima 
of  Uganda,  some  others  away  westwards  across  the 
continent  to  the  Niger.  Here  they  scattered  and 
resumed  the  nomadic  life,  chiefly  in  the  districts  about 
the  sources  of  the  Senegal  and  Gambia  rivers,  where 
their  herds  found  suitable  pasturage.  In  all  their 
wanderings  amidst  inferior  races  and  strange  surround- 
ings they  retained  their  pride  of  race,  their  faith  in  the 
bull-worship  of  their  ancestors,  their  stories  of  ancient 
Hebrew  laws  and  customs,  handed  down  from  genera- 
tion to  generation.  More  important  still,  they  kept 
their  Asiatic  blood  pure  by  never  permitting  their 
daughters  to  wed  any  but  men  of  their  own  race, 
though  the  men  also  took  wives  from  the  aboriginal 
populations  amongst  whom  they  dwelt. 

This  remarkable  people  must  have  reached  West 
Africa  long  before  the  dawn  of  the  Christian  era, 
yet  they  retain  to  this  day  the  characteristics  of  their 
nomad  ancestry,  and  are  known  in  the  Sudan  as  the 
Fulani  (plural).  They  are  loosely  scattered  in  small 
groups  over  a  vast  area,  dwelling  with  their  flocks 
and  herds  amongst  pagan  or  Mohamedan  tribes  as 
the  case  may  be,  ruling  over  some,  subject  to  others, 
strict  followers  of  the  Prophet  in  general,  though 
pagans   in  a  very  few  inaccessible    districts.      Their 


78  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

conversion  to  Mohamedanism  occurred  in  the  sixteenth 
century. 

As  regards  appearance  the  pure-bred  Fulani  are 
still  of  an  Eastern  type,  their  copper-coloured  skin, 
straight  hair,  clean-cut  features  and  well-developed 
skulls  differing  widely  from  those  of  the  African  races. 
The  women  may  be  described  as  quite  good-looking. 
The  numerous  mixed  progeny  of  Fulani  men  and 
negresses  has  introduced  a  strain  of  blood  which  has 
been  of  advantage  to  the  lower  races  throughout  the 
land.  Everywhere  the  Fulani  are  distinguishable 
by  their  fine  linen,  haughty  manners,  cleanly  habits 
and  irreproachable  orthodoxy. 

In  1802,  after  centuries  of  mild  subjection  to 
pagans,  the  Fulani  of  Hausaland  started  a  revolt 
which  had  far-reaching  consequences.  Inspired  by  a 
religious  enthusiast  named  Othman  Dan  Fodio,  the 
scattered  groups  of  herdsmen  assembled  beneath  the 
banner  of  Islam,  attacked  and  subjugated  all  the 
Hausa  States  and  founded  an  empire  which  extended 
from  Lake  Chad  to  Senegal.  They  so  communicated 
the  fervour  of  their  intense  rehgious  feelings  to  their 
converts  that  a  Christian  missionary  has  recently 
admitted  that  "  To  the  Hausa  what  is  in  the  Koran 
is  of  God,  and  what  is  not  in  the  Koran  is  not  worth 
knowing."  Othman,  the  leader  of  this  remarkable 
movement,  died  in  1817  in  a  fit  of  religious  mania, 
and  was  succeeded  by  his  sons,  of  whom  only  Sultan 
Bello  was  a  capable  man.  The  Fulani  Empire,  deca- 
dent and  latterly  pernicious,  made  way  in  1903  for 
British  rule  under  Sir  Frederick  Lugard. 

We  will  next  turn  our  attention  to  the  beginnings 
of  European  enterprise  in  West  Africa. 

Dismissing  the  unverified  story  put  forward  by 
certain  French  writers  to  prove  that  a  colony  of  hardy 


THE  STORY  OF  NIGERIA  79 

Dieppe  fishermen  was  established  on  the  Guinea  Coast 
in  the  fourteenth  century,  we  commence  the  narrative 
in  1456,  when  certain  of  Prince  Henry  of  Portugal's 
patient  adventurers  discovered  the  mouths  of  the 
Senegal  and  Gambia  rivers.  They  returned  with 
vague  stories  of  the  fabulous  wealth  of  Timbuktu. 
A  chartered  company  was  started  in  Lisbon  which  on 
its  first  venture  imported  a  cargo  of  200  slaves, 
and  the  Portuguese  commenced  the  traffic  in  black 
humanity  which  was  carried  on  uninterruptedly  during 
four  centuries  :  to  them  belongs  the  distinction  of 
being  the  first  European  nation  to  begin  it  and  the 
last  to  leave  it  off.  They  built  forts  along  the  West 
Coast  and  endeavoured  to  open  up  trade  with  the  far 
interior,  but  there  is  no  authentic  record  of  their  having 
established  more  than  a  precarious  intercourse  with  the 
natives  through  whom  they  bargained  for  slaves. 
Being  first  in  possession  and  jealous  of  interference 
by  rivals,  they  bent  their  energies  chiefly  to  strengthen- 
ing their  monopoly,  and  were  so  far  successful  as  to 
retain  it  for  a  century. 

But  sooner  or  later  a  monopoly  which  has  to  be 
fought  for  by  armed  trading  ships  is  sure  to  be  con- 
tested by  adventurous  outsiders,  and  we  accordingly 
find  that  in  1550  (a  few  years  before  Queen  Elizabeth 
ascended  our  throne)  a  guild  of  London  merchants 
fitted  out  a  small  fleet  and  sent  it  to  the  Guinea  Coast 
under  the  command  of  Captain  Thomas  Windham, 
a  younger  son  of  Sir  Thomas  Windham,  the  direct 
ancestor  of  the  present  Wyndhams  of  Petworth  House, 
Sussex.  He  was  noted  as  a  successful  navigator,  and 
was  therefore  put  in  charge  of  this  first  British  trading 
voyage  to  the  West  Coast,  his  quest  being  gold.  He 
made  three  separate  voyages,  and  on  one  of  them 
brought  home  '*  150  lbs.  of  gold,"  which   at   present 


8o  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

prices  would  mean  a  sum  of  £7000.  In  his  journal 
he  records  in  1552  :  "  Here,  by  the  way,  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  the  Portuguese  were  much  offended  with 
this  our  new  trade  into  Barbary  ;  and  both  in  our 
voyage  the  year  before  and  also  in  this,  gave  out 
in  England,  through  the  merchants,  that  if  they  took 
us  in  those  parts  they  would  use  us  as  their  mortal 
enemies." 

Undaunted  by  threats,  a  certain  John  Lok  under- 
took a  couple  of  years  later  a  trading  voyage  which  he 
described  in  minute  detail.  He  owned  three  ships 
and  some  smaller  boats,  and  took  two  months  to  reach 
the  Gold  Coast.  He  found  the  natives  wiUing  to 
bargain,  and,  in  exchange  for  cloth  and  other  articles, 
brought  back  a  valuable  cargo — 400  lbs.  of  gold,  36 
cwt.  of  pepper  and  250  tusks  of  ivory,  some  of  which 
weighed  90  lbs.  each — so  Master  Lok's  voyage  was  a 
success,  in  spite  of  Portuguese  opposition  and  without 
a  cargo  of  slaves.  Others,  especially  Towrson,  followed 
this  trade  with  vigour  and  profit ;  but  to  Sir  John 
Hawkins  belongs  the  discredit  of  being  the  first  English- 
man to  embark  a  cargo  of  slaves,  which  he  sold  in 
America,  notwithstanding  an  indignant  remonstrance 
from  Queen  EHzabeth.  The  year  of  the  defeat  of  the 
Spanish  Armada  (1588)  saw  the  first  British  Chartered 
Company  launched,  and  about  the  same  time  there 
occurred  a  minor  scramble  amongst  the  European 
Powers  for  stations  on  the  West  Coast,  a  scramble 
which  continued  spasmodically  through  the  seven- 
teenth century.  Spain  crushed  Portugal  and  laid 
claim  to  her  colonies ;  the  Dutch  threw  off  the 
yoke  of  Spain  and  seized  them  ;  the  Danes  engaged 
with  alacrity  in  what  was  termed  the  "  new "  (i.e. 
slave)  trade  ;  the  Germans  founded  their  Brandenberg 
Company  ;    the    French    laid  the  foundation  of  their 


THE  STORY  OF  NIGERL\  8i 

extensive  West  African  Empire.  Each  of  the  rivals 
built  forts  along  the  coast,  the  French  under  the  Sieur 
Brue  being  more  enterprising  towards  the  interior 
than  all  the  others  combined.  The  British  Company 
seems  to  have  neglected  its  opportunity  and  was  more 
or  less  a  failure.  Each  set  of  traders  held  parchments 
engrossed  in  magnificent  language,  signed  by  their 
respective  sovereigns,  granting  to  each  the  "  monopoly 
of  all  trade  from  Morocco  to  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope 
and  beyond;"  the  consequent  jealousy,  confusion  and 
lawlessness  were  indescribable.  Here  was  the  buc- 
caneers' opportunity,  at  a  period  when  big  events  were 
taking  place  in  other  parts  of  the  world,  and  misdeeds 
on  the  Gold  Coast  remained  unrecorded  and  unpunished ; 
how  can  we  be  surprised  if  the  reports  of  the  white  man's 
behaviour,  which  reached  the  interior  through  native 
slave-raiders,  disgusted  Mohamedan  missionaries,  and 
made  them  curse  the  white  man  and  his  gin  ? 

Thus  the  seventeenth  century  closes  with  the  over- 
sea slave  trade  in  full  swing,  it  being  a  far  more  lucra- 
tive business  than  gold,  ivory  or  pepper.  The  planta- 
tions of  America  and  the  West  Indies  were  growing 
apace,  their  demand  for  labour  annually  increased, 
so  that  during  the  eighteenth  century  we  find  the 
French,  Dutch  and  British  struggling  for  supremacy 
along  the  West  Coast.  Of  these,  the  French  from 
the  Senegal  River  continued  to  display  the  greater 
interest  in  the  warlike  races  which  interposed  between 
themselves  and  Timbuktu ;  the  British  were  estab- 
lished on  the  Gambia,  and  held  seventeen  forts  on  the 
Gold  Coast,  but  these  were  mostly  reduplicated  by 
rival  Dutch  estabhshments,  with  here  and  there  an 
additional  French  or  Portuguese  fort ;  so  there  was 
no  monopoly  for  any  nation  in  the  slave  trade. 

Should  my  readers  be  incUned  to  surmise  that  these 

F 


82  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

rival  forts  were  centres  from  which  radiated  the  civilis- 
ing influence  of  the  Christian  into  the  recesses  of  the 
Dark  Continent,  let  him  peruse  some  of  the  eighteenth- 
century  literature  on  this  subject  and  the  illusion 
will  soon  be  dispelled.  The  Hfe  and  habits  of  the 
Mohamedans  were  shining  lights  of  virtue  compared 
with  that  of  the  white  men.  A  conservative  estimate 
puts  the  number  of  negroes  shipped  across  the  Atlantic 
in  the  year  1748  at  the  total  of  97,000 ;  another 
computes  at  200,000  the  number  of  blacks  annually 
exported  during  each  year  of  the  last  decade  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  and  it  has  been  calculated  that 
at  least  seven  millions  crossed  the  seas  between  1700 
and  1800.  Those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  rate 
of  mortaUty  which  must  occur  in  the  raiding  of  an 
inland  village  for  slaves,  in  the  caravan  journey  to 
the  coast  and  in  the  holds  of  saihng-ships,  will  reahse 
that,  for  every  slave  safely  landed  ten  or  more  were 
sacrificed,  and  that  this  draft  of  blacks  represented 
a  serious  drain  on  the  country.  In  the  end  there  was 
an  awakening  of  the  British  conscience  ;  the  voice  of 
declamation  rose  loud  in  the  land  ;  and  Abolition  w^as 
carried  in  1807,  followed  by  similar  enactments  in  all 
other  civilised  countries  by  1815. 

Looking  \vith  dispassionate  eyes  on  the  hot  con- 
troversies of  those  days,  we  perceive  that  AboHtion 
was  a  necessity,  not  from  mere  sentimentahsm,  nor 
because  the  planters  were  unkind  to  their  slaves  as 
was  often  falsely  alleged,  nor  even  because  slavery 
is  reckoned  "immoral;"  but  because  the  demand 
for  negroes  inflicted  an  atrocious  injury  on  the  nations 
of  Africa  and  made  progress  on  that  Continent  im- 
possible. Moreover,  the  cheap  liquor  and  gunpowder 
which  were  exchanged  for  slaves  were  gradually  sap- 
ping the  energies  of  the  coastwise  populations. 


THE  STORY  OF  NIGERIA  83 

The  abolition  of  over-sea  slavery  happens  also  to 
coincide  with  the  era  of  legitimate  exploration. 

If  individual  heroism,  magnificent  courage,  an 
indomitable  will  and  an  optimism  which  no  adversity 
could  disappoint,  are  the  emblems  of  a  great  explorer, 
then  Mungo  Park  ranks  amongst  the  highest.  His 
achievements  should  be  read  in  his  biography  by 
Joseph  Thomson,  the  hfe  of  an  explorer  by  another 
explorer,  because  only  such  an  author  can  convince 
one  of  the  hardships  which  Mungo  Park  endured. 
In  1795  he  started  from  the  Gambia  River  with  a  couple 
of  native  servants,  two  donkeys  and  a  horse,  plunged 
into  the  unknown  interior,  and  emerged  in  1799  after 
exploring  300  miles  of  the  middle  Niger.  He  was 
ill  equipped  for  such  an  expedition,  which  had  been 
the  death  of  many  a  brave  man  before  him. 

"  Think  of  Park,  and  picture  to  yourself  the  position 
of  a  lonely  European  wandering  about  inland  Western 
Africa  in  a  thick  blue  fustian  coat,  with  gilt  buttons, 
keeping  his  precious  notes  in  the  crown  of  a  top-hat, 
and  kicked,  buffeted,  spat  upon,  treated  with  con- 
tumely, subjected  to  every  insult,  over  and  over  again 
a  slave,  exposed  for  hours  at  a  time  in  a  burning  sun 
without  water,  often  on  the  verge  of  starvation,  racked 
by  disease,  and  in  so  miserable  a  plight  upon  many 
occasions  that  death  would  have  been  a  welcome  relief 
— yet  triumphing  over  everything,  and  finally  return- 
ing, notes  and  all,  to  his  own  land."* 

Undaunted,  he  set  out  again  in  1804,  at  the  request 
of  the  British  Government,  and  navigated  more  than 
a  thousand  miles  of  the  Niger  in  a  rickety  boat  which 
he  built  himself,  meeting  his  death  at  the  hands  of  the 
natives  in  the  rapids  of  Busa. 

*  "  Affairs  of  West  Africa  " 


84  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

For  some  years  after  this  fatality  all  endeavours 
to  reach  the  Niger  from  the  West  Coast  failed,  and 
resulted  in  the  death  of  the  explorers  from  disease  and 
hardships.  It  was  therefore  decided  to  make  an 
attempt  from  the  Mediterranean,  to  follow  the  route 
of  the  Arab  conquerors  and  utilise  if  possible  the  native 
caravan  trade  as  a  means  of  crossing  the  Sahara  from 
Tripoli.  Accordingly  three  Englishmen,  Clapperton, 
Denham  and  Oudney  (a  naval  captain,  a  major,  and 
a  doctor)  started  in  1821,  under  the  auspicies  of  the 
British  Government.  Every  sort  of  difficulty  was  put 
in  their  way  by  the  local  merchants,  who  suspected 
them  as  trading  rivals  ;  they  took  six  months  to  journey 
from  Tripoli  to  Fezzan,  where  they  were  further  delayed 
seven  months  more  before  they  could  commence  the 
desert  march  :  it  was  therefore  with  great  deUght  that 
they  beheld  the  gleaming  waters  of  Lake  Chad  in 
February  1823.  Having  at  last  penetrated  into 
negroland,  they  were  much  gratified  by  the  warm 
welcome  extended  to  them  by  the  reigning  Sultan  of 
Bornu. 

"  It  was  in  a  sense  a  new  world  which  the  explorers 
had  entered,  a  world  of  absorbing  interest,  where 
Eastern  magnificence  and  display  mingled  with  the 
naked  barbarism  of  Africa ;  where  semi-arabised 
potentates  went  a-warring  with  mail-clad  knights, 
and  powerful  barons  brought  their  contingent  of  re- 
tainers to  assist  their  liege-lord  in  his  campaigns  of 
plunder  and  conquest.  The  travellers  had  left  nine- 
teenth-century England,  had  plunged  into  the  desert 
and  had  emerged  therefrom  amid  a  feudaUsm  which 
recalled  the  Middle  Ages.  .  .  .  They  were  the  first 
white  men  to  reach  the  Chad,  to  discover  the  Shari, 
to  explore    Bornu,  Sokoto  and   part  of   Kanem,  and 


THE  STORY  OF  NIGERIA  85 

to  describe,  however  indifferently,  the  wonderful 
social  fabric,  the  picturesque  civilisation,  teeming  with 
energy  and  industrialism,  which  existed,  and  exists 
in  the  upper  portion  of  the  Niger  basin."* 

Clapperton  alone  survived  to  tell  the  tale  of  his 
journey  through  the  beautiful  country,  adorned  with 
plantations  of  cotton,  tobacco  and  indigo,  rows  of 
date  palms,  magnificent  herds  of  cattle,  and  to  describe 
the  industry  of  the  Hausa  inhabitants,  their  proficiency 
in  weaving,  dyeing  and  churning,  their  aptitude  as 
traders  ;  and  to  expatiate  on  the  qualities  of  the  ruling 
Fulani,  who  encouraged  industry  and  protected  trade 
routes  with  such  success  that  the  city  of  Kano  became 
the  greatest  emporium  of  Central  Africa.  Such  was 
the  impression  produced  on  the  rough-and-ready 
sailor,  who  was  too  ready  to  accept  the  Fulani  version 
of  the  prosperity  which  he  beheld.  If,  however,  we 
wish  to  possess  a  scientific  knowledge  of  the  country 
and  peoples  of  Nigeria,  we  may  turn  from  the  glowing 
descriptions  of  Captain  Clapperton  to  the  five  thought- 
ful volumes  in  which  Dr.  Barth,  a  cultivated,  genial 
German,  recorded  his  wanderings  from  1850  to  1855. 

The  expedition  which  he  joined  was  organised  by 
Lord  Palmerston,  with  Dr.  Richardson  as  its  leader, 
for  the  purpose  of  promoting  commercial  intercourse 
with  the  states  which  Clapperton  had  visited.  Barth 
was  the  lecturer  at  the  University  of  BerHn  on 
Comparative  Geography  and  Colonial  Commerce  ;  he 
had  lately  published  his  "  Wanderings  Round  the 
Mediterranean,"  which  comprised  a  journey  through 
Barbary  in  the  company  of  Arabs  ;  and  he  was  per- 
mitted to  join  Richardson's  expedition,  provided  he 
was  wiUing    to  contribute  £200  towards    his  personal 

*  "  Affairs  of  West  Africa." 


86  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

expenses.  But  Richardson  died  of  fever  in  Bornu, 
in  March,  185 1,  so,  in  the  words  of  Barth,  "  Her 
Majesty's  Government  honoured  me  with  their  con- 
fidence, and,  in  authorising  me  to  carry  out  the  objects 
of  the  expedition,  placed  sufficient  means  at  my 
disposal  for  the  purpose.  The  position  in  which  I 
was  thus  placed  must  be  my  excuse  for  undertaking, 
after  the  successful  accomphshment  of  my  labours, 
the  difficult  task  of  relating  them  in  a  language  not 
my  own."  Such  was  the  modest  preface  in  which 
he  introduced  to  the  British  public  the  delightful 
pages  which  convey  a  truer  insight  into  the  condition 
of  the  Sudan  than  can  be  gained  from  any  other  source. 
Barth  was  qualified  by  temperament  and  years  of 
previous  study  for  the  task  he  undertook ;  his  ac- 
quaintance with  the  history  of  Africa  and  his  famiharity 
with  the  traditions  of  its  religions  placed  him  on  a 
footing  of  equaUty  wdth  the  educated  Mohamedans 
whom  he  met ;  his  sincerity  and  straight  dealing 
disarmed  the  intrigues  of  suspicious  fanatics ;  and 
wherever  he  tarried  he  made  friends  who  were  \villing 
to  forward  him  on  his  travels  and  glad  to  see  him  when 
he  returned.  He  was  a  naturalist,  a  linguist  and  a 
scientific  geographer. 

Throughout  his  volumes  one  is  struck  by  his  intelli- 
gent observations  on  men  and  things.  There  are  no 
cheap  reflections,  no  endeavours  to  "  make  up "  a 
book  ;  his  triumphant  enthusiasm  at  each  discovery 
of  importance  is  obviously  genuine  ;  and  his  disappoint- 
ment when  obliged  to  stay  in  some  native  town  with 
nothing  to  do  is  best  expressed  in  his  words  :  "  The 
little  information  which  I  had  been  able  to  gather  at 
this  place  was  not  sufficient  to  give  my  restless  spirit 
its  proper  nourishment,  and  I  felt,  therefore,  mentally 
depressed." 


THE  STORY  OF  NIGERIA  87 

Starting  from  Tripoli,  Earth's  itinerary  comprised 
Fezzan,  Agades,  Zinder,  Kano,  Bornu,  Adamawa, 
Bagirmi,  Logon,  Sokoto,  Gando,  Say,  Timbuktu,  Gogo, 
Lake  Chad,  Kanem,  and  Bilma ;  it  occupied  five 
consecutive  years  ;  and  as  the  States  and  cities  which 
he  visited  and  studied  have  since  been  more  or  less 
occupied  by  France,  England,  or  Germany,  Earth's 
are  the  only  unprejudiced  notes  we  shall  ever  have 
of  Nigeria  under  native  rule.  He  had  no  political 
interests  to  subserve  ;  in  fact,  he  made  it  a  stipulation 
of  his  engagement  that  the  mission  should  be  non- 
political  ;  yet  the  lesson  which  every  chapter  of  his 
book  emphasises  is  that,  in  spite  of  the  picturesque  and, 
in  a  few  instances,  capable  government  of  the  Sultans 
and  viziers,  the  state  of  the  country  was  bad,  life  and 
property  were  insecure,  the  stability  of  all  institu- 
tions was  precarious,  slave-raiding  was  universal  and 
wealthy  communities  were  continually  the  prey  of 
plunderers  and  freebooters.  Even  within  the  few 
years  of  his  personal  experience  he  several  times  attests 
the  total  ruin  of  prosperous  towns  and  districts  in 
which  he  had  been  hospitably  entertained  on  previous 
occasions.  Native  rulers  deplored  with  him  the  exist- 
ence of  this  state  of  things,  but  neither  the  enUgthened 
Vizier  of  Bornu  nor  the  Fulani  Sultans  of  Sokoto  and 
Gando  had  the  will  or  the  power  to  correct  the  evil, 
or  even  to  mitigate  its  effects.  Each  princeling — 
and  princelings  are  numerous  throughout  Nigeria 
— maintained  himself,  his  court  and  his  wealth  as 
best  he  could  from  year  to  year,  without  concerning 
himself  with  the  welfare  of  the  general  community. 
There  was  evident  prosperity  in  many  parts,  because 
Nature  had  so  bountifully  endowed  these  lands  and 
the  Hausa  population  was  really  industrious ;  but, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  the 


88  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

gifts  of  Nature  and  the  works  of  man  were  frequently 
sacrificed  by  the  incompetence  and  weakness  of  the 
governing  families. 

Of  the  first  negro  state  seen  by  Barth  he  says  the 
vegetation  and  crops  were  abundant,  the  villages 
neat  and  prosperous,  cotton  weaving  was  common, 
"  the  whole  country  had  an  interesting  and  cheerful 
appearance,  villages  succeeding  each  other  with  only 
short  intervals  of  thick  underwood,  manifesting  every- 
where the  unmistakable  marks  of  the  comfortable, 
pleasant  sort  of  life  led  by  the  natives  .  .  .  the  dwel- 
lings shaded  with  spreading  trees  and  enlivened  with 
groups  of  children,  goats,  fowls,  pigeons  and,  where 
a  little  wealth  had  been  accumulated,  a  horse  or  a 
pack-ox.  The  inhabitants  were  of  cheerful  tempera- 
ments, bent  upon  enjoying  life,  rather  given  to  women, 
dance  and  song,  but  without  any  disgusting  excess." 
This  state  had  not  yet  been  conquered  by  the  Fulani 
when  Barth  traversed  it  in  the  company  of  a  caravan 
of  3700  camels  carrying  salt  to  Kano.  On  nearing  the 
capital,  "almost  all  the  people  who  met  us  saluted  us 
most  kindly  and  cheerfully  ;  and  I  was  particularly 
amused  by  the  following  form  of  salutation :  God  bless 
you :  gently,  gently :  how  strange !  Only  a  few  proud 
Fulani  very  unlike  their  brethren  in  the  West,  passed 
us  without  a  salute  .  .  .  the  villages  are  here  scattered 
about  in  the  most  agreeable  and  convenient  way,  as 
farming  villages  ought  always  to  be,  but  which  is 
practicable  only  in  a  country  in  a  state  of  security." 
He  estimated  the  population  of  Kano  city  at  30,000, 
of  whom  4000  were  Fulani,  and  did  not  think  that 
the  latter  governed  this  particular  city  oppressively, 
though  the  possession  of  wealth  and  comfort  during 
two  generations  had  impaired  their  characteristics 
and  made  them  cowardly  and  incapable  of  protecting 


THE  STORY  OF  NIGERIA  89 

the  villages  at  a  distance  from  the  city.  The  city 
walls  and  fortifications  (kept  in  the  best  repair)  enclosed 
an  immense  area  of  ground,  in  order  that  a  supply  of 
corn  for  the  inhabitants  might  be  grown  during  a  long 
siege  ;  the  market  was  immensely  crowded,  the  export 
of  cotton  cloth,  dyed  with  indigo,  being  prodigious. 
"If  we  consider  that  this  industry  is  not  carried  on 
here,  as  in  Europe,  in  immense  establishments,  degrad- 
ing man  to  the  meanest  condition  of  Hfe,  but  that  it 
gives  employment  and  support,  to  famihes  without 
compelling  them  to  sacrifice  their  domestic  habits, 
we  must  presume  that  Kano  ought  to  be  one  of  the 
happiest  countries  in  the  world  ;  and  so  it  is  as  long 
as  its  governor,  too  often  lazy  and  indolent,  is  able 
to  defend  its  inhabitants  from  the  cupidity  of  their 
neighbours." 

From  the  principal  city  in  Hausaland  to  Kuka,  the 
capital  of  Bornu,  the  journey  was  made  along  paths  from 
village  to  village,  as  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  direct 
road.  On  the  border  of  these  two  empires  predatory 
excursions  were  the  order  of  the  day,  and,  as  Barth 
happened  to  make  the  journey  twice,  he  records  : 

"  We  had  a  most  interesting  and  cheerful  scene  of 
African  life  in  the  open,  straggHng  village  of  Kahmari, 
where  numerous  herds  of  cattle  were  being  watered 
at  the  wells ;  but  how  melancholy,  how  mournful 
became  the  recollection  of  the  busy,  animated  scene 
which  I  then  witnessed  when,  three  years  and  a  half 
later,  as  I  travelled  again  through  this  district,  the 
whole  village,  which  presented  such  a  spectacle  of 
happiness  and  well-being,  had  disappeared,  and  an 
insecure  wilderness,  greatly  infested  by  robbers,  had 
succeeded  to  the  abode  of  man." 

The  difference  of  type  between  the  Hausa  and  the 


90  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

black  of  Bornu  became  marked  as  Barth  crossed  the 
frontier,  the  former  being  of  Hvely  spirit  and  cheerful 
countenance,  the  latter  melancholy  and  brutal,  with 
broad  face,  wide  nostrils  and  large  bones.  Yet  in  a 
bygone  age  Bornu  held  the  headship  of  an  immense 
empire,  including  Kanem,  Bagirmi  and  other  states  ; 
and  its  Sultans  still  maintained  the  outward  show  of 
barbaric  splendour  which  Clapperton  described.  But, 
as  Barth  relates,  it  was  in  the  fifties  in  full  decadence. 
"  The  condition  of  the  finest  part  of  the  country  is  a 
disgrace  to  its  present  rulers,  who  have  nothing  to  do 
but  transfer  thither  a  few  hundreds  of  their  lazy  slaves 
and  establish  them  in  a  fortified  place,  whereupon  the 
natives  would  immediately  gather  round  them  and 
change  this  fine  country  from  an  impenetrable  jungle 
into  rich  fields,  producing  not  only  grain,  but  also 
immense  quantities  of  cotton  and  indigo." 

Arrived  in  Kuka,  Barth  was  well  received  by  the 
Vizier,  allotted  a  spacious  abode  near  the  palace  and 
introduced  to  the  learned  men  of  the  place,  with  whose 
help  he  obtained  access  to  the  chronicles  of  the  Kings 
dating  from  the  ninth  century.  Thus  he  succeeded 
in  sending  to  Europe  a  copy  of  the  abridgment  of  the 
whole  history  of  Bornu  from  the  earUest  times  down 
to  Ibrahim,  the  last  offspring  of  the  royal  family,  who 
was  on  the  throne  when  the  previous  English  expedi- 
tion visited  Kuka.  From  this  it  appears  that  in  the 
thirteenth  century  the  Prince  of  Kanem  wielded  the 
strength  of  a  vigorous  empire  and  extended  his  in- 
fluence to  the  Dongola  province  of  Egypt.  His  reign 
was  succeeded  by  civil  wars  and  regicides,  which  ended 
in  the  seat  of  power  being  transferred  to  Bornu  by  the 
conquering  tribe,  who  reduced  Kanem  to  a  pro\dnce. 
On  the  whole  the  sixteenth  century  was  the  most  glorious 
period  of  the  Bornu  empire,  adorned  as  it  was  by  two 


THE  STORY  OF  NIGERIA  91 

capable  Sultans.  Then  followed  a  quiet  period  during 
which  pious  and  peaceful  kings  occupied  the  throne, 
and  old  age  seemed  gradually  to  gain  on  the  kingdom  ; 
the  last  blow  feU  when  the  Fulani  occupied  the  centre 
of  the  country  in  1809,  and  a  stranger  of  Arab  descent 
founded  a  new  dynasty. 

About  the  Vizier  (Prime  Minister)  in  185 1  Barth  has 
much  to  say.  He  was  a  charming,  cultivated  and  amiable 
gentleman,  but  so  fond  of  the  other  sex  that  he  possessed 
a  harem  of  between  three  and  four  hundred  slaves. 

"  In  assembling  this  immense  number  of  female 
companions  for  the  entertainment  of  his  leisure  hours 
he  adopted  a  scientific  principle  ;  in  fact,  a  credulous 
person  might  suppose  that  he  regarded  his  harem  only 
from  a  scientific  point  of  view,  as  a  sort  of  ethnological 
museum — doubtless  of  a  peculiarly  interesting  kind — 
which  he  had  brought  together  in  order  to  impress 
upon  his  memory  the  distinguishing  features  of  each 
tribe.  I  have  often  observed  that,  in  speaking  with 
him  of  the  different  tribes  of  negroland,  he  was  at  times 
struck  with  the  novelty  of  a  name,  lamenting  that  he 
had  not  yet  had  a  specimen  of  that  tribe  in  his  harem, 
and  giving  orders  at  once  to  his  servants  to  endeavour 
to  procure  a  perfect  sample  of  the  missing  kind.  I 
must  also  say  that,  notwithstanding  the  great  number 
and  variety  of  the  women  who  shared  his  attention, 
he  seemed  to  take  a  hearty  interest  in  each  of  them  : 
at  least,  I  remember  that  he  grieved  most  sincerely 
for  the  loss  of  one  who  died  in  the  winter  of  1851. 
Poor  Haj  Beshir  !  He  was  put  to  death  in  the  last 
month  of  1853,  leaving  seventy-three  sons  ahve,  not 
counting  the  daughters  and  the  number  of  children 
which  may  be  supposed  to  die  in  such  an  establishment 
without  reaching  maturity." 


92  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

That  is  one  side  of  Arab  life,  in  the  days  of  its 
decadence  ;  but  if  we  desire  to  be  impartial,  we  shall 
not  pass  judgment  on  this  phase  without  also  consider- 
ing what  conditions  Arab  civihsation  replaced ;  and 
above  all  we  shall  guard  against  the  error  of  applying 
to  negro  states  the  standards  of  twentieth  century 
England.  Conceive  then  the  sort  of  hfe  led  by  the 
weltering  masses  of  Central  Africa  during  the  cen- 
turies previous  to  Arab  conquests  ;  how  they  lived, 
propagated  and  died,  shut  off  from  any  sort  of  elevating 
influence,  unlettered,  absorbed  in  the  worship  of  a 
disgusting  local  fetishism,  practising  horrible  forms  of 
human  sacrifices  and  rejoicing  in  such  unmentionable 
cruelties  as  only  a  witch-doctor  can  invent.  That  such 
was  roughly  the  state  of  negroland  before  its  religious 
awakening  may  be  inferred  from  our  knowledge  of 
those  tribes  amongst  whom  Mohamedanism  is  to  this 
day  unknown.  The  author  has  dwelt  amidst  such 
tribes,  and  knows  that  the  picture  as  drawn  above  is 
not  exaggerated.  But,  having  accorded  a  full  measure 
of  praise  to  the  Mohamedan  conquerors  who  lifted 
the  Sudan  from  disorganised  confusion  to  comparative 
civihsation,  it  must  be  remembered  that  their  aspira- 
tions were  and  are  strictly  limited,  and  that  they  are 
not  capable  of  further  progress  alone. 

Meanwhile  the  days  of  the  white  slaver's  iniquities 
are  passed,  and  the  days  of  Mohamedan  potentates 
are  numbered.  For  the  nineteenth  century  wit- 
nessed a  complete  change  in  the  attitude  of  mind  of 
the  white  man  towards  the  blacks  ;  and  thus  it  may 
come  to  pass  that  the  European  will  in  the  future 
atone  for  the  injury  which  he  inflicted  in  former  times. 
In  India,  Egypt,  and  the  Egyptian  Sudan,  Great 
Britain  is  accomplishing  a  splendid  work  of  regeneration. 
Its  benefits  are  now  extended    to  Nigeria,  where  an 


THE  STORY  OF  NIGERIA  93 

even  greater  success  may  be  predicted.  For  the  rule 
of  the  British  Administrator  promotes  the  interests 
of  the  governed  to  a  far  greater  extent  than  anything 
previously  dreamed  of  by  any  native  prince  during 
the  centuries  which  have  gone  before. 

We  will  now  deal  with  the  acquisition  of  Nigeria 
by  the  British,  and  describe  Vandeleur's  share  in  the 
work  of  a  successful  expedition. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA 

See  map  facing  page  120 

The  story  of  our  West  African  colonies  during  the 
decade  1884  to  1895  cannot  be  studied  without  a  feeling 
of  pained  wonder  at  the  blindness  of  British  Cabinets 
and  of  hearty  admiration  at  the  foresight  and  wisdom 
of  the  Governments  of  France  and  Germany  and  now 
that  the  story  is  ten  years  old  and  nearly  forgotten  it 
may  not  be  out  of  place  to  review  our  mistakes  and 
realise  the  necessity  of  vigilant  watchfulness  in  other 
remote  parts — as  for  instance  in  the  Far  East — before 
it  is  too  late. 

In  the  previous  chapter  a  sketch  of  Sudan  history 
was  outlined  from  the  ninth  century  to  1855,  when  it 
was  visited  by  Barth  under  the  auspices  of  Lord 
Palmerston.  He  travelled  through  the  country  and 
recorded  his  observations  in  a  readable  book,  which 
was  nevertheless  left  unread  by  the  Ministers  respon- 
sible for  British  interests  in  those  parts.  Their  igno- 
rance of  the  Sudan,  with  such  a  mass  of  verified 
evidence  available,  affords  but  a  feeble  excuse  for  the 
apathy  which  deprived  us  of  many  rich  provinces,  and  we 
may  well  ask  why  British  Ministers  should  be  unaware 
of  what  was  well  known  to  French  and  German  states- 
men ?  In  order  to  realise  how  much  our  colonies 
were  neglected  it  is  only  necessary  to  study  maps 
which  show  European  possessions  in  Africa  in   1884 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA    95 

and  1902  respectively.*  They  illustrate  more  com- 
pletely than  pages  of  letterpress  the  results  of  the 
scramble  for  Africa  between  the  years  in  question,  and 
are  specially  instructive  as  regards  the  West  Coast, 
where  Great  Britain  sat  still  and  looked  on  whilst 
France  filched  from  her  the  hinterlands  of  her  colonies 
of  Gambia,  Sierra  Leone  and  the  Gold  Coast,  and  Ger- 
many ousted  her  from  the  Cameroons. 

It  would  be  foolish  to  reproach  these  two  Powers  ; 
their  actions  were  legitimate  and  reflected  credit  on 
the  statesmen  who  conceived  and  the  officials  who 
carried  out  their  poHcy.  The  oft-repeated  statement 
that  they  are  incapable  of  managing  negro  colonies 
is  not  borne  out  by  facts.  The  truth  is  that,  whilst 
we  in  England  were  wrangling  over  Home  Rule  for 
Ireland,  the  French  and  Germans  were  actually  estab- 
lishing their  rule  in  Africa.  They  accomphshed  a 
task  which  we  neglected,  in  spite  of  our  prior  occupancy 
and  boasted  Imperialism,  and  are  fully  entitled  to 
the  reward  of  their  labours  and  the  success  of  their 
enterprise.  With  admirable  foresight  and  courage 
French  officers  undertook  the  exploration  of  a  conti- 
nent, made  treaties  with  hundreds  of  native  rulers, 
now  subjects  of  the  Repubhc,  extended  her  frontiers 
in  all  directions,  took  care  to  establish  themselves 
at  the  back  of  each  of  our  West  African  possessions, 
and  this  in  spite  of  our  salaried  local  governors,  who 
were  aware  of  the  encroachments,  but  were  not  per- 
mitted to  interfere  for  fear  of  hurting  foreign  sus- 
ceptibilities. Practically  nothing  was  done  to  safe- 
guard our  interests  during  this  period  of  laissez  /aire, 
so  fatal  to  the  traditions  of  a  governing  race,  so  costly 
when  the  consequences  are  recognised  and  have  to  be 
remedied. 

*  See  two  maps  at  end  of  book. 


96  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

In  1865  a  "strong"  Committee  of  the  House  of 
Commons  unanimously  resolved  "  that  all  further 
British  extension  of  territory  or  assumption  of  govern- 
ment or  new  treaty  offering  protection  to  native  tribes 
would  be  inexpedient,"  and  this  policy  held  the  field 
for  years.  It  was  dictated  not  by  feelings  of  mag- 
nanimity or  humanity,  but  "  through  craven  fears 
of  being  great,"  and  was  a  direct  encouragement 
to  foreign  aggression — especially  German — about  which 
a  few  remarks  will  not  be  out  of  place  in  these  pages. 
Prince  Bismarck  at  first  treated  our  Government  with 
forbearance  and  scrupulous  consideration  when  he 
commenced  to  found  a  German  colony  in  South  West 
Africa,  but  he  grew  tired  of  our  unbusinesslike  methods 
and  peevish  complaints,  and  adopted  a  different  pro- 
cedure with  regard  to  his  second  venture;  indeed, 
the  story  of  his  acquisition  of  the  Cameroons  deserves 
to  be  told  as  a  sample  of  British  ineptitude.  The 
Cameroon  Mountains  (13,000  feet  high)  happen  to 
possess  the  only  salubrious  climate  near  the  West 
Coast  of  Africa,  and  other  ranges  of  high  altitude 
and  fertility  are  found  in  the  interior  of  the  province. 
In  1864  Burton  raised  the  British  flag  unofficially 
over  a  portion  of  these  hills,  foreseeing  the  future  value 
of  a  climate  so  suitable  for  European  habitation. 
Mission  and  trading  stations  were  estabhshed,  but 
not  formally  acknowledged  by  our  Government, 
though  they  proved  of  such  benefit  to  the  neighbouring 
tribes  that  the  chiefs  along  the  coast  petitioned  to  be 
included  in  the  British  settlement.  Their  prayers 
remained  unanswered  when  sent  through  the  Consul, 
so  at  last,  in  1879,  ^^^  ^^  the  Cameroon  Kings  ventured 
to  write  the  following  letter  direct  to  Queen  Victoria : 

"  We,   your  servants,   have  joined   together,   and 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA    97 

thought  it  better  to  write  you  a  nice  long  letter  which 
will  tell  you  about  our  wishes.  We  wish  to  have  your 
laws  in  our  territories.  We  want  to  have  every  fashion 
altered  ;  also  we  will  do  according  to  your  Consul's 
word.  Plenty  wars  here  in  our  country.  Plenty 
murder,  and  plenty  idol-worshippers.  Perhaps  these 
lines  of  our  writing  will  look  to  you  as  an  idle  tale.  We 
have  spoken  to  the  Enghsh  Consul  plenty  times  about 
having  an  Enghsh  Government  here.  We  never  have 
answer  from  you,  so  we  wish  to  write  to  you  ourselves. 
When  we  know  about  Calabar  River,  how  they  have 
Enghsh  laws  in  their  towns,  and  how  they  have  put 
away  their  superstitions,  oh,  we  shall  be  very  glad 
to  be  like  Calabar  River." 

The  British  residents,  had  they  been  consulted, 
could  have  proved  that  the  peace  of  the  Calabar  River 
and  the  insecurity  of  the  rest  of  the  country  accounted 
for  the  Kings'  desire  for  a  change,  yet  four  years  elapsed 
and  it  was  not  till  1883  that  the  Foreign  and  Colonial 
Offices  decided  to  place  the  Cameroons  under  the 
British  flag,  and  even  after  this  decision  had  been 
reached  months  were  allowed  to  slip  before  action 
was  taken.  On  May  16,  1884,  Consul  Hewett  was 
instructed  to  proclaim  the  formal  annexation,  but  this 
official  proved  no  swifter  than  his  superiors,  and  was 
beaten  on  the  post  by  a  German  under  the  following 
circumstances.  On  April  20,  or  a  month  before  the 
British  Colonial  Office  gave  any  instructions.  Lord 
Granville  received  a  communication  from  the  German 
Embassy  in  London  which  ought  to  have  aroused  the 
energy  of  a  Secretary  of  State  who  had  quite  recently 
been  deprived  of  South  West  Africa  by  Bismarck. 
He  was  informed  that  Dr.  Nachtigal  had  been  "  com- 
missioned to  visit  the  West  Coast  of  Africa  in  a  gun- 

G 


98  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

boat,  and  conduct  negotiations  connected  with  certain 
questions  on  behalf  of  Germany  "  ;  and  he  was  further 
requested  "  to  cause  the  authorities  in  the  British 
possessions  to  be  furnished  with  suitable  instructions." 
In  reply  an  assurance  was  given  that  the  British 
Colonial  authorities  would  be  enjoined  to  give  all 
possible  assistance  to  the  German  envoy.  Accordingly 
the  Mowe,  with  Dr.  Nachtigal  on  board,  accompanied 
by  the  Elizabeth,  anchored  off  the  Los  Islands  (British) 
and  proceeded  past  the  Gold  Coast  (British)  to  Togo- 
land,  where  the  German  flag  was  hoisted  on  July  2. 
Togoland  has  since  become  one  of  the  most  flourishing 
little  colonies  in  Africa,  and  proves  beyond  doubt 
that  Germans  are  not  incapable  of  founding  a  paying 
colony. 

After  this  easy  success  the  Mowe  steamed  on  to  the 
Cameroons,  where  everything  had  been  prepared  by 
the  four  German  traders  settled  in  the  place.  At  mid- 
night meetings,  arranged  with  the  native  Kings,  who 
were  tired  of  waiting  for  their  reply  from  Great  Britain, 
treaties  were  negotiated  and  signed  handing  over  the 
whole  country  to  German  protection,  and  Consul 
Hewett,  who  had  been  the  reverse  of  prompt,  arrived 
on  the  scene  five  days  after  the  German  flag  had  been 
hoisted  conspicuously  over  what  was  all  but  a  British 
colony.  Under  German  management  the  Cameroons 
have  since  developed  into  a  valuable  possession,  with 
a  hinterland  extending  to  Lake  Chad,  deliberately 
cutting  off  British  extension  towards  the  Nile.  The 
event  was  hailed  with  paroxysms  of  delight  in  Ger- 
many, whilst  in  England  futile  reproaches  were  heaped 
upon  the  Gladstone  Ministry  for  its  indifference  to 
British  interests.  But,  after  all,  the  Cabinet  only 
reflected  the  prevaihng  spirit  in  the  Houses  of  Parha- 
ment,  a  spirit  which|had  sat  down  under  Majuba  three 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA    99 

years  previously,  and  which  Bismarck  had  gauged 
before  he  sent  Dr.  Nachtigal  out  in  the  Mowe.  In  the 
end  Bismarck  paid  £4000  for  our  Cameroons  Mission 
Station  of  forty  years'  growth,  whereas  we  pocketed 
a  humihation,  condoned  a  piece  of  sharp  practice  and 
meekly  acknowledged  German  sovereignty. 

From  such  an  episode  it  is  pleasant  to  turn  to  the 
neighbouring  province  of  Nigeria,  and  dwell  upon  the 
services  rendered  to  his  country  by  one  man — Sir 
George  Goldie — who,  fortunately  for  England,  was  free 
from  the  blighting  control  of  a  British  Cabinet.  Even 
as  Cecil  Rhodes  added  Rhodesia  to  our  Empire,  Goldie 
gave  us  Nigeria,  and  of  the  two  Nigeria  is  the  more 
valuable,  and  was  the  more  difficult  to  acquire.  George 
Taubman  Goldie,  born  in  the  Isle  of  Man,  son  of  the 
Speaker  of  the  House  of  Keys,  was  educated  at  Wool- 
wich, and  held  a  commission  for  a  short  time  in  the 
Royal  Engineers.  He  subsequently  took  to  travelling 
in  Africa,  and  first  visited  the  Niger  in  1877.  With 
true  insight  he  perceived  the  potential  value  of  this 
great  river  and  devoted  his  life  and  abilities  to  securing 
it  for  his  country. 

It  had  been  explored  by  MacGregor  Laird  in  1832, 
by  British  gunboats  in  1841  and  by  Baikie  in  1854, 
but  the  withdrawal  of  the  parliamentary  grant  and 
the  destruction  of  Lokoja  by  the  natives  caused  the 
abandonment  of  all  enterprise  in  this  region,  and  Goldie 
only  found  a  few  rival  traders  conducting  a  precarious 
business,  without  intelligence  or  knowledge  of  the 
markets  of  Hausaland.  His  first  step  was  to  induce 
the  British  to  amalgamate  their  interests  and  form 
themselves  into  a  trading  company,  which  under  his 
management  became  in  two  years  a  concern  with  a 
capital  of  £125,000,  and  was  pressing  for  a  royal 
charter.     This  was  refused  on  the  ground  of  insuffi- 


100  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

ciency  of  capital,  so  Goldie  set  to  work  to  increase 
the  amount  to  £1,000,000,  and  at  last  in  1886  the 
charter  was  granted,  together  with  governing  rights 
over  Hausaland  and  Bornu.  In  1887  the  K.C.M.G. 
was  bestowed  upon  this  able  administrator,  and  he 
became  a  viceroy  in  fact,  though  not  in  name,  a  viceroy 
whose  dominion  must  needs  be  created  from  the  founda- 
tions upwards,  in  the  face  of  persistent  rivals  backed 
by  the  purses  and  diplomacy  of  two  European  Powers. 
The  measure  of  his  success  compared  v/ith  that  of  our 
other  coast  colonies  can  be  seen  on  the  map  and  judged 
from  the  annual  reports  on  this  tit-bit  of  Northern 
Africa  ;  the  story  of  how  he  accomplished  his  ends 
has  not  yet  been  given  to  the  public.  All  that  we 
know  of  this  strong  and  patient  man  during  his  twenty 
years'  task  on  the  Niger  is  that  he  succeeded.  French 
officers  openly  occupied  several  of  his  outlying  dis- 
tricts ;  German  civilians,  such  as  Herr  Flegel,  accepted 
British  hospitality  in  order  to  steal  a  march  on  their 
entertainers  and  occupy  territory  behind  their  backs  ; 
but  Goldie  triumphed  over  all,  and  on  January  i, 
1900,  handed  to  the  British  Government  the  provinces 
which  he  acquired.  The  difficulties  he  surmounted 
in  London,  Berlin  and  Paris,  without  mentioning 
those  in  Africa,  would  fill  a  whole  volume,  but  he  alone 
could  write  it  with  accuracy. 

Meanwhile,  owing  to  the  fact  that  Vandeleur  was 
employed  during  the  most  important  military  expedi- 
tion conducted  by  Sir  George,  we  possess  a  detailed 
description  of  the  operations  and  are  afforded  a  gumpse 
of  how  he  set  about  his  work.  I  refer  to  the  first 
expedition  against  the  Fulani,  which  resulted  in  our 
dominion  over  Hausaland.  It  illustrates  how  fore- 
thought should  be  applied  to  soldiering,  in  order  to 
accomplish  great  ends  with  small  means  ;    it  was  a 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA    loi 

conspicuous  success,  though  it  might  have  been  merely 
a  "  regrettable  incident ; "  and  I  propose  to  relate  its 
story  as  recorded  by  Vandeleur,  who  took  a  prominent 
part  in  it.  In  October  1896,  Sir  George  Goldie's 
plans  were  matured  and  he  was  in  London,  selecting 
officers  for  active  service  in  Nigeria.  Vandeleur, 
recently  returned  from  Uganda  with  a  good  record, 
was  just  the  sort  of  man  he  wanted,  so  the  formalities 
were  quickly  got  through  and,  overjoyed  at  this  unex- 
pected prospect  of  more  fighting,  the  young  Guardsman 
embarked  at  Liverpool  with  other  special  service 
officers  on  November  28.  Amongst  them  were  his 
friends  Major  Cunningham  and  Leutenant  Cecil 
Pereira  of  the  Coldstream  Guards.  He  had  on  this 
occasion  an  additional  motive  for  the  keen  interest 
he  always  took  in  a  campaign  in  that  Sir  George  had 
recommended  him  to  the  Times  as  its  correspondent 
with  the  expedition. 

The  voyage  was  eventless  and  dreary,  a  monotonous 
succession  of  stoppages  and  delays  at  various  West 
African  ports,  and  it  was  not  until  December  26  that 
the  ss.  Coomassie  dropped  anchor  in  the  For^ados 
River,  the  most  westerly  branch  of  the  Niger  delta. 
The  whole  coast  is  here  intersected  by  creeks,  back- 
waters and  tiny  channels,  choked  and  veiled  by  endless 
mangrove  swamps,  through  which  the  Niger  oozes 
and  trickles  to  the  sea  in  an  ignominious  fashion. 

The  expedition  was  due  to  start  from  the  head- 
quarters of  Northern  Nigeria,  at  the  beginning  of 
January  1897,  so  the  officers  on  the  Coomassie  were 
but  just  in  time.  They  found  a  steam  launch  waiting 
to  convey  them  up  the  river  to  Lokoja,  an  important 
town  built  at  the  junction  of  the  Niger  and  Benue, 
the  mihtary  headquarters  of  the  Protectorate.  The 
place  was  full  of  Ufe  and  activity  in  view  of  the  coming 


102  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

campaign,  and  numerous  stern-wheeled  steamers  were 
moored  to  the  river  bank  receiving  their  suppUes  of 
rations  and  reserve  ammunition,  though  nothing  as 
regards  equipment  and  organisation  had  been  left 
to  chance  or  to  the  last  moment.  Sir  George  Goldie 
had  bent  his  energies  towards  perfecting  the  organisa- 
tion of  a  fighting  force  during  several  years,  offering 
us  an  example  of  how  brains  and  money  can  be  econo- 
mically applied  to  military  policy,  and  a  contrast 
to  the  makeshifts  of  British  Cabinets,  drifting  into  war 
yet  preaching  peace. 

Here  Vandeleur  learned  the  objective  of  the  ex- 
pedition, which  had  hitherto  been  kept  a  profound 
secret  even  from  the  officers  engaged.  It  was  to  be 
directed  against  the  powerful  State  of  Nupe,  situated 
on  both  banks  of  the  Niger  north  of  Lokoja,  a  depen- 
dency of  the  Fulani  Empire.  The  Emir  of  Nupe, 
himself  a  Fulah,  had  sent  emissaries  from  his  capital, 
Bida,  to  the  neighbouring  Emir  of  Ilorin  and  the  King 
of  Busa,  to  persuade  them  to  join  forces  with  him  in 
order  to  turn  the  white  men  out  of  the  country.  The 
King  of  Busa  declined,  preferring  to  hold  to  his  treaty 
with  the  British  company,  and  had  even  gone  so  far  as 
to  denounce  the  conspiracy  to  Sir  George  Goldie.  The 
latter  saw  that  a  trial  of  strength  between  the  Moha- 
medan  rulers  and  himself  was  at  last  inevitable — it  had 
been  pending  for  eighteen  years — and  wisely  decided 
to  prove  in  a  decisive  manner  who  should  be  master. 

Hitherto  the  company,  although  it  had  engaged 
in  trade  with  the  natives  and  forestalled  French  enter- 
prise by  concluding  treaties  with  the  Sultans  of  Sokoto 
and  Bornu,  in  reality  held  its  position  in  the  anterior 
on  mere  sufferance.  European  merchandise  was  wel- 
comed, but  British  ideas  on  the  subject  of  slave- 
raiding    were    abhorrent    to    Mohamedan    potentates. 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA    103 

To  hope  that  such  princehngs  would  perceive  the  error 
of  their  ways  and  proceed  to  reform  their  methods  at 
the  bidding  of  a  missionary  was  an  idea  which  might 
do  duty  on  an  Exeter  Hall  platform,  though  nowhere 
else.  The  ripe  experience  of  the  Governor  of  Nigeria 
taught  him  that  progress  was  impossible  till  the  Fulani 
had  been  conquered  in  at  least  one  battle. 

With  the  means  at  command  it  was  a  daring 
venture,  and  when  the  intention  leaked  out  at  home 
the  value  of  secrecy  in  England  as  well  as  in  Nigeria 
was  amply  illustrated.  Experts  (so-called)  prophesied 
the  speedy  annihilation  of  the  expedition,  Little 
Englanders  shouted  for  its  recall,  and  the  press  teemed 
with  the  kind  of  advice  which  produced  the  abandon- 
ment of  Gordon  in  the  Sudan  and  the  policy  of  scuttle 
whenever  any  enterprise  seemed  to  involve  a  risk. 
Such  counsel  would  have  been  but  too  congenial  to 
the  Colonial  Secretaries  of  a  few  years  previously,  but 
fell  unheeded  on  the  ears  of  Mr.  Joseph  Chamberlain, 
who  fully  grasped  the  duty  of  accepting  some  risk  in 
order  to  further  a  British  interest,  and  took  upon  his 
shoulders  the  responsibility  of  backing  Sir  George's 
enterprise.  Goldie's  critics  were  so  far  in  the  right 
that  absolute  disaster  awaited  him  if  he  miscalculated 
the  fighting  capabiUty  of  his  enemy  or  the  reliabihty 
of  his  own  troops.  His  forces  consisted  of  Hausas 
trained  and  led  by  British  officers.  They  had  been 
carefully  drilled  and  disciphned  for  several  years, 
and  had  distinguished  themselves  in  small  encounters 
with  slave-raiders,  but  had  not  before  met  their  co- 
rehgionists  in  pitched  battle.  They  were  now  to  be 
pitted  against  overwhelming  "numbers  of  the  very 
Fulani  who  had  conquered  and  ruled  Hausaland 
without  question  for  a  century.  They  were  therefore, 
to  say  the  least,  untried  soldiers,  though  their  British 


104  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

officers  were  staking  their  lives  as  a  guarantee  of  their 
competency. 

Meanwhile  the  Emir  of  Nupe,  equally  confident  in 
the  superiority  of  his  numerous  cavalry,  had  sent 
6000  men  under  his  chief  general,  the  Markum  Mohamed, 
to  Kabba  with  the  object  of  striking  a  blow  direct 
at  Lokoja.*  His  main  army  he  kept  at  Bida  for  the 
defence  of  the  capital  and  thus  divided  his  force  into 
two  parts,  separated  by  the  broad  Niger  and  a  hundred 
miles  of  difficult  country.  The  Governor,  informed 
of  this  move,  decided  to  interpose  his  tiny  force 
between  the  two  Nupe  armies,  defeat  the  smaller 
first,  and  then  by  rapid  marching  throw  himself  against 
the  main  body  at  Bida.  The  idea  was  simple,  bold  and 
stragetically  sound,  but  the  utmost  secrecy  and 
despatch  were  required  to  carry  it  out  and  prevent  a 
junction  of  the  two  armies  before  they  could  be  dealt 
with  separately.  Goldie  also  took  care  to  patrol  the 
Niger  with  gunboats  and  launches,  to  prevent  all  com- 
munication across  the  river  and  to  frustrate  the 
intended  alliance  of  Nupe  and  Ilorin.  In  this,  as  in 
other  campaigns,  the  decision  having  been  made  and 
the  means  provided,  mobility  became  an  essential 
factor  in  the  problem. 

The  force  at  his  disposal  consisted  of  thirty  British 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers,  and  513  Hausas 
and  Yorubas,  commanded  by  Major  Arnold,  a  young 
cavalry  officer  who  had  devoted  his  energies  to  the 
training  and  organising  of  the  troops.  The  flotilla  was 
entrusted  to  Mr.  Wallace,  the  Agent-General  of  the 
Company,  a  civilian  with  twenty  years'  experience  of 
the  country,  while  Sir  George  Goldie  accompanied  the 
troops  and  directed  the  plan  of  campaign.  The  expe- 
dition started  by  land  and  water  on  January  6,  1897. 

*  See  map  facing  page  120. 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA  105 

The  land  force  was  organised  in  seven  companies, 
each  a  complete  unit,  with  a  maxim  attached  to  it. 
Seymour  Vandeleur  commanded  the  maxim  of  No.  5 
Company,  manned  as  were  the  rest  by  Hausas.  The 
artillery  consisted  of  two  Whitworth  B.L.  guns  (a 
twelve-  and  a  nine-pounder)  and  five  seven-pounder 
light  guns,  carried  by  native  porters  and  served  in 
action  by  three  Royal  Artillery  officers  and  59  Hausa 
gunners.  This  force,  in  addition  to  its  offensive 
operations,  had  to  safeguard  the  march  of  900  carriers, 
loaded  with  three  weeks'  supply  of  food  and  ammuni- 
tion. Owing  to  the  bush  and  scrub,  the  first  few 
marches  had  to  be  conducted  in  single  file,  thus  reduc- 
ing the  speed  of  the  column  to  that  of  its  slowest 
porter.  Two  companies  formed  the  advance  guard 
and  went  on  daily  to  prepare  the  next  night's  camping 
ground  ;  the  remainder  undertook  the  duty  of  escort 
to  the  procession  of  carriers  which  from  its  length  and 
slowness  was  vulnerable  to  attack  by  cavalry,  though 
luckily  nothing  of  the  kind  was  attempted.  Each  even- 
ing strands  of  wire  were  stretched  round  the  bivouac 
at  forty  yards  distance  to  guard  against  night  attacks, 
and  "  surprise "  lights  were  hung  up  at  intervals. 
These,  on  being  fired,  burned  clearly  for  sufficient  time 
to  enable  the  maxims  to  be  turned  on  the  threatened 
point.  The  men  slept  with  their  rifles  close  beside 
them. 

The  British  officers  were  mounted  on  wiry  little 
ponies  from  the  interior,  and  were  each  allowed  a 
native  servant,  but  their  baggage  was  of  the  hghtest 
description.  Two  mallams  (priests)  accompanied  the 
troops  ;  prayers  were  repeated  thrice  daily  ;  Mohame- 
dan  observances  were  strictly  respected — thus  no 
Fulani  could  truthfully  assert  that  the  white  man 
was  perverting  the  pious  Hausa. 


io6  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

It  was  hot  even  for  tropical  Africa  as  the  column 
marched  in  a  northerly  direction  to  place  itself  astride 
the  road  between  Kabba  and  Bida,  a  position  which 
was  reached  without  opposition  on  January  ii,  at  a 
village  called  Sura,  where  a  zariba  was  built  to  accom- 
modate the  bulk  of  the  porters  under  the  protection 
of  one  company,  commanded  by  Pereira.  The  remain- 
der of  the  force  started  in  the  lightest  possible  order 
to  surprise  the  Markum's  camp  at  Kabba.  Three  days 
of  forced  marches  through  beautiful  country  brought 
them  to  the  outer  walls  of  the  town,  but  only  to  learn 
that  the  Nupe  army  had  just  broken  up  its  camp  and 
marched  north-west  to  rejoin  the  main  body  at  Bida. 
It  was  a  bitter  disappointment  to  the  troops,  who  were 
spoiling  for  a  fight,  but  Sir  George  relied  on  Mr. 
Wallace's  system  of  steamer  patrols  to  prevent  the 
Markum's  army  from  crossing  the  Niger  ;  moreover 
the  time  could  not  be  considered  as  altogether  wasted. 
During  the  marches  the  men  had  learned  to  trust  their 
officers,  and  confidence,  mobility  and  discipline  had 
improved  daily. 

The  inhabitants  of  Kabba  rejoiced  at  their  deliver- 
ance from  oppression  and  none  was  more  demonstra- 
tive than  the  old  chief,  who  had  been  in  receipt  of  a 
subsidy  from  the  Fulani  for  collecting  slaves  among 
his  own  people.  With  true  native  caution,  however, 
he  refused  all  tangible  assistance  to  the  British,  and 
would  not  even  sell  them  horses,  of  which  they  stood 
greatly  in  need.  As  in  his  experience  no  institution 
had  hitherto  been  permanent,  why  should  he  now 
believe  that  the  Fulani  would  not  return  in  a  week 
or  two  ?  A  picturesque  review  of  the  troops  was  held 
under  the  walls  of  the  town,  Fulah  power  was  declared 
at  an  end,  and  the  country  formally  taken  over  ;  the 
enemy's  deserted  camp  was  burned,  and  by  the  i6th 


AIM.'^OIZ    »^I 


^ii 


ON    TH1-:    MARCH    IN    NIGKKIA 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA  107 

the  Hying  column  rejoined  its  supplies,  and  was  enjoy- 
ing a  day  of  rest,  for  the  long  hot  marches  were  begin- 
ning to  tell  on  both  officers  and  men. 

The  scenery  had  hitherto  offered  every  variety 
of  scrub,  grassy  plain,  thick  forest  and  rocky  hills  ; 
the  country  was  fertile,  dotted  with  villages  and 
patches  of  cultivation,  chiefly  of  dhurra  (maize),  yams, 
plantain  and  cotton.  A  good  deal  of  primitive  industry 
was  carried  on,  especially  the  weaving  of  cotton  into 
cloth  on  ingenious  native  looms.  Here  and  there, 
however,  sad  spectacles  of  ruin  and  desolation  marked 
the  track  of  a  party  of  Nupe  slave-raiders,  of  whom 
the  inhabitants  showed  the  greatest  terror,  though  they 
welcomed  the  British  with  confidence.  On  turning 
northward  a  long  and  trying  march  led  the  column 
over  the  Jakpana  Hills,  which  here  form  the  watershed 
between  the  Middle  Niger  and  Lagos.  Owing  to  absence 
of  water  these  hills  had  to  be  crossed  without  a  halt, 
and  the  lava  rocks  burning  under  a  tropical  sun  caused 
suffering  to  the  bare-footed  porters. 

At  last,  however,  the  river  again  came  into  view 
and,  passing  through  villages  surrounded  by  exten- 
sive cultivation,  the  force  rejoined  the  flotilla  at 
Egbon  and  learned  that  the  gunboats  had  pre- 
vented any  contingent  of  the  enemy  from  crossing  the 
stream. 

Thus,  in  spite  of  a  minor  disappointment  at  Kabba, 
the  original  plan  held  good,  and  preparations  were 
made  for  the  advance  on  Bida,  distant  twenty-five 
miles  from  the  river.  After  the  crossing,  an  unford- 
able  creek  running  parallel  to  the  Niger  was  no  in- 
superable obstacle,  as  with  the  aid  of  some  canoes 
and  a  steel  boat  the  troops  were  safely  ferried  across, 
but  a  swamp  just  beyond  proved  a  more  serious  diffi- 
culty and  indeed  nearly  wrecked   the   success  of  the 


io8  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

expedition.  The  two  heavy  guns  now  became  the  prob- 
lem of  the  day.  To  leave  them  behind  might  involve 
failure  to  breach  the  walls  of  Bida,  to  drag  them  by 
manual  labour  through  a  swamp  in  face  of  an  enemy 
involved  delay  and  necessitated  an  undesirable  sub- 
division of  the  small  force.  Meanwhile,  information 
derived  from  captured  natives  pointed  to  desperate 
fighting  by  the  Nupes  in  defence  of  their  capital.  It 
was  decided  after  consideration  to  run  a  risk  and  tem- 
porarily divide  the  force,  so  Cunningham  was  sent 
on  with  two  companies,  including  Vandeleur's,  whilst 
the  remainder  escorted  the  guns  and  porters. 

Pushing  rapidly  forward  the  advance  guard,  ac- 
companied by  Sir  George  Goldie,  made  a  long  march 
into  a  country  which  changed  its  character,  cultivation 
gi\ang  place  to  open  undulating  downs  with  gentle 
folds  and  here  and  there  a  village  or  farmstead  nestling 
amongst  some  trees.  It  seemed  admirably  adapted  to 
the  enemy's  cavalry  tactics.  After  crossing  a  wide 
ravine  and  ascending  a  slope,  the  advance-guard 
suddenly  beheld  the  Nupe  army  drawn  up  in  its 
thousands  on  a  wide  front,  flanked  by  large  bodies 
of  white-robed  horsemen.  Major  Arnold  now  came  up 
with  a  reinforcement  of  two  companies  and  decided  to 
continue  the  advance  in  order  to  distract  the  enemy's 
attention  from  our  line  of  carriers  and  slow-moving 
guns  in  rear.  The  little  body  of  Hausas  in  their  khaki 
uniforms  and  red  tarbooshes  carried  out  the  movement 
with  deliberation  and  coolness  under  a  galling  fire 
from  the  enemy's  advanced  marksmen,  who  disputed 
every  yard  of  the  ground.  But  their  volleys  and  maxim 
fire  told  with  effect  on  the  Nupes,  who  gave  ground  as 
the  force  moved  steadily  forward  to  the  summit  of 
an  undulating  ridge  where  a  halt  was  called.  Here 
a  full  view  of  Bida  city  two  thousand  yards  off  burst 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA    109 

upon  them  and  they  knew  that  a  decisive  hour  in  the 
destiny  of  Nigeria  was  at  hand. 

The  scene  was  worthy  of  the  occasion  and  deeply 
impressed  Vandeleur  and  the  few  British  officers  who 
were  present.  The  town,  containing  from  70,000  to 
100,000  inhabitants,  stretched  as  far  as  the  eye  could 
reach,  a  mass  of  lofty  thatched  roofs  and  clay  walls 
encircled  by  a  massive  crenalated  outer  wall  on  which 
stood  a  throng  of  citizens,  the  spectators  of  a  struggle 
which  should  decide  whether  British  or  Fulani  were  to 
be  their  future  masters.  In  front,  brilliantly  robed 
Emirs  trotted  at  the  head  of  their  retainers,  horse  and 
foot,  and  the  air  resounded  with  the  roar  and  din  of 
an  army  drawn  up  for  battle. 

Clearly  the  little  knot  of  250  Hausas  on  the  ridge, 
who,  be  it  remembered,  constituted  half  the  entire 
force,  could  not  venture  on  an  attack,  nor  could  they 
remain  where  they  were  without  water.  Meanwhile, 
in  spite  of  occasional  outbursts  from  our  Maxims, 
the  enemy  interpreted  the  halt  as  a  confession  of  weak- 
ness, an  invitation  to  attack.  They  therefore  started 
a  forward  move  in  extended  line  with  enveloping 
flanks.  But  the  British  officers,  keenly  on  the  watch, 
formed  the  well-drilled  companies,  by  word  of  command, 
into  square  at  the  double,  and  then  slowly  retired  in 
steady  ranks  to  avoid  being  cut  off  from  the  ravine. 

Instantly  the  whole  Nupe  army  raised  a  mighty 
shout  of  enthusiasm  and  bore  down  upon  the  square, 
surrounding  it  on  all  sides.  The  moment  was  critical ; 
the  smallest  mistake,  the  sHghtest  panic  would  have 
brought  eager  Fulani  horsemen  charging  into  our 
ranks  in  their  thousands,  and  the  day  would  have 
ended  in  a  massacre  by  superior  numbers.  But  the 
officers  kept  cool,  their  men  shot  steadily  at  every  halt, 
the  square  showed  no  signs  of  wavering.     The  Nupe 


no  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

footmen  aimed  so  high  that  their  bullets  for  the  most 
part  whizzed  harmlessly  overhead,  but  the  active  horse- 
men on  the  point  of  charging  home  came  so  dangerously 
near  that  frequent  halts  were  necessary  to  open  maxim 
and  seven-pounder  fire,  in  order  to  clear  the  path  for 
further  retreat.  Slowly,  gradually  and  surely  the  square 
fought  its  way  back  towards  the  ravine,  brushing  aside 
the  more  adventurous  horsemen,  keeping  others  on 
the  flanks  at  a  respectful  distance  and  facing  at  each 
halt  the  threatened  rush  of  the  footmen.  Of  all 
tactical  operations  none  is  more  trying  than  a  retire- 
ment in  the  face  of  a  fanatical  enemy,  none  a  severer 
test  of  nerve  and  discipline  ;  and  it  was  with  intense 
relief  that  at  last  Arnold  and  his  officers  approached 
their  bivouac  at  the  ravine  and  found  its  supplies 
and  reserve  ammunition  intact.  Here  they  could  halt 
near  water  and  defy  attack. 

It  was  now  2.30  p.m.  ;  the  advance-guard  had  been 
marching  and  fighting  since  dawn  ;  the  men  were 
hungry  and  tired,  but  were  still  threatened  by  a  host 
of  twenty  to  thirty  thousand  of  the  enemy,  and  rest 
was  not  possible.  The  seven-pounders  had  fortunately 
arrived  at  the  front  and  were  busily  employed  in  pre- 
venting the  cavalry  from  working  round  the  flanks 
to  the  immediate  rear,  a  task  which  they  successfully 
accomplished,  though  their  accuracy  was  moderate 
and  their  range  limited.  However,  their  moral 
effect  was  far  greater  than  their  execution,  and 
Arnold  felt  strong  enough  to  detach  two  of  his  com- 
panies to  the  rear,  in  order  to  reinforce  the  escort 
of  the  heavy  guns,  on  which  the  success  of  the  ex- 
pedition depended.  They  were  not  yet  in  sight  and 
nothing  had  been  heard  of  them,  but  soon  after  4  p.m. 
the  nine-pounder  was  dragged  into  camp,  and  matters 
assumed  a  brighter  aspect. 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA  iii 

The  first  shell,  aimed  with  precision  at  long  range, 
landed  among  a  clump  of  horsemen  in  a  village  and 
scattered  them  in  all  directions,  amidst  loud  cheers 
from  the  camp.  After  a  few  more  shells  of  a  similar 
kind  the  enemy  with  one  accord  drew  off  to  Bida, 
carrying  their  dead  and  wounded  with  them.  It  was 
an  unexpected  but  welcome  rehef,  which  the  British 
officers  only  understood  next  day  when  they  learnt 
that  one  of  the  first  shells  burst  amongst  the  Agaie 
division,  alUes  of  the  Emir  of  Bida,  kilhng  their  chief 
and  so  disheartening  the  contingent  that  it  departed 
homewards  the  same  night. 

It  was  dusk  when  the  advance-guard  sat  down 
to  a  meal  after  tv/elve  hours'  fighting,  and  quite  dark 
before  the  remainder  of  the  force  escorting  the  twelve- 
pounder  reached  camp,  amid  cheering  and  bugle- 
playing.  This  gun,  by  means  of  a  compass-bearing, 
was  aimed  in  the  dark  at  the  city  of  Bida,  elevated 
to  its  extreme  range  (5400  yards)  and  fired — more  as 
a  rehef  to  the  feelings  of  the  officers  and  a  defiance 
to  the  enemy  than  for  any  practical  purpose.  As 
luck  would  have  it,  this  single  shell  fell  in  the  to\vn 
and  burst  near  the  palace,  causing  considerable  com- 
motion and  alarm.  Thus  did  the  heavy  artillery 
compensate  for  the  risk  involved  in  the  subdivision 
of  the  force  during  twelve  hours  of  critical  work. 

When  morning  broke,  after  a  night  spent  in  firing 
rockets  to  keep  the  enemy  at  a  distance,  the  force, 
including  loaded  carriers  and  heavy  guns,  crossed 
the  ravine  and  formed  into  square  on  the  slope  beyond 
— porters  in  the  centre,  heavy  guns  in  the  front  face, 
maxims  at  the  corners.  Slowly  this  unwieldy  square 
crept  forward,  tightly  packed,  a  solid  mass  of  men 
occupying  a  tiny  space  of  ground.  The  Fulani  cavalry 
swept  round  to  threaten  the  rear,  but  this  time  the 


112  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

British  were  a  compact  force  with  no  rearguard,  and 
had  the  added  prestige  of  advancing  to  the  attack. 
The  fighting  was  in  fact  a  repetition  of  that  of  the 
previous  day,  and  would  be  tedious  to  describe  in 
detail.  Riflemen  in  bushes  and  horsemen  in  the  open 
delayed  the  square,  but  it  reached  the  ridge  with  a  few 
casualties,  including  Sir  George's  servant  shot  dead 
at  his  side,  and  beheld  the  Nupe  army  drawn  up  on 
the  opposite  slope.  The  guns  came  into  action  and 
soon  cleared  the  ground,  masses  of  the  enemy  retiring 
into  the  town  by  its  several  gates  in  order  to  line  the 
wall,  others  sheering  off  to  some  high  ground  to  the 
west.  So  the  force  moved  on  to  within  half  a  mile 
of  the  city,  took  up  a  defensive  position  on  a  rising 
piece  of  ground  near  some  water,  and  commenced  the 
bombardment.  About  this  time  the  Emir  of  Bida 
was  wounded  in  the  arm  as  he  stood  near  the  western 
gate  in  a  crowd  of  horsemen,  and  the  moral  effect  of 
our  shells  spread  dismay  amongst  the  enemy ;  moreover, 
the  thatched  roofs  of  Bida,  scorched  dry  by  a  tropical 
sun,  were  soon  blazing  in  all  directions.  Thus  the 
fighting  men  on  the  outer  wall  who  had  opened  a  well- 
sustained  fire  were  now  hotly  engaged  with  our  volleys, 
maxims  and  guns,  and  were  also  threatened  by  a  con- 
flagration in  rear.  They  wavered,  and  finally  aban- 
doned the  defence  of  the  city.  By  midday  the  whole 
Nupe  army  was  in  full  retreat  through  the  town, 
dispersing  into  the  country  beyond,  and  the  place  stood 
at  the  mercy  of  the  conquerors. 

Camp  was  pitched  outside,  a  meal  cooked,  and  later 
in  the  day  the  officers  marched  their  troops  through  the 
city,  when  they  realised  for  the  first  time  its  immense 
extent  (three  miles  by  two  and  a  half)  and  were  fully 
impressed  with  the  danger  which  street  fighting  would 
have  entailed,  accompanied  as  it  always  is  by  loss  of 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA  113 

discipline  and  temptations  to  loot,  which  no  African 
troops  can  resist.  The  moral  effect  of  the  heavy  guns 
had  obviated  a  costly  assault  on  the  outer  wall  and 
hand-to-hand  scuffles  in  the  streets. 

After  one  day's  halt  to  rest  the  troops  and  en- 
courage the  inhabitants  to  resume  their  usual  occupa- 
tions, the  force  took  up  quarters  in  the  palace  in  the 
heart  of  the  city,  and  proclamations  were  issued 
declaring  Fulani  rule  and  slavery  at  an  end.  The 
British  flag  was  hoisted  over  the  place,  reconnais- 
sances were  undertaken  into  the  surrounding  country, 
and  soon  the  trading  population  learned  that  they 
would  be  more  secure  under  our  rule  even  though  the 
old  currency,  slaves,  was  abohshed.  Some  members 
of  the  reigning  family  came  in  to  surrender,  and  finally 
the  Markum  was  appointed  Emir  with  power  to  rule 
the  State  under  British  supervision.  Thus  the  whole 
of  Nupe  was  freed  from  oppression,  confidence  was 
restored,  commerce  encouraged  and  the  last  report 
of  the  country's  progress  shows  how  beneficial  the 
expulsion  of  the  old  rulers  has  proved.  Having  estab- 
lished a  native  government  to  replace  the  old  one 
the  expedition  returned  to  the  Niger. 

Writers  on  mihtary  operations  are  sometimes 
obhged — by  way  of  illustration — to  institute  com- 
parisons between  one  campaign  and  another,  and 
to  draw  deductions  therefrom.  In  this  connection 
the  Bida  expedition  has  been  hkened  "  to  the  historic 
battle  of  Plassey,  whereon  the  foundation  of  the 
Indian  Empire  was  laid "  ;  but  I  do  not  propose 
to  enter  upon  this  subject  beyond  suggesting  that  the 
inferences  to  be  drawn  are  obvious.  Brains  and 
forethought,  unhampered  by  circumlocution,  planned 
and  carried  out  the  whole  thing.  The  criticism  that 
the  enemy  possessed  no  field-guns,  that  he  ought  to 


114  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

have  rushed  the  ravine  camp  early  during  the  first 
day's  fight,  that  he  could  have  successfully  attacked 
the  column  on  its  hundred  miles'  march  from  Kabba 
to  Bida  is  true  enough.  But  in  judging  of  the  event 
one  must  give  weight  to  many  considerations,  including 
the  past  history  of  the  country,  the  numbers  engaged 
on  both  sides,  the  difficulties  of  transport  and  the 
results  achieved.  The  object  of  war  is  neither  to  kill 
as  many  enemies  as  possible  nor  to  telegraph  home  a 
big  butcher's  bill  in  one's  own  force,  as  is  sometimes 
supposed.  At  Bida  our  losses  were  Lieutenant  Thom- 
son and  seven  men  killed,  nine  men  wounded,  and  one 
seven-pounder  captured  by  the  enemy.  In  addition 
Captains  Hatton  and  Anderson  and  Lieutenants  Thorpe, 
Parker  and  Musters  (he  died  on  the  homeward  journey) 
were  invaUded  to  England.  Thus  the  achievement 
was  out  of  proportion  to  the  loss,  though  the  enemy 
suffered  heavily  during  the  first  day's  fight.  From 
start  to  finish  the  expedition  occupied  one  month. 

A  commander  of  native  troops  may  be  judged  from 
the  point  of  view  of  a  strategist,  a  tactician  or  a  humani- 
tarian ;  but  in  any  case  he  must  be  successful.  Now 
the  campaign  under  review  was  a  small  masterpiece 
of  strategy;  it  included  a  tactical  success  gained 
by  five  hundred  men  against  twenty  thousand ;  it 
advanced  the  cause  of  humanity  by  freeing  a  wide  area 
from  slave-raids  ;  and  it  ultimately  added  Hausaland 
to  the  British  Empire.  Surely  no  Englishman,  save 
those  who  habitually  cry  down  the  British  Empire, 
will  complain  of  such  a  result  ! 

But  before  we  quit  Nigeria  to  follow  Vandeleur's 
career  into  other  parts,  some  mention  must  be  made 
of  another  expedition  in  which  he  was  engaged  against 
an  important  Fulah  State  named  Ilorin,  situated 
sixty  miles  to  the  south  of  the  Niger  at  Jebba  (one 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA  115 

hundred  miles  up  stream  from  Bida).  It  will  have  been 
gathered  from  what  has  been  said  that  the  Company, 
with  its  headquarters  at  the  confluence  of  two  rivers, 
had,  until  1897,  been  essentially  a  trading  company, 
with  command  of  the  navigable  waters  but  no  real 
authority  inland.  Based  on  its  steamers  and  gunboats, 
the  time  had  come  for  its  land  force  to  carry  forward 
the  enterprise,  and  put  the  company  into  touch  with 
the  commercial  cities  of  the  interior.  But  it  was 
impossible  to  bring  this  about  so  long  as  the  Fulani 
impeded  all  intercourse  and  clung  obstinately  to  the 
practice  of  levying  a  tribute  of  slaves.  With  such 
magnificent  highways  of  trade  as  the  Niger  and  Benue 
flowing  through  regions  inhabited  by  such  intelligent 
traders  as  the  Hausas,  it  will  always  be  a  remarkable 
fact  that  the  desirability  of  sea-power  was  never  grasped 
by  the  native  mind,  and  that  the  navigable  rivers 
were  looked  upon  as  obstacles  to,  rather  than  pro- 
moters of,  commerce.  In  a  land  where  the  art  of 
weaving  and  dyeing  rivalled  Manchester's  best  efforts, 
the  art  of  boat-building  had  not  progressed  beyond 
the  dug-out  canoe  of  the  ancient  Briton. 

The  British  introduced  a  new  conception  by  depend- 
ing on  river-power.  Now,  with  increasing  prosperity 
and  the  fear  of  German  and  French  encroachment — 
a  French  force  actually  occupied  Busa  (250  miles  within 
the  British  frontier  as  laid  down  by  treaty)  during  the 
Bida  campaign — the  time  had  come  to  take  action 
on  land.  Bida  in  January,  was  the  first  step,  Ilorin 
a  month  later  was  the  second  ;  together  they  con- 
solidated the  whole  region  south  of  the  Middle  Niger, 
and  on  the  north  opened  a  road  to  Hausaland  and  the 
Fulani  Empire — the  road  which  in  1903  enabled  Sir 
Frederick  Lugard  to  complete  the  conquest  of  Nigeria. 

We  will  therefore  close  this  chapter  with  an  account 


ii6  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

of  the  Ilorin  expedition,  derived  from  Vandeleur's 
copious  materials.  During  previous  years  the  Governor 
had  made  several  ineffectual  attempts  to  arrive  at  a 
friendly  understanding  with  this  Fulah  Emir,  and 
on  one  occasion  offered  to  ride  to  the  capital  and 
personally  settle  the  frontiers  beyond  which  slave- 
raids  into  Lagos  would  no  longer  be  permitted.  But 
the  weak  Emir,  though  half  inchned  to  agree  to  the 
proposal,  was  overruled  by  his  own  military  chiefs, 
called  Beloguns,  who  could  not  conceive  the  possibility 
of  defeat  by  the  British  and  were  unwilling  to  forego 
their  privilege  of  making  expeditions,  involving  no 
risk  to  themselves,  against  neighbouring  pagans. 
In  the  hope,  however,  that  the  sharp  lesson  just  read 
to  the  more  powerful  State  of  Nupe  might  modify 
the  overweening  confidence  of  the  Beloguns  and  their 
thousand  horse  and  five  thousand  foot.  Sir  George 
sent  messengers  to  explain  the  altered  situation  and 
press  for  a  peaceful  settlement  of  the  frontier.  But 
the  military  caste  in  Ilorin,  not  unlike  similar  bodies 
in  other  parts  of  the  world,  held  foreign  peoples  in 
supreme  contempt  and  had  to  suffer  the  consequent 
humiliation. 

Meanwhile  our  expedition,  consisting  of  fifteen 
officers,  340  men,  two  seven-pounders,  and  four  maxims, 
proceeded  in  steamers  up  the  Niger,  and  was  continu- 
ously cheered  by  the  riverside  villagers,  who  kept 
running  along  the  banks  in  a  state  of  wild  excitement, 
dancing  and  singing  to  testify  their  joy  at  the  defeat 
of  the  Fulani. 

At  Jebba,  the  limit  of  uninterrupted  navigation, 
the  force  landed  and  marched  inland  towards  Ilorin — 
at  first  through  a  waterless,  sandy  tract,  which  re- 
minded Vandeleur  of  the  Haud  of  Somaliland,  and 
afterwards  through  a  beautiful  park-like  district  where 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA  117 

rolling  plains  dotted  with  timber  kept  an  agricultural 
population  in  ease  and  comfort.  From  the  villages, 
partially  hidden  beneath  luxurious  banana  groves, 
the  peasants  looked  out  upon  the  column  with 
curiosity.  As  the  city  was  gradually  approached 
the  rivers  and  streams  became  numerous,  the  villages 
larger  and  more  frequent,  and  the  whole  scene  presented 
an  appearance  of  rich  fertility ;  but  here  the  inhabitants, 
influenced  by  their  Fulani  masters,  began  to  display 
unmistakable  symptoms  of  hostihty.  They  could  be 
seen  peering  from  behind  trees  and  houses,  refusing 
to  acknowledge  the  friendly  shouts  of  our  guides,  and, 
by  their  general  behaviour,  warning  our  experienced 
officers  to  be  ready  for  a  fight.  No  shot  was  fired  by 
either  side,  though  numbers  of  white-robed  cavalry 
dogged  the  march  of  the  column,  but  three  miles  from 
Ilorin  city  the  aspect  of  affairs  became  so  threatening 
that  Arnold  halted  the  advance-guard,  and  ordered 
square  to  be  formed  as  successive  detachments  came 
up. 

This  precaution  was  but  just  in  time,  for  a  body  of 
300  to  400  horsemen,  following  on  the  heels  of  our  rear- 
guard, charged  home  just  as  the  last  detachment 
formed  up  into  the  square.  On  they  came,  and  Vande- 
leur  could  not  but  admire  their  daring  courage  as, 
headed  by  a  Belogun,  they  made  straight  for  the 
serried  line  of  bayonets,  brandishing  their  spears  over 
their  heads.  But  here,  as  at  Bida,  our  Kansas  behaved 
with  the  coolness  born  of  disciphne  and  success,  and 
justified  the  confidence  of  their  officers  in  what  proved 
an  exciting  moment.  Without  flinching  they  received 
the  charge  of  horse  with  a  steady  volley,  which  emptied 
many  a  saddle  and  caused  the  enemy  to  swerve  round 
both  flanks  of  the  square.  The  flanks  at  once  opened 
fire,    completed   the   rout,    and   proved,    if   proof   be 


ii8  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

needed,  that  the  most  gallant  and  expert  horsemen 
cannot  hope  to  contend  with  disciplined  riflemen. 
Yet  this  failure  of  the  horse  in  no  way  disconcerted  the 
tactics  of  the  Belogun  who  had  been  told  off  to  attack 
with  the  men  on  foot,  and  the  action  became  general 
all  round  the  square. 

Passing  over  details  our  musketry  cleared  away 
the  more  adventuresome  natives  and  enabled  the  force 
to  advance  towards  the  river  whose  passage  the 
florins  were  concentrating  to  dispute.  Here  fighting 
of  a  desultory  kind  continued  till  evening,  but  the 
enemy  did  not  again  venture  upon  an  attack,  and  at 
nightfall  fell  back  to  a  position  in  rear.  Accordingly 
camp  was  formed  by  the  river,  as  it  was  too  late  to 
enter  the  city  and,  moreover,  it  was  hoped  that  by 
giving  time  for  the  news  of  the  day's  fighting  to  spread, 
further  bloodshed  might  be  avoided  on  the  morrow. 
The  little  force  lay  down  to  rest  on  the  battlefield, 
under  a  brilliant  moon  on  a  cold  night,  illumined 
by  fiery  rockets  discharged  from  the  square  and  a  huge 
circle  of  grass  fires  lighted  by  the  natives.  Every 
precaution  against  a  night  surprise  was  taken,  as  the 
enemy  was  still  busy  and  had  dragged  out  an  old  cannon 
which  threw  a  projectile  that  moved  like  a  frightened 
rabbit  over  sandy  ground.  Men  also  came  down  to 
shout  imprecations  and  threats  at  the  picquet,  and 
about  midnight  a  false  alarm  caused  the  troops  to 
stand  to  arms,  except  one  officer  who  slept  soundly 
through  the  noise. 

Next  morning,  under  cover  of  a  mist,  our  men 
resumed  their  advance  towards  the  town,  and,  when  the 
sun  rose,  opened  with  seven-pounders  on  the  enemy's 
last  position  outside  its  walls.  Their  demorahsation 
was  then  seen  to  be  complete,  for  they  began  to  bolt 
in  driblets,  and  a  little  later  the  white  flag  was  dis- 


THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA  119 

played  over  a  gateway  as  a  signal  of  submission.  A 
halt  was  called,  firing  ceased  on  both  sides  and  later 
in  the  day  our  victorious  troops  paraded  in  Ilorin 
and  estabhshed  themselves  on  the  market  square. 

The  city  was  found  to  be  larger  than  Bida  though 
of  similar  character,  and  our  first  duty  was  to  restore 
order  and  stop  looting  by  runaway  slaves.  The  Emir 
and  four  Beloguns  had  fled  to  a  neighbouring  village 
with  a  few  adherents  in  a  sorry  phght  ;  hearing  of  their 
condition.  Sir  George  sent  to  try  and  induce  them  to 
come  in  and  surrender  unconditionally.  His  embassy 
was  successful,  and  the  Emir  and  Beloguns,  mounted 
on  their  horses  covered  with  picturesque  saddle  cloths, 
and  followed  by  their  personal  attendants,  were 
ushered  ceremoniously  into  the  square  where  the 
troops  were  drawn  up  beneath  the  British  flag.  Here 
they  threw  themselves  on  their  knees  before  the 
Governor  in  an  attitude  of  utter  submission— being 
evidently  apprehensive  of  what  might  be  their  fate. 
Still  the  fact  of  their  coming  in  when  they  might  easily 
have  escaped  showed  a  degree  of  confidence  in  British 
methods  which  they  would  not  have  displayed  to  their 
own  co-rehgionists,  and  was  satisfactory  evidence 
of  our  prestige.  The  treaty  to  be  signed  was  at  once 
read  out  and  carefully  explained.  It  recognised  Ilorin 
as  being  henceforth  subject  to  Great  Britain  instead 
of  to  Sokoto  ;  it  enacted  that  gin  and  rum  were  to  be 
immediately  destroyed  wherever  found  ;  it  stipulated 
that  war  was  never  to  be  undertaken  without  the 
previous  consent  of  the  Governor  ;  and  it  reinstated 
the  Emir  as  the  British  representative.  The  whole 
party  was  obviously  relieved  when  these  clauses  were 
understood,  and  wilHngly  afhxed  their  signatures  in 
Arabic.  After  the  ceremony  the  Governor  had  a 
private   interview   with   the   Emir   who   retired   with 


120  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

dignity  and  pleasure  at  so  easily  escaping  from  an 
unpleasant  situation. 

It  thus  came  about  that  a  State  was  lifted  from  the 
slough  of  mediaeval  oppression  and  enrolled  with  the 
other  thriving  provinces  of  our  Empire. 

The  return  trip  down  the  Niger  was  enlivened  by 
some  shooting  in  a  burnt-up  and  rather  gameless 
country.  An  expedition  planned  against  the  Potani, 
a  tribe  on  the  banks  of  the  river,  proved  unnecessary 
owing  to  the  submission  of  their  ruler,  so  Vandeleur 
and  the  other  special  service  officers  embarked  for 
England  in  March.  Their  way  lay  through  Lisbon 
and  Madrid,  where  they  visited  the  picture  galleries 
and  saw  "  a  sickening  bull-fight."  Recognition  for 
his  services  awaited  Seymour  at  home.  He  was  highly 
commended  in  official  despatches,  and  although  only 
twenty-seven  and  still  a  subaltern,  was  noted  for 
future  promotion  to  the  rank  of  Brevet-Major  directly 
he  became  a  captain. 

The  scene  of  his  activities  now  shifted  to  different 
surroundings.  He  was  appointed  aide-de-camp  to 
Major-General  Lord  Methuen  commanding  the  Home 
District.  Inspections  and  reviews  were  the  order  of  the 
day  coupled  with  the  military  arrangements  for  the 
Diamond  Jubilee  Procession.  That  memorable  event 
was  no  holiday  for  those  concerned  with  its  success, 
and  with  his  personal  acquaintance  of  Empire-making 
the  assembly  of  the  Queen's  subjects  from  all  parts 
had  more  meaning  for  Vandeleur  than  for  most.  Nay, 
he  furnished  a  practical  illustration  of  the  brotherhood 
of  Empire,  for  at  an  inspection  of  Colonial  troops 
he  recognised  several  Hausas  with  whom  he  had  served 
in  Nigeria  and  among  them  a  man  of  his  own  gun 
detachment. 

A  pleasant  autumn  was  spent  in  Norway  where  his 


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THE  ACQUISITION  OF  BRITISH  NIGERIA  121 

father  hired  a  river  abounding  in  sea-trout.  Reindeer- 
stalking  was  also  to  be  had,  so  Seymour  got  together 
a  camp  kit  and  started  on  a  three  days'  expedition. 
After  eleven  hours  of  such  walking  and  mountaineering 
as  he  had  never  known  before  he  brought  down  two 
buck,  one  with  a  very  fine  head. 

As  regards  the  military  future  Vandeleur  was  fully 
determined  to  secure  the  first  vacancy  in  the  Egyptian 
Army,  in  fact  Major-General  Hunter  had  promised 
his  help  in  the  matter.  For  this  reason  he  refused 
what  might  otherwise  have  been  an  attractive  offer 
of  the  post  of  Deputy-Assistant  Commissioner  in  the 
Central  African  Protectorate.  Meanwhile  he  devoted 
himself  to  bringing  out  a  book  on  his  experiences  in 
Uganda  and  Nigeria,  and  he  was  hard  at  work  on  it 
when,  on  Christmas  Eve,  1897,  a  telegram  arrived 
offering  him  service  in  the  Egyptian  Army  if  he  could 
start  at  once.  Twenty-four  hours  later  he  left  Charing 
Cross  for  Cairo,  and  by  dint  of  incessant  writing  on 
board  the  mail  boat  he  was  able  to  send  back  the 
finished  manuscript  of  his  volume  from  Port  Said. 
It  was  published  under  the  title  "  Campaigning  on 
the  Upper  Nile  and  Niger,"  and  was  very  favourably 
received. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  he  intended,  had  he  lived, 
to  publish  his  further  military  experiences,  and  those 
who  now  have  the  task  to  perform  can  fully  reahse 
how  far  more  interesting  they  would  have  been  from 
his  own  pen. 


CHAPTER  VI 

ENGLAND  ON  THE  NILE 

[See  general  map  of  Egypt  and  the  Egyptian  Sudani] 

Considerations  of  space  and  the  limited  scope  of  this 
volume  unfortunately  forbid  an  excursion  into  the 
fascinating  study  of  ancient  Egypt  and  the  curious 
history  of  the  dwellers  by  the  banks  of  the  Middle  Nile. 
Their  story  has  not  yet  been  written  in  popular  form 
and  those  who  seek  acquaintance  with  it  must  mean- 
while grope  for  the  facts  in  works  whichjare  difficult 
to  understand  without  personal  experience  of  the  Nile 
valley.  Other  lands  alter,  but  the  Sudan  remains  a 
region  of  ingrained  conservatism,  pervaded  by  a  dis- 
tinct flavour  of  the  Old  Testament,  where  Enghsh 
officials  who  have  acquired  some  fluency  in  Arabic 
come  daily  in  contact  with  customs,  modes  of  thought 
and  turns  of  expression  which  remind  them  of  the  Bible 
history  they  learnt  in  their  childhood.  Even  the 
journey  of  Herodotus,  Father  of  historians,  who 
travelled  with  an  army  up  the  Nile  (457  B.C.)  might 
have  been  written  in  our  own  time,  so  little  have  the 
circumstances  or  the  people  altered. 

But  apart  from  the  history  of  the  Sudan  in  the 
remote  past  and  the  later  tales  of  Sir  Samuel  Baker 
and  other  explorers  of  the  Nile  sources,  it  is  advisable 
that  we  refresh  our  memories  regarding  some  of  the 
more  recent  occurrences  connected  with  the  countr}^ ; 
otherwise  it  will  be  difficult  to  reahse  the  cause  of  Lord 


ENGLAND  ON  THE  NILE  123 

Kitchener's  campaigns  or  to  follow  with  intelUgence  the 
reason  for  his  operations.  Indeed,  these  occurrences 
and  causes  were  famihar  to  Vandeleur,  and  were  so 
frequently  discussed  by  him  during  the  war,  that,  if  I 
were  to  omit  them  and  merely  record  the  doings  of  this 
officer  on  active  service  I  should  not  present  a  faithful 
picture  of  his  hfe.  His  work  contributed  to  the  success 
of  the  wider  issues  involved,  and,  had  he  hved  to  record 
his  personal  experiences,  his  book  would  have  com- 
manded a  special  interest  by  reason  of  the  author's 
grasp  of  the  situation  as  a  whole.  Thus,  if  I  am  able 
in  this  narrative,  to  clearly  outline  the  main  events  I 
shall  be  accomphshing  that  which  Vandeleur  himself 
would  have  done  with  pleasure. 

The  Egyptian  Sudan  with  which  we  are  concerned  is 
that  portion  of  the  continent  which  extends  southwards 
from  the  Assouan  Cataract  to  Fashoda*  on  the  Upper 
Nile  ;  it  embraces  the  northern  deserts  between  the 
Red  Sea  httoral  and  Darfur,  and  the  luxuriant  vegeta- 
tion of  the  southern  districts  lying  betwixt  the  moun- 
tains of  Abyssinia  and  the  swamps  of  the  Bahr-el-Gazal 
— a  huge  extent  of  country,  fertile  beyond  conception 
for  hundreds  of  miles  along  the  borders  of  mighty  rivers, 
barren  and  remorseless  over  vast  areas  of  desert  and 
scrub.  To  imagine  that  its  inhabitants  are  mere 
savages,  fit  victims  for  maxim  guns  or  missionary 
enterprise,  as  may  happen  to  suit  the  taste  of  the  English 
pubhc,  would  be  an  error  ;  yet  this  false  impression  was 
prevalent  during  the  operations  of  our  army  in  the  field. 
Men  had  no  leisure  to  devote  to  the  history  or  condition 
of  the  inhabitants,  and  thus  imbibed  during  the  cam- 
paign certain  prejudices  which  it  is  desirable  to  dispel 
regarding  a  people  far  removed  from  savagery  ;  indeed, 
both  Arabs  and  Blacks  are  members  of  an  old-estab- 

*  Fashoda  has  been  renamed  Kodok. 


124  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

lished  social  order  which  deserves  to  be  studied  and 
improved,  but  not  aboHshed. 

Here,  as  in  Nigeria  and  other  States  of  northern 
Africa,  the  Mohamedan  rehgion  has  been  for  centuries 
the  dominating  influence  ;  but  in  the  Egyptian  Sudan, 
perhaps  owing  to  its  proximity  to  Mecca,  the  rehgious 
note  has  been  more  accentuated,  the  fanaticism  more 
merciless  and  the  sword  has  claimed  a  greater  number  of 
victims.  Consequently,  in  spite  of  nearer  access  both  by 
sea  and  land,  the  country  has  developed  neither  native 
industry  nor  manufacture.  It  has  produced  no  trade 
emporium  such  as  Kano  in  the  west  and  has  never 
utilised  its  natural  resources  like  Hausaland.  Its  chief 
product  has  been  a  prodigious  crop  of  Mohamedan 
teachers  and  sects,  which  have  in  turn  worked  upon  the 
susceptibilities  of  emotional  and  warlike  races,  fanning 
their  behef  in  the  supernatural,  until  it  may  fairly  be  said 
that  no  fable  can  be  too  grotesque  to  obtain  credence 
on  the  banks  of  the  Nile.  Men  of  such  temperament 
have  elsewhere  been  welded  into  nations  under  strong 
and  capable  rulers  and  have  then  borne  an  honourable 
record  in  history.  But  until  to-day  the  Sudan  has  been 
consistently  misgoverned  whether  by  local  sheiks  or 
foreign  invaders  ;  each  man's  hand  has  been  hfted 
against  his  neighbour,  tribe  warring  against  tribe,  yet 
knowing  no  better  than  to  endure  extortion  from  the 
strong  and  injustice  from  those  in  authority.  Between 
the  exactions  of  the  Khedive's  subordinates  and  the 
raids  of  free-booting  slave-dealers,  a  man's  Ufe  and 
property  were  of  small  account.  Yet  this  gloomy 
picture  had  its  bright  side  and  was  frequently  relieved 
by  deeds  of  heroism,  by  magnificent  loyalty  to  local 
chiefs,  by  devotion  to  tribal  and  family  ties  and  by 
enthusiastic  self-sacrifice.  Indeed,  to  those  who  will 
study  below  the  surface  of  a  sea  of  bloodshed,  the  key- 


ENGLAND  ON  THE  NILE  125 

note  of  the  people's  character  will  be  found  in  an 
emotional  romanticism  of  the  type  of  our  Middle  Ages — 
a  period  of  chivalrous  deeds  stained  by  barbarous  crimes. 
The  Middle  Ages  of  the  Sudan  lasted  through  the  nine- 
teenth century,  during  which  the  tribes  were  subjected 
to  much  provocation.  They  bore  with  apathy  from 
1821  to  1881  the  burden  of  conquest  by  Egyptian 
pashas  and  occupation  by  Egyptian  garrisons,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  customary  exactions  of  their  own  sheiks. 
In  at  last  freeing  themselves  from  this  foreign  yoke, 
they  enjoyed  for  four  brief  years  a  delirious  period  of 
intoxicating  hcence  under  the  Mahdi,  slaying  40,000 
helpless  Egyptian  soldiers  and  one  great  Englishman — 
Charles  Gordon  :  they  successfully  resisted  invasion  by 
three  British  mihtary  expeditions,  which  strewed  the 
desert  sands  with  fallen  tribesmen  but  effected  no 
useful  purpose  whatsoever. 

Then  followed  a  period  best  described  as  "  stemng 
in  their  own  juice  " — juice  brewed  by  the  strong  for 
consumption  by  the  weak — a  period  which  commenced 
with  the  death  of  the  Mahdi  in  1885,  and  ended  at  the 
battle  of  Omdurman  in  1898.  During  those  fourteen 
dreary  years  the  Sudan  was  crushed  beneath  the  heel  of 
Baggara  tyranny  under  the  one-man  rule  of  the  Khalifa 
AbduUahi,  who  reduced  the  population  by  murder, 
famine  and  perpetual  fighting  from  8,525,000  to 
1^870,500.*  Whole  tribes  were  wiped  out  to  secure  the 
supremacy  of  the  Baggara  ;  wide  fertile  lands  reverted 
to  desert  because  man  would  not  sow  what  he  might  not 
reap  :  and  thus  did  the  survivors  suffer  for  their  brief, 
hcentious  riot  under  the  victorious  Mahdi.  The  last 
act  of  the  bloody  drama  will  be  described  when  we  deal 
with  Lord  Kitchener's  campaigns  which  brought  peace 
to  the  country  ;  but  meanwhile  can  any  one  doubt  that 

*  Lord  Cromer's  ofl&cial  report,  1904. 


126  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

the  Sudan  requires  complete  rest  for  two  or  more  genera- 
tions, under  the  protection  of  the  first  Uberal  rulers  it 
has  ever  known  ?  With  twenty  years'  experience  to 
guide  our  judgment  we  at  last  perceive  that  the  problem 
of  Egypt  and  the  problem  of  the  Sudan  were  after  all 
.but  one — namely  the  problem  of  the  Nile — and  that 
England's  constant  endeavour  to  sub-divide  the  whole 
and  curtail  her  responsibility  has  been  a  failure.  She 
may  have  been  wise,  from  her  own  point  of  view,  to 
take  only  one  step  at  a  time,  but  the  great  river,  flowing 
placidly  over  three  thousand  miles  of  land,  heeds  not  the 
makeshifts  of  timorous  man.  The  Nile  has  proved  more 
potent  than  the  statecraft  of  nations,  has  united  peoples 
whom  rulers  have  attempted  to  separate  and  has 
quietly  rejected  the  theory  that  several  masters  can 
peacefully  control  its  waters.  This  axiom  is  writ  large 
across  the  pages  of  its  ancient  and  modern  history  and 
has  been  illustrated  by  events  in  our  own  time  ;  is  it 
then  too  much  to  ask  of  British  statesmen  that  they 
shall  acknowledge  its  truth  and  firmly  maintain  the 
guardianship  which  England  so  unwillingly  undertook, 
but  so  successfully  carried  out  on  the  banks  of  the 
historic  river  ? 

The  story  of  England  in  Egypt  has  developed  into 
England  on  the  Nile  and  may  now  be  briefly  told. 

In  1 88 1  the  Mahdi  arose  to  reform  the  laws  and 
eliminate  the  incompetent  pashas  who  ruled  at  Khar- 
toum :  in  the  following  year  the  Egyptian  army 
revolted  under  Arabi  and  destroyed  the  Khedive's 
authority  in  Egypt  itself.  Though  almost  simulta- 
neous, the  two  insurrections  had  nothing  in  common 
beyond  the  frenzied  desire  of  all  men  for  emancipation 
from  the  same  rotten  government,  yet,  but  for  England, 
the  fighting  hosts  of  the  Mahdi  would  undoubtedly  have 
swept  down  the  Nile  and  destroyed  Arabi  and  his  undis- 


A    W  ATKK-W  HKI.L   ON     IHE    NILE 


ENGLAND  ON  THE  NILE  127 

ciplined  soldiers.  That  this  was  the  real  intention  of 
the  Mahdi  and  his  Khalifa  can  be  proved  over  and  over 
again  by  contemporary  documents  and  by  studying 
Wad  el  Negumi's  gallant  invasion  of  Egypt,  which 
ended  disastrously  for  him  at  the  battle  of  Toski  (1889). 
In  fact  Arabi's  party  contained  no  germ  of  sufficient 
strength  or  capacity  to  organise  a  native  force  fit  to 
protect  the  native  soil,  and,  if  England — heeding  the 
cry  of  Egypt  for  the  Egyptians — had  refrained  from 
occupying  Cairo  in  1882,  she  would  afterwards  have 
heard  the  barbarous  yell,  Egypt  for  the  Mahdi,  enforced 
by  Dervish  swords  throughout  the  Delta.  Fortunately, 
however,  England  was  firmly  seated  at  Cairo  in  1889 
and  put  an  end  to  the  Dervish  invasion  which  Egypt 
under  Arabi  could  certainly  not  have  accompUshed. 

In  connection  with  the  disaffection  which  we  have 
said  was  the  cause  of  revolt  throughout  the  land,  it  may 
be  pointed  out  that,  whereas  in  civilised  states  public 
opinion  is  believed  to  control  the  government,  in  back- 
ward countries  prosperity  depends  on  strong  individuals 
at  the  centre.  In  eastern  parlance,  the  ruler  is  the 
father  and  mother  of  the  people.  Oppression  by  a 
capable  man  like  the  great  Khedive  Mehemet  Ah  will  be 
patiently  endured  whilst  the  people  are  fairly  prosperous 
and  foreign  exactions  are  prohibited.  He  had  emanci- 
pated Egypt  from  the  Turkish  rule  first  established 
in  the  twelfth  century,  and  had  governed  with  inteUi- 
gent  efficiency  and  strength  from  181 1  to  1848.  In 
the  twenties  he  had  sent  his  son  to  conquer  the  Sudan 
which  he  exploited  with  success.  But  under  feeble 
successors  there  arose  a  horde  of  foreigners  and  petty 
officials  who  preyed  upon  all  departments  of  the  State. 
The  Khedive  was  no  longer  master  in  his  own  house, 
and  the  dry-rot  at  the  core  gradually  extended  through- 
out the  body  pohtic,  until  the  richest  country  in  the 


128  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

world  for  its  size  fell  gradually  into  the  depths  of 
ruin,  misery  and  rebeUion.  In  fact  the  plight  of  the 
Egyptians  was  comparatively  worse  than  that  of  the 
Sudanese  tribes.  For,  when  we  consider  the  notorious 
patience  of  the  fellaheen  peasantry  and  realise  that 
even  such  men  were  goaded  into  insurrection  by  petty 
oppression,  we  obtain  some  measure  of  the  worthless- 
ness  of  the  Cairo  government  and  some  explanation  of 
the  prosperity  which  was  developed  as  soon  as  it  was 
replaced  by  British  officials. 

Meanwhile  the  government  of  the  pashas,  faced 
with  a  crisis  throughout  the  land,  clung  to  power  in 
helpless  bewilderment  and  had  not  the  sense  to  realise 
the  peril  of  a  situation  which  they  had  themselves 
created.  The  promoters  of  the  revolts  both  in  the 
Sudan  and  Egypt  were  successful  beyond  their  wildest 
dreams  ;  the  usual  excesses  were,  of  course,  committed 
during  the  period  of  excitement,  and  chaos  reigned 
supreme  from  Fashoda  to  Alexandria.  Every  journalist 
in  Europe  thoughtlessly  cried  out  that  something  must 
be  done  ! 

Yet  so  little  were  the  circumstances  understood  at 
the  time,  that  we  find  British  statesmen  gravely  sug- 
gesting that  the  "  unspeakable "  Turk  whom  they 
wished  to  deport  "  bag  and  baggage  "  out  of  Europe  in 
1877,  should  in  1882  undertake  a  civilising  mission  on 
behalf  of  the  Great  Powers  in  the  Nile  valley  !  Their 
serious  endeavour  in  this  direction  had  also  its  humorous 
side,  inasmuch  as  they  went  out  of  their  way  to  inform 
Turkey  that  she  must  pay  for  her  troops  if  any  of  them 
should  be  sent  into  Egypt !  The  tempting  offer  was 
politely  declined  by  the  Sultan. 

Ob\dously,  prompt  action  could  alone  save  the 
situation,  yet  Lord  Granville,  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  seemed  to  think  that  mere  words  would 


ENGLAND  ON  THE  NILE  129 

suffice.  He  accordingly  engaged  in  prolonged  negotia- 
tions first  with  France,  then  with  Turkey,  then  again 
with  France,  and  finally,  with  all  the  Great  Powers, 
trying  to  induce  some  of  them  to  restore  order  in  Egypt. 
They  all  refused  to  do  it  themselves  or  to  help  us  do  it, 
and  Lord  Granville's  futile  despatches  remain  as  a 
pitiable  record  of  British  statesmanship.  Fortunately, 
Queen  Victoria  from  the  first  displayed  the  wise  political 
instinct  for  which  she  was  famous  and  insisted  that 
the  only  solution  promising  happy  results  would  be 
"  undivided  English  control."  This  pohcy  was  at  last 
adopted.  The  campaign  under  Lord  Wolseley  was 
completely  successful,  and  Cairo  was  occupied  after 
an  engagement  at  Tel-el-Kebir  in  1882.  The  con- 
sequences were  far-reaching,  in  spite  of  our  Premier's 
reiterated  pledges  to  evacuate  the  country,  pledges 
which  nobody  asked  for  or  expected,  but  which  were 
nevertheless  repeated  by  his  successor.  Truly  plain 
men  have  reason  for  sometimes  doubting  whether  the 
country's  business  is  managed  with  ordinary  fore- 
sight ! 

But  if  there  remain  a  faithful  few  who  still  believe 
that  the  Cabinet  of  1880  to  1885  was  capable  of  direct- 
ing the  business  of  an  oversea  Empire,  they  will  surely 
find  conversion  in  those  chapters  of  Mr.  John  Morley's 
Life  of  Gladstone  which  deal  with  Egyptian  and  Sudanese 
affairs.  Mr.  Morley  is  not  only  a  sympathetic  bio- 
grapher but  also  Mr,  Gladstone's  warmest  political 
admirer,  yet  even  his  literary  skill  is  unable  to  mask 
the  ineptitude  of  that  Statesman's  Egyptian  policy  or 
his  inability  to  carry  out  such  policy  as  he  had.  First 
he  did  not  want  to  go  to  Egypt,  then  he  sent  25,000 
men  to  occupy  the  country  :  having  done  this  he  longed 
to  withdraw,  but  was  afraid  to  do  it  ;  having  consented 
to  stay  temporarily  in  Egypt,  he  was  quite  determined 


130  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

not  to  be  responsible  for  any  part  of  the  Sudan  mess  : 
no  sooner  was  this  announced  than  he  despatched 
Charles  Gordon  and  three  extravagantly  managed 
expeditions  to  Suakin  and  Dongola,  costing  over 
£10,000,000  of  British  money  and  ending  in  utter 
failure,  not  through  the  defeat  of  the  soldiers  but  owing 
to  the  fact  that,  in  spite  of  reiterated  warnings  that 
high  Nile  is  the  season  for  ascending  the  river,  British 
Ministers  could  not  make  up  their  minds  to  start  their 
expedition  till  the  flood  was  already  sinking.  They 
were,  therefore,  too  late  to  rescue  their  own  envoy, 
Gordon,  at  Khartoum. 

Thus  within  the  short  space  of  two  years  (1882-4) 
they  blundered  in  their  attempts  to  avoid  an  expedition 
and  blundered  again  whenever  they  feverishly  deter- 
mined to  send  one.  Their  one  success  was  the  occupa- 
tion of  Cairo,  which  restored  prosperity  to  Egypt,  yet 
this  was  the  very  thing  they  were  thoroughly  ashamed 
of  and  anxious  to  abandon.  Looking  back  on  the 
several  episodes  of  this  quite  recent  history  one  is 
tempted  to  ask  whether  our  home  administration  was 
after  all  more  competent  to  deal  with  the  situation  than 
the  Egyptian  pashas  whom  it  superseded  ? 

By  the  summer  of  1885,  having  failed  to  relieve  the 
garrisons,  having  failed  to  suppress  Osman  Digna  at 
Suakin,  and  still  muttering  threats  of  scuttling  out  of 
Egypt,  British  Ministers  retired  from  the  scene  of  their 
costly  and  humiliating  labours,  and  handed  over  the 
conduct  of  affairs  to  the  man  on  the  spot — Sir  Evelyn 
Baring,  now  Lord  Cromer. 

It  was  a  lucky  chance  for  the  Empire  that  nobody 
then  knew  that  Lord  Cromer  was  a  strong  man,  other- 
wise he  would  not  have  been  selected  for  an  independent 
post  at  Cairo.  Courageous  men  are  not  usually  trusted 
by  vacillating  ministers,  as  was  proved  by  the  treat- 


ENGLAND  ON  THE  NILE  131 

ment  accorded  to  Sir  Bartle  Frere — dismissed  from 
his  post  in  South  Africa  by  the  Cabinet  which  appointed 
Baring  to  Egypt.  But  the  probabihty  is  that  the 
Government,  having  lost  popularity  with  the  electorate, 
became  heartily  sick  of  its  own  mess  on  the  Nile,  and 
thankfully  handed  it  over  to  some  one  else.  Be  this 
as  it  may.  Lord  Cromer's  twenty  years'  patient  states- 
manship at  Cairo  has  compensated  for  the  bungUng  of 
some  of  his  masters  in  London. 

Thwarted  at  every  turn  by  the  provoking  restric- 
tions entailed  by  a  British  protectorate  which  was  not 
a  protectorate,  but  only  a  temporary  occupation,  he, 
nevertheless,  managed  to  rescue  the  nation  from  bank- 
ruptcy by  restoring  its  prosperity.  He  augmented  the 
revenues  by  increasing  the  country's  productiveness  ; 
nursed  a  native  army  through  infancy  to  manhood  ; 
created  huge  reservoirs  for  storing  and  distributing  the 
fertilising  flood-water  of  the  Nile  to  parched  deserts  ; 
economised  on  Egyptian  budgets  an  annual  sum 
(£320,000)  sufficient  to  start  the  Sudan  on  its  new 
career  of  prosperity;  and  at  last  brought  even  the 
most  inveterate  enemies  of  the  British  occupation  to 
acknowledge  its  value  and  cease  carping  at  its  con- 
tinuance. The  story  is  no  fairy  tale,  but  can  be  read 
in  England  in  Egypt  by  Sir  Alfred  Milner,  and  in  the 
twenty-four  solid  blue-books  which  deal  with  the  sub- 
ject. It  affords  a  striking  example  of  what  the  best 
sort  of  Englishmen  can  do,  when  beyond  the  sterilising 
influence  of  party  politics. 

From  the  above  brief  survey  of  the  general  situation 
let  us  turn  to  the  work  accomphshed  by  our  officers. 

By  the  end  of  1885  all  troops  were  withdrawn  from 
the  Sudan  and  the  country  handed  over  to  the  tender 
mercies  of  the  Khalifa.  The  reformed  Egyptian  army 
took  over  the  defence  of  the  frontiers  at  Wadi  Haifa 


132  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

and  Suakin,  and  commenced  that  prolonged  training 
for  war  which  enabled  it  subsequently  to  defeat  the 
Dervishes  in  numerous  unrecorded  skirmishes  and  in 
the  important  actions  which  reconquered  the  Sudan. 
The  old  Egyptian  army,  the  one  which  was  defeated 
under  Arabi,  under  Hicks  and  under  Baker,  was  almost 
unequalled  for  cowardice  and  incapacity  ;  the  new 
army  under  Grenfell  and  Kitchener,  composed  of  the 
same  human  material,  grew  to  be  a  model  of  efficiency 
in  war.  It  attracted  to  its  ranks  every  British  sub- 
altern and  captain  who  was  eager  to  learn  soldiering 
or  ambitious  to  see  active  service,  and  the  result  of  their 
efforts  may  be  judged  by  the  contrast  afforded  in  the 
two  following  official  documents  : 

(i)  Extract  from  General  Valentine  Baker's  tele- 
gram describing  the  action  near  El  Teb  in  February 
1884:  "  Marched  yesterday  morning  with  three  thou- 
sand five  hundred  men  towards  Tokar.  .  .  .  On 
square  being  only  threatened  by  small  force  of  enemy, 
certainly  less  than  a  thousand  strong,  Egyptian  troops 
threw  down  their  arms  and  ran,  allowing  themselves 
to  be  killed  without  slightest  resistance.  More  than 
two  thousand  killed.     All  material  lost." 

(2)  Extract  from  Special  Army  Order  (War  Ofiice, 
September  1898)  regarding  Battle  of  Omdurman, 
signed  by  Field  Marshall  Viscount  Wolseley,  Com- 
mander-in-Chief: "The  rank  and  file  in  the  army  of 
his  Highness  the  Khedive  showed  a  spirit  which  reflects 
the  greatest  credit  on  those  officers  and  non-com- 
missioned officers  who  have  so  raised  the  standard  of 
their  discipline  and  military  efficiency  that  they  are 
now  worthy  to  fight  alongside  European  troops ;  they 
exhibited  not  only  steadiness  in  action,  but  remarkable 
endurance  during  two  years  of  prolonged  and  most 
arduous  labour.  ..." 


ENGLAND  ON  THE  NILE  133 

The  above  extracts  speak  for  themselves  and  would 
require  no  further  words  of  explanation  were  it  not  that 
certain  critics  have  suggested  that,  as  the  Sudanese 
battalions  of  the  Egyptian  army  bore  the  brunt  of 
the  recent  fighting,  the  fellaheen  remain  untested. 
Now,  I  am  encouraged  to  record  my  own  testimony  on 
the  point  by  the  circumstance  that  during  the  cam- 
paign I  served  exclusively  ^vith  Sudanese  troops,  and 
may,  therefore,  be  considered  impartial  towards  the 
fellaheen.  Vandeleur,  too,  served  in  a  Sudanese 
battalion,  and  had  a  similar  opinion  regarding  the 
fellaheen.  He  held  that,  though  the  Sudanese  might 
be  considered  the  flower  of  the  army,  the  fellaheen 
cavalry,  artillery  and  infantry  were  absolutely  trust- 
worthy troops ;  and  numerous  examples  of  their 
quality  can  be  brought  forward  to  support  this  state- 
ment. There  were  no  Sudanese  artillery  or  cavalry 
yet  the  conduct  of  the  fellaheen  throughout  the  dan- 
gerous reconnaissances  which  they  constantly  under- 
took during  four  years  of  warfare  places  them  high  in 
the  estimation  of  soldiers.  Again  the  2nd  (fellaheen) 
BattaHon  formed  an  integral  part  of  Macdonald's 
brigade  which  happened,  at  the  Battle  of  Omdurman, 
to  come  in  for  the  most  desperate  of  all  the  fights  of 
the  campaign.  This  battahon  had  previously  been 
noted  for  strict  discipline,  and,  on  the  day  of  its  trial, 
manoeuvred  and  fired  with  steadiness  under  the  shock 
of  two  tremendous  charges,  delivered  in  quick  succes- 
sion from  different  directions  and  repelled  them  both 
without  flinching.  Vandeleur  who  was  present  during 
the  episode  bore  testimony  to  the  behaviour  of  the 
fellaheen  who  were  warmly  praised  by  General  Mac- 
donald  himself. 

Yet  how  can  it  happen  that  in  only  fourteen  years 
men's  characters  can  be  so  essentially  altered  and  im- 


134  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

proved  as  to  justify  the  enconiums  which  I  have  quoted 
above  ?  It  seems  almost  more  marvellous  than  some 
of  the  other  mysteries  of  Egypt,  and  yet  is  perfectly 
true.  Men  are  made  or  marred  by  the  treatment  to 
which  they  are  subjected.  Let  us  disclose  what  that 
treatment  had  been  in  Egypt. 

No  one  will  pretend  that  the  fellah  is  by  nature  a 
fighting  animal,  but  he  is,  nevertheless,  capable  of  being 
trained  to  light  by  officers  whom  he  respects  and  believes 
in,  and  who  themselves  come  of  a  fighting  race.  In  the 
old  army  such  officers  were  rare,  but  on  the  few  occa- 
sions when  they  commanded  the  fellah  he  fought  with 
pluck  as  at  El  Obeid  (1883).  As  a  rule,  he  was  ill- 
used  and  flogged  for  petty  offences  ;  his  pay  was  inter- 
cepted ;  he  was  not  taught  the  business  of  a  soldier 
but  generally  worked  as  a  slave  ;  his  barracks  were 
insanitary,  his  food  poor  and  no  provision  was  ever 
made  for  sick  or  wounded ;  the  legal  terms  of  his  enlist- 
ment were  disregarded,  and  he  was  never  allowed  to  go 
home  on  furlough.  To  be  sent  to  the  Sudan  meant 
practically  penal  servitude  for  life,  and  so  it  was  con- 
sidered by  the  man  and  his  family.  Indeed,  so  de- 
graded was  the  profession  of  arms  that  it  would  be 
difficult  to  devise  a  more  certain  system  of  destroying 
the  spirit  of  any  man,  or  knocking  the  manliness  out 
of  any  soldier. 

The  officers,  drawn  from  the  class  which  supplies 
Egypt  with  a  bureaucracy  and  boasts  a  leaven  of 
Turkish  blood,  were,  in  no  sense,  leaders  of  men.  They 
possessed  some  intelligence  and  were  fairly  well  edu- 
cated, but  had  no  idea  of  discipline  amongst  themselves 
or  confidence  in  one  another.  They  were  consumed 
with  the  spirit  of  intrigue,  through  which  alone  lay 
the  avenue  to  promotion  and  lucrative  posts.  It  did 
not  occur  to  them  either  to  share  in  or  alleviate  the 


ENGLAND  ON  THE  NILE  135 

privations  of  their  men  :  nor  were  they  under  any 
obhgation  to  accept  unnecessary  risks  either  in  the 
hour  of  battle  or  the  gloom  of  a  cholera  camp.  In 
fact,  one  of  the  best  days  for  Egypt  occurred  when  the 
Khedive  signed  the  laconic  decree  "  the  army  is  here- 
by disbanded."     That  was  in  1882. 

The  young  British  officers  who  subsequently  under- 
took to  organise  and  command  the  squadrons,  bat- 
teries and  battalions  of  the  new  army  started  the 
machine  with  a  totally  different  conception  of  duty 
and  military  service  to  any  which  had  hitherto  pre- 
vailed. Indeed,  the  change  was  so  bewildering  to  the 
native  officers  and  men,  that  at  first  the  task  seemed 
hopeless.  However,  with  stubborn  insular  determina- 
tion they  persevered  on  their  own  lines,  without  com- 
promise, and  without  appearing  to  see  any  difficulty. 
Exact  pay  was  handed  out  to  the  men  on  fixed  dates  ; 
good  barracks,  solid  food  and  clean  clothing  were  pro- 
vided ;  the  discipHne  was  strict  and  carefuUy  enforced  ; 
promotion  went  solely  by  merit  and  no  intrigue  could 
avail  to  alter  a  selection  ;  furloughs  were  granted  each 
year,  and  the  men  went  home  to  their  squalid  villages 
smart  in  appearance  and  with  plenty  of  money  in  their 
pockets.  They  were  no  longer  ashamed  of  themselves 
or  their  calling.  When  their  term  of  six  years'  service 
expired  they  left  the  colours  to  become  local  poUce 
men.  Then  came  years  of  active  ser\dce,  first  on  the 
lines  of  communication  of  Lord  Wolseley's  Nile  expedi- 
tion, then  on  the  frontier,  continuously  in  touch  with 
Dervishes,  unsupported  by  other  troops — with  eyes 
always  turned  towards  the  desert  and  the  enemy 
beyond.  At  intervals,  the  Dervishes  would  attack 
patrols,  or  raid  villages,  and  a  skirmish  would  take 
place,  a  more  or  less  serious  affair,  but  always  a  useful 
experience   to   an    army   in   training.       Two    pitched 


136  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

battles,  at  Ginnis  in  1885  and  Toski  in  1889,  attested 
the  progress  of  the  force.  The  fellaheen  soldier  began 
to  feel  he  was  a  man,  in  fact  became  one.  He  at  last 
understood  his  British  officers,  those  curious  foreigners 
who  insisted  on  every  one  doing  his  duty  without  shirk- 
ing, and  who  did  it  themselves  !  In  action  there  they 
were  always  in  front,  never  excited  :  in  cholera  camp, 
still  they  were  present  working  like  slaves  to  stamp  out 
the  pestilence :  always  cheerful  and  approachable,  yet 
maintaining  their  position  as  officers  and  the  respect 
due  to  their  rank. 

The  fellah  did  not  take  to  fighting  for  fighting's 
sake  but  he  no  longer  feared  to  go  into  action,  and,  in 
fact,  was  sure  he  would  win  whenever  he  fought.  A 
story  is  told  of  one  battalion  that  the  men  were  more 
terrified  at  the  wrath  of  their  commanding  officer,  if 
one  man  wavered,  than  ever  they  were  of  a  Baggara's 
spear.  Thus  the  private  soldier  responded  to  proper 
treatment,  the  Egyptian  officer  grumbled  but  did  his 
duty,  and  the  army  grew  into  a  formidable  force 
— 16,000  men  of  splendid  physique.  It  also  helped 
to  popularise  the  British  occupation  throughout  the 
villages  of  Egypt. 

But  if  British  officers  have  done  much  for  the 
Egyptian  army  it  is  also  plain  to  any  one  who  served 
in  it,  that  the  Egyptian  army  has  done  a  great  deal  for 
British  officers.  Indeed,  it  would  be  almost  as  difficult 
to  exaggerate,  as  it  certainly  is  to  measure,  the  benefit 
our  officers  derived  from  service  in  the  Khedive's  forces 
— provided  they  served  for  a  sufficient  period  to  correct 
the  narrow  militarism  inculcated  at  home.  We  have 
said  that  the  treatment  accorded  to  the  soldiery  of  the 
old  army  was  likely  to  knock  the  manliness  even  out  of 
a  Samurai,  and  that  a  reversal  of  such  methods  quickly 
restored  the  men's  pluck.      Just  in  a  similar  way  the 


ENGLAND  ON  THE  NILE  137 

home  training  of  the  British  officer  before  the  Boer  war 
was  calculated  to  stifle  the  most  precious  qualities  an 
officer  can  possess — namely,  resourcefulness  and  initia- 
tive— qualities  which  were  rekindled  and  developed 
directly  he  joined  the  Egyptian  army. 

I  am  not  suggesting  that  our  subalterns,  who  have 
much  to  learn  especially  as  regards  discipline  and  duty 
during  the  first  years  of  their  service,  should  be  accorded 
free  scope  for  misdirected  initiative  or  ill-judged  experi- 
ments ;  but  surely  captains  of  companies  and  com- 
manding officers  of  battalions  should  not  be  sacrificed 
to  a  passion  for  uniformity  which  converts  them  into 
mechanical  automatons,  registering  the  innumerable 
decrees  contained  in  the  thirty-five  volumes  of  regula- 
tions which  compose  every  commanding  officer's 
library  ?  Some  were  too  sensible  to  devote  much  time 
to  learning  up,  in  peace,  regulations  which  no  one 
could  possibly  carry  out  in  war,  and  such  were  reported 
as  slack  by  the  average  staff  officer,  who  was  all- 
powerful  and  most  meddlesome.  Though  the  Alder- 
shot,  Curragh  and  other  brigades  were,  undoubtedly, 
commanded  by  able  men,  it  is  well  known  that  some 
of  the  battalions  were  practically  commanded  by  the 
brigade-major,  who  was  encouraged  to  interfere  to  an 
intolerable  degree  with  the  commanding  officers'  work, 
in  order  to  produce  the  desired  uniformity  and  insist 
on  the  brigadiers'  special  fads  being  attended  to  in 
season  and  out  of  season. 

Throughout  the  army  at  home  the  zeal  of  the  regi- 
mental officer  was  thus  confined  within  the  narrowest 
sphere  ;  all  his  actions  were  strictly  laid  down  ;  to 
deviate  to  the  right  or  left,  or  to  reverse  the  order  of 
the  prescribed  routine  was  wrong;  whether  practising 
a  stereotyped  attack  or  digging  a  regulation  shelter- 
trench,  drilling  a   company  or  shooting   at   a   target, 


138  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

every  detail  was  printed  in  the  books,  as  well  as  the 
exact  words  to  be  used  by  the  instructor.  Nothing 
was  left  to  the  intelligence  of  the  individual,  and  on 
re-reading  some  of  the  text-books  one  is  obliged  to 
confess  that  officers  were  by  regulation  debarred  from 
exercising  either  intelligence  or  common  sense.  Under 
such  a  blighting  regime,  how  could  regimental  officers 
be  expected  to  develop  either  initiative  or  resourceful- 
ness ?  Their  only  means  of  escape  from  a  dreary 
groove  lay  in  hunting,  polo  and  other  games,  or  in 
going  away  on  leave  as  often  as  they  could. 

Our  later  experience  is  that  if  you  give  the  British 
officer  sensible  work  to  do  he  will  usually  do  it  extremely 
well  and  it  was  on  this  principle  that  the  Egyptian 
army  was  started  and  run.  To  join  it  after  some  years 
of  garrison  duty  at  home  was  like  walking  into  fresh 
air  after  a  journey  on  the  old  underground  railway. 
We  have  seen  how  the  fellah  was  raised  from  the  level 
of  a  coward  to  fight  in  line  with  European  troops, 
and  it  is  equally  easy  to  understand  how  his  officer 
resumed  in  the  Sudan  qualities  which  had  been  stifled 
in  the  United  Kingdom. 

A  young  captain  or  subaltern  on  joining  at  Cairo 
usually  has  a  personal  interview  of  five  minutes  with 
the  Sirdar,  during  which  he  is  quietly  told  that  he  is  to 
start  for  the  Sudan  in  a  couple  of  days,  that  on  reaching 
his  battalion  he  should  pick  up  all  he  can  about  every- 
thing going  on  at  the  front,  and  that  his  most  necessary 
accomplishment  will  be  a  colloquial  acquaintance  with 
the  Arabic  language,  without  which  nobody  can  be  of 
much  use.  His  rank  is  bimbashi  (major),  and  his  duties 
are \' various.  He  is  not  given  any  book  of  regulations, 
and,  if  he  asks  for  one,  is  informed  that  some  of  the 
English  text-books  have  been  translated  into  Arabic 
for  the  use  of  the  army,  but  that  they  have  long  been 


ENGLAND  ON  THE  NILE  139 

out  of  print — though  second-hand  ones  are  sometimes 
obtainable.  Accordingly  the  budding  bimbashi,  per- 
haps a  little  shocked  at  the  thought  of  the  regulations 
being  out  of  print  and  his  exact  itinerary  not  being 
detailed  in  writing,  starts  on  his  long  journey  to  the 
Sudan  by  railway,  steamboat,  camel,  and  sailing-boat. 
In  course  of  time  he  reaches  his  battalion,  usually 
without  his  baggage,  with  the  vaguest  idea  of  the  where- 
abouts of  his  horse  and  camel  and  in  the  mental  con- 
dition commonly  attributed  to  a  lost  sheep.  But  he 
has  already  learned  one  thing  thoroughly,  namely, 
that  if  he  does  not  look  after  himself  and  his  belongings 
no  one  else  will  do  it  for  him.  Thus  his  new  training 
is  well  begun,  and  his  days  of  military  dry-nursing  are 
over. 

On  reporting  himself  at  the  front  the  bimbashi  is 
plunged  into  a  battalion  of  Arabic-speaking  officers, 
non-commissioned  officers  and  men,  of  whom  none  but 
the  commanding  officer,  the  interpreter  and  three 
bimbashis  can  speak  or  understand  the  English  langu- 
age. He  is  introduced  to  a  form  of  drill  similar  to  that 
of  the  British  army,  but  with  words  of  command 
delivered  in  Turkish  and  explanations  given  in  Arabic. 
He  ascertains  from  his  brother  bimbashis  that,  by 
working  hard  for  six  months,  he  can  acquire  sufficient 
fluency  in  the  new  language  for  all  practical  purposes. 
So  instead  of  attempting  to  learn  a  Turco-Arabic  drill- 
book  like  a  parrot,  he  perceives  that  he  must  confine 
himself  to  essentials  and  first  master  such  simple  words 
of  command  as  he  may  require  if  the  battalion  should 
be  sent  into  action  within  a  week.  In  fact,  he  realises 
that  he  must  reverse  the  method  commonly  adopted 
of  beginning  at  the  beginning,  and  it  dawns  upon  his 
mind — now  emancipated  from  the  detail  of  the  goose- 
step  and  the  firing  exercise    by  numbers — that   drill 


140  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

rightly  understood  and  intelligently  applied  is  a  factor 
in  winning  battles.  He  is  so  much  the  richer  by  the 
acquisition  of  this  new  idea  that  his  attitude  towards 
the  whole  art  of  soldiering  takes  a  practical  turn,  and 
he  sees  real  reasons  for  things  which  have  hitherto 
seemed  tiresome  and  useless.  From  this  moment  his 
work  becomes  interesting,  and,  at  the  end  of  six  months' 
probation,  he  feels  he  is  a  better  officer  and  is  in  daily 
contact  with  better  officers,  because  the  initiative  of 
each  individual  has  produced  the  habit  of  responsible 
work  throughout  the  force.  As  time  passes,  the  new 
bimbashi  is  employed  on  numerous  jobs,  all  essential 
to  the  continued  progress  of  the  campaign,  with  which 
he  now  identifies  his  own  efforts.  Whether  it  be  hauling 
steamers  up  cataracts,  furnishing  escorts  to  gunboat 
patrols,  acting  as  station-master,  postmaster,  or  supply 
officer,  commanding  a  squadron,  battery,  camelry,  or 
a  fort,  as  brigade-major  or  staff  officer — wherever 
British  supervision  is  required  there  the  bimbashi  is  to 
be  seen,  directing  native  officers  and  men,  and  dis- 
charging duties  which  in  European  armies  are  often 
entrusted  to  generals.  With  such  varied  and  continu- 
ous employments  during  the  intervals  between  import- 
ant actions,  is  it  surprising  that,  compared  with  his 
brother  in  England,  he  becomes  a  handy-man  and  a 
distinct  personage — useful  in  peace  and  invaluable  in 
war  ? 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  a  bimbashi  should  fail  to 
profit  by  the  opportunities  thus  offered,  his  place 
can  easily  be  filled  by  one  of  the  numerous  candidates 
who  are  longing  to  take  it.  The  work  is  hard,  the 
sun  hot,  fevers  are  weakening,  relaxations  are  few,  but 
the  service  is  popular,  promotion  is  quick,  the  pay 
adequate,  and  the  rewards  ample.  Moreover,  since 
peace  rules  in  the  land,  numerous  responsible  posts  are 


ENGLAND  ON  THE  NILE  141 

open  to  bimbashis,  and  the  service  has  not  lost  all  the 
attractions  which  it  held  for  the  ambitious  at  the  time 
of  the  campaigns. 

If  in  the  foregoing  pages  I  have  been  able  to  refresh 
the  reader's  memory  as  to  the  salient  features  of  the 
general  situation  and  the  conditions  under  which 
British  officers  serve  the  Khedive,  it  may  be  easier  in 
future  chapters  to  tell  the  tale  of  Lord  Kitchener's 
operations  and  describe  the  part  taken  in  them  by 
Bimbashi  Vandeleur.  Meanwhile,  those  of  my  readers 
who  care  for  dates  will  doubtless  read  the  following 
synopsis,  whereas  those  who  dislike  them  may  pass  on 
to  the  story  beyond — 

1798,  July  21. — Battle  of  the  Pyramids  and  defeat 
of  the  Mameluks  by  Napoleon. 

1798,  Aug.  I. — Battle  of  the  Nile  and  defeat  of  the 
French  fleet  by  Nelson. 

1801,  March  8. — Battle  of  Aboukir  :  French  evac- 
uate Egypt.     British  occupy  Cairo. 

1803. — Egypt  evacuated  by  British. 

181 1. — Mehemet  Ali,  an  Albanian,  massacres  the 
Mameluks  in  Cairo  citadel,  and  usurps  the  Pashalik  of 
Egypt  from  Turkey.  He  founds  a  family  which  still 
holds  the  sovereignty.  During  the  years  which  follow 
he  organises  a  fighting  army,  which  is  so  successful 
under  Ibrahim  that  it  constantly  defeats  large  Turkish 
forces  in  Syria,  and  on  two  occasions  has  Constanti- 
nople at  its  mercy,  but  refrains  from  capturing  this 
capital. 

1820. — Mehemet  Ali  sends  his  son  to  conquer  and 
hold  the  Sudan. 

1838. — Mehemet  Ah  himself  visits  the  Sudan,  and 
organises  conquering  military  expeditions  up  the  White 
Nile,  Blue  Nile,  and  into  Kordofan.     He  converts  the 


142  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

Sudan  into  a  place  d'armes,  imports  quantities  of  war 
material  and  raises  large  local  forces. 

N.B. — His  object  was  to  consolidate  an  independent 
Sudan  Empire  for  his  family,  in  the  event  of  their  being 
deprived  of  Egypt ;  and  the  policy  of  arming  the  Sudan 
continued  till  1882.     Khartoum  was  the  capital. 

1842. — Mehemet  Ali  builds  the  Barrage,  below 
Cairo. 

1849. — Death  of  Mehemet  Ali — a  great  man,  born 
the  same  year  as  Napoleon  and  Wellington. 

1869. — Opening  of  the  Suez  Canal.  Sir  Samuel 
Baker  appointed  Governor-General  of  the  Sudan. 

1874. — Colonel  C.  G.  Gordon  appointed  Governor- 
General  of  the  Sudan. 

1875. — Ismail  Pasha,  Khedive,  one  of  the  most 
extravagant  rulers  ever  known,  gradually  ruins  the 
finances  of  Egypt.  When  unable  to  raise  further 
loans,  he  sells  his  holding  in  the  Suez  Canal  Company  to 
England  for  £4,000,000  (now  worth  £20,000,000). 
Conquest  of  Darfur  by  Zobair. 

1876. — Major  Evelyn  Baring  (now  Lord  Cromer)  is 
appointed  a  member  of  an  international  Commission 
of  Inquiry  into  the  Khedive's  debts,  and  Egypt  is 
found  to  be  on  the  brink  of  financial  ruin. 

1879.  —  Gordon's  Governor-Generalship  of  the 
Sudan  terminates.  The  Khedive  Ismail  is  deposed 
and  replaced  by  his  son,  Tewfik  Pasha — at  the  in- 
stigation of  England. 

1881. — The  Mahdi  declares  himself  at  Abba  Island, 
W^hite  Nile. 

iSSi,  Atig. — His  followers  massacre  200  Egyptian 
soldiers  sent  from  Khartoum  to  arrest  him. 

1881,  Dec.  9. — Mahdi  defeats  1400  Egyptians  near 
Fashoda  and  captures  their  arms. 

1882. — The  Mahdi's  insurrection  gradually  spreads. 


ENGLAND  ON  THE  NILE  143 

1882,  July  II. — Bombardment  of  Alexandria  by 
British  fleet,  owing  to  Arabi's  revolt  against  the 
Khedive. 

1882,  Sept.  13. — Battle  of  Tel-el-Kebir,  followed  by 
occupation  of  Cairo  by  British  under  Wolseley,  and 
restoration  of  Khedive. 

1883,  Jan.  17. — Mahdi  takes  the  field  in  person  and 
captures  El  Obeid  after  protracted  siege. 

1883,  Feh. — Ten  thousand  of  Arabi's  soldiers  are 
sent  to  the  Sudan  as  reinforcements  by  the  Egyptian 
Government. 

1883,  March. — Colonel  Hicks,  late  of  the  Indian 
Army,  arrives  in  Khartoum  as  Chief  of  the  Staff. 

1883,  Sept. — Hicks  advances  into  Kordofan  wdth 
9000  men  and  20  guns,  to  attack  the  Mahdi. 

1883,  Nov.  5. — Hicks'  force  annihilated  at  Shekan, 
near  El  Obeid. 

1883,  Dec. — Slatin  taken  prisoner  in  Darfur, 
N.B. — By  end  of  1883  the  Mahdi  had  captured  at 

least  20,000  rifles,  19  guns  and  quantities  of  ammunition. 

1884,  Jan.  16. — Gordon  sent  by  Gladstone  to 
evacuate  the  Sudan  garrisons — Egyptian  soldiers — 
namely,  the  remnant  of  the  original  40,000  quartered 
in  the  Sudan. 

1884,  Feh.  4. — Colonel  V.  Baker,  sent  to  relieve 
Tokar  with  3500  Egyptians  and  six  guns,  is  completely 
defeated  at  El  Teb  by  Osman  Digna. 

1884,  Feh.  18. — Gordon  reaches  Khartoum,  tele- 
graphs to  British  Government  that  he  "  cannot 
evacuate  and  will  not  abandon  the  garrison,"  and 
asks  for  the  assistance  of  Zobair.  This  is  refused  on 
moral  grounds,  because  Zobair  Pasha  was  once  a 
slaver ! 

1884,  Feh.  29. — British  force  of  3000  defeats  Osman 
Digna  at  El  Teb. 


144  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

1884,  March  13. — Same  force  again  defeats  him 
at  Tamaai,  but  is  subsequently  withdrawn  to  Suakin, 
which  it  holds. 

1884,  March  19. — Gordon  at  Khartoum  cut  off  and 
invested. 

1884,  May  26. — Mahdi  captures  Berber,  and  the 
question  is  definitely  put — Will  England  send  a  rehef 
expedition  or  not  ?  The  Nile  will  rise  in  July.  The 
British  Government  takes  no  action. 

1884,  Aug.  7. — Lord  Hartington,  Secretary  of  State 
for  War,  obtains  a  vote  of  credit,  with  a  view  to  eventual 
relief  of  Gordon — "  if  necessary." 

1884,  Sept.  10. — First  portion  of  Relief  Expedition 
leaves  England. 

1884,  Oct.  21. — Expedition  leaves  Wadi  Haifa. 

1885,  Jan.  17. — Battle  of  Abu  Klea — Mahdists 
break  into  British  square,  but  are  beaten  off. 

1885,  Jan.  20. — Desert  Column  arrives  at  Gubat 
on  the  Nile,  near  Metemma,  and  is  met  by  Gordon's 
four  steamers  next  day. 

1885,  Jan.  24. — These  steamers  embark  a  small 
force  for  Khartoum. 

1885,  Jan.  26. — Khartoum  falls  and  Gordon  is 
killed. 

1885,  Jan.  28. — Steamers  sight  Khartoum — too  late! 

N.B. — By  its  capture  the  Dervishes  become  pos- 
sessed of  quantities  of  rifles  and  munitions  of  war. 

1885,  Feb.  14. — Retreat  of  Desert  Column  from 
Gubat  to  Dongola. 

1885,  Feb.  17. — Contract  for  construction  of  a  rail- 
way from  Suakin  to  Berber  signed  by  British  Govern- 
ment. 

1885,  Feb.  20. — Another  Suakin  Field  Force  organ- 
ised— about  fifteen  thousand  men,  British  and  Indian 
— to  protect  this  railway. 


ENGLAND  ON  THE  NILE  145 

1885,  March  13. — Railway  construction  com- 
menced. 

1885,  March  22. — McNeill's  zariba — Arabs  break 
into  it. 

1885,  May  17. — Suakin  Field  Force  withdrawn  and 
railway  abandoned. 

1885,  June. — Death  of  the  Mahdi,  and  succession 
of  the  Khahfa. 

1885,  July  5. — Dongola  evacuated.  Frontier 
handed  over  to  Egyptian  Army. 

1885,  Dec.  30. — Battle  of  Ginnis.  (Stephenson). 

1889,  Aug.  3. — Battle  of  Toski,  near  Wadi  Haifa — 
Dervish  invasion  of  Egypt  defeated  by  Grenfell  (Sirdar). 

1895,  Feb.  20. — Slatin  escapes  from  Omdurman. 

1896,  March  i.  —  Battle  of  x\dowa  —  defeat  of 
Itahans  by  Abyssinians. 

1896,  March  20.  —  Dongola  Expedition  starts. 
(Kitchener,  Sirdar). 

1896,  Sept.  23. — Dongola  occupied. 

1897,  Aug.  7. — Battle  of  Abu  Hamed.  (Hunter.) 

1898,  April  8.— Battle  of  the  Atbara.   (Kitchener.) 

1898,  Sept.  2. — Battle  of  Omdurman.   (Kitchener.) 

1899,  Nov.  24. — Battle  of  El  Gedid  and  death  of 
the  Khalifa.     (Wingate.) 

1900,  Jan.  I. — Railway  completed  from  Wadi 
Haifa  to  Khartoum. 

1902,  Nov.  8. — Gordon's  College  at  Khartoum 
opened  by  Kitchener. 

1905. — Peace  and  plenty  in  the  Sudan — see  Lord 
Cromer's  last  Official  Report. 


K 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK 

See  map  facing  page  238 

Whenever  military  errors  are  committed  the  general 
public  is  usually  led  to  believe  that  the  fault  lies  with 
the  "  stupid  officer  "  on  the  spot.  Yet  there  have  been 
occasions  in  which  the  officer  on  the  spot  has  saved  the 
civilian  in  the  Cabirtet  from  the  consequences  of  his 
ignorance,  as  the  Egyptian  Army  was  now  to  prove. 

In  March  1896,  a  Cabinet  Council  was  summoned 
at  short  notice  to  deliberate  upon  an  unexpected  event. 
The  Prime  Minister  addressing  his  colleagues  in  a  room 
at  the  Foreign  Office,  announced  that  a  grave  situation 
had  arisen  in  one  of  the  new  colonies  of  the  Kingdom  of 
Italy.  There  was,  unfortunately,  truth  in  the  public 
telegrams  describing  an  Italian  defeat  in  Abyssinia. 
King  Menelek's  army  had,  undoubtedly,  gained  a 
decisive  victory  over  a  considerable  Italian  force  at 
Adowa,  capturing  some  hundreds  of  prisoners.  The 
probable  fate  of  these  wretched  Europeans  was  horrible 
to  contemplate,  and  England  would  willingly  extend  to 
Italy  a  helping  hand  in  the  north-east  corner  of  Africa, 
where  this  regrettable  occurrence  took  place.  At 
Cairo  we  had  a  small  British  garrison,  but  Cairo  being 
a  considerable  distance  from  Adowa,  it  would  be  diffi- 
cult for  this  garrison  to  render  effective  assistance. 
Under  these  circumstances,  could  any  means  be  devised 
of  helping  Italy,  without  incurring  undue  risk  ourselves  ? 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        147 

At  this  point  several  ministers  shifted  uneasily  in 
their  chairs,  putting  on  their  spectacles  and  removing 
them  nervously.  One  of  the  younger  members  begged 
that  a  map  might  be  brought  to  assist  them  in  their 
deliberations,  and  a  messenger  departed  to  fetch  it.  He 
returned  with  an  atlas  printed  in  1882,  that  being  the 
latest  edition  available.  After  some  difficulty  Cairo 
was  found  on  one  page  and  Abyssinia  on  another,  but 
the  intervening  regions  were  nowhere  shown.  How- 
ever, on  looking  at  the  small  general  map  of  Africa, 
some  one  remarked  that  Cairo  did  not  after  all  appear 
very  far  distant  from  Abyssinia,  and  those  who  had 
been  uneasy  were  reassured  ! 

Meanwhile,  a  Cabinet  Minister  who  had  lately 
travelled  up  the  Nile  to  Wadi  Haifa  sent  to  his  office  for 
a  bigger,  modern  map.  On  arrival  it  covered  the  table 
in  the  middle  of  the  room,  though  it  only  represented 
the  Nile  valley  from  Cairo  to  Khartoum.  At  the  men- 
tion of  Khartoum  there  was  an  awkward  pause  and 
one  or  two  murmurs  of  apprehension* — so  the  Prime 
Minister  quickly  pointed  out  that  there  was  no  inten- 
tion of  undertaking  the  reconquest  of  the  Sudan,  but 
that  a  demonstration  on  the  northern  frontier  of  the 
Khalifa's  empire  might  cause  that  potentate  to  refrain 
from  attacking  our  Itahan  friends'  garrison  at  Kassala, 
which  was  at  that  moment  threatened.  This,  though 
still  somewhat  alarming,  sounded  less  dangerous, 
especially  as  the  Prime  Minister,  who  meant  to  have 
his  way,  proceeded  to  state  that  the  Egyptian  Army 
had  a  force  at  Wadi  Haifa,  and  that  it  might  be  pos- 
sible for  this  force  to  advance  a  httle  distance  south. 

The  heads  now  bent  over  the  map  to  discover  where 

*  One  member  of  the  Cabinet  had  been  Secretary  of  State  for  War 
in  Mr.  Gladstone's  administration,  during  which  all  the  military 
failures  in  the  Sudan  occurred. 


148  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

the  Egyptian  Army  had  a  post,  and  the  Minister  who 
had  seen  it  explained  to  his  colleagues  how  efficient 
the  garrison  was.  Moreover,  the  name  Wadi  Haifa 
was  printed  in  large,  block  letters  which  gave  it  a  solid 
look.  Southwards  the  names,  Akasha,  Firkeh,  Kosheh, 
(in  small  type,)  looked  comparatively  insignificant,  and 
as  if  a  small  force  could  easily  occupy  one  of  them,  so 
each  was  suggested  in  turn.  But  the  Minister  who  had 
been  up  the  Nile  and  knew  what  he  was  talking  about 
put  his  finger  on  the  big  block  letters — dongola — 
and  suggested  that,  if  any  advance  at  all  were  advisable, 
the  occupation  of  Dongola  might  have  some  influence 
on  the  Khalifa,  whereas  to  occupy  a  small  mud  village 
whose  inhabitants  the  Dervishes  had  already  exter- 
minated could  have  no  effect. 

However  the  Cabinet  dispersed  without  coming  to 
any  decision,  beyond  a  request  to  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  to  write  a  minute  on  the  feasibilit}^  of  an  advance 
— not  an  expedition — to  an  unnamed  spot  south  of 
Wadi  Haifa.  A  few  of  England's  councillors  left  the 
room  with  a  vague  recollection  of  some  unfamiliar 
African  names  which  had  been  referred  to  on  the  map, 
and  one  aged  politician  in  particular  was  so  bewildered 
that  when,  in  the  street,  a  reporter  of  his  acquaintance 
hurriedly  asked  him  what  the  meeting  had  been  con- 
cerned with,  he  could  remember  nothing  but  the  word 
"  Dongola,"   which  he  murmured  unconsciously. 

That  afternoon  the  Commander-in-Chief  sat  at  his 
desk  composing  a  minute  which  he  knew  would  be 
futile,  when  suddenly  his  ear  caught  sound  of  the  word 
"  Dongola  " — shouted  by  newsboys  down  in  the  street. 
By  spending  a  halfpenny  he  learned  that  the  subject 
of  his  minute  had  been  settled  without  him,  and  that 
he  might  spare  himself  further  effort  that  day. 

In  the  evening  to  all  parts  of  the  British  Empire  the 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        149 

various  press-associations  telegraphed  the  welcome 
report  that  the  long-delayed  Nile  expedition  was  to 
start,  and  that  Dongola  would  be  its  objective — nor 
was  this  the  first  time  a  hesitating  administration  has 
had  its  hand  forced  by  a  smart  reporter  possessing  the 
gift  of  intelHgent  anticipation.* 

The  news  was  everywhere  received  with  approba- 
tion, and  the  Cabinet  had  to  decide  whether  it  should 
be  categorically  denied  or  confirmed.  Much  depended 
upon  the  views  held  by  Lord  Cromer,  the  strong  man 
directing  the  destiny  of  Egypt  and  by  the  Sirdar,  Sir 
Herbert  Kitchener,  neither  of  whom  were  expecting 
any  call  to  arms.  Had  they  flinched,  as  lesser  men 
might  have  done,  from  undertaking  a  campaign  at  the 
season  of  lowest  Nile  and  with  no  opportunity  of  pre- 
paring for  desert  warfare  on  a  large  scale,  it  is  probable 
that  the  reconquest  of  the  Sudan  would  have  been 
indefinitely  postponed.  Had  either  of  them  begged  for 
a  short  space  of  time — that  valuable  factor  which 
British  Cabinets  never  accord  to  British  generals  before 
either  plunging  or  drifting  into  war — the  opportunity 
might  have  been  lost.  They,  therefore,  telegraphed  to 
London  that  the  Egyptian  army  could  move  south- 
wards at  once  and  the  premature  newspaper  reports 
were  accordingly  confirmed.  By  March  20 — that  is 
within  three  weeks  of  the  Italian  defeat  at  Adowa,  and 
within  a  week  of  any  advance  being  thought  of — Major 
John  CoUinson  had  covered  eighty-five  miles  to  Akasha, 
in  command  of  the  13th  Sudanese  battahon,  with  two 
squadrons  of  cavalry,  one  company  of  camelry,  one. 
battery  of  artillery  and  a  couple  of  machine  guns. 
Thus  the  gauntlet  was  boldly  flung  down  on  the  desert 

*  Note  the  contrast  between  this  and  the  arrangements  made  by 
Bismarck  and  Moltke  ior  the  invasions  of  Schleswig-Holstein  1864, 
Austria  1866,  France  1870  ;   and  by  the  Japanese  in  Manchuria  1904. 


150  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

sand  within  a  single  day's  march  of  3000  Dervishes  at 
Firkeh,  and  the  reconquest  of  the  Sudan  had  com- 
menced. So  ready  was  the  Egyptian  Army  for  active 
service  that  the  troops  at  Wadi  Haifa  started  at  dawn  on 
the  day  following  their  first  orders  to  move. 

The  advance  guard  thus  thrust  forward  confined 
itself  to  fortifying  a  defensive  position,  patrolling  in 
all  directions  and  protecting  convoys  from  the  base, 
whilst  the  master-mind  of  the  Sirdar  bent  itself  to  the 
task  of  rapidly  building  up  at  Akasha  an  army  and  its 
stores,  destined  to  recapture  the  Dongola  Province  and 
hold  it  against  any  probable  attack. 

During  this  necessary  pause  for  preparation,  let 
us  glance  at  the  problem  confronting  the  General  and 
the  methods  he  adopted  to  solve  it. 

The  expression  Nile  valley  is  conveniently  used  to 
denote  the  wide  belt  of  country  crossed  by  the  river  on 
its  long  journey  from  the  Victoria  Nyanza  to  the  Medi- 
terranean Sea,  but  is  by  no  means  descriptive  of  the 
scene,  because  no  valley  is  visible  to  the  eye,  nor  does 
the  landscape  bear  the  remotest  resemblance  to  valleys 
such  as  those  of  the  Rhine  or  the  Thames.  The 
scenery  has  a  beauty  and  colouring  of  its  own  which 
cannot  be  likened  or  compared  with  that  of  other  lands. 
In  the  mid-day  sun  the  chiselled  lines  of  rocky  hill  strike 
hard  and  clear  against  a  steel-blue  sky  without  a  cloud. 
At  sunset  all  is  softened  by  the  vivid  colours  in  the  west, 
and  a  weird  calm  broods  over  the  landscape.  The  Nile 
itself,  when  not  in  flood,  resembles  a  giant  canal 
humbly  flowing  at  the  bottom  of  a  vast  ditch,  flanked 
by  perpendicular  banks  of  sun-baked  mud :  the  top  of 
these  banks  is  level  with  the  surrounding  country,  yet 
the  masts  of  vessels  sailing  over  the  water  are  unseen, 
and  the  maxim  at  the  mast-head  of  a  gunboat  cannot 
be   aimed   at   distant   objects.     But   at   full-flood   the 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        151 

canal  has  grown  into  a  tumultuous  tide  of  surging  water, 
brim-full  to  the  bank's  top  and  almost  even  with  the 
desert.  The  gunboat,  seen  from  a  distance,  now 
towers  above  the  land  and  looks  as  if  it  were  steaming 
across  country.  The  canal-like  appearance  of  the 
river  is  further  heightened  by  the  action  of  the  so- 
called  "cataracts,"  which  are  really  miles  and  miles  of 
rocky  boulders  and  islands,  obstructing  the  waterway 
and  holding  up  the  water-level — like  rough-hewn  locks 
devised  by  mighty  Titans.  Without  them,  the  Nile 
would  have  such  a  rapid  fall  that  it  would  either  run 
dry  or  degenerate  into  a  string  of  pools  during  half  the 
year  ;  and  on  the  flood  would  become  an  unmanageable 
torrent.  For  this  peculiar  river,  which  is  wider  and 
deeper  at  Khartoum  than  at  Cairo  and  flows  unfed 
by  rain  or  tributary  stream  during  the  last  1500 
miles  of  its  course,  rises  twenty-six  feet  in  a  couple 
of  months,  and  submerges  the  cataracts  deep  below 
its  surface — so  great  is  the  rainfall  at  its  distant 
sources.  From  Abyssinian  mountains  2000  miles  from 
Cairo,  and  from  equatorial  lakes  and  marshes  3000 
miles  to  the  south,  the  abundant  waters  travel  down 
the  canal  through  parched  lands  and  deserts,  every- 
where producing  in  August,  September  and  October 
the  annual  marvel  of  the  flood,  which  men  have 
watched  and  worshipped  since  the  dawn  of  their 
earliest  history.  To  ignore  this  prodigy  of  nature  when 
engaged  on  a  campaign  or  in  the  pursuit  of  agriculture, 
is  as  fatal  as  to  neglect  the  seasons  of  the  solar  year  in 
other  lands.  It  spells  disaster.  Yet  it  was  through 
neglect  of  this  obvious  factor  that  the  first  Sudan 
expeditions  organised  in  London  ended  in  failure 
whereas  those  directed  from  Cairo  succeeded,  and  that 
the  failures  cost  England  many  millions  of  pounds, 
whereas  the  successes  cost  her  only  £800,000  spent  on 


152  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

railways.  The  truth  is  that  for  the  invasion  of  the 
Sudan  a  knowledge  of  how  and  when  to  work  boats  up 
dangerous  cataracts  is  of  infinitely  greater  value  than 
the  information  supplied  in  military  text-books. 

Right  methods  were,  therefore,  only  employed  after 
the  Consul-General  at  Cairo  had  rescued  the  govern- 
ment of  Egypt  from  the  hands  of  politicians  in  England, 
and  when  the  direction  of  the  forces  engaged  in  Sudan 
operations  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  officers  who 
studied  their  job  on  the  spot  and  discarded  without 
fear  military  notions  which  experience  proved  to  be 
fads.  It  is  no  exaggeration  to  assert  that  any  of  the 
Sirdar's  battahons  could  at  any  time  have  marched  out 
from  its  quarters  on  the  frontier  to  engage  in  a  battle 
like  Abu  Klea  or  one  of  the  numerous  British  engage- 
ments around  Suakim.  A  Dervish  Emir,  if  he  sees  a 
tempting  opportunity,  will  almost  invariably  launch  an 
attack,  and  the  art  of  fighting  him  consists  in  giving 
him  no  such  opening  until  it  suits  the  invading  force  to 
be  attacked  with  a  chance  of  victory,  yielding  results 
worth  fighting  for.  To  blunder  forward  in  ignorance  of 
the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy  and  be  "  unexpectedly 
attacked  "  in  the  scrub  is  not  a  manoeuvre  calculated  to 
defeat  Dervishes.  Such  battles  may  be  won  by  the 
valour  and  discipline  of  junior  officers  and  their  men,  but 
do  not  display  much  acquaintance  with  the  business  of 
war.  They  are  usually  followed  by  necessary  retreats 
to  obtain  water  and  supplies,  and  have  to  be  constantly 
repeated  until  one  side  or  the  other  is  worn  out.  Now, 
Sir  Herbert  Kitchener's  conception  of  Sudan  warfare 
was  of  a  different  type.  In  the  first  place  he  armed 
himself  during  peace  with  an  intelligence  department, 
under  Major  Wingate,  which  devoted  its  whole  energies 
year  in  and  year  out  to  collecting  and  studying  every 
scrap  of  news  regarding  what  occurred  at  Omdurman 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK       153 

and  the  provinces  of  the  KhaUfa's  dominion.  Through 
this  agency,  which  was  materially  strengthened  by  the 
escape  of  Slatin  Pasha  from  Omdurman,  the  general 
was  well  posted  with  accurate  information  about  his 
enemy. 

His  quick  advance  to  iVkasha  was,  therefore,  not  a 
blind  move  in  a  southerly  direction  in  obedience  to 
orders  from  London,  but  a  deliberate  plan  for  getting 
into  touch  with  a  substantial  Dervish  force  at  Firkeh 
and  reconnoitring  it  at  leisure,  whilst  the  Egyptian 
army  mobilised  in  rear  and  became  gradually  perfected 
in  the  thousand  and  one  details  which  just  make  the 
difference  between  brigades  trained  by  their  own  officers 
and  a  haphazard  assemblage  of  armed  units.  If  only 
the  Dervishes  at  Firkeh  could  be  kept  in  play  for  a  few 
months,  even  at  the  risk  of  their  being  meanwhile 
reinforced,  it  would  be  possible  to  utilise  the  whole 
army  in  the  forward  move  to  Dongola — backed  by  a 
railway  to  be  constructed  round  200  miles  of  con- 
secutive cataracts,  and  strengthened  at  high  Nile 
by  gunboats  which  would  then  be  able  to  ascend  the 
river.  For  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  above  Wadi 
Haifa  the  river's  course  is  obstructed  by  rocks  and 
boulders  of  the  most  forbidding  granite,  which  extend 
all  the  way  to  the  navigable  water  of  the  Dongola 
province.  They  constitute  the  most  formidable  series 
of  cataracts  encountered  along  the  whole  course  of  the 
Nile,  and  are  bordered  by  vast  uninhabited  deserts  of 
sand  and  rocky  hills — locally  termed  the  "  belly  of 
rocks."  Akasha,  a  small  deserted  village  situated  on 
the  river's  bank  in  the  midst  of  this  barren  land,  became 
on  the  arrival  of  the  advanced  guard,  the  point  of 
concentration  of  the  scattered  corps  of  the  Egyptian 
army.  From  Suakin,  Cairo,  Assouan  and  Wadi 
Haifa,  squadrons,  batteries  and  battalions  trickled  into 


154  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

Akasha,  and  for  three  months  the  Uttle  place  loomed 
large  in  the  eyes  of  all  who  take  an  interest  in  the  affairs 
of  our  Empire.  After  the  first  week  the  advanced  guard 
was  increased  to  a  brigade  of  all  arms  commanded  by  a 
Major  ;  it  subsequently  grew  into  a  division  of  three 
brigades  commanded  by  a  Colonel  under  forty  years  of 
age.  To  supply  such  a  force  in  this  wilderness  and 
southwards  was  the  problem  of  the  hour,  a  problem, 
too,  which  must  be  solved  on  economical  lines.  No  one 
understood  better  than  the  thoughtful  soldier  who  con- 
ducted operations  that  the  future  prosecution  of  the 
campaign  depended  on  its  being  both  cheaply  managed 
and  successfully  fought.  He  could  afford  neither  to 
waste  money  nor  hazard  a  military  reverse,  nor  even  to 
indulge  in  a  regrettable  incident.  Thirteen  years  of 
experience  had  taught  him  that  most  of  our  failures 
had  been  due  to  starting  too  late,  and  being  con- 
sequently in  too  great  a  hurry. 

For  immediate  necessities  5000  camels  were  pur- 
chased to  work  convoys  between  railhead  at  Sarras 
and  Akasha.  But  camels  are  an  expensive  and 
perishable  form  of  transport,  requiring  constant 
consideration  in  the  matter  of  food  and  rest.  The 
Sirdar,  therefore,  decided  to  reconstruct  the  old  torn- 
up  railway,  started  but  never  completed  by  Ishmail 
Pasha  in  the  days  of  Egypt's  unchecked  extravagance. 
Railway  work  was  begun  forthwith,  and  a  long  chapter 
might  pleasantly  be  devoted  to  the  romance  of  building 
the  Sudan  Military  Railway,  were  it  not  that  our  brief 
resume  can  only  spare  it  a  few  sentences.  The  Sirdar's 
idea  was  to  build  it  on  military  lines  with  labour  con- 
trolled by  young  bimbashis  from  the  Royal  Engineers 
and,  as  the  campaign  progressed,  it  developed  into  a  great 
achievement.  Long  before  any  of  the  experts  at  home 
had  grasped  the  necessities  of  the  situation.  Sir  Herbert 


THE  ECxYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        155 

Kitchener  had  made  his  plans,  worked  out  their 
cost  and  begun  to  order  his  material.  When  it  was 
discovered  that  the  section  between  Wadi  Haifa  and 
Dongola  Province  involved  nearly  200  miles  of  line, 
the  War  Office  offered  to  send  out  a  full  Colonel  and 
the  usual  staff  for  such  an  undertaking.  But  the 
Sirdar  pointed  out  that  a  subaltern  on  the  spot, 
Bimbashi  Girouard,  fully  satisfied  his  requirements 
and  that  this  young  officer  preferred  to  build  the  hne 
without  the  "  usual  "  staff.  In  the  sequel  Girouard 
and  a  dozen  brother  subalterns  constructed  and 
operated  780  miles  of  railway  under  difficult  and 
entirely  novel  conditions,  and  may  fairly  claim  to 
have  conquered  the  Sudan  on  an  iron  horse. 

By  the  first  week  in  June  the  situation  was  as 
follows,  and  all  was  ready  for  the  first  battle  of  the 
campaign.  Suakim,  Tokar  and  their  neighbourhood 
were  safely  held  by  a  brigade  of  the  Indian  army. 
Egypt  was  protected  by  a  brigade  of  British  troops. 
Wadi  Haifa  was  garrisoned  by  a  battalion  of  British 
infantry.  The  new  railway  was  completed  to  within 
one  day's  camel-march  of  Akasha,  where  9000  men 
were  concentrated  with  ample  supplies  within  striking 
distance  of  the  enemy. 

Meanwhile  the  Dervishes  at  Firkeh  had  not  been 
idle,  nor  was  the  KhaUfa  at  Omdurman  unaware  of  the 
impending  attack.  But  they  knew  not  what  to  think 
of  our  prolonged  delay,  and  finally  put  it  down  to 
hesitation  and  fear.  Fifty  notable  Emirs  commanded 
the  various  detachments  at  Firkeh  whom  they  disposed 
in  a  fortified  position  of  some  strength — intending  to 
issue  forth  and  attack  at  the  first  favourable  oppor- 
tunity. Almost  daily  they  reconnoitred  the  outpost 
hne  which  surrounded  Akasha  and  frequently  had 
brushes  with  Egyptian  patrols.     They  had  plenty  of 


156  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

spies  in  and  about  the  Egyptian  camp  in  the  shape  of 
camel-drivers  and  villagers  on  adjacent  Nile  islands. 
But  as  week  after  week  passed  without  any  aggressive 
action  the  Dervishes  were  lulled  into  a  false  sense  of 
security.  The  Egyptian  cavalry,  admirably  led  by 
Bimbashi  Broadwood,  meanwhile  reconnoitred  the 
enemy's  stronghold  without  ever  offering  themselves 
as  a  target  for  overwhelming  attack.  So  the  Emirs 
openly  boasted  in  their  camp  that  the  "infidel  Kafirs" 
were  too  terrified  to  hazard  a  fight  with  the  chosen 
warriors  of  the  Khahfa,  whilst  in  truth  the  Sirdar  was 
preparing  his  blow  and  acquiring  exact  knowledge  upon 
which  to  base  his  action. 

On  June  6,  1896,  keeping  his  intentions  secret  until 
the  last  moment,  Kitchener  suddenly  issued  detailed 
orders  to  all  units  to  make  a  night  march  on  Firkeh  and 
assault  it  at  dawn.  A  complete  surprise  was  aimed  at,  but 
being  a  most  difficult  thing  to  achieve,  any  commander 
is  lucky  if  he  brings  off  a  partial  surprise  only.  In  this 
instance  fortune  favoured  the  scheme — for  at  three  in 
the  afternoon,  when  the  force  was  actually  parading 
in  camp  for  its  night  march,  Osman  Azrak,  the  chief 
Dervish  Emir,  lay  in  observation  on  a  hill  near  our  out- 
posts. As  he  watched,  clouds  of  dust — a  common 
feature  of  the  country — obscured  the  view,  and  after 
waiting  a  little  he  retired  with  his  horsemen  and  re- 
ported at  Firkeh  that  the  Turks  lay  quiet  as  usual ! 

For  the  night  march  the  Sirdar  distributed  the 
troops  in  two  columns  which  were  to  move  by  different 
routes  and  attack  simultaneously,  if  possible.  The 
small  column,  some  2000  strong,  all  mounted  on 
camels  or  horses,  included  a  battery  of  horse 
artillery,  seven  squadrons  of  cavalry,  eight  companies 
of  camel-corps  and  a  battalion  of  Sudanese  infantry 
riding  transport  camels  for  the  occasion.     This  column, 


LORD    KITCHENER   IN    1890 

From  a  Portrait  by  H.  Herkomer  in  the  Possession 
OF  P.  Ralli.  Eso. 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        157 

commanded  by  Major  Burn-Murdoch,  moved  from 
Akasha  just  before  sunset  and  took  a  desert  road 
leading  round  the  enemy's  position.  Its  orders  were 
to  occupy  certain  hills  behind  the  Dervish  flank  by 
4.30  A.M.,  and  then  to  wait  and  co-operate  with  the 
main  attack.  The  larger  column  under  the  personal 
command  of  the  Sirdar  was  composed  of  two  field 
batteries,  one  maxim  battery  and  a  division  of  infantry, 
the  latter  under  Colonel  Hunter,  whose  Brigadiers 
were  Majors  Maxwell,  MacDonald  and  Lewis.  It 
marched  off  about  4  p.m.  along  the  river  track  which 
leads  direct  to  Firkeh  village,  fourteen  miles — a 
narrow  and  difficult  path  for  an  army  to  follow  in  the 
dark.  The  moon  rose  late,  and  the  nine  infantry 
battalions  tramped  silently  through  the  darkness, 
strung  out  along  a  narrow  track,  at  one  time  stumbling 
over  rocks  and  boulders,  at  others  ankle-deep  in  soft 
sand.  Not  a  sound  was  audible  save  the  crunch  of 
boots  and  the  occasional  rattle  of  a  rifle  against  the 
accoutrements,  as  the  men  pressed  eagerly  onwards. 
To  their  right  the  swish  of  the  river,  forcing  its  way 
through  rockstrewn  cataracts,  muffled  all  noises  into 
one  monotonous  murmur.  To  their  left  high  hills  of 
granite  throwing  out  spurs  to  the  river's  edge  caused 
delays  to  the  column  as  it  passed  them  in  single  file. 
The  darkness  was  intense,  but  by  midnight  the  force 
was  concentrated  and  lay  down  to  rest  on  a  level  and 
sandy  plain — within  four  miles  of  its  objective.  At 
2.30  it  moved  on  by  moonlight  and  trickled  man  by 
man  through  a  gorge,  while  in  front  the  way  seemed 
barred  by  a  mountain  mass  rising  900  feet  above  the 
river  and  leaving  the  narrowest  of  defiles  from  which 
the  battalions  must  debouch  within  shot  of  the  enemy's 
advanced  post.  Suddenly  in  the  stillness  of  the  night 
drums  were  heard  beating  a  mile  to  the  front.     The 


158  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

Dervishes  must  be  on  the  alert  !  Would  they  charge 
the  head  of  the  column  in  the  defile  ?  But  the  sound 
died  down.  It  had  been  but  the  usual  call  to  morning 
prayer  in  the  Dervish  dem.  Had  not  Osman  Azrak 
with  his  own  eyes  seen  the  infidels  quiet  in  their  camp, 
just  as  they  had  been  any  day  these  two  months  past  ? 
Onwards  pressed  the  column  till  dawn .  Then  rapidly 
the  leading  battalion,  loth  Sudanese,  deployed  into 
line  across  the  defile — the  keen  active  blacks  grinning 
with  pleasure  at  the  prospect  of  a  fight,  every  man 
intently  watching  for  the  first  sign  of  the  hated  Baggara, 
yet  drilled  to  listen  and  wait  for  the  orders  of  his 
officers.  This  fine  battahon,  which  had  recently  been 
engaged  in  a  brush  with  Osman  Digna  at  Suakin,  was 
from  commanding  officer  to  recruit  a  remarkable  blend 
of  civilised  discipline  and  primitive  manhood,  a  living 
example  of  the  virtues  of  England  grafted  to  the  valour 
of  Equatoria.  It  pushed  on  in  line  over  ground  broken 
by  scrub,  high  grass  and  stunted  trees  ;  paused  for 
the  remainder  of  Lewis's  brigade  to  deploy  on  either 
side,  and  to  give  time  to  MacDonald's  brigade,  still 
hemmed  between  mountain  and  river,  to  prolong  the 
line  to  the  left.  Daylight  now  appeared  ;  the  moment 
for  swift  action  was  at  hand ;  yet  no  further  sound  or 
sign  revealed  the  enemy's  presence.  Quick  orders 
from  the  Sirdar  at  the  front  hurried  MacDonald  round 
the  base  of  the  mountain,  which  trended  away  from 
the  river  and  gave  place  to  a  dry  kor  in  which  to  deploy 
out  of  sight — with  open  ground  in  front.  Maxwell's 
brigade  too  was  hustled  through  the  defile  as  minutes 
were  precious.  Suddenly  a  single  shot  rang  out  high  up 
on  the  mountain  side.  It  was  the  Dervish  outpost's 
first  alarm.  Other  shots  quickly  followed  as  the  out- 
post fell  back.  The  rocky  ridge  in  front  opened  fire. 
The  loth  replied  with  crashes  of  volley  firing.     Awa}^ 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        159 

in  the  distance  beyond  the  Dervishes  the  Sirdar  heard 
the  report  of  his  horse  artillery  in  action,  and  knew  that 
his  two  columns  would  combine.  It  was  5.30  a.m. 
The  simultaneous  attack  had  begun.  The  surprise 
of  the  enemy  was  complete. 

With  the  opening  of  a  battle,  a  commander's  task 
is  temporarily  ended.  The  art  of  generalship  is  to 
dispose  troops  within  touch  of  their  enemy  in  such 
tactically  superior  positions  and  at  such  a  tactically 
favourable  moment  that— if  their  fighting  qualities  are 
superior  to  those  of  the  opponent — the  victory  shall  be 
decisive  and  far-reaching.  The  attack  once  launched 
must  be  left  to  the  initiative  of  subordinate  officers  and 
the  valour  of  the  men.  In  this  instance  the  brigadiers 
were  men  of  forty,  the  commanders  of  battahons  men 
of  about  thirty-three  and  the  bimbashis  still  younger. 
Their  battle-leading,  dictated  by  common  sense  and 
experience,  gave  the  Dervishes  not  one  chance  in  a 
hundred.  Nevertheless  the  enemy,  stubborn  and 
defiant  in  spite  of  his  flank  being  turned  before  the 
action  began,  fought  \\dth  the  old  courage  of  his  race — 
neither  giving  nor  expecting  quarter. 

When  MacDonald  had  deployed,  he  and  Lewis 
pushed  home  their  attacks — the  former  against  the 
Dervish  right  the  latter  against  their  left,  posted  at  the 
village  of  Firkeh  on  the  river  bank.  Maxwell — held  in 
reserve — soon  pressed  forward  to  cover  the  gap  between 
these  two  brigades.  A  field  battery  and  the  maxims 
found  good  positions  on  a  slope  of  Firkeh  mountain, 
whence  they  fired  over  the  heads  of  the  attacking 
infantry.  The  desert  column  had  strict  orders  to  keep 
out  of  the  line  of  fire  of  our  main  attack  and  therefore 
confined  its  action  to  long-range  shooting  of  a  useful 
character. 

The  scheme  of  the  night  march  and  deployment  at 


i6o  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

daylight  had  been  so  carefully  planned  and  carried  out 
that  the  actual  fighting  was  short,  sharp  and  decisive. 
The  scene  of  action,  in  which  men  contended  like  tiny 
ants  in  a  wilderness  of  lonely  desert,  resembled  a  toy 
arena,  as  the  men  in  khaki  advanced  and  the  white- 
robed  Dervishes  hurried  from  village  and  camp  to  man 
their  walls  and  trenches.  The  fortified  position — a 
mile  and  a  half  long — extended  across  level  ground  by 
the  Nile  to  a  rocky  ridge  in  the  desert.  From  loop- 
holed  walls,  houses  and  breastworks,  a  spluttering  fire 
of  Remington  rifles  was  directed  on  the  Egyptian  and 
Sudanese  battalions  as  they  advanced  to  the  assault. 

While  Lewis's  brigade  swung  to  the  right  to  attack 
the  village  and  engage  in  close  fighting  with  its 
defenders,  MacDonald  and  his  Sudanese  were  charged 
by  a  gallant  band  of  Baggara  horse,  who  all  perished  in 
their  attempt.  Wheeling  his  left  well  forward  so  as  to 
envelop  the  Dervish  flank  MacDonald  assaulted  the 
ridge  with  great  dash,  shooting  and  bayoneting  its 
brave  defenders  and  driving  them  out  of  their  breast- 
works to  another  ridge  in  rear.  Pressing  impetuously 
forward  the  Sudanese  drove  the  enemy  down  one  hill 
and  up  another,  always  swinging  their  left  forward,  until 
at  the  end  of  the  action  the  brigade  faced  the  river  and 
hemmed  the  flying  enemy  against  its  shore.  Some 
escaped  by  swimming,  others  sought  cover  below  the 
bank  ;  all  in  the  open  were  routed  or  killed.  Mean- 
while Lewis  carried  the  village,  Maxwell  occupied  the 
enemy's  dem  or  camp,  and  the  Desert  Column  took  up 
the  pursuit  with  cavalry,  horse  artillery  and  camel- 
corps,  a  pursuit  which  was  continued  to  Fereig,  sixty-five 
miles  distant,  during.the  following  days.  By  7.30  a.m. 
the  general  action  was  over,  though  a  number  of  Arabs 
still  maintained  a  desperate  resistance  in  the  houses  and 
courtyards.     So  the  long  straggling  village  had  to  be 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        i6i 

cleared  by  the  three  brigades — some  loo  corpses  being 
afterwards  counted  in  one  group  of  buildings.  The 
enemy's  casualties  numbered  780  dead,  500  wounded, 
and  600  prisoners.  The  Sirdar's  list  amounted  to  one 
British  officer  wounded  and  103  of  other  ranks  killed 
and  wounded.  Such  was  indeed  a  small  price  to  pay 
for  a  decisive  and  complete  victory,  and  on  this  account 
some  critics  have  concluded  that  the  action  was  unim- 
portant. But  surely  the  value  of  a  victory  should  be 
measured,  not  by  the  length  of  the  casualty  list,  but  by 
the  ultimate  effect  of  defeat  on  the  conquered  and  the 
advantages  reaped  by  the  victors. 

At  Firkeh  the  Dervish  "  Empire  "  sustained  a  blow 
which  paralysed  its  military  enterprise  for  a  year, 
whilst  the  Egyptian  army  gathered  self-confidence  and 
prestige.  Had  the  victory  been  less  decisive  or  had  the 
Dervishes  been  able  to  claim  a  minor  success,  there  is 
no  doubt  that  further  desperate  fighting  would  have 
been  necessary  before  peace  could  have  been  restored  to 
the  Dongola  province,  and  few  who  recollect  the  circum- 
stances of  the  moment  can  afiirm  that  Sir  Herbert 
Kitchener  would  have  been  the  man  entrusted  with 
the  supreme  command  of  the  forces  subsequently  sent 
to  reconquer  the  Sudan.  Through  his  victory  at 
Firkeh,  he  gained  the  approval  of  the  Home  Govern- 
ment ;  the  Egyptian  army  showed  it  could  win  British 
battles  without  aid  from  British  troops  and  the 
operations  continued  to  be  directed  by  the  youthful 
general  and  his  officers,  instead  of  by  older  men  and 
inexperienced  troops  from  home  stations.  Moreover 
the  British  public  became  keenly  interested  in  the 
further  prosecution  of  the  war  and  none  heeded  the 
various  croakers  who  in  England  always  side  with 
England's  enemies  and  foretell  disaster  to  every  British 
enterprise. 

L 


i62  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

After  burying  the  dead  and  enlisting  the  prisoners 
into  the  Sudanese  battahons,  the  Sirdar  distributed 
the  force  in  several  camps  south  of  Firkeh  and  busied 
himself  with  preparations  for  the  forward  move,  which 
would  place  him  upon  an  open  reach  of  the  river  and  in 
military'  occupation  of  the  province  of  Dongola.  It 
was  an  anxious  period  of  hard  work  in  the  hottest 
months  of  the  year  and  in  the  hottest  part  of  the 
Sudan.  Moreover  the  good  fortune  which  had  hitherto 
attended  the  undertaking  seemed  to  desert  it  and 
everything  went  contrary.  Before  operations  could 
be  resumed  railway  construction  must  be  completed  to 
the  advanced  base  at  Kosheh :  gunboats  and  sailing- 
boats  had  to  be  passed  up  the  cataracts  on  the  rising 
Nile  :  and  food  and  stores  accumulated  at  the  front. 
The  labour  for  these  undertakings  and  the  directing 
control  must  be  provided  by  the  army  and  its  officers. 
Unfortunately  the  Nile  rose  late  and  delayed  the  work  : 
instead  of  the  usual  north  winds,  which  enable  sailing 
boats  to  ascend  the  rapids,  it  blew  for  forty  consecutive 
days  from  the  south  :  the  desert  which  for  half  a 
century  had  known  no  rain  was  deluged  by  violent 
cyclonic  storms  and  several  miles  of  railway  embank- 
ment were  washed  completely  away,  leaving  the  rails 
hanging  in  festoons  amidst  the  wreckage  :  worst  of  all 
an  epidemic  of  cholera  broke  out  in  Egypt,  ascended  the 
Nile  and  attacked  the  army  in  a  virulent  form.  Each 
of  these  misfortunes  was  exceptional  and  peculiar  to 
1896,  yet  all  descended  upon  the  troops  during  July 
and  August  and  nearly  wrecked  the  expedition.  It 
required  the  Sirdar's  highest  powers  of  rapid  organisa- 
tion and  decision  to  deal  with  each  occurrence  in  turn, 
and  he  displayed  his  quality  in  a  marked  degree — as 
will  never  be  forgotten  by  those  who  saw  him  at  work. 

The  epidemic  killed  off  919  out  of  1218  attacked,  and 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        163 

the  usual  horrors  of  a  cholera  camp  were  present  day 
and  night.  The  bimbashis  and  their  men  struggled 
with  gunboats  and  sailing-boats  in  the  river,  at  railway 
construction  and  repairs  in  the  desert,  and  with  the 
nightmare  of  a  deadly  disease.  If  the  Dervishes  had 
not  been  so  thoroughly  beaten,  what  an  opportunity 
for  counter-attacks  ! 

However,  by  dint  of  perseverance  on  the  part  of  the 
army  and  a  cool  head  on  the  shoulders  of  its  commander, 
difficulties  were  overcome  as  they  arose.  Four  gun- 
boats and  three  steamers  were  hauled  by  manual  labour 
up  the  worst  cataracts  ;  a  refreshing  wind  from  the 
north  at  last  enabled  the  flotilla  of  sailing-boats  to  stem 
the  swift  current  of  the  Nile  ;  the  railway  was  repaired 
by  supreme  efforts  in  seven  days,  and  was  then  com- 
pleted to  Kosheh,  where  stores  for  some  months  were 
collected.  The  British  battalion  at  Wadi  Haifa  was 
moved  to  the  front  ;  a  fourth  brigade  (Fellaheen) 
under  i\Iajor  David  was  added  to  Colonel  Hunter's 
division  ;  on  September  12  all  was  ready  for  the  march 
on  Dongola,  and  the  trials  of  officers  and  men  were 
forgotten  in  the  exhilaration  of  the  advance. 

Meanwhile  the  Dervishes  under  Wad  Bishara — a 
young  Emir  and  a  line  specimen  of  the  Arab  fighting 
chief — had  been  reinforced  from  Omdurman  and 
numbered  nearly  8000  regulars,  besides  a  contingent  of 
local  tribesmen  of  little  or  no  military  value.  That  this 
Emir  and  his  men  meant  fighting  there  can  be  no  doubt, 
for  Wad  Bishara  had  shown  his  mettle  in  many  an 
action  in  Darfur  where  he  held  supreme  command  until 
replaced  by  the  Khalifa's  cousin,  Mahmud.  But  the 
defeat  at  Firkeh  had  somewhat  diminished  that  absolute 
certainty  of  victory,  without  which  Moslem  soldiers  are 
not  seen  at  their  best.  In  civilised  forces,  such  as  the 
Egyptian  and  Indian  armies,  discipline,  esprit  de  corps 


i64  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

and  mutual  confidence  make  fanaticism  unnecessary  ; 
but,  in  armies  where  discipline  depends  on  personal 
influence,  fanaticism  of  one  sort  or  another  is  essential 
to  success.  The  Dervishes  have  always  been  brave 
fighters,  prepared  to  die  in  battle  for  their  cause  and 
ready  to  sell  their  lives  dearly  when  cornered,  but 
long  years  of  easy  victories  over  inferior  enemies 
followed  by  the  unrestrained  pillage  of  the  conquered 
had  deadened  the  spiritual  power  of  their  early  fanatic- 
ism. In  the  days  of  the  Mahdi  it  was  glorious  to  die 
in  battle  for  the  sake  of  religion  and  to  free  the  land 
from  alien  tyrants.  It  was  a  different  thing  to  fight  as 
a  mercenary  in  the  army  of  a  despotic  Khalifa.  Yet  so 
great  is  the  warlike  instinct  of  the  tribes  of  the  Sudan, 
that,  if  only  the  Dervishes  could  score  a  single  success 
against  the  Egyptians,  Wad  Bishara  and  the  Sirdar 
both  knew  that  they  would  at  once  become  a  formidable 
military  force.  The  tactics  of  these  two  commanders 
were  therefore  simple  and  straightforward.  The  Sirdar 
meant  to  give  his  enemy  no  opportunity  of  winning 
even  a  minor  action  :  Wad  Bishara,  after  stemming 
the  flight  from  Firkeh,  was  determined  not  to  suffer  a 
second  defeat,  but  hoped  to  fall  upon  some  detachment 
of  Egyptians  and  quicken  the  spirit  of  his  men  by  a 
taste  of  victory.  He  accordingly  moved  northwards 
from  Dongola  with  his  whole  force,  crossed  the  Nile 
and  occupied  a  position  at  Kerma,  a  hundred  miles 
south  of  Kosheh  on  the  same  side  of  the  river.  From 
thence  he  sent  out  strong  patrols,  which  cut  the  tele- 
graph wire  behind  Kitchener's  leading  brigade  and 
fought  our  cavalry  without  decisive  results.  Mean- 
while, instead  of  using  their  superior  mobility,  the 
Dervishes  sat  passively  in  this  position,  whilst  the 
invading  army  concentrated  within  seven  miles  of 
them,  ready  for  another  destructive  swoop  like  that  of 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        165 

Firkeh:  but  Wad  Bishara,  more  alert  and  better 
informed  than  Osman  Azrak,  had  an  alternative  plan, 
and,  as  soon  as  he  reaUsed  that  he  could  neither  stop 
the  main  advance  nor  overwhelm  a  detachment,  he 
suddenly  withdrew  across  the  river  and  placed  its 
flooded  waters  between  himself  and  destruction. 
Meanwhile  the  Sirdar's  force  was  ordered  to  deploy 
at  sunrise  and  assault  Kerma.  At  that  hour  it  ac- 
cordingly advanced  majestically  to  the  attack,  but 
the  carefully  planned  manoeuvre  proved  abortive, 
because  the  Dervishes  had  abandoned  their  intrench- 
ments  that  night.  A  mile  beyond,  at  Hafir  on  the 
further  bank,  a  small  steamer — sad  rehc  of  Gordon's 
ingenuit}^ — and  a  fleet  of  boats  indicated  what  had 
happened,  so  the  Egyptian  advance  was  continued  till 
the  two  forces  faced  one  another,  with  only  the  Nile 
between  them.  At  6.30  a.m.  the  infantry,  disappointed 
of  its  prey,  sat  down  to  watch  as  spectators  a  naval 
action  between  our  three  gunboats — the  fourth  had 
been  sunk  on  a  rock  in  the  cataracts — and  a  fortified 
village.  The  Dervish  position  occupied  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  of  the  bank  and  was  cunningly  devised  to 
shelter  its  defenders  and  afford  them  a  good  field  of 
fire  towards  the  river.  Entrenchments,  thick  mud 
walls,  houses  and  pits  covered  the  bank.  Five  brass 
guns  in  gun-pits  were  mounted  close  to  the  water's 
edge ;  a  number  of  riflemen  had  chmbed  the  tall  palm- 
trees  which  waved  overhead  and,  concealed  by  the 
foliage,  commanded  the  decks  of  boats.  At  intervals 
the  coloured  flags  of  the  principal  Emirs,  blazoned  with 
texts  from  the  Koran,  bid  defiance  to  the  invaders,  and, 
in  the  desert  beyond,  the  broad-bladed  spears  of  the 
Baggara  horse  flashed  in  the  sun  as  the  riders  brandished 
their  arms. 

Directly  the  gunboats  were  ready  for   action,  the 


i66  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

horse  battery  opened  fire,  and  was  answered  by  a 
splutter  of  musketry  along  the  whole  line  of  intrench- 
ments,  indicating  that  they  were  thickly  occupied  from 
end  to  end.  Then,  one  by  one  the  three  gunboats 
struggled  against  the  current  to  within  range  of  the 
Dervishes  and  became  targets  for  a  formidable  fire, 
which  splashed  like  hail  all  over  them  and  cut  the 
water  around  them  into  foam.  From  the  palm-tops 
the  fire  was  especially  galling,  as  it  searched  the  decks 
and  enfiladed  the  slight  shields  of  both  maxims  and 
guns.  One  Dervish  shell  penetrated  the  Abu  Klea  at 
the  water-line  and  entered  the  magazine,  but  did  not 
explode.  Several  shells  struck  the  Metemma.  Com- 
mander Colville,  R.N.,  on  the  Tamai,  was  severely 
wounded  in  the  wrist,  and  casualties  occurred  on  all  the 
boats.  Their  practice  on  the  entrenchments  sent  clouds 
of  dust  into  the  air  and  did  some  execution,  but  without 
subduing  the  enemy's  fire.  The  bold  riflemen  in  the 
tree-tops  were  frequently  dropped  like  young  rooks  on 
a  spring  day,  but  the  Dervish  fire  scarcely  slackened, 
and  the  gunboats  had  to  turn  tail  amidst  the  jeers  of 
the  Arabs  and  run  down-stream  to  make  good  their 
injuries.  Again  they  moved  up-stream  and  renewed 
the  attack  with  no  better  success.  At  the  end  of  three 
hours'  engagement  hardly  any  progress  had  been  made, 
and  it  was  obvious  to  the  Sirdar  that  other  tactics  must 
be  adopted.  He  accordingly  directed  the  gunboats 
once  more  to  run  the  gauntlet,  but  to  proceed  at  full 
steam  in  line  abreast  without  attempting  to  reply  to 
the  Dervishes,  and  to  run  on  thirty-five  miles  to  the 
town  of  Dongola  and  attack  the  enemy's  base  and  line 
of  communications. 

This  movement  was  prepared  and  supported  by  long 
range  infantry  volleys  across  the  river  and  by  the  fire 
of  all  the  batteries  at   1300  yards.      It  proved  more 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        167 

effective,  though  it  did  not  completely  subdue  the 
Dervishes.  The  palm-tree  riflemen  were  dislodged, 
the  five  brass  guns  were  silenced,  the  Arab  steamer 
sunk,  and,  under  cover  of  these  results,  the  gunboats 
steamed  past  the  entrenchments.  At  eleven  o'clock 
the  action  subsided  into  desultory  firing  which  lasted 
throughout  the  hot  day — a  reminder  to  the  opposing 
armies  that  neither  side  could  yet  claim  a  victory.  The 
Egyptian  losses  were  insignificant.  Wad  Bishara  had 
200  dead  and  many  wounded.  He  himself  was  hurt 
by  a  splinter  and  was  nervous  about  his  line  of  re- 
treat since  the  gunboats  had  gone  south.  During  the 
night  he  attempted  to  revictual  his  force  from  the 
stores  of  grain  which  lay  in  his  boats  by  the  bank,  but 
the  moon  in  the  Sudan  is  bright — brighter  than  else- 
where— and  the  watchful  Egyptian  gunners  drove  away 
all  who  tried  to  carry  provisions  to  the  shore.  Wad 
Bishara  was  therefore  obliged  to  evacuate  Hafir,  abandon 
his  boats  and  beat  a  hasty  retreat  on  Dongola.  By  day- 
light the  place  was  forsaken,  and  the  villagers  were 
easily  persuaded  to  bring  over  the  boats  to  the  Sirdar. 
He  at  once  commenced  crossing  the  river  \\ath  his 
whole  force,  and  it  is  evidence  of  the  efficient  methods 
of  the  Egyptian  army  that  by  means  of  only  two  small 
steamers  and  fifty  captured  boats  14,000  men,  24  guns, 
3000  horses,  mules  and  camels,  and  five  days'  supplies 
for  all  concerned  were  ferried  across  a  wide  and  rapid 
river  in  thirty  hours,  with  only  one  casualty — a  lamed 
horse.  Yet  there  were  no  special  landing  facilities  on 
either  bank,  and  the  animals  had  to  be  lifted  b}^  men 
into  boats,  their  legs  tied  together  to  prevent  kicking. 
It  is  by  similar  feats  over  material  obstacles  that  an 
organising  brain  gains  victories  for  its  side — victories 
which  perhaps  only  the  student  of  military  history 
recognises  and  admires. 


i68  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

The  remainder  of  this  year's  campaign  (1896)  can 
be  related  in  a  few  words.  Having  got  the  Dervishes 
fairly  on  the  run  and  obtained  naval  command  of  a 
clear  waterway  at  either  high  or  low  Nile,  the  Sirdar 
pressed  his  advantage  without  hesitation.  Even  before 
the  troops  had  all  crossed,  the  leading  brigades  were 
heading  for  Dongola  which  the  gunboats  had  busily 
bombarded. 

Would  Bishara  stand  and  fight  ?  was  the  question 
every  man  was  asking  :   and  it  is  certain  that  the  Emir 
himself  was  as   anxious  as  any  one  in  either  force  to 
hazard  a  battle.      Indeed  he  constantly  harassed  the 
Egyptian  outposts  six  miles  from  Dongola  during  their 
halt.     But  Wad  Bishara  was  dealing  with  occurrences 
beyond  his  control  and  with  an  enemy  who  gave  him 
few  openings.     For  on   the  following  morning  at  4.30 
the  Sirdar  was  again  moving  to  the  attack  and,  after 
the  sun  rose    and  Ughted  up  the  level  sands  of  the 
desert,  the  two  armies  were  again  facing  one  another. 
The  Egyptian  force  extended  for  two  miles  across  the 
plain,  a  thin  line  of   marching  men,  strengthened  at 
intervals  by  supports,  followed    by  transport  camels 
and  a  reserve,  with  one  flank  on  the  river  and  the  other 
in    the    desert    protected    by    mounted   troops.     The 
Dervishes,  less  numerous  but  more  imposing,  stood  in 
groups  outside  the   town  hesitating  whether  to  charge 
home  or  take  to  flight.      But   a  nearer  view  of  the 
approaching  battalions,  moving  slowly  and  steadily  in 
disciplined   ranks,   quickened  their   decision,   and   the 
Dervish  force  retreated  southwards  without    firing  a 
shot.     There  was  to  be  no  more  fighting  in  the  Dongola 
province,  for  the  riflemen  retired  round  the   bends  of 
the  river  three  hundred  and  fifty  miles  to  Abu  Hamed, 
whilst  the  horsemen  made  across  the  desert  to  Metemma 
and  Omdurman.     The  Egyptian  army  was  everywhere 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        169 

received  with  enthusiasm  by  the  remnant  of  the  local 
population,  and  agricultural  prosperity  was  restored 
very  soon  after  the  occupation. 

In  England  a  military  success  in  the  Sudan,  after  so 
many  years  of  disappointment  and  failure,  was  hailed 
with  dehght.  Colonel  Sir  Herbert  Kitchener  was 
promoted  a  major-general,  as  were  also  Colonels  Hunter 
and  Rundle,  a  generous  list  of  promotions  and  decora- 
tions bestowed  fitting  rewards  on  the  junior  officers 
who  had  created  a  fighting  force  out  of  unpromising 
material,  and  the  thoughts  of  the  British  nation 
turned  wistfully  to  Khartoum  and  the  half-forgotten 
tale  of  the  abandonment  of  Gordon. 

The  news  carried  to  Omdurman  by  Wad   Bishara 

and  Osman  Azrak  created  an  alarm   which  can  only 

be    explained    on    the    hypothesis    that    these    Emirs 

exaggerated  the  power  of  the  Egyptian  army  in  order 

to  make  out  a  case  for  their  loss  of  a  province.     They 

reported  that  they  had  been  closely  pursued  across  the 

desert   and  that   the  invaders  would    shortly  appear 

before  the  gates  of  the  capital.     The  story  caused  a 

panic  in  the  city  whose  300,000  inhabitants  had  believed 

the  Khalifa  to  be  the  supreme  ruler  of  the  world,  and 

business   came  to  a  standstill.     Hitherto  the  various 

Dervish  armies  had  been  everywhere   successful,  save 

in  their  failure  to  invade  Egypt — a  failure  unknown  to 

the  mass  of  the  people.     They  had  repeatedly  massacred 

thousands  of  Egyptian  soldiers  under  the  Mahdi  :    had 

conquered   Kordofan,  Darfur  and  the  country  beyond 

Fashoda  :    had   three   times   compelled   British   forces 

to  evacuate  the  Sudan  :    and  had  defeated  the  armies 

of  Abyssinia  led  in  person  by  King  John,  whose  head 

was  exposed   in   Omdurman   as   a   trophy  of   \dctory. 

Now  that  the  Abyssinians  had  defeated  the  ItaUans, 

the  Khalifa  was  arranging  an  expedition   to  turn  the 


170  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

latter  out  of  Kassala.  Thus  the  capital  was  wholly 
unprepared  for  anything  in  the  nature  of  a  reverse, 
and  its  population  was  not  of  a  character  to  bear 
a  shock  with  equanimity,  for  the  inhabitants  of 
this  peculiar  town  were  in  no  way  indigenous  to  its 
soil,  but  had  been  collected  from  various  districts  for 
the  glorification  of  the  Baggara  and  as  hostages  for 
the  behaviour  of  distant  provinces.  Whenever  the 
Khalifa  suspected  the  loyalty  of  a  tribe — and  each  was 
in  turn  suspected — his  system  was  to  round  up  a 
number  of  its  chief  families  and  drive  them  to  the 
capital  with  their  portable  property,  to  dwell  under 
his  eye  in  a  suburb  built  by  themselves  and  their 
slaves.  None  could  leave  Omdurman  without  his 
permission,  imder  penalty  of  death. 

In  this  manner  the  city  grew  from  the  hamlet  in 
which  the  Mahdi  first  pitched  his  camp  into  a  huge 
agglomeration  of  solid  houses,  covering  an  immense 
area,  each  quarter  subdivided  into  sections,  tribe  by 
tribe — to  facilitate  control  by  the  central  authority. 
As  the  tribes  from  time  immemorial  had  been  at  feud 
with  one  another,  they  were  unlikely  to  combine  for 
any  common  purpose,  and  by  playing  off  one  against 
the  other  and  occasionally  executing  a  leader,  the 
despot  maintained  a  rough  kind  of  discipline  with 
consummate  ability.  According  to  his  lights  the 
Khalifa  was  undoubtedly  a  ruler  of  men,  who  federated 
a  mass  of  warring  elements  into  a  nation  and  governed 
it  without  a  rival  during  difficult  times.  His  methods, 
though  effective,  were  deplorable,  and  his  despotism 
proved  sterile  ;  but  in  future  years  we  perhaps  shall 
realise  that,  in  spite  of  the  evil  he  wrought,  he  uncon- 
sciously paved  the  way  for  the  higher  standard  of 
government  which  England  is  now  developing  on  the 
Nile. 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        171 

With  characteristic  power  and  an  intuitive  under- 
standing of  the  people  he  addressed,  Abdullahi  stood  up 
in  the  pulpit  of  the  open  mosque  square  to  arrest  the 
panic  and  explain  away  the  news  from  Dongola.  He 
announced  that  his  mighty  armies  would  at  once  be 
recalled  from  distant  provinces  for  the  defence  of  the 
city,  that  the  insolent  invaders  would  be  lured  into  the 
heart  of  the  Sudan  and  wiped  off  the  face  of  the  earth. 
He  had  seen  in  a  dream  the  yellow  plains  of  Kerreri 
whitened  by  their  bones.  Had  not  the  accursed  white 
men  once  before  reached  Metemma,  only  to  be  driven 
back  by  the  chosen  warriors  of  Mohammed  ?  Let  no 
man  doubt  him.  The  intrigues  of  the  discontented 
would  be  punished  with  death  and  the  faithful  would 
live  for  ever  in  God. 

His  words  were  received  with  a  shout  of  triumph, 
and  thus  by  the  mere  weight  of  his  personality  he 
overawed  the  timid,  encouraged  the  fanatical  and 
restored  his  own  prestige.  Moreover  he  hit  upon  a  plan 
of  campaign  which  was  probably  the  best  under  the 
circumstances,  though  other  bones  than  those  of  his 
enemy  were  destined  to  whiten  the  plains  of  Kerreri, 
near  Omdurman. 

Accordingly  he  recalled  Mahmud  and  his  14,000 
men  from  Darfur  and  sent  them  to  Metemma  ;  by 
degees  he  concentrated  at  the  capital  various  forces 
from  outlying  districts  until  his  army  numbered  nearly 
80,000  men,  mostly  Sudanese  blacks  commanded  by 
Baggara  arabs ;  he  strengthened  Abu  Hamed  and 
Berber  by  small  contingents,  and  ordered  local  levies 
to  be  added  to  their  garrisons  ;  he  commanded  Osman 
Digna  and  his  Suakin  adherents  to  concentrate  at 
Adarama  on  the  Atbara  River.  These  plans  and  move- 
ments took  several  months  to  carry  out  and  were 
meanwhile  duly  reported  to  the  Sirdar  by  the  agents 


172  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

of  his  sleepless  intelligence  department.  Our  infantry 
garrisons  and  gunboats  in  tlie  newly  acquired  Dongola 
province  were  kept  alert  by  frequent  rumours  of 
impending  attacks,  and  the  cavalry  and  camel-corps 
ceaselessly  patrolled  the  wells  of  the  surrounding 
deserts.  During  this  lull  in  the  operations  the  rail- 
way was  extended  to  Kerma  which  it  reached  in  April 
1897,  and  another  line  was  boldly  projected  across 
233  miles  of  desert  from  Wadi  Haifa  towards  Abu 
Hamed,  held  by  a  Dervish  garrison  under  Mohamed-el- 
Zain. 

When  the  Sirdar,  on  his  own  responsibility,  deter- 
mined to  construct  this  desert  line,  he  made  a  decision 
on  which  the  future  success  or  failure  of  the  campaign 
mainly  depended,  and  the  reader  is  invited  to  study 
the  map  facing  page  238  in  order  that  he  may  realise 
the  nature  of  the  problem  and  the  reasons  which  in- 
duced Kitchener  to  adopt  a  plan  which  others  openly 
condemned.  Subsequent  events  have  proved  the 
soundness  of  his  judgment,  but,  at  the  time,  experts 
both  at  home  and  on  the  spot  had  no  hesitation  in 
denouncing  the  desert  railway  as  the  scheme  of  a 
lunatic.  As  an  alternative,  they  suggested  one  of 
three  lines  of  advance  for  the  Egyptian  army,  each 
necessitating  a  railway  and  each  designed  to  establish 
our  force  on  a  navigable  reach  of  the  Nile  between  Abu 
Hamed  and  Khartoum.  Of  these  the  most  popular 
and  expensive  was  the  line  from  Suakim  to  Berber. 
That  it  would  take  many  years  to  build  in  no  way 
daunted  its  ardent  advocates,  who  were  doubtless 
thinking  more  of  future  dividends  than  of  immediate 
military  necessities.  Next  in  importance  were  those 
who  favoured  the  theory  of  linking  up  all  the  navigable 
reaches  of  the  river  by  railways  round  the  cataracts, 
and  wanted  a  railway  from  Merawi   to  Abu  Hamed. 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        173 

The  third  alternative  was  a  hne  from  Korti  to  Metemma 
across  the  Bayuda  desert.  But  Kitchener  considered 
that  the  advocates  of  these  and  other  Unes  miscalcu- 
lated the  essential  difficulties  of  building  railways 
within  striking  distance  of  an  enemy  and  the  time 
required  for  the  work.  No  railway  could  be  built  until 
its  proposed  terminus  was  held  by  an  Egyptian  garrison 
and  its  whole  length  protected  by  adequate  forces. 
Construction  trains  on  a  single  line  cannot  carry  the 
supplies  of  an  army  as  well  as  masses  of  railway  plant  ; 
and  large  forces  cannot  subsist  in  deserts  on  camel 
transport.  In  fact  it  was  not  possible  to  construct 
the  railway  without  a  large  force  or  to  advance  a  large 
force  \^ithout  a  railway,  and  it  was  because  the  Sirdar 
understood  this  simple  proposition  that  he  selected  a 
Hne  which  obviated  both  difficulties. 

Between  Wadi  Haifa  and  Abu  Hamed  the  Nile  makes 
an  enormous  bend  and  struggles  through  two  long 
series  of  cataracts.  Sir  Herbert  Kitchener  therefore 
decided  on  a  line  of  advance  which  would  cut  across 
this  bend,  as  the  string  cuts  the  arc  of  a  bow,  and  would 
also  permit  of  the  main  portion  of  his  railway  being 
completed  at  a  safe  distance  from  the  enemy's  raiding 
parties.  No  defending  force  would  be  required  to 
guard  the  line ;  Abu  Hamed,  the  terminus,  was  within 
striking  distance  of  the  Egyptian  army  at  Merawi  and 
withal  too  distant  from  the  main  Dervish  posts  to  be 
quickly  reinforced.  The  opponents  of  this  scheme 
declared  that  only  a  madman  could  propose  to  supply 
water  by  train  to  2000  plate-layers  in  mid-desert,  and 
that  the  further  the  railway  advanced,  the  more 
impossible  would  the  task  become.  But  the  problem 
depended  on  just  the  kind  of  calculation  in  which 
Kitchener  excelled.  He  worked  out  the  figures  to  his 
own  satisfaction,  and,  in  spite  of  remonstrance,  started 


174  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

construction  at  Wadi  Haifa  in  January  1897,  so  as 
to  be  ready  to  move  at  the  rise  of  the  Nile.  It  was  a 
daring  resolve,  daringly  carried  out  and  amply  justified 
by  results. 

Whilst  construction  was  in  progress  and  the  Nile 
stood  at  its  lowest,  a  pause  occurred  in  the  prosecution 
of  the  campaign,  and  both  sides  had  ample  time  to 
prepare  for  the  eventual  struggle.  Meanwhile  the 
tribes  and  numerous  tribelets  which  unfortunately 
dwelt  between  the  opposing  armies  suffered  every 
hardship  which  Dervish  malignity  could  inflict,  and 
the  Jaalin  Arabs — who  boast  a  descent  direct  from  the 
Prophet  Mohamed — were  massacred,  man,  woman 
and  child,  to  the  number  of  3000,  merely  because  they 
favoured  the  invaders.  This  butchery  occurred  at 
Metemma  in  July  and  was  the  work  of  Mahmud's 
army,  by  direct  order  of  the  tyrant  of  Omdurman. 
Similar  methods,  on  a  smaller  scale,  were  practised 
by  Mohamed-el-Zain,  the  Baggara  chief  of  Abu 
Hamed,  against  the  dwellers  in  the  cataracts  between 
himself  and  our  Merawi  garrison,  and  his  horsemen  on 
one  occasion  cut  off  the  rear-guard  of  an  Egyptian 
patrol,  wounding  the  British  bimbashi  and  killing 
fourteen  of  his  men. 

But  Mohamed-el-Zain' s  day  of  reckoning  was  at 
hand — for  the  railway  at  last  reached  to  within 
100  miles  of  his  post,  the  Nile  was  rising  in  the 
cataracts  and  the  moment  for  a  blow  was  approaching. 
The  task  of  capturing  Abu  Hamed  was  entrusted  to 
Major-General  Hunter  and  a  brigade  of  all  arms,  con- 
sisting of  twenty-five  picked  cavalry  scouts,  a  battery 
of  small  guns,  four  battalions  of  infantry  and  1314 
transport  camels — in  all  2500  combatants  with  eighteen 
days'  supplies.  The  little  force  was  inspected  by  the 
Sirdar  on  July  28,  on  the  bank  of  the  Nile  opposite 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        175 

Merawi  and  began  its  forced  march  the  following  day, 
under  the  greatest  secrecy.* 

The  problem  confronting  Hunter  was  to  defeat 
Mohamed-el-Zain  before  he  could  be  reinforced,  and 
to  hold  Abu  Hamed  against  future  attacks.  The  dis- 
tance to  be  covered  was  145  miles  through  difficult 
and  unknown  country,  and  rapidity  of  movement  was 
essential  to  success.  The  risk  to  his  detached  force 
lay  in  the  possibility  that  the  700  Dervishes  at  Abu 
Hamed  might  be  reinforced  by  others  from  Berber 
(1200  men)  or  Metemma  (10,000  men)  of  whom  the 
latter,  by  merely  floating  down  the  Nile  in  boats,  could 
reach  Abu  Hamed  ten  days  after  Hunter's  departure 
from  Merawi.  Moreover  Hunter's  column  once 
launched  could  not  be  reinforced,  owing  to  the  difficulty 
of  camel  transport  by  land  and  the  impossibility  of 
hauling  gunboats  up  cataracts  in  the  face  of  an  enemy. 
To  mislead  the  Dervishes  a  strong  patrol  was  despatched 
to  Abu  Klea  wells  whence  rumours  were  spread  that  an 
advance  on  Metemma  was  imminent .  But  a  Dervish  spy 
had,  of  course,  seen  Hunter's  column  start,  and  a  swift 
camel  soon  carried  the  news  to  the  Baggara  chiefs. 

There  was  thus  an  element  of  romance  and  un- 
certainty in  the  enterprise  undertaken  by  the  fljang 
column,  and  as  all  ranks  in  Dongola  were  acquainted 
with  the  situation  and  knew  that  the  force  was  cut 
off  from  assistance,  news  of  its  progress  was  awaited 
with  interest.  The  men  composing  it  had  implicit 
faith  in  the  ability  of  their  general  whose  rapid 
promotion  had  been  earned  in  their  midst,  and  bore 
with  cheerful  fortitude  long  and  trying  nights  of 
marching  and  days  of  broken  sleep  under  a  pitiless  sun. 
For  eight  and  a  half  consecutive  days  the  force 
averaged  seventeen  miles   across  desolate  rock-strewn 

*  See  map  facing  page  238. 


176  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

country,  by  tracks  which  cut  short  the  bends  of  the 
Nile  in  its  struggle  through  the  Monasir  cataracts. 
As  the  route  had  not  been  reconnoitred  this  work 
was  undertaken  by  a  bimbashi  who  rode  forward 
with  the  cavalry  scouts  to  select  halting-places  by 
the  river's  edge.  After  leaving  the  fertile  fields  of 
Dongola  one  is  struck  by  the  absolute  nakedness  of  the 
Monasir  hills.  The  land  possesses  not  even  a  thin 
streak  of  vegetation  and,  looked  at  from  a  height,  has 
the  appearance  of  a  stormy  ocean  suddenly  petrified 
into  solid,  red  trap-rock  and  left  to  bake  for  centuries 
in  the  sun — a  wilderness  of  volcanic  hillocks,  rising  in 
rugged  ridges  hundreds  of  feet  above  the  river.  The 
inhabitants  are  few,  and  those  few  have  a  bearing  as 
sullen  as  the  aspect  of  their  home,  to  which  no  man 
travels  except  his  business  be  war.  The  Nile  alone 
has  a  smiling  surface  as  it  dances  along  its  numerous 
channels  amidst  water- worn  boulders. 

To  march  a  column  impeded  by  laden  camels  night 
after  night  through  such  a  country  required  endurance, 
discipline  and  enthusiasm  on  the  part  of  all  concerned, 
yet  so  well  did  the  troops  respond  to  the  test  that  their 
rate  of  marching  brought  them  before  Abu  Hamed  a 
day  ahead  of  the  programme. 

By  the  morning  of  August  6,  Ginnifab,  eighteen  miles 
from  Abu  Hamed,  was  occupied  without  opposition, 
but  news  had  reached  Hunter  that  Dervish  reinforce- 
ments from  both  Berber  and  Metemma  were  on  the 
move  and  might  possibly  reach  Abu  Hamed  that  night. 
Moreover  it  was  discovered  that  a  Monasir  Arab  had 
accompanied  our  column  from  Merawi  and  had  fre- 
quently sent  villagers  of  his  tribe  to  warn  Mohamed- 
el-Zain  of  our  approach.  Hunter  accordingly  decided 
to  push  forward  that  night  to  some  point  within  striking 
distance  of  the  town  and  make  a   fortified  zariba  for 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK       177 

his  impedimenta.  Starting  before  sundown,  the  force 
marched  throughout  the  night,  and  at  4  a.m.  halted  by 
the  river  a  mile  and  a  half  from  Abu  Hamed,  whose 
look-out  tower  was  just  visible  against  the  starlit  sky. 
As  soon  as  the  weary  transport  came  up  a  strong 
parapet  was  constructed  of  sacks  of  forage,  biscuits, 
camel-saddles  and  baggage,  and  manned  by  half  a 
battalion  of  infantry,  two  machine  guns  and  all  the 
servants,  camel-men  and  followers — under  a  bimbashi. 

Within  this  little  fort  the  mass  of  camels  were 
made  to  sit  down,  closely  packed,  with  their  forelegs 
lashed  to  prevent  a  stampede  when  firing  commenced. 
Having  thus  secured  his  supplies  and  got  rid  of  his 
baggage,  Hunter  paraded  in  light  order  and  marched 
out  to  fight  with  2200  men. 

Much  valuable  time  had  been  consumed  by  the 
construction  of  the  defensive  post,  and  it  was  daylight 
by  the  time  we  reached  the  plateau  near  Abu  Hamed. 
Two  Dervishes  perched  on  the  watch-tower  calmly 
surveyed  our  proceedings.  No  other  inhabitant  was 
visible,  and  the  town  itself  lay  tucked  along  the 
river's  bank  so  close  to  the  steep  slope  of  the  over- 
hanging plateau  that  nothing  could  be  seen  of  it.  A 
couple  of  circular  forts  were  found  empty  by  the  cavalry 
scouts — who,  accompanied  by  three  staff  officers,  rode 
well  in  advance  of  the  infantry.  As  they  neared  the 
watch-tower  the  two  Dervishes  sullenly  climbed  down 
and  disappeared  with  calm  deliberation  from  the 
plateau,  whose  crest  lay  just  beyond.  Their  place  was 
taken  by  an  eager  bimbashi,  who  climbed  to  the  top 
and  obtained  a  clear  view  of  the  town  which  was  so  soon 
to  be  assaulted.  It  straggled  for  nearly  a  mile  along 
the  Nile,  and  was  silent  and  apparently  deserted  as  he 
gazed  upon  its  walls  and  flat  roofs.  Across  the  wide 
river  lay  the  green,  fertile    island  of  Mograt,  whose 

M 


178  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

inhabitants  were  commencing  their  morning  work — as 
though  no  disturbing  element  could  interrupt  their 
labours.  Overhead  coveys  of  sand-grouse  chirped  in 
alarm,  but  the  Dervishes  lay  low,  silent  and  invisible. 

As  soon  as  Hunter  had  considered  the  reports 
of  his  staff  he  deployed  the  whole  force  on  the 
plateau,  facing  towards  the  town  and  river,  but  with 
the  left  thrown  shghtly  back.  The  loth  Sudanese 
under  Brevet  Major  Sidney  held  the  more  exposed  left 
flank,  with  the  gth  Sudanese  next  them  ;  the  battery 
was  in  the  middle,  half  the  3rd  Egyptians  on  the  right 
of  the  guns  and  the  nth  Sudanese  on  the  extreme  right 
with  its  flank  on  the  river.  The  infantry  brigade  was 
commanded  by  MacDonald. 

At  6.30  A.M.  our  guns  broke  silence  and  under 
cover  of  their  fire  the  infantry  advanced  to  the  crest 
of  the  plateau,  halted,  fixed  bayonets  and  awaited 
orders,  overlooking  the  houses.  The  battery  then  took 
ground  to  the  right  to  enfilade  the  walls.  Our  shells  were 
now  bursting  in  the  houses,  but  still  the  enemy  made 
no  sign.  Only  some  affrighted  hens  cackled  in  panic  on 
the  roof-tops.  To  those  unacquainted  with  Dervish 
tactics  the  place  might  seem  untenanted.  The  pause 
enabled  officers  to  examine  their  objective.  Then  the 
advance  sounded  and  the  force  moved  down  the  slope 
and  was  at  once  received  by  an  outburst  of  rifle  fire 
from  concealed  trenches  and  loopholed  houses.  This 
was  the  Dervish  surprise  on  which  they  had  expended 
much  cunning.  Hunter  rode  ahead  of  the  advancing 
line  amid  a  hail  of  bullets,  and  the  men  dropped  fast, 
especially  on  the  left  flank.  Here  the  loth  Sudanese, 
in  a  few  moments,  had  their  commanding  officer  and  a 
bimbashi  shot  dead  and  a  number  of  men  killed  and 
wounded.  The  fire  at  short  range  was  so  galling  to  our 
infantry  on  the  exposed  slope  that  Hunter  resolved  to 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK       179 

rush  the  place  and  bring  the  matter  to  an  immediate 
issue.  He  accordingly  directed  the  maxims  to  en- 
filade the  enemy's  firing  line  and  then  sounded  the 
advance  and  the  double.  Exasperated  at  the  loss 
of  their  beloved  ofiicers  and  eager^  as  always,  for 
a  hand-to-hand  fight,  the  blacks  rushed  down-hill 
upon  the  trenches,  regardless  of  the  hot  fire  which 
thinned  their  ranks,  and  bayoneted  or  shot  every 
Baggara  who  stood  to  his  post.  Passing  over  their 
bodies,  they  stormed  the  walls,  swarmed  into  the  town 
and  dispersed  through  its  narrow  streets  and  alleys, 
clearing  the  enemy  out  of  houses  and  courtyards  as  they 
proceeded.  By  7.30  the  place  was  in  our  possession, 
after  an  hour's  warm  work.  But  a  few  desperate  men 
still  held  out,  killing  all  who  approached  them  and 
refusing  on  any  condition  to  surrender.  In  one  house 
nine  such  fanatics  defended  themselves  till  the  afternoon 
and  were  only  quieted  by  having  the  building  blown 
to  pieces  by  shells  at  close  range. 

The  Egyptian  casualties  were  two  British  ofiicers 
killed — Major  Sidney  and  Lieutenant  FitzClarence — 
and  24  men  killed  and  64  wounded,  of  whom  21  died 
in  the  night.  Among  the  Dervish  garrison  the  loss  was 
heavier,  as  must  generally  happen  with  the  beaten  side. 
Over  400  were  either  killed  or  too  severely  wounded  to 
escape,  and  152  unwounded  prisoners  were  captured, 
including  Mohamed-el-Zain  and  other  chiefs.  The 
Baggara  horse  and  remnants  of  the  riflemen  fled  to- 
wards Berber  along  the  Nile  and,  meeting  reinforce- 
ments some  twenty  miles  from  the  scene  of  action, 
spread  news  of  the  disaster  and  arrested  the  advance  of 
their  friends.  At  Abu  Hamed  the  local  tribesmen  who 
had  fought  for  our  enemy  swam  the  river  under  a  hail 
of  bullets,  and  dispersed  themselves  discreetly  amongst 
the    peaceful    inhabitants    of    Mograt    island.     Mean- 


i8o  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

while  our  infantry,  tired  by  perpetual  night  marching, 
was  not  required  to  pursue — because  it  would  have  been 
detrimental  to  the  Sirdar's  plan  of  campaign  to  send 
detachments  beyond  Abu  Hamed  before  the  railway 
reached  it.  Hunter,  therefore,  established  his  out- 
posts along  a  ridge  of  hills  to  the  south,  brought  up 
his  supplies  from  their  temporary  zariba,  quartered 
his  battalions  in  the  larger  houses  of  the  town,  gave 
them  six  hours  in  which  to  work  off  arrears  of  sleep 
and  proceeded  to  fortify  and  entrench  against  attack 
from  the  south. 

Next  day  all  the  empty  camels  and  mules  were 
despatched  to  the  base  near  Merawi  for  further  provi- 
sions, together  with  the  Dervish  prisoners  and  our 
sick  and  wounded — for  the  problem  of  feeding  the  Abu 
Hamed  brigade  taxed  the  Sirdar's  slender  resources 
to  the  utmost.  From  Korosko  in  Egypt,  from  Rail- 
head in  mid-desert,  from  the  Dongola  Province,  strings 
of  laden  camels  were  directed  on  Abu  Hamed,  each 
animal  bearing  its  maximum  load  of  360  lb.,  of  which 
half  consisted  of  the  forage  it  would  consume  on  the 
journey.  Thus  each  camel  which  survived  the  long 
marches  deposited  one  i8o-lb.  sack  of  food-stuff  at  Abu 
Hamed,  as  a  contribution  towards  the  total  of  15,000 
lb.  of  grain  required  by  Hunter's  column  every  day. 
And  the  reader  will  perceive,  through  a  simple  calcula- 
tion, how  difficult  it  was  to  ration  one  brigade  by 
camel-transport  even  when  it  was  not  raided,  and 
how  impossible  would  have  been  the  task  of  supplying 
several  brigades  across  the  southern  deserts,  where 
convoys  would  certainly  have  been  ambushed  by 
mounted  Dervishes. 

The  news  of  Hunter's  victory  was  conveyed  by 
swift  riders  to  the  Sirdar  ;  railway  construction  was 
energetically  resumed  in  mid-desert ;  the  laden  camels 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK        i8i 

started  on  their  weary  journeys  ;  and  the  gunboats 
and  saiHng-boats  forthwith  commenced  to  ascend  the 
forbidding  cataracts  which  had  never  before  been 
surmounted  by  such  craft.  Whilst  bustle  and  stren- 
uous work  were  the  order  of  the  day  along  two  busy 
hues  of  communication,  the  scene  of  interest  was 
moving  from  the  Dongola  to  the  Berber  Province, 
the  base  of  operations  was  shifting  from  Merawi  to  Wadi 
Haifa,  and  Dongola  was  henceforward  relegated  to  a 
mere  siding  on  the  lines  of  communication. 

The  step  forward  to  Abu  Hamed,  timed  as  it  was 
to  coincide  with  the  Nile's  full  flood,  ought  to  have 
been  followed  by  a  halt  in  the  operations— whilst  the 
railway  and  the  cataracts  received  attention.  But 
events  moved  too  fast  for  a  pohcy  of  calculated  pro- 
gression, and  Kitchener  was  compelled  to  occupy 
the  town  of  Berber  and  hold  150  additional  miles 
of  the  Nile,  within  a  month  of  the  battle  of  Abu 
Hamed  and  many  months  before  he  was  prepared  for 
such  a  responsibihty.  War  has  its  surprises  in  the 
Sudan  as  elsewhere.  The  Dongola  campaign  of  1896, 
starting  at  a  moment's  notice  and  without  forethought,' 
surprised  us  with  its  floods  of  rain  and  epidemic  of 
cholera ;  but  the  Berber  campaign  of  1897 — undertaken 
with  studied  care  and  a  determined  preference  for 
caution— astonished  us  by  the  dangerous  rapidity  of 
its  success. 

As  soon  as  Hunter  had  prepared  Abu  Hamed  for 
defence,  he  sent  forward  a  contingent  of  friendly 
Ababda  Arabs  on  camels,  to  reconnoitre  and  report. 
They  proceeded  through  a  disturbed  country,  spread- 
ing rumours  that  they  were  merely  the  advanced- 
guard  of  an  immense  force.  Under  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances the  falseness  of  such  reports  would  have 
been  discovered  by  the  enemy  and  the  Arabs  would 


i82  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

have  been  promptly  ambushed  and  killed.  But  Zaki 
Osman,  the  Dervish  Emir,  incensed  because  neither 
the  Khalifa  nor  Mahmud  would  send  him  sub- 
stantial reinforcements,  abandoned  Berber  in  dis- 
gust, and  marched  away  south,  leaving  chaos  and 
consternation  amongst  the  tribes  of  the  place.  Our 
Arabs  met  one  Dervish  patrol  which  they  defeated  ; 
then  marched  on  boldly  to  the  city,  and  took  formal 
possession  of  its  grain-store  in  the  name  of  the  Sirdar. 
Abu  Hamed  had  been  captured  on  August  7.  On 
September  2,  Hunter  telegraphed  to  Kitchener  the 
astonishing  news  that  Berber  also  had  fallen  ;  was  he 
to  occupy  it  or  not  ? 

Rarely  in  Lord  Kitchener's  eventful  life  has  he  been 
asked  a  question  more  difficult  to  answer  or  one  re- 
quiring a  more  immediate  and  definite  reply. 

At  that  date  Berber  and  the  mouth  of  the  Atbara 
constituted  the  most  important  strategic  position  in 
the  Sudan — distant  only  seventy-five  miles  from 
Metemma  and  Mahmud's  pov/erful  army.  To  occupy 
and  hold  it  in  strength  was  therefore  the  most  desirable 
of  all  military  events.  But  to  occupy  it  with  a  weak 
force,  dependent  upon  insecure  communications,  meant 
surrendering  the  initiative  of  the  whole  campaign  to 
the  enemy,  and  none  knew  better  than  Kitchener  the 
value  of  retaining  in  his  own  hands  the  power  of 
the  initiative — the  secret  of  military  success.  If  the 
Khalifa,  or  Mahmud  or  even  Osman  Digna  (who,  with 
2000  men,  occupied  Adarama  on  the  Atbara,  should 
elect  to  attack  Berber  with  vigour  or  cut  it  off  from 
the  north,  the  chances  of  holding  it  w^ould  be  small, 
and  the  campaign  would  assume  very  unpleasant 
proportions.  During  twelve  hours  Kitchener  weighed 
all  the  consequences,  decided  in  favour  of  the  bolder 
course,     telegraphed     Hunter    to  occupy  Berber  and 


THE  EGYPTIAN  ARMY  AT  WORK       183 

himself  rode  there  direct  from  Merawi  to  Berber  with  a 
small  escort  by  the  shortest  route — 170  miles  across 
the  Bayuda  Desert. 

Meanwhile  Hunter  at  Abu  Hamed  lost  no  time— 
for  a  game  of  bluff,  to  be  successful,  must  be  played 
without  hesitation.  He  put  350  men  of  the  9th 
Sudanese  on  the  four  available  gunboats  and  disem- 
barked them  at  Berber  in  two  days'  time.  He  then 
sent  on  the  gunboats  to  shell  and  harass  Zaki  Osman's 
retiring  force,  and  to  create  a  general  impression  of  our 
strength  amongst  the  riparian  tribes  as  far  as  Metemma. 
These  measures  had  the  effect  of  gaining  time,  just 
when  time  was  of  infinite  value  to  the  Egyptian  army, 
scattered  along  a  front  of  300  miles  from  Dongola 
to  Berber. 

If  during  September,  October  or  November 
Mahmud's  Dervishes  had  attacked  in  force  they  would 
certainly  have  captured  Berber  and  would  probably 
have  annihilated  its  weak  garrison.  But  the  Khalifa 
who  was  essentially  a  civihan,  obstinately  refused  to 
permit  Mahmud  to  attack.  He  remained  convinced  that 
the  Sirdar  and  his  infidel  band  would  advance  against 
Omdurman  before  the  Nile  fell,  and  was  determined 
to  concentrate  and  husband  the  whole  of  his  strength 
in  order  to  deal  it  a  crushing  blow  near  his  city 
walls.  He  therefore  ordered  Osman  Digna  back  to 
Shendi  and  redoubled  his  efforts  to  increase  the  Omdur- 
man army  by  new  levies.  He  collected  stores  of  grain 
from  distant  provinces,  built  forts  and  additional  walls 
round  the  city  and  rejected  the  advice  of  the  fighting 
Emirs  who  counselled  a  policy  of  attack.  He  thus 
failed  to  profit  by  the  initiative  which  had  been  tem- 
porarily surrendered  to  him  and  the  golden  oppor- 
tunity was  lost. 

By  January  1898,  Berber  and  the  Atbara  fort  were 


i84  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

sufficiently  garrisoned  to  withstand  a  siege  ;  the  road 
from  Suakin  was  open  ;  the  Eastern  Sudan — reUeved 
from  the  disturbing  influence  of  Osman  Digna — was 
incHned  for  peace  ;  the  railway,  completed  to  Abu 
Hamed,  was  steadily  advancing  towards  the  Atbara  ; 
an  Egyptian  garrison  had  relieved  the  Italian  force 
at  Kassala  and  was  in  touch  with  the  Abyssinian 
frontier  ;  our  flotilla  of  gunboats  patrolled  the  Nile 
to  the  Shabluka  cataract,  occasionally  engaging  the 
Metemma  forts  and  keeping  an  ever-watchful  eye  upon 
Mahmud's  army. 

Thus  far  the  reconquest  of  the  Sudan  had  been 
accomplished  by  Egypt  and  her  reorganised  army, 
unaided  by  British  troops.*  Under  the  guidance  of 
Kitchener  and  his  officers,  amongst  whom  Vandeleur 
was  a  bimbashi  in  the  gth  Sudanese,  much  had  been 
done  ;  but  it  was  obvious  to  all  concerned  that  the 
Khalifa's  policy  of  concentration  at  Omdurman  would 
compel  England  to  despatch  reinforcements  for  the 
final  overthrow  of  the  great  Dervish  army  :  and  the 
question  which  engaged  our  thoughts  was,  would  the 
British  troops  be  placed  under  the  Sirdar's  command  ? 
or  would  he  and  his  army  fight  under  a  senior  general 
from  Pall  Mall  ? 

*  The  British  battalion  which  marched  to  Hafir  and  Dongola  had 
immediately  returned  to  Egypt. 


A    SOLUIEK   OF  THE   yiH    SUDANESE 


CHAPTER  VIII 

ON  THE  ATBARA,  APRIL  1898. 

See  maps  facing  pages  208  and  238 

The  following  table  shows  the  distribution  of  the  troops 
in  December  1897  and  January  1898  and  illustrates 
the  facility  for  concentration  conferred  by  the  Desert 
Railway,  without  which  this  campaign  could  not  have 
taken  place. 

Place.  December  1897.  January  1898. 

^  J  Battalion  Infantry  i  Squadron  Cavalry  (Bimbashi  Le 
4  Gunboats  Gallais) 

2  Companies  Camel  Corps  (Bim- 
bashi King) 

2nd  Battery  Artillery  (Bimbashi 
Peak) 

3rd  Egyptian  Battalion  (Sillem 
Bey) 

4th  Egyptian  Battalion  (Sparks 
Bey) 

7  th  Egyptian  Battalion  (Fathy 
Bey) 

15th  Egyptian  Battahon  (Hick- 
man Bey) 

4  Gunboats  (Commander  Keppel) 

2     Companies    Camel     2  Squadrons  Cavalry  (Broadwood 


Fort 
Atbara 


Berber 


Corps 
I  Battery  Artillery 
4^    Battalions    Infan- 
try 
I  Gunboat 


Bey) 

4th    Battery    Artillery    (Bimbashi 

Lawrie) 
5th  Batter}^  Artillery  (Bimbashi  de 

Rougemont) 
IXth  Sudanese  Battalion  (Walter 
i-  Bey) 
Xth    Sudanese    Battalion    (Nason 

Bey) 


i86 


SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 


Place. 


Berber 

{Cont.) 


December  1897. 


Suakin 


Kassala 


Between 
Berber 

and  Abu 
Hamed 


Detachment  Garrison 

Artillery 
I     Company    Camel 

Corps 
2^  Battalions  Infantry 

Nil 


January  1898. 

Xlth  Sudanese  Battalion  (Jackson 

Bey) 
Xllth  Sudanese  Battalion  (Town- 

shend  Bey) 
Xlllth  Sudanese  Battalion  (CoUin- 

son  Bey) 
XlVth  Sudanese  Battalion  (Shekle- 

ton  Bey) 
I  Gunboat 

Half    5th    Egyptian    Battalion    (a 
native  officer) 


I  Company  Camel  Corps  (native 
officer) 

1 6th  Egyptian  Battalion  (Nichol- 
son Bey) 

Arab  Battalion  (lately  Italian) 


3^  Battalions  Infantry     ist  Egyptian  Battalion  (Heygate 

Bey) 
2nd  Egyptian  Battalion  (Pink  Bey) 
Half  5th  Egyptian  Battalion  (Bor- 

han  Bey) 
8th   Egyptian   Battalion    (Kalussi 

Bey) 


Railhead 

at  Dekeish 
(20  miles 
South  of 

Abu 
Hamed) 


(Nil 


Wadi 
Haifa 


{■ 


Battalion  Infantry 


Dongola 
Province 


8  Squadrons  Cavalry 

5  Companies    Camel 
Corps 

3  Batteries  Artillery 

6  Battalions  Infantry 
Detachments  Garrison 

Artillery 
3  Gunboats 


Advance  parties  of  Royal  War- 
wickshire, Lincolnshire,  and 
Cameron  Highlanders,  under 
Major  Simpson 

I  Battery  Egyptian  Horse  Artil- 
lery (Bimbashi  Young) 

4  Squadrons  Egyptian  Cavalry 
(Bimbashi  Mahon) 

1 8th  Egyptian  Battalion  (Matchett 
Bey) 

I  Squadron  Cavalry  (depot) 

5  Companies  Camel  Corps  (Tud- 
way  Bey) 

3rd  Battery  Artillery  (Bimbashi 
Stewart) 

6th  Egyptian  Battalion  (a  native 
Bey) 

17th  Egyptian  Battalion  (Bun- 
bury  Bey) 


ON  THE  ATBARA,  APRIL  1898 


187 


Place. 

Dongola  ( 
Province  1 


December  1897. 


Nil 


Between 
Railhead  -{ 
and  Cairo 


Cairo    «( 


ist  Battery  Egyptian 
Horse  Artillery 

2  Battalions  Egyptian 

Infantry     (being 
raised) 

3  Battalions    British 
Infantry 

I     Regiment     British 

Cavalry 
I  Battery  R.F.A. 


January  1898. 

Detachments     Garrison     Artillery 

(Egyptian) 
3  Gunboats 

ist     Batt.     Royal     Warwickshire 

Regiment     (Lieut. -Col.     Quayle 

Jones) 
ist   Batt.    Lincolnshire   Regiment 

(Colonel  Verner) 
ist    Batt.    Cameron     Highlanders 

(Colonel  ]Money) 

2 ist  Lancers  (Colonel  Martin) 
5th  Fusihers  (from  Gibraltar) 
20th    Lancashire    Fusiliers    (from 

Quetta) 
87th   Royal   Irish   Fusiliers   (from 

Burmah) 
ist    Batt.     Seaforth    Highlanders 

(from  Malta) 
32nd  Battery  R.F.A. 


Whilst  the  thoughts  of  those  who  interest  themselves 
in  the  continued  progress  of  the  British  Empire  were 
directed  towards  Omdurman,  its  Dervish  army  and 
Kitchener's  scattered  garrisons  ;  and  whilst  the  Military 
Clubs  in  London  were  still  busily  speculating  on  the 
name  of  the  particular  general  who  might  command  in 
the  field,  reports  were  reaching  the  Sirdar  that  the 
Khalifa  was  on  the  move.  He  had  marshalled  his 
host  outside  the  walls  of  his  city  and  was  marching 
north  in  great  strength — determined  to  attack  us  in 
Berber.  This  information  came  through  such  reliable 
channels  that  it  could  not  be  disbelieved,  however 
unlikely  it  might  seem,  and  in  fact  the  Dervish  army 
did  set  forth  from  Omdurman  one  day  in  January 
under  the  personal  command  of  the  Khalifa.  Kitchener 
at  once  concentrated  the  Egyptian  army  in  the  Berber 
Province,  by  moving  the  Dongola  garrisons  back  to 
Wadi  Haifa  and  forward  to  Abu  Hamed  by  train,  as 


i88  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

shown  in  the  table  above.  He  telegraphed  to  Lord 
Cromer  for  the  loan  of  one  brigade  of  British  infantry 
as  reinforcement,  and  ordered  an  entrenched  camp  to 
be  constructed  at  the  gunboat  depot  near  the  mouth  of 
the  Atbara  River.  These  necessary  precautions  were 
most  inconvenient  both  to  the  engineer  subalterns 
engaged  on  railway  construction  and  to  the  inadequate 
camel-transport,  employed  at  several  small  cataracts 
which  made  their  unwelcome  appearance  between  Abu 
Hamed  and  Berber  as  the  Nile  fell. 

Meanwhile  the  Khalifa's  march  northwards  came 
to  a  halt.  Difficulties  of  transport  and  of  food-supply 
confronted  him  at  the  outset.  Neither  he  nor  any 
other  man  can  improvise  supply  and  transport  services 
at  a  moment's  notice.  Moreover,  he  began  to  perceive 
that  he  was  not  quite  soldier  enough  to  conduct  a  great 
military  enterprise  to  success.  He  therefore  hesitated, 
called  together  a  council  of  war,  mistrusted  its  advice 
but  yet  feared  to  delegate  to  any  of  the  fighting  Emirs 
the  command  of  his  precious  troops.  Finally  he  moved 
the  army  back  to  Omdurman  and  ordered  Mahmud's 
division  to  attack  Berber  from  Metemma.  Now,  if 
this  decision  had  been  arrived  at  and  acted  upon 
between  September  and  January  it  might  have 
resulted  in  a  Dervish  victory.  But  in  February — 
owing  to  the  power  of  rapid  concentration  possessed 
by  the  Egyptians  through  their  growing  railway — the 
Khalifa's  belated  order  to  Mahmud  merely  courted  an 
unnecessary  defeat  and  illustrated  the  danger  of  en- 
trusting military  policy  to  a  ruler  however  capable, 
devoid  of  military  instinct.  Our  own  British  history 
abounds  in  similar  misfortunes.  For  several  months, 
Mahmud  who  was  gifted  with  a  soldier's  eye  had  implored 
the  Khalifa  to  let  him  attack  Berber  whilst  its  garrison 
was  still  weak,  but  his  appeal  was  merely  snubbed  and 


ON  THE  ATBARA,  APRIL  1898  189 

refused.  Now  that  Berber  was  stronger  he  received 
supphes  of  ammunition  and  the  order  to  attack.  He 
accordingly  crossed  the  Nile  with  15,000  fighting  men, 
joined  Osman  Digna's  contingent  at  Shendi,  and  opened 
the  stirring  campaign  which  tested  Kitchener's  capa- 
city as  a  general  and  the  quality  of  the  Egyptian  army, 
as  they  had  not  been  tested  before.  Although  one 
brigade  of  British  infantry  joined  in  the  fray,  it  was 
wisely  decided  not  to  supersede  Kitchener  or  in  any 
way  interfere  with  his  unfettered  conduct  of  the  opera- 
tions. The  British  infantry  was  therefore  placed 
entirely  under  his  command  as  soon  as  its  various 
units  passed  southwards  of  Assouan.  Thus  for  the 
first  time  in  our  recent  history — so  far  as  my  knowledge 
goes — a  British  general,  selected  for  proved  efficiency, 
commanded  an  army  which,  excepting  the  British 
brigade,  he  had  had  ample  time  and  opportunity  to 
equip,  organise  and  train,  in  respect  of  every  detail — 
including  finance,  stores,  enlistments,  arms,  clothing, 
ammunition,  promotion  of  officers  and  selection  of 
staffs — with  a  result  which  justified  the  ,  experiment 
and  may  lead  to  its  future  adoption,  even  in  India. 

It  is,  however,  instructive  to  note  that  this  general 
was  technically  the  servant  of  the  Khedive  of  Egypt 
who  paid  him,  and  that,  even  when  he  commanded 
auxiliary  British  troops,  he  remained  in  foreign  employ 
and  fought  under  a  foreign  flag.  He  received  his 
orders,  not  from  the  War  Office,  but  from  Lord  Cromer, 
and  thus  enjoyed  a  position  of  freedom  for  his  military 
arrangements  and  of  personal  responsibihty  for  their 
success,  which  has  rarely  been  conferred  on  a  Com- 
mander-in-Chief in  the  field. 

When,  on  the  present  occasion,  the  boots  of  the 
British  infantry  proved  unserviceable  and  its  ammni- 
tion  defective,  observers  recognised  the  working  of  that 


igo  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

time-honoured  procedure  which  deprives  individuals 
of  responsibihty  and  shifts  the  blame  for  defects  from 
one  departmental  office  to  another.  During  the  years 
which  intervened  between  Waterloo  and  Colenso,  we 
perfected  in  peace  a  system  of  minimising  a  com- 
mander's power  and,  by  means  of  elaborate  regulations, 
promoted  the  art  of  evading  personal  censure  into 
an  exact  science.  If  the  boots  or  ammunition  of  an 
Egyptian  brigade  had  been  faulty,  somebody  would 
certainly  have  been  "  hanged "  for  neglect.  But 
England's  unfortunate  habit  of  hurriedly  assembling 
battalions,  and  sending  them  forth  to  fight  her 
battles — under  a  general  who  is  a  complete  stranger 
to  them  and  a  scratch  staff  appointed  for  the  occasion 
— makes  efficient  supervision  impossible.  Yet,  if  the 
British  brigade  which  fought  on  the  Atbara  had  been 
trained  for  only  one  month  in  Egypt  under  its  own 
brigadier,  minor  defects  would  have  been  remedied 
before  instead  of  after  the  commencement  of  hostilities, 
and  the  force  would  have  started  as  an  organised  unit 
instead  of  a  heterogeneous  assemblage  of  battalions. 
But,  instead  of  fairly  facing  any  military  problem  and 
acting  with  average  foresight,  we  prefer  to  muddle 
through  somehow,  trusting  to  luck  to  give  us  a  general 
who  will  get  us  out  of  the  difficulties  into  which  we 
drift.  In  this  instance  we  were  fortunate  enough  to 
pitch  on  Kitchener  and  may  take  credit  for  sticking  to 
him  when  found. 

Let  us  then  return  to  Berber  where  the  units  were 
gathering  for  the  campaign  which  their  general  had 
long  foreseen,  and  for  which  he  had  trained  a  foreign 
army,  at  the  expense  of  a  foreign  State. 

The  three  weeks'  operations  upon  which  we  now 
enter  present  a  striking  example  of  what  is  called 
offensive-defensive  tactics.     To  understand  this  clearly 


ON  THE  ATBARA,  APRIL  1898  191 

we  should  realise  the  objects  which  Kitchener  and 
Mahmud  each  desired  to  attain,  and  we  can  then  appre- 
ciate the  logical  sequence  of  the  separate  events  and 
not  merely  dwell  upon  marches  and  reconnaissances  as 
exciting  incidents  and  view  the  battle  as  a  purposeless 
slaughter  on  an  accidental  field. 

The  audacity  of  Hunter's  first  occupation  of  Berber 
with  a  mere  handful  of  men  was  discussed  in  a  previous 
chapter,  and  the  hazard  which  was  then  dehberately 
courted  can  be  measured  by  the  effort  now  made  to 
defeat  Mahmud' s  attack — an  effort  which  would  cer- 
tainly have  overstrained  our  force,  if  the  Khahfa  had 
launched  his  full  strength  upon  the  enterprise.  For 
the  battle  of  the  Atbara  was  fought  solely  in  defence 
of  Berber,  to  ward  off  Mahmud' s  unsupported  attack, 
and  it  would  never  have  been  fought  at  all,  but  for 
the  Emir's  determination  to  throw  himself  into  the 
city  in  a  headlong  rush.  For  he  calculated  that  his 
adversary  would  wait  for  him  in  Berber  and  try  to 
hold  it  by  passive  defence.  To  sit  down  behind 
entrenchments  and  utihse  the  labour  of  thousands  of 
soldiers  to  strengthen  a  position  into  a  so-called 
"impregnable  "stronghold  offers  a  temptation  which 
few  commanders  resist.  Yet,  in  spite  of  the  high 
proficiency  which  mihtary  engineering  has  attained, 
the  misuse  of  fortification  has  probably  caused  more 
disasters  than  any  other  accepted  theory  of  war, 
because  generals  are  not  all  gifted  with  the  trained 
imagination  which  alone  can  tell  them  when  to  trust 
to  mobihty  and  where  to  discard  spade-work.  Thus 
Mahmud  and  his  Emirs  argued  quite  reasonably  that 
they  would  close  on  Berber  and  discover  some  way  of 
breaking  into  it,  and  that,  even  if  they  failed  to  do 
this,  they  would  certainly  succeed  in  destroying  the 
railway  which  supplied  its  garrison.     In  fact  their  plan 


192  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

of  campaign,  though  undertaken  too  late,  was  not  a 
stupid  one,  and  might  have  led  to  success  even  at  the 
eleventh  hour  —  on  the  assumption  that  Kitchener 
would  defend  Berber  at  Berber  itself. 

But,  unluckily  for  Mahmud,  the  Sirdar  adopted  a 
different  plan  of  defence  to  that  which  was  expected 
of  him.  He  marched  his  whole  force — except  one 
Egyptian  battalion — out  of  the  town  as  soon  as  the 
gunboats  reported  that  the  Dervishes  were  moving  in 
earnest.  Representatives  of  the  merchants  and  the 
civil  population  remonstrated  and  entreated  in  vain. 
Those  who  were  loyal  were  served  out  with  rifles  and 
ammunition  to  protect  their  property  from  the  disloyal, 
and  the  army  remained  free  and  mobile,  unhampered 
by  passive  defence  or  the  civilian  pressure  which  some- 
times mars  a  campaign. 

By  the  middle  of  March  Kitchener  had  concen- 
trated his  force  at  the  village  of  Kunur  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Nile,  some  five  miles  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Atbara  and  eighteen  miles  south  of  Berber.  Mahmud 
on  the  same  date  was  moving  northwards  from  Shendi 
to  Aliab  along  the  same  bank  of  the  river,  and  the 
head  of  his  marching  column  was  distant  some  fifty 
miles  from  Kitchener's  camp.  The  position  of  these 
places,  whose  inhabitants  had  fled  from  Dervish  raids 
and  massacre,  can  be  seen  on  the  map  on  page  238, 
and  it  is  also  important  to  notice  the  peculiar  course 
of  the  Atbara — whose  bed  at  low  water  presented  a 
waste  of  sand-banks  studded  by  deep  pools — enclosed 
within  a  wide  belt  of  palm-trees  and  impenetrable 
thorn  thickets.  The  surrounding  country,  irrigated 
and  fertile  when  the  Atbara  rises  in  flood,  was  in 
March  a  mere  desert  across  which  sand-storms  and 
wind-devils  swept,  beneath  a  brazen  sun.  Yet  the 
nights    were    cool    and    the    climate    healthy,    owing 


ON  THE  ATBARA,  APRIL  1898  193 

to    the    pure    dry    breezes    which     blew    from    the 
north. 

ANGLO-EGYPTIAN  ARMY  DURING  THE  ATBARA 

OPERATIONS 

Concentrated  at  Kunur  and  Fort  Atbara  on  March  i6,  1898. 

Sirdar. — (Commander-in-Chief)  Major-General  Sir  Herbert  Kitchener. 

Cavalry — Lieut. -Colonel  Broadwood. 
Eight     Egyptian     squadrons    and    four     Egyptian    maxim     guns 
(horsed).     One  Battery  Egyptian  Horse  Artillery. 

Camel-Corps. — ]\Iajor  Tudway. 
Six  companies  (Egyptian  and  Sudanese). 

Artillery. — Lieut. -Colonel  Long. 
Three  Egyptian  Batteries,  small  guns  carried  on  pack  mules. 
Six  maxim  guns  (British  gun  detachments). 
One  Naval  Rocket  Detachment. 

Transport  Corps  (Camels) — Lieut. -Colonel  Walter  Kitchener. 
Infantry  (Except  British  Brigade). — Major-General  Hunter. 

British  Brigade. — Major-General  Gatacre.  ist  BattaUon  Royal 
Warwickshire  Regiment  (less  two  companies  at  Dongola). 
ist  Battalion  Lincolnshire  Regiment,  ist  BattaUon  Seaforth 
Highlanders,  ist  BattaUon  Cameron  Highlanders.  Field 
Hospital. 

MacDonald's  Brigade. — Lieut. -Colonel  Hector  MacDonald.  2nd 
Egyptian  BattaUon,  9th  Sudanese  Battalion,  loth  Sudanese 
BattaUon,  nth  Sudanese  Battalion.     Field  Hospital. 

Maxwell's  Brigade. — Lieut.-Colonel  Maxwell.  8th  Egyptian  Bat- 
talion, 12th  Sudanese  BattaUon.  13th  Sudanese  BattaUon, 
15th  Sudanese  Battalion.     Field  Hospital. 

Lewis's  Brigade. — Lieut.-Colonel  Lews.  3rd  Egyptian  BattaUon, 
4th  Egyptian  Battalion,  7th  Egyptian  Battalion,  1 5th  Egyptian 
Battalion.     Field  Hospital. 

Gunboats. — Commander  CoUn  Keppel,  R.N. 
Four  Gunboats,  patrolling  the  Nile. 

Total  Strength  =  12,000  combatants. 

Of  the  above,  Lewis's  Brigade  was  at  Fort  Atbara,  the 
remainder  at  Kunur — the  whole  in  readiness  to  move 


194  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

at  a  moment's  notice,  waiting  only  for  Mahmud's  in- 
tentions to  be  translated  into  action. 

With  the  exception  of  two  officers  attached  to  the 
headquarter  staff  and  the  usual  staff  of  a  British 
brigade,  the  whole  of  the  staff-work  was  performed  by 
officers  of  the  Egyptian  army — mostly  bimbashis  under 
thirty  years  of  age.  The  supply,  transport,  and  in- 
telligence departments  were  also  found  by  the  Egyp- 
tian army. 

The  advantage  of  Kunur  as  a  point  of  concentra- 
tion will  be  apparent  after  a  glance  at  the  map  on 
page  238.  If  Mahmud  elected  to  cross  the  fordable 
Atbara  near  its  mouth  and  attack  the  fort  at  the  con- 
fluence. Kitchener  could  make  a  five-mile  march  from 
Kunur  and  fall  on  the  Dervish  flank,  whilst  Lewis's 
brigade  engaged  it  in  front  ;  should  Mahmud  evade 
the  fort  and  attempt  to  cross  the  Atbara  at  Hudi, 
twenty-five  miles  from  Berber,  Kitchener  could  fore- 
stall him  by  a  ten-mile  march  to  the  same  place  ; 
while,  should  Mahmud  cross  the  Atbara  at  a  point 
higher  up  and  then  make  for  Berber,  Kitchener  could 
keep  him  moving  in  the  desert  and  attack  him  from  a 
base  on  the  Nile.  Thus  Kunur  secured  to  Kitchener 
what  is  technically  termed  the  interior  line  and  relegated 
Mahmud  to  the  longer,  exterior  line  of  operation. 

Having  disposed  the  army  in  a  good  strategic 
situation,  early  and  accurate  news  of  the  march  of  the 
Dervishes  from  Aliab  was  of  paramount  importance, 
and  right  well  was  the  Sirdar  served  by  the  gunboats  on 
the  Nile  and  the  cavalry  watching  the  line  of  the 
Atbara.  The  initiative  still  lay  with  Mahmud,  and 
the  camp  at  Kunur  buzzed  with  conflicting  rumour 
and  amateur  strategy— both  in  the  English  and  Arabic 
languages.  The  only  man  who  never  gave  out  his 
views  was  the  silent  Sirdar.     But  every  day  he  practised 


ON  THE  ATBARA,  APRIL  1898  195 

the  brigades  in  the  special  formations  required  for 
desert  warfare,  and  so  a  week  passed  in  useful  prepara- 
tion and  high  expectation  on  the  part  of  the  troops. 
On  Saturday  March  19,  Mahmud's  army  began  to 
move  inland  from  Aliab  towards  Hudi  with  the 
intention  of  carrying  out  the  second  alternative 
suggested  above.  But  Kitchener  promptly  fore- 
stalled his  adversary  by  sending  the  cavalry  to  Hudi 
the  same  day,  following  it  up  on  Sunday  with  the 
remainder  of  the  army.  The  British  brigade  was  at 
Divine  Service  in  the  open  air  when  the  order  to  march 
arrived.  That  evening  the  Kunur  force  joined  Lewis's 
brigade  at  Hudi,  and  thus  occupied  the  very  place 
which  ]\Iahmud  had  selected  for  his  own  camp  on  the 
same  date.  One  battalion  remained  in  Fort  Atbara 
to  safeguard  the  base.  Mobility,  aided  by  early  and 
accurate  information,  had  already  won  a  victory  at  a 
cost  of  fifteen  cavalry  casualties,  and  Mahmud's 
advance-guard  was  obliged  to  deflect  its  movement 
to  the  east.  His  whole  force  arrived  that  night  at 
Nakheila  after  a  magnificent  forty-mile  march  across 
the  desert — a  fine  example  of  Dervish  endurance  and 
discipline — though  at  Nakheila  it  was  no  nearer  to 
Berber  than  it  had  been  at  Aliab. 

Next  morning  Kitchener  pushed  his  advantage  by 
moving  the  Anglo-Egyptian  camp  to  Ras-el-Hudi  six 
miles  further  up  the  river,  where  it  makes  a  bend  in  its 
course.  Here  he  guarded  the  lower  course  of  the  Atbara 
and  his  own  communications,  he  remained  on  or  near 
the  line  of  any  Dervish  advance  on  Berber,  he  length- 
ened that  line  by  keeping  the  enemy  well  up-stream, 
and  at  the  same  time  he  interposed  his  concentrated 
force  between  Mahmud  and  his  objective.  Meanwhile 
the  infantry  halted,  whilst  the  mounted  troops  en- 
deavoured to  clear  up  the  situation  by  reconnaissance. 


196  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

So  far,  in  the  preliminary  moves  for  position, 
Kitchener  had  outmanoeuvred  his  opponent  and 
shouldered  him  away  from  Berber,  but  the  menace  still 
threatened.  Mahmud's  hardy  warriors  might  yet 
achieve  success. 

In  a  previous  chapter  a  favourable  opinion  was 
expressed  regarding  the  Khalifa's  wisdom  in  concen- 
trating his  strength  at  Omdurman  when  his  Dongola 
garrisons  were  routed  in  1896,  as  it  would  then  have 
been  futile  to  attempt  the  reconquest  of  the  northern 
province.  But  a  policy  of  concentration,  to  be 
effective,  must  include  a  determination  to  strike  decisive 
blows  when  favourable  opportunity  may  offer.  Yet 
we  saw  how  the  Khalifa  forgot  this  elementary  truth 
when  the  Egyptian  advanced-guard  reached  Berber  in 
1897.  One  or  two  blunders  may,  however,  be  for- 
given to  any  statesman  or  soldier  who  profits  by 
realising  his  own  mistakes.  But  the  Khalifa  learned 
nothing  by  experience.  On  the  Atbara  he  launched 
Mahmud  against  Berber  but  obstinately  refused  to 
support  the  enterprise  with  reserve  troops — just  when 
a  reserve  was  obviously  indispensable.  The  mere 
presence  of  10,000  Dervishes  at  Aliab — after  Mahmud 
reached  Nakheila — would  have  greatly  facilitated  this 
Emir's  task  by  endangering  Kitchener's  communica- 
tions between  Fort  Atbara  and  Ras-el-Hudi.  Indeed 
it  is  doubtful  whether  Kitchener  could  have  main- 
tained his  position  if  a  substantial  Dervish  body  had 
threatened  him  from  Aliab,  and  this  view  is  strengthened 
by  the  fact  that  on  March  26,  the  Sirdar  sent  a  batta- 
lion, a  battery  and  three  gunboats  to  raid  and  recon- 
noitre the  Dervish  communications  with  Omdurman. 
This  expedition  landed  south  of  Shendi,  attacked 
Mahmud's  depot,  captured  its  supplies  and  returned 
to  report  that  no  reinforcements  were  moving  north- 


ON  THE  ATBARA,  APRIL  1898  197 

wards  from  Omdurman.  The  information  was  to  be 
of  great  value  to  Kitchener,  as  it  permitted  him  to  deal 
with  Mahmud  single-handed  at  his  own  time,  and 
enabled  him  to  put  his  full  force  into  the  fighting  line 
whenever  he  should  decide  to  strike  a  blow.  Even  the 
astute  and  experienced  Osman  Digna,  who  had  often 
bested  disciplined  white  troops  around  Suakin,  could 
now  offer  Mahmud  neither  hope  of  evading  the  Sirdar 
nor  prospect  of  attacking  him  at  an  advantage.  In 
fact  the  initiative  was  slipping  from  Mahmud' s  hands 
into  Kitchener's,  and  the  rest  of  the  story  discloses 
how  the  latter  made  use  of  this  power  and  how  the 
Dervish  army  met  its  fate  at  Nakheila — officially 
named  the  Battle  of  Atbara. 

The  mere  presence  of  the  Anglo-Egyptian  force  at 
Ras-el-Hudi — instead  of  at  Berber — was  a  sore  puzzle 
to  Mahmud.  It  upset  his  plans,  and  left  him  with  the 
choice  between  an  immediate  attack  or  an  ignominious 
retreat.  He  chose  neither,  and  thereby  surrendered 
the  initiative  completely.  But  he  arranged  to  conceal 
his  army  in  a  cunning  defensive  position  in  the  thickets 
near  Nakheila,  whilst  the  arch-marauder  Osman  Digna 
went  to  recover  certain  valuable  grain  stores,  which  he 
had  secreted  in  the  desert  on  leaving  Adarama.  Thus 
the  opposing  armies  sat  down  within  twenty  miles  of 
one  another,  waiting,  watching  and  uncertain — until 
Kitchener  should  make  up  his  mind  how  he  would  deal 
with  Mahmud.  But  before  he  could  settle  this,  he 
had  to  discover  Mahmud' s  exact  position,  and  the  task 
of  locating  it  devolved  on  the  Egyptian  cavalry.  It 
numbered  only  800  troopers.  The  Arab  horse  were 
some  3000  men.  They  were  now  to  be  pitted  against 
one  another  during  a  fortnight  of  incessant  recon- 
naissance. 

Every  day  at  dawn  some  of  Broadwood's  squadrons 


198  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

rode  forth  to  reconnoitre  and  skirmish  towards  Nak- 
heila — in  the  scrub,  over  miles  of  undulating  desert, 
on  stony  ground,  or  across  dry  khors  fissured  and 
cracked  by  the  action  of  the  sun  on  a  wet  surface.  It 
was  not  an  easy  country  for  cavalry.  The  wide  belt 
of  mimosa-trees  and  dom-palms  by  the  river  was  fresh 
and  green  and  beautiful  to  behold  owing  to  the  rich 
alluvial  soil  deposited  by  the  annual  flood.  Brilhant 
parrots  and  other  bright  birds  flitted  amongst  the 
trees.  The  stagnant  pools  in  the  river-bed  were 
crowded  with  crocodiles  and  big  fish  waiting  patiently 
for  the  flood.  Dainty  gazelles  hurried  across  the  open 
desert,  disturbed  by  the  opposing  horsemen  or  scared 
by  the  sharp  crack  of  rifle  fire  in  a  silent  landscape. 
But  it  was  a  period  of  anxious  work  for  the  bimbashis 
of  cavalry,  commanding  Fellaheen  troopers  endowed 
with  no  natural  aptitude  for  either  riding  or  raiding,  in 
conflict  with  Baggara  Arabs  who  were  experts  at  both. 
Every  day  the  patrols  encountered  superior  numbers  of 
the  enemy,  lost  men  and  horses,  gained  confidence  in 
themselves,  procured  knowledge  of  the  strange  country 
and  returned  at  nightfall — dogged  back  to  their  camp 
by  an  enemy  with  whom  they  had  fought  rear-guard 
actions  all  the  afternoon. 

Yet  the  main  Dervish  position  had  not  been  dis- 
covered at  the  end  of  ten  such  weary  days  and  Mahmud 
still  made  no  sign  of  moving.  A  single  Egyptian 
squadron  could  by  no  means  pierce  the  Arab  cordon 
and  the  state  of  uncertainty  threatened  to  be  pro- 
longed. The  Sirdar,  therefore,  decided  to  risk  his  whole 
mounted  force  on  a  decisive  reconnaissance,  in  order 
to  break  through  the  Arab  horse  and  examine  the 
Dervish  stronghold  at  close  quarters.  He  entrusted 
Broadwood  with  the  enterprise,  and  sent  Hunter  and 
some    staff    officers — unhampered    by   the    cares    of 


ON  THE  ATBARA,  APRIL  1898  199 

executive  command — to  examine  and  report  on  the 
enemy's  position.  A  deserter  from  Mahmud  was 
impressed  as  guide,  and  the  following  units  marched 
from  Ras-el-Hudi  very  early  on  March  30 — eight 
squadrons  cavalry,  one  battery  horse-artillery,  four 
galloping  maxims  and  a  brigade  of  infantry. 

As  the  day's  outing  might  involve  an  engagement 
and  would  certainly  necessitate  a  forty-  to  fifty-mile 
march,  the  supporting  infantry  proceeded  a  portion  of 
the  distance  to  await  developments  in  a  defensive 
position.  The  mounted  troops  trotted  continuously 
forward,  brushed  aside  several  strong  bodies  of  Baggaras, 
and — piloted  by  their  Dervish  guide — made  straight 
for  Mahmud' s  hidden  position.  The  very  boldness  of 
this  manoeuvre,  the  sudden  appearance  of  a  compact 
force  in  their  midst  disconcerted  the  Dervishes.  They 
apprehended  that  their  defences  would  be  instan- 
taneously assaulted  and  stood  by  to  defend  them  with 
strict  orders  to  hold  their  fire  for  close  ranges.  As  the 
only  object  of  the  reconnaissance  was  to  see  clearly 
not  fight,  a  near  view  was  essential.  Accordingly,  the 
horse  artillery  and  maxims  opened  at  1000  yards  on 
the  blurred  hne — dancing  in  a  mirage — which  repre- 
sented the  enemy's  camp,  in  the  hope  of  attracting 
attention  and  inducing  the  Dervishes  to  show  them- 
selves. Meanwhile  Hunter  and  four  staff  officers  rode 
towards  the  place  and  actually  got  within  300  yards 
of  it  before  they  reahsed  what  it  was.  Then  as  they 
topped  a  slope  the  waving  lines  resolved  themselves 
into  zaribas,  palisades  and  trenches  at  least  a  mile  in 
length,  one  behind  the  other,  enclosing  an  immense 
area,  swarming  with  Dervishes.  It  was  a  sight  which 
these  adventurous  officers  will  never  forget.  They 
had  accomplished  in  a  few  moments  the  whole  object 
of  their  enterprise  and  at  once  rode  back  to  the  guns 


200  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

and  attendant  squadrons.  The  force  then  withdrew 
to  its  infantry  support  as  rapidly  as  it  had  come — 
foUowed  by  the  enemy  for  ten  miles,  but  never 
seriously  engaged.  It  was  a  smart  piece  of  work,  and 
the  news  that  Mahmud's  stronghold  had  at  last  been 
seen  was  satisfactory  alike  to  the  Sirdar  and  all  ranks 
of  the  army. 

A  few  days  later  the  camp  was  moved  to  Abadar 
six  miles  nearer  the  enemy  and  on  April  5,  the  mounted 
troops  again  undertook  a  similar  reconnaissance, 
supported  by  the  9th  Sudanese  (Vandeleur  being  with 
it)  and  the  loth  Sudanese — in  order  to  further  investi- 
gate the  best  method  of  arranging  our  infantry  assault. 
Hunter,  Maxwell,  and  Long — the  latter  officer  deputed 
to  select  artillery  positions — accompanied  Broadwood, 
in  order  to  familiarise  themselves  with  the  approaches 
to  the  place  and  advise  as  to  the  best  plan  of  attacking 
it.  But,  on  approaching  to  within  1200  yards.  Broad- 
wood  perceived  that  a  reception  very  different  from 
the  last  awaited  his  second  reconnaissance.  Directly 
his  leading  squadrons  had  crossed  the  front  of  the 
zariba  to  "make  good"  the  ground  beyond,  a  cloud  of 
Baggara  horsemen,  superior  in  numbers  to  the  Egyptian 
force,  emerged  from  the  south  end  of  the  camp  and 
trotted  through  the  scrub  towards  the  desert.  Our 
squadrons  and  guns  in  compact  order  moved  on  at  a 
walk  until  the  force  was  concentrated  opposite  the  zariba 
which  lay  1000  yards  to  the  right  flank,  and,  mean- 
while, the  officers  watched  the  continuous  extension  of 
these  hostile  horsemen  who  evidently  aimed  at  envelop- 
ing the  Egyptian  front  and  left  flank.  Next  it  was 
noticed  that  another  considerable  body  of  Arab  horse 
were  issuing  from  the  northern  end  of  the  camp  and 
threatened  to  cut  off  the  Egyptian  retreat.  The  long, 
flat-bladed  spears  glinting  in  the  morning  sun  and  tiie 


ON  THE  ATBARA,  APRIL  1898  201 

dust  raised  by  so  many  bodies  of  cantering  horsemen 
plainly  disclosed  the  intention  of  the  enemy  to  surround 
our  diminutive  force.  Meanwhile  the  palisades  and 
entrenchments  of  the  position  literally  swarmed  with 
Dervish  spectators  watching  the  progress  of  events, 
and  their  guns,  concealed  in  a  dozen  emplacements, 
opened  fire  with  loud  reports  and  puffs  of  white  smoke 
owing  to  their  use  of  black  powder.  Evidently  the 
situation  though  picturesque  bore  a  serious  aspect  and 
would  require  cool  and  judicious  handhng.  Broad- 
wood  decided  to  deal  with  one  phase  at  a  time,  avoided 
dispersing  his  force  and  reUed  on  the  discipline  and 
training  of  his  squadrons  to  counter-balance  the  vastly 
superior  numbers  of  the  enemy. 

The  battery  opened  fire  at  1800  yards  on  the 
Baggaras  extending  in  front,  the  horse-artillery  and 
maxims  coming  quickly  into  action  with  damaging 
effect.  Broadwood  next  detached  two  squadrons 
under  Major  Le  Gallais  to  deal  with  the  Dervishes 
who  menaced  his  right  flank  and  rear,  and  two  other 
squadrons  under  Captain  Hon.  E.  Baring  to  protect 
his  left.  With  the  four  remaining  squadrons  and  the 
guns  he  moved  cautiously  forward — suspicious  as 
always  of  Dervish  ambuscades — towards  the  horse- 
men whom  his  guns  had  driven  south.  But,  suddenly, 
the  move  forward  was  brought  to  a  standstill  by  a 
solid  line  of  dismounted  spearmen,  who  rose  out  of  a 
concealed  khor  between  the  guns  and  the  distant 
horsemen  and  confronted  Broadwood  at  300  yards. 
This  was  the  ambush.  In  well-ordered  array,  sub- 
divided into  regular  companies  headed  by  white  flags 
the  spearmen  advanced.  The  four  maxims  came  into 
action  in  an  instant.  The  battery  trotted  back  a 
couple  of  hundred  yards  to  get  a  range.  It  then 
opened  with  case-shot.     The  squadrons  retired  at  a 


202  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

walk,  alternately  facing  and  threatening  the  foe.  The 
promptness  with  which  each  unit  acted  prevented  a 
catastrophe  and  the  retreat  was  continued  without 
confusion,  whilst  the  spearmen's  advance  was  tem- 
porarily checked. 

But  now  the  Dervish  spectators  in  the  position  with 
one  accord  opened  a  sustained  though  wild  fire.  The 
range  was  too  great  for  accuracy,  but  the  effect, 
extremely  galling  as  it  was,  was  not  allowed  to  hasten 
the  retreat.  Meanwhile  the  staff  officers  for  nearly 
an  hour  had  examined  the  ground.  It  was  high  time 
to  Withdraw.  Indeed  the  order  to  do  so  was  given  none 
too  soon. 

Already  on  three  sides  Dervishes  menaced  the 
column  in  considerable  numbers.  The  fourth  side 
might  shortly  be  closed.  Baring  on  the  desert  flank  was 
reinforced  by  one  squadron  but  was  pressed  so  hard 
when  the  retirement  started  that  Broadwood  sent 
him  another,  making  four  in  all.  Alternately  the 
battery  and  maxims  retreated  a  few  hundred  yards, 
faced  about  and  poured  out  a  damaging  fire  on  the 
advancing  foe.  On  the  river  flank,  which  now  claimed 
the  commander's  attention,  the  Baggara  horse  made  a 
bold  attempt  to  cut  in  behind  and  capture  the  guns. 
This  was  frustrated  only  in  the  nick  of  time  by  Broad- 
wood  himself.  He  promptly  took  command  of  both 
squadrons  on  this  flank,  sounded  the  "advance,"  then 
the  "charge"  and — leading  them  in  person — struck  the 
loose  assemblage  of  400  Baggaras  obliquely.  The 
shock  upset  them.  They  were  routed  in  a  few  moments 
and  fell  back.  The  squadrons  were  then  rallied  and 
dismounted,  and  directed  to  open  carbine  fire  on  the 
retreating  enemy.  Here  we  wiU  leave  them  for  the 
moment. 

But   meanwhile    the    precious   guns   were    also   in 


ON  THE  ATBARA,  APRIL  1898  203 

danger  from  the  pursuing  spearmen  in  their  front.  So 
Baring  with  two  squadrons  from  the  desert  flank 
galloped  to  the  rescue,  rode  across  the  front  of  the  guns 
and  charged  the  enemy  in  flank.  He  routed  them, 
broke  them  up  and  rode  completely  through  them,  but 
not  without  disordering  his  own  command.  When  his 
troopers  came  out  on  the  river  flank,  their  companions 
were  already  dismounted  and  firing  volleys  as  already 
described.  Baring  therefore  raUied  behind  them, 
restored  order  in  his  squadrons  and  returned  with 
them  to  his  post  on  the  left. 

The  two  charges  I  have  thus  described,  supple- 
mented by  the  fire  of  the  guns,  maxims  and  troopers, 
temporarily  checked  the  whole  Dervish  movement 
and  saved  the  situation.  An  attack  in  force  by  the 
enemy's  infantry  still  threatened  and  the  white-robed 
riflemen  were  striding  forward  at  a  great  pace.  But 
Broadwood  eluded  the  menace,  withdrew  his  force  at 
a  trot  and  gradually  shook  off  all  pursuit.  At  12 
noon  the  mounted  troops  rejoined  their  infantry  sup- 
port and  returned  to  camp  with  a  loss  of  one  British 
ofhcer  wounded,  seven  Egyptian  troopers  killed,  eleven 
wounded  and  thirty  horses  disabled. 

The  behaviour  of  the  Fellaheen  trooper,  the  quality 
of  his  British  bimbashi,  the  confidence  placed  m 
them  by  their  commander  were  admirably  displayed 
during  this  reconnaissance,  and,  if  an  infantry  ofticer 
may  venture  an  opinion,  I  would  suggest  that  Broad- 
wood's  success  was  directly  due  to  his  system  of 
training.  Instead  of  fussy  interference  with  details, 
he  adopted  the  novel  plan  of  allowing  his  bimbashis  to 
really  command  their  own  squadrons.  He  recognised 
that  two  good  officers  may  have  two  diametrically 
opposite  methods  of  training  men,  yet  may  both 
produce  excellent  results.     He  supervised  their  work 


204  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

with  intelligent  interest,  but  never  insisted  on  rigid 
uniformity  or  strict  adherence  to  minute  rules.  Years 
of  personal  experience  had  taught  him  what  was 
important  and  what  might  be  considered  trivial  and 
he  obtained  from  his  subordinates  a  whole-hearted 
devotion  to  sensible  work,  such  as  has  rarely  been 
equalled  before  or  since.  And  he  had  his  reward  when 
the  squadrons  which  he  had  created  faced  odds  of 
five  to  one  in  a  tight  place  and  the  regenerated  Fellah 
of  Egypt  rode  down  the  war-lord  of  the  Sudan  at  a 
signal  from  a  British  bimbashi. 

Next  day  the  Anglo-Egyptian  army  moved  on  seven 
miles  to  Umdabia  and  marched  on  the  following  night 
to  the  assault  of  Mahmud's  position. 

The  reconnaissances  had  been  deliberate,  thorough 
and  somewhat  prolonged.  The  army  had  approached 
their  enemy  by  short  marches  at  long  intervals. 
But  the  final  assault  was  swift  and  overwhelming. 
Its  success  was  due  to  disciplined  combination 
and  to  the  practical  and  sensible  arrangements  made 
by  British  officers  of  the  Egyptian  staff,  who  had  been 
working  together  at  all  kinds  of  soldiering  during  a 
number  of  years.  This  staff  was  accustomed  to  carry 
out  its  duties  with  the  least  amount  of  writing-paper 
and  the  fewest  printed  regulations,  and  was  a  live 
body — imbued  with  practical  intelligence  and  resource. 
But  it  was  not  created  in  one  day.  Any  nation  can,  in 
a  crisis,  enrol  and  arm  a  vast  number  of  brave  men,  but 
it  cannot  improvise  a  staff,  create  habits  of  discipline 
or  command  military  success  by  spending  its  money  too 
late — this  the  Sudan  proved,  as  also  the  South  African 
and  every  other  war  ever  waged. 

On  April  7,  1898  towards  dusk,  the  troops  fell  in 
for  their  twelve-mile  night  march,  an  operation  which 
is   always  critical   and  sometimes   disastrous,   though 


ON  THE  ATBARA,  APRIL  1898  205 

absolutely  necessary  in  tropical  climates.  No  precau- 
tion which  the  Sirdar's  experience  could  suggest  was 
neglected.  A  staff  officer,  familiar  with  the  country  by 
daylight,  guided  the  leading  brigade.  Careful  patrolUng 
guarded  against  surprise,  and  the  four  brigades  marched 
in  separate  squares  on  a  broad  front  ready  to  use  their 
rifles  if  attacked.  The  cavalry  remained  in  camp  with 
orders  to  trot  out  and  join  the  infantry  before  dawn, 
leaving  a  single  battalion  to  guard  the  camp. 

At  9  P.M.,  a  halt  was  called,  water  was  served 
out  from  camel-tanks  and  the  men  lay  down  to  rest  on 
the  open  desert,  protected  by  vigilant  sentries.  A 
bitterly  cold  wind  drove  clouds  of  fine  sand  across  the 
landscape  and  any  soldier  who  strayed  from  his  post 
would  have  had  a  difficulty  in  finding  it  again.  The 
moon  rose  early  and  illumined  the  weird  scene  of 
thousands  of  uneasy  sleepers  lying  in  curious  atti- 
tudes beside  their  rifles,  in  death-like  silence,  rank  by 
rank.  The  reserve  ammunition-mules  and  artillery 
pack-mules  received  special  attention  to  prevent  them 
bra)dng  when  the  moon  appeared.  At  one  o'clock  the 
march  was  resumed,  and  those  who  saw  it  will  not 
forget  the  strange  sight  and  stranger  sound  of  thousands 
of  soldiers  rising  from  the  ground  and  stealthily  moving 
forward  in  ordered  array — with  no  word  uttered  above 
a  whisper.  Only  the  grating  and  monotonous  crunch 
of  shoe-leather  on  dry  sand  could  be  heard  and  it 
had  a  sinister  sound,  though  none  could  foretell  the 
event.  At  four  there  was  another  halt,  but  the 
bitter  cold  prevented  sleep  and  only  the  glow  of  the 
enemy's  fires  visible  above  some  distant  palms  afforded 
a  point  of  interest  to  the  waiting  soldiery.  Four  miles 
now  separated  the  combatants.  At  da\dight  the 
deployment  from  square  into  attack-formation  was 
carried    out    according    to    programme — the    British 


2o6  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

brigade  on  the  left,  MacDonald's  next,  Maxwell's  on  the 
right,  Lewis's  in  reserve,  the  batteries  in  the  intervals 
between  brigades — and  thus  the  machine  moved 
towards  Mahmud's  position  with  bayonets  fixed.  The 
value  of  the  cavalry  reconnaissances,  the  accuracy  of 
the  staff  leading,  the  precision  and  timing  of  the  night 
march  were  evident  to  all  ranks,  as  the  army  strode 
without  concealment  straight  towards  the  thorn 
thickets,  where  Mahmud  had  been  waiting  for  nearly 
three  weeks.  It  halted  on  a  gentle  slope,  some  900 
yards  from  the  enemy's  zariba,  and  here  at  6.15  a.m., 
the  infantry  sat  down  to  watch  the  opening  of  the 
battle  by  the  artillery. 

Three  mule-batteries  and  the  horse-artillery  took 
part,  twenty-four  guns  in  all.  Thud  !  phutt  I  !  went 
the  first  discharge,  and  we  all  looked  hard  as  the  shell 
burst  well  above  the  entrenchments  in  the  middle  of 
the  enemy's  camp.  A  pale  yellow  flash  in  the  midst  of 
a  ball  of  white  smoke  marked  the  exact  spot,  and  then 
the  crack  !  of  the  explosion  came  faintly  back,  like  an 
echo,  from  the  smoky-grey  mist  which  hung  over  the 
place.  That  first  gun  resembled  a  toy  explosion  in  a 
toy  battle,  but,  when  report  followed  report  in  quick 
succession  and  the  air  above  the  trenches  became 
dotted  with  white  puffs  dealing  out  shrapnel  bullets 
and  the  cannonade  grew  ever  louder  as  the  projectiles 
were  multiplied,  one  realised  that  serious  business  was 
on  hand.  Then  gradually,  the  strange  scene  became 
almost  monotonous,  and  many  a  weary  infantry-man 
dozed  into  sleep,  whilst  the  Egyptian  gunners  plied 
their  trade  and  searched  with  the  precision  of  their 
arm  the  whole  interior  of  the  circular  encampment.* 
The  cavalry  and  maxims  guarded  the  flanks  which  were 
threatened  but  not  attacked  bytheBaggara  horse. 

*  See  plan  facing  page  208. 


ON  THE  ATBARA,  APRIL  1898  207 

After  the  shelling  commenced  the  Dervish  position 
presented  the  appearance  of  a  deserted  place,  and  those 
who  had  not  accompanied  the  reconnaissances  could 
scarcely  beheve  it  contained  15,000  fighting  men — 
waiting,  as  the  event  proved,  to  pour  out  a  heavy 
fire  at  the  closest  range.  A  number  of  coloured  banners, 
a  few  camels  and  donkeys,  an  occasional  jibba-c\a.d 
Dervish  —  strolhng  with  contemptuous  unconcern 
amidst  shrapnel  bullets^-were  alone  visible.  All  else 
seemed  empty  and  lifeless  behind  the  stockade  and 
breastwork  which  ran  along  the  front,  covered  by  a 
thorn  zariba.  The  naval  rockets  set  fire  to  some  grass 
huts  and  dry  palm-trees  and  the  smoke  mingled  with 
shell  puffs  in  the  still  air.  For  an  hour  and  a  quarter 
the  Egyptian  gunners  distributed  a  continuous  hail  of 
shrapnel  and  expended  a  great  quantity  of  ammunition 
in  their  relentless  methodical  manner. 

At  7.40  A.M.  the  guns  ceased  fire.  Kitchener  sounded 
the  general  advance  and  gooo  infantry  swept  majes- 
tically into  action  in  a  thin  line,  strengthened  at 
intervals  by  supports.  From  flank  to  flank  it  was 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  long,  and  looked  very  business- 
like. Let  us  accompany  Bimbashi  Vandeleur  and  the 
9th  Sudanese  into  the  fray,  in  which  they  took  a 
prominent  part  sharing  with  five  other  Sudanese 
battalions  the  brunt  of  the  close  fighting  and  the 
heaviest  casualties.  Vandeleur  led  the  right  wing  of 
his  battalion  and  was  posted  near  the  centre  of  the 
whole  line  in  command  of  his  two  companies  of  blacks. 

During  the  first  few  hundred  yards  the  advance  was 
dehberate  and  slow,  and  several  halts  were  made  for 
volley  firing  ;  but  with  the  cessation  of  the  rain  of 
shells  on  the  Dervish  trenches,  their  unharmed  riflemen 
put  up  their  heads  and  opened  a  continuous  fire  from 
breastwork  and  stockade  which,  as  by  magic,  bristled 


2o8  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

with  defenders.  To  advance  slowly,  halt  and  shoot 
volleys  merely  exposed  our  men  to  unnecessary  loss 
wathout  subduing  the  enemy's  fire.  Accordingly  the 
''  charge  "  was  sounded,  and  the  eager  Sudanese 
followed  their  beloved  British  officers  in  a  rush  at  the 
Dervish  trenches — with  the  bands  playing  and  colours 
flying,  just  as  in  the  days  of  Marlborough's  great  fights. 
Vandeleur  claimed  that  one  of  his  companies  got  first 
o\'er  the  zariba,  whilst  the  British  brigade  was  delayed 
by  a  special  drill  they  had  invented  for  overcoming  this 
obstacle.  Practically  the  whole  line  got  over  at  about 
the  same  time.  Yet  the  enemy  stuck  to  their  posts 
like  brave  men  and  let  off  their  rifles  in  the  faces  of 
their  assailants  with  deadly  effect.  But  the  impetu- 
osity of  the  Sudanese  and  the  drilled  discipline  of  the 
Highlanders  carried  them  over  the  breastwork  and 
stockade  in  spite  of  severe  punishment,  and  those  of 
the  defenders  who  were  not  immediately  shot  down 
were  subsequently  bayoneted  by  the  supports  which 
followed. 

The  line  moved  on  into  the  interior  shooting  at 
close  quarters,  and  such  was  the  fierce  nature  of  the 
enemy  that  wounded  Dervishes  would  rise  from  the 
trenches  behind  our  backs  and  fire  at  our  men  mth 
exasperating  accuracy.  The  whole  interior  of  the 
camp  was  honeycombed  into  a  labyrinth  of  irre:,ular 
trenches,  pits  and  deep  holes,  in  which  men,  donkeys, 
camels  and  even  women  had  been  sheltered  during 
the  cannonade.  They  were  now  defended  with  the 
courage  of  fanaticism  and  had  to  be  cleared  as  they 
were  encountered,  for,  though  the  enemy  were  at  last 
bolting  towards  the  Atbara,  isolated  bands  would 
neither  run  away  nor  accept  or  give  quarter.  It  was 
just  a  case  of  bullet  and  bayonet  and  butt,  and 
resembled  a  hideous  nightmare  in  which  the  deafening 


ifartr:^ 


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Stan/irrdJa  Ge^^ySstah^.Laruitm, 


ON  THE  ATBARA,  APRIL  1898  209 

roar  of  musketry  never  ceased.  Our  men  fought  their 
way  for  half  a  mile  through  this  curious  encampment, 
now  the  scene  of  such  slaughter  and  destruction  as  a 
fight  to  a  finish  must  always  produce. 

The  action  ended  at  the  river's  bank  three-quarters 
of  an  hour  after  the  infantry  started,  and  we  were  then 
able  to  congratulate  ourselves  on  a  complete  victory. 
Anything  less  would  merely  have  led  to  a  repetition  of 
the  combat  at  an  early  date,  which  nobody  at  that 
moment  desired — not  even  the  jubilant  Sudanese  who 
crowded  round  their  officers  with  joyous  beaming  faces 
and  insisted  on  shaking  hands  all  round — first  a  short 
shake,  then  a  salute,  another  shake  and  another  salute, 
accompanied  by  proud  grins.  These  are  the  men  who 
deliberately  run  ahead  of  their  officers  to  try  and  stop 
the  bullets  where  the  fire  is  hottest,  so  how  can  any  one 
be  surprised  that  their  officers  believe  in  them  and 
place  them  amongst  the  best  fighting  troops  in 
existence  ?  They  have  dash  and  pluck  and  endurance, 
and  plenty  of  steadiness  when  carefully  officered  and 
strictly  disciplined  ;  but  above  all  they  are  intensely 
human  and  should  never  be  treated  like  machines. 

From  Vandeleur's  diary  I  find  that  his  two  com- 
panies lost  five  killed  and  twenty-eight  wounded,  and 
his  battalion  seventy-three  killed  and  wounded  out  of 
a  strength  of  717  in  action.  The  hard  fighting  was 
practically  all  done  by  eight  battalions — namely,  the 
Seaforth  Highlanders,  the  Cameron  Highlanders  and 
six  Sudanese  battalions,  total  about  5700  bayonets. 
Their  casualties  amounted  to  473,  which  works  out 
at  over  8  per  cent.  The  casualties  in  the  whole 
force  numbered  nineteen  British  officers  and  533  other 
ranks,  British  and  Egyptian. 

Mahmud  was  captured  by  the  loth  Sudanese  and 
paraded  in   triumph   through   the   streets   of  Berber. 


210  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

One  thousand  one  hundred  other  prisoners  were  taken. 
Some  3000  Dervishes  were  killed,  more  were  wounded, 
the  remainder  escaped,  but  ceased  to  be  in  any  sense 
an  army  during  the  remainder  of  the  campaign.  When 
the  troops  were  all  formed  up  and  the  wounded]  had 
been  succoured,  the  Sirdar  rode  round  the  brigades 
and  was  received  with  such  an  ovation  of  cheers  as  only 
a  successful  general  can  ever  experience — for  there 
was  not  a  man  in  the  force  but  realised  that  he  had  been 
led  to  victory  by  Kitchener's  brain  and  Kitchener's 
tactics. 

Let  those  who  feel  inclined  to  scoff  at  all  "  savage 
warfare  "  reflect  that  England  had  been  several  times 
humiliated  in  her  Sudan  campaigns,  and  let  them  also 
try  to  picture  what  a  catastrophe  our  defeat  on  the 
Atbara  would  have  entailed. 


CHAPTER  IX 

OMDURMAN,  SEPTEMBER  1898. 

See  maps  facing  pages  232  and  238 

The  defeat  and  dispersal  of  Mahmud's  army  at  the 
Battle  of  the  Atbara  in  April  removed  the  only  formid- 
able body  of  Dervishes  from  Kitchener's  path  to 
Omdurman,  and  the  Khalifa  did  not  deem  it  prudent  to 
send  forward  another  contingent  to  delay  the  next 
blow.  Military  critics  in  England  thereupon  suggested 
that  the  Anglo-Egyptian  force  ought  at  once  to  follow 
up  their  victory  and  advance  upon  the  city  before  its 
defenders  were  ready.  The  suggestion  would  have 
been  wise  and  appropriate  in  nine  campaigns  out  of  ten, 
but  its  authors  failed  to  appreciate  the  essential  feature 
of  the  river  war — namely  the  Nile  flood.  In  April  and 
May  it  was  at  its  lowest.  In  June  it  would  begin  to 
rise  and  would  continue  rising  throughout  July  and 
August.  In  September  it  would  reach  its  highest 
point  and  then  commence  slowly  to  subside.  August 
would  therefore  be  the  month  to  start  on  an  offensive 
campaign.  Moreover  the  intense  heat  of  a  Sudan 
summer  and  the  risk  of  exposing  the  health  of  British 
soldiers  to  the  fatigues  of  marches  at  night  and  halts  in 
shadeless  bivouacs  by  day  rendered  it  advisable  to  defer 
the  campaign  to  the  autumn.  Finally  the  Sirdar  was 
not  ready  to  start  and  was  not  the  man  to  start  before 
he  was  ready. 

Railhead  had  not  reached  even  Berber.     The  new 


212  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

gunboats,  travelling  in  parcels  between  England  and 
Fort  Atbara,  could  not  be  put  together  until  the  railway 
could  deposit  them  near  open  water.  Food,  fodder, 
ammunition  and  steamer-fuel  for  several  months  must 
be  accumulated  and  provided  with  transport.  Sailing- 
boats  must  wait  till  half-flood  before  they  could  be 
hauled  over  cataracts.  Telegraph  lines  take  time  to 
lay  but  are  essential  in  modern  war.  In  fact  a  hurried 
advance  after  the  Atbara  would  have  entailed  vexatious 
delays  at  a  critical  stage  later  on.  So  the  army  retired 
into  summer  quarters  under  the  substantial  roofs  of 
Berber  and  neighbouring  villages,  whilst  Kitchener 
and  all  the  departmental  services  made  adequate 
preparation  for  future  events.  During  four  long  weary 
months  they  toiled  without  rest  beneath  a  pitiless 
sun.  Along  the  1400  miles  of  communications 
stores  were  pushed  forward  day  and  night,  and  where 
the  Sirdar  himself  watched  and  planned  work  was  got 
through  quickest  and  best.  Even  impossibilities,  as 
some  said,  were  accomplished  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  business,  and  the  difficulty  of  getting  articles  to  the 
front  in  the  order  of  their  relative  importance  was 
overcome,  in  spite  of  the  six  changes  of  vehicle  which 
they  made  en  route. 

Thus  by  the  end  of  July  the  railway  terminus  at 
Fort  Atbara  presented  the  appearance  of  a  busy  port 
containing  streets  of  tinned  beef-boxes,  biscuits, 
blankets,  barrels  and  bales,  and  more  than  200 
sailing-craft,  whose  tapering  spars  waved  aloft  as  they 
rolled  on  the  gentle  billows  of  the  broad  river.  At  last 
both  the  Sirdar  and  the  Nile  flood  were  ready  to  move 
the  troops,  and  on  August  3,  MacDonald's  and 
Maxwell's  Sudanese  brigades  embarked  on  troop-barges 
towed  by  steamers  and  started  for  the  Shabluka  cat- 
aract— 150  miles  to  the  south. 


OMDURMAN,  SEPTEMBER  1898  213 

Vandeleur  and  the  9th  Sudanese  went  in  the  first 
boat,  heartily  glad  to  exchange  the  monotony  of  Berber 
for  the  excitements  of  active  service — his  happy, 
smihng  blacks  packed  tight  as  tinned  sardines  on  the 
limited  decks,  whilst  their  wives  gave  them  an  enthusi- 
astic send-off  from  the  shore.  The  Nile  in  flood 
presented  a  magnificent  and  imposing  spectacle  as  the 
volume  of  water,  a  mile  broad,  sped  through  this  fertile 
province  at  the  rate  of  five  miles  an  hour.  The  steamer 
struggled  slowly  against  the  current,  and  Vandeleur 
had  ample  time  to  note  the  scene  and  speculate  on  the 
coming  campaign.  Shendi  and  Metemma  and  the 
fourteen  pyramids  of  Meroe  were  passed,  and  he  was 
particularly  interested  in  an  island  noted  as  the 
legendary  abode  of  the  Queen  of  Sheba.  But,  as  the 
business  of  the  moment  was  war  and  an  army  was 
concentrating  at  Shabluka,  the  reader  shall  not  be 
detained  by  reflections  on  this  historic  land,  but  shall 
at  once  be  transported  to  the  advanced  camp,  in  which 
the  troops  detailed  below  were  assembled  by  August 
23 — with  orders  to  start  next  day  on  their  fifty-mile 
march  to  Omdurman — 

Sirdar.  (Commander-in-Chief)  Major-General  Sir  H.  Kitchener. 

Mounted  Troops. 

2ist  Lancers  (Colonel  Martin)  :    four  squadrons. 
Egyptian  Cavalry  (Lieut. -Colonel    Broadwood)  :     nine  squadrons. 
Egyptian  Artillery  (Major  Young) :    one  battery,  four  maxim  guns. 
Camel  Corps  (Major  Tudway)  :    eight  Egyptian  Companies. 
Field  Hospital,  Captain  Hill-Smith. 

Artillery. — Lieut. -Colonel  Long. 

British. — 32nd    Field     Battery     (Major    Williams).    37th    Howitzer 
Battery  (Major  Elmslie),  two  Forty-pounder  guns,  six  maxim  guns. 

Egyptian. — Four  Batteries,  carried  by  pack-mules. 

Ammunition  Columns — ist.  Column  (Camel  Transport),  2nd  Column 
(Water  Transport). 


214  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

Infantry. 
The  British  Division  (Major-General  Gatacre). 

ist  Brigade  [Brig. -General  Wauchope] :  ist  Battalion  Royal  War- 
wickshire Regiment  (Lieut. -Colonel  Forbes),  ist  BattaUon  Lincoln 
Regiment  (Lieut. -Colonel  Lowth),  ist  Battalion  Seaforth  Highlanders 
(Colonel  Murray),  ist  Battalion  Cameron  Highlanders  (Colonel  Money), 
two  maxim  guns,  Field  Hospital. 

2nd  Brigade  [Brig. -General  Hon.  N.  Lyttelton] :  ist'  BattaUon 
Grenadier  Guards  (Colonel  Hatton),  ist  Battalion  Northumberland 
Fusiliers  (Lieut. -Colonel  Money),  2nd  Battalion  Lancashire  Fusiliers 
(Lieut. -Colonel  CoUingwood),  2nd  Battalion  Rifle  Brigade  (Colonel 
Howard),  two  maxim  guns.  Field  Hospital. 

The  Egyptian  Division  (Major-General  Hunter). 

(i)  MacDonald's  Brigade  [Lieut. -Colonel  Hector  MacDonald] :  2nd 
Egyptian  BattaUon  (Major  Pink),  9th  Sudanese  Battalion  (Major 
Walter),  loth  Sudanese  Battalion  (Major  Nason),  nth  Sudanese 
Battalion  (Major  Jackson).  Field  Hospital  (Captain  Spong),  two  maxim 
guns. 

(2)  Maxwell's  Brigade  [Lieut. -Colonel  Maxwell] :  8th  Egyptian 
Battalion  (Kalussi  Bey),  12th  Sudanese  Battalion  (Lieut. -Colonel 
Townshend),  13th  Sudanese  Battalion  (Lieut. -Colonel  Smith-Dorrien), 
14th  Sudanese  Battalion  (Major  Shekleton),  Field  Hospital  (Captain 
Dunn),  two  maxim  guns. 

(3)  Lewis's  Brigade  [Lieut. -Colonel  Lewis] :  3rd  Egyptian  BattaUon 
(Lieut. -Colonel  Sillem),  4th  Egyptian  BattaUon  (Major  Sparkes), 
7th  Egyptian  Battalion  (Fathy  Bey),  15th  Egyptian  BattaUon  (Major 
Hickman),  Field  Hospital  (Captain  Jennings),  two  maxim  guns. 

(4)  Collinson's  Brigade  [Lieut. -Colonel  ColUnson] :  ist  Egyptian 
BattaUon  (Major  Doran),  6th  Egyptian  Battalion  (A  Native  Bey), 
17th  Egyptian  Battalion  (Major  Bunbury),  i8th  Egyptian  BattaUon 
(Captain  Matchett),  Field  Hospital  (Captain  Whiston),  two  maxim 
guns. 

Gunboats  (Commander  CoUn  Keppel,  R.N.). 

Ten  gunboats  of  various  patterns,  carrying  altogether  thirty  guns 
and  twenty  maxims — manned  by  Egyptian  crews,  commanded  by 
British  naval  officers. 

Transport. 

3600  Camels  (Lieut. -Colonel  Walter  Kitchener),  5  steamers,  206 
sailing-boats  (Captain  Gorringe). 

Total  =  22,000  combatants. 

The  above  army  moved  as  a  "  flying  Column/'  that 
is  to  say  without  hnes  of  communications  beyond  Fort 
Atbara.        By    this    arrangement    the    difficulties    of 


OMDURMAN,  SEPTEMBER  1898  215 

defending  bases  from  raids  was  overcome,  and  all 
reserve  stores  moved  forward  in  sailing-boats  and 
steamers,  which  could  accompany  the  march  of  the 
army  and  be  moored  at  night  on  either  bank  of  the 
river  as  required. 

Some  refreshing  rain  showers  laid  the  desert  dust 
and  cooled  the  air  during  our  first  march  from  Shabluka, 
and  the  cataract  was  turned  with  ease  and  comfort  by 
the  troops — though  difficulty  was  experienced  in 
hauling  laden  boats  up  its  narrow  channel,  which 
reduces  the  Nile's  width  to  a  few  hundred  yards  and 
greatly  increases  its  current.  Beyond  the  cataract 
the  problem  was  quite  simple  till  we  reached  the 
neighbourhood  of  Omdurman.  With  cavalry  spread 
out  like  a  fan  several  miles  ahead,  with  gunboats  on 
the  river  flank  and  camel-corps  on  the  desert  flank,  the 
stolid  infantry  brigades  moved  forward  on  a  wide  front 
(ij  miles)  and  accomplished  about  ten  miles  every  day 
across  a  fairly  level  country  covered  by  scrub  and 
stunted  trees.  Of  population  there  was  none,  as  the 
Jaalin  tribe  had  been  almost  mped  out  of  existence  by 
Mahmud  during  the  previous  year. 

Meanwhile  the  Khalifa,  fully  informed  of  our 
advance,  appears  from  information  gathered  after 
the  event  to  have  planned  that  Kitchener,  the 
accursed,  should  be  enticed  to  the  outskirts  of  Omdur- 
man and  there  exterminated  as  Hicks  had  been 
exterminated  in  Kordofan.  Like  the  President  of 
the  South  African  Republic,  the  Khalifa  AbduUahi 
would  wait  till  the  tortoise  poked  its  head  out  of  its 
shell  before  he  would  deal  it  the  death  blow.  The 
Baggara  horse  therefore  retreated  before  our  cavalry 
and  evacuated  Kerreri  village  without  an  encounter. 

And  thus  it  came  to  pass  that  on  September  i. 
Kitchener,  continuing  his  steady  methodical  movement. 


2i6  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

crossed  the  Kerreri  ridge,  descended  on  to  a  bare  level 
plain  and  bivouacked  unopposed  eight  miles  from 
Omdurman  at  the  village  of  Agaiga,  by  the  bank  of  the 
Nile.  The  Khalifa  on  the  same  day  marched  60,000 
warriors  out  of  the  city  and  camped  them  in  the 
desert  only  five  miles  from  Kitchener. 

Rarely  have  two  armies  aggregating  80,000  com- 
batants approached  so  near  to  one  another  without  a 
preliminary  skirmish  or  even  an  affair  of  outposts. 
Rarely  have  two  commanders  been  more  certain  of 
success  than  were  both  Kitchener  and  Abdullahi. 
And  rarely  have  two  forces  been  more  imbued  with  the 
spirit  of  their  respective  chiefs  or  more  willing  to  make 
such  sacrifices  as  might  be  necessary  to  ensure  victory. 
The  Dervishes  were  determined  to  fight  in  the  open  and 
die  for  their  religion  and  the  glory  of  conquest.  The 
Anglo-Egyptians  were  prepared  to  attack  a  huge  city 
and  sustain  enormous  losses  during  several  days'  street- 
fighting — in  the  cause  of  their  duty  and  their  patriotism. 
As  between  the  motives  animating  these  opponents  the 
verdict  of  the  reader  will  doubtless  vary  according  to 
his  temperament  and  inclinations,  but  the  effect  was 
to  bring  about  a  colhsion  with  the  least  possible  delay. 
The  choice  of  the  battle  ground  lay  with  the  Dervishes, 
and  they  deliberately  selected  a  treeless  plain.  Their 
military  system  required  a  clear  manoeuvring  area  for 
concentrated  masses  of  men  to  enable  the  Emirs  to  see 
what  they  were  doing  and  control  their  numerous 
retainers.  They  had  decided  in  any  case  to  attack  and 
to  keep  on  attacking  regardless  of  loss  till  they  won. 
They  attributed  their  recent  defeats  at  Firkeh,  Abu 
Hamed  and  The  Atbara  to  the  defensive  attitude  they 
had  assumed  in  those  actions.  On  this  occasion  they 
meant  to  revert  to  the  precedents  of  Hicks'  disaster 
at  Shekan,  Baker's  disaster  at  El-Teb,  Gordon's  death 


OMDURMAN,  SEPTEMBER  1898  217 

at  Khartoum  and  a  number  of  minor  affairs — such  as 
McNeil's  zariba  near  Suakim  and  the  British  square  at 
Abu  Klea,  both  of  which  had  been  pierced  by  rushes  of 
spearmen.  The  Dervishes  now  possessed  both  riflemen 
and  spearmen  in  greater  quantities  than  ever.  They 
would  charge  and  charge  again,  as  the  Prophet  Mohamed 
had  done  in  all  his  most  glorious  and  holy  battles. 
Mahdism  too  should  conquer  on  this  the  greatest  day 
of  its  history,  and  the  plains  of  Kerreri  should  witness 
the  slaughter  of  the  foe. 

Midway  between  the  armies  in  their  respective 
bivouacs  a  high  conical  hill,  named  Surgham,  rose  out 
of  the  plain.  It  was  occupied  by  our  cavalry  and  a 
signal  station,  and  offered  a  distant  view  of  the  Dervish 
host  which  was  watched  through  glasses  till  night- 
fall. 

The  Dervish  army  left  an  impression  of  great  power 
on  the  minds  of  those  who  beheld  it  marching  across  the 
desert  towards  its  camp,  and  some  of  the  squadrons 
saw  it  at  very  close  quarters  in  the  morning's  recon- 
naissance. The  enormous  tract  of  country  it  filled,  the 
rate  at  which  it  moved  and  the  spirit  with  which  it  was 
animated  caused  thoughtful  officers  to  doubt  the  issue. 
Had  Kitchener  sufficient  force  to  beat  off  such 
numbers  ?  How  could  we  stand  up  to  their  rushes 
during  the  darkness  of  the  night  ?  Such  questions 
arose  involuntarily,  as  officers  on  Surgham  Hill  looked 
from  the  Dervish  mass  in  its  vast  camp  towards 
their  own  thin  line,  disposed  in  an  irregular  crescent 
round  the  village  of  Agaiga.*  Its  flanks  rested  on 
the  bank  of  the  Nile,  and  were  a  mile  apart.  The 
crescent,  about  two  miles  long,  was  held  only  by  a 
double  rank  of  infantry.  Gunboats  in  mid-stream 
brought  a  cross  fire  to  bear  on  both  flanks,  and  every- 

*  See  plan  facing  page '232. 


2i8  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

where  the  field  of  fire  was  excellent  by  daylight.  But 
by  moonlight  no  man  would  see  further  than  200 
yards  beyond  his  rifle-barrel  ! 

Thus  the  night  of  September  i^  was  an  anxious  one 
for  British  officers,  though  the  one  most  concerned, 
Kitchener,  showed  no  anxiety.  He  had  taken  the 
precaution  of  privately  informing  some  villagers  of 
Agaiga  that  he  meant  to  attack  the  Dervish  army  at 
midnight.  He  then  sent  them  out  to  the  Khalifa's 
camp  for  news  of  the  enemy — knowing  full  well  they 
would  faithfully  report  his  own  intention  to  the  other 
side.  Whether  this  ruse  or  the  rooted  aversion  of  the 
Emirs  to  night  operations  influenced  the  Khalifa  it  is 
impossible  to  know.  He  was  himself  inclined  for  a 
night  attack.  He  called  a  council  of  war  after  sunset, 
and  at  this  council  the  plans  for  next  day  were  dis- 
cussed and  decided.  The  night  attack  was  mooted  and 
rejected.  My  own  impression  after  carefully  cross- 
examining  one  of  the  Baggara  Emirs  who  was  present 
(he  was  subsequently  wounded  and  taken  prisoner)  is 
that  the  council  of  war  was  so  numerously  attended  that 
little  business  could  be  done,  and  that  the  real  decision 
rested  with  the  Khalifa  and  Osman  Azrak  who  together 
planned  the  attack.  At  any  rate  the  hours  of  darkness 
passed  without  incident,  and  with  daylight  the  Khalifa's 
best  chance  of  victory  vanished. 

The  Battle  of  Omdurman  has  been  described  by 
many  pens.  My  own  sketch  shall  therefore  be  brief, 
and  designed  rather  to  carry  forward  the  narrative  to 
the  downfall  of  the  Dervishes  a  year  after  the  action 
than  to  add  any  new  light  to  what  is  known  of  the 
battle-tactics  and  incidents  of  September  2,  1898.  The 
Dervishes  were  on  the  move  long  before  daylight, 
mars  ailing  their  men  in  careful  array,  and  when  the 
sun  rose  about  5.50  a.m.  an  Egyptian  squadron  posted 


OMDURMAN,  SEPTEMBER  1898  219 

betimes  on  Surgham  Hill  beheld  a  stirring  sight.  In 
five  great  subdivisions,  all  beautifully  aligned  and 
occupying  fully  four  miles  of  frontage,  the  brave  Arabs 
and  blacks  were  striding  into  action  at  a  prodigious 
pace.  The  ranks  were  ten,  twenty  and  sometimes 
thirty  deep.  One  of  the  masses  followed  in  rear  as  a 
reserve,  marching  straight  towards  Surgham  HiU  from 
which  the  nearest  body  was  but  one  mile  distant.  The 
contingent  of  each  great  Emir  was  clearly  denoted  by 
his  flag  borne  aloft  on  a  pole  or  spear,  and  the  enthusiasm 
of  the  whole  force  was  sufficiently  evinced  by  the 
unhesitating  way  in  which  it  moved,  and  by  the  shouts 
and  roars  of  tens  of  thousands  of  men  calling  upon 
Allah  to  grant  them  victory.  Long  before  our  troops 
could  see  a  man  or  even  a  flag  on  the  horizon  the  distant 
murmur  of  raucous  voices  gave  them  some  idea  of  the 
vast  numbers  they  were  about  to  engage. 

The  Dervish  plan  of  attack  was  simple,  compre- 
hensive and  suitable  to  the  ground  they  had  selected 
and  the  discipHne  they  could  enforce.  But  it  com- 
pletely miscalculated  the  effect  of  fire-arms  on  an  open 
plain.  The  idea  was  to  envelop  the  Sirdar's  position 
and  attack  it  from  three  directions  whilst  a  central 
reserve  of  20,000  picked  men,  concealed  behind 
Surgham  Hill,  waited  till  one  of  the  attacks  should 
succeed.  It  was  then  to  rush  forward  and  complete 
the  victory.  The  five  contingents  were  marshalled  as 
under,  from  left  to  right,  but  the  figures  should  be 
accepted  as  only  approximately  correct  : 


(i)  Ali  Wad  Helu's  Bright  Green  Flag  . 

(2)  Sheik-el-Din's  (son  of  the  Khahfa)  Dark  Green  Flag 

(3)  Yakoob's  (brother  of  the  Khalifa)  Great  Black  Flag 

(4)  Osman  Azrak's  various  Flags  of  Subordinate  Emirs 

(5)  Sherif's  Red  Flag 


6,000  men. 
12,000      „ 
20,000      ,, 
15,000 

7,000      ,. 


Total     .     60,000 


220  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

The  Khalifa  himself  remained  with  Yakoob  and 
the  Krupp  artillery  near  the  Great  Black  Flag  which 
was  his  own  special  ensign.  The  first  two  contingents 
were  to  make  for  the  Kerreri  Hills,  move  behind  their 
cover,  turn  to  the  right  and  attack  the  northern  face  of 
Kitchener's  crescent.  The  third  contingent  was  to 
remain  in  reserve  as  stated  above.  The  fourth  under 
its  celebrated  fighting  chief  was  to  make  a  frontal 
attack  across  the  level  ground  between  Surgham  and 
Kerreri  Hills.  The  fifth  was  to  chmb  over  the  Surgham 
ridges  and  attack  our  southern  flank  simultaneously 
with  Osman  Azrak.  Osman  Digna  with  several 
hundred  Hadendoa  Arabs  from  Suakin  was  to  lie 
in  wait  near  the  Omdurman  road  and  fall  upon  any 
detachments  which  might  try  to  get  into  the  city. 
Beyond  the  combination  arranged  between  Osman 
Azrak  and  Sherif  we  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  the 
several  attacks  were  intended  to  be  simultaneous.  The 
evidence  rather  points  to  the  probabiUty  that  each  Emir 
was  to  emulate  the  zeal  of  his  neighbour  and  try  to  be 
first  into  the  invaders'  ranks. 

Whilst  the  Dervishes  are  still  marching  to  their 
allotted  places  let  us  glance  at  the  map  facing  page 
232  and  notice  Kitchener's  dispositions  to  meet  the 
impending  attack.  He  remained  in  the  formation  he 
had  selected  when  a  night  attack  seemed  probable  and 
rehed  wholly  on  fire  action  to  win  the  battle.  He 
therefore  put  as  many  rifles  as  possible  in  the  firing 
line,  keeping  only  two  companies  per  battalion  in 
support  and  one  (Collinson's)  brigade  in  reserve. 
Roughly  speaking  the  larger  half  of  the  crescent,  which 
faced  Surgham  Hill  and  the  space  between  it  and 
Kerreri  Hills,  was  manned  by  the  British  Division  and 
Maxwell's  brigade.  This  was  the  part  which  Osman 
Azrak  and  Sherif  were  about  to  attack.     The  lesser  half 


OMDURMAM,  SEPTEMBER  1898  221 

of  the  crescent,  facing  the  Kerreri  Hills  and  ridges,  was 
manned  by  MacDonald's  and  Lewis's  brigades,  which 
were  not  attacked  in  the  early  morning.  Batteries  of 
artillery  were  posted  in  the  intervals  between  brigades, 
maxims  between  battalions.  Hunter  had  arranged 
that  his  brigades  should  fire  from  a  slight  shelter  trench 
wdth  no  zariba  in  front,  because  a  zariba  would  merely 
impede  the  field  of  fire  without  affording  any  protection 
against  the  enemy's  bullets.  But  Gatacre's  British 
brigades  laboriously  collected  branches  and  trees  for  a 
zariba  and  omitted  to  dig  a  shelter  trench.  The 
consequence  was  that,  when  the  attack  developed, 
the  British  soldier  had  to  stand  up  to  shoot,  as  otherwise 
he  could  not  see  to  fire  over  his  zariba,  and  he  thus 
laboured  under  the  double  disadvantage  of  being  fully 
exposed  to  bullets  and  of  firing  from  an  awkward 
standing  instead  of  an  easy  kneeling  position.  It  was  a 
drawback  from  which  Hunter's  command  was  free. 

The  2ist  Lancers  and  Hospitals  remained  within 
the  Unes  under  cover  of  the  Nile  bank  whilst  the  attack 
was  in  progress.  The  Egyptian  cavalry.  Camel-corps 
and  Horse  Battery  were  posted  on  Kerreri  Hills  under 
Broadwood,  where  they  were  destined  to  take  an 
important  part.  The  Howitzer  Battery  and  40- 
pounders  were  several  miles  up  the  river  and  had 
already  inflicted  considerable  damage  on  the  Mahdi's 
tomb,  the  forts  and  the  w^alls,  from  the  right  bank  of 
the  Nile. 

A  flotilla  of  gunboats  was  engaged  in  reducing  the 
river-forts  of  Omdurman,  the  other  flotilla  stood  by 
with  steam  up  to  join  in  the  general  action  at  Agaiga, 
whenever  opportunity  should  offer. 

Thus  all  the  pieces  were  set  out  upon  the  board  and 
it  will  be  easy  to  follow  their  play  and  see  how  each 
contributed    to  the  day's  fighting.     At  6.15  a.m.  the 


222  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

murmur  of  beating  drums  and  war-cries  grew  very  loud, 
the  tramp  of  Dervish  feet  was  continuous,  but  as  yet 
from  Agaiga  we  could  only  see  cavalry  scouts  retiring 
before  the  enemy  across  our  front.  Presently  a  line 
of  flags  appeared  like  a  crested  wave  on  the  horizon  a 
mile  and  a  half  in  front  of  Maxwell's  brigade.  Then  a 
wave  of  linen-clad  men  emerged  from  under  the  flags 
and  drove  towards  us  straight  across  the  plain. 
It  was  Osman  Azrak's  frontal  attack.  Behind  and 
beyond  him  similar  waves  of  Green  Flags  dashed 
towards  the  Kerreri  Hills,  whilst  on  his  right  the  Red 
Flag  of  Sherif  topped  Surgham  ridge  and  descended 
swiftly  into  the  arena.  Within  half  an  hour  of  their 
first  appearance,  Maxwell's  brigade  was  hotly  engaged 
with  Osman  Azrak,  Gatacre's  Division  with  Sherif, 
Broadwood's  troops  with  Sheik-el-Din  and  the  artillery 
and  maxims  with  all  of  them.  The  Khalifa  opened  the 
battle  with  his  Krupp  guns,  whose  shells  fell  close  to 
our  line. 

If  bravery  and  sublime  indifference  to  death  could 
have  carried  men  over  the  bullet-swept  zone,  Osman 
Azrak  and  Sherif  would  certainly  have  closed  with 
Maxwell  and  Gatacre.  But  the  thing  was  utterly 
impossible.  No  human  being  could  run  and  live  in  the 
storm  of  lead  which  swept  over  the  ground.  Shrapnel 
burst  amidst  the  more  distant  masses  with  perpetual 
accuracy  :  maxim  and  rifle  bullets  tore  through  the 
flesh  and  bones  of  those  who  came  nearer.  The 
Dervish  ranks  nevertheless  hurried  unflinchingly  for- 
ward in  their  magnificent  and  sullen  determination 
to  grapple  with  the  foe.  But  the  attack  in  broad  day- 
light could  have  only  one  termination,  though  some 
Dervishes  survived  to  reach  within  a  couple  of  hundred 
paces  of  our  position  and  some  of  their  riflemen, 
concealed  by  hollows  and  depressions  in  the  plain,  kept 


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OMDURMAN,  SEPTEMBER  1898  223 

up  a  galling  fire  which  killed  more  men  in  our  reserves 
than  in  our  firing  Une.  By  8.15  a.m.  after  an  hour 
and  a  half  of  struggle  the  attack  died  away  from  sheer 
exhaustion  and  loss,  and  two  of  the  enemy's  five 
contingents  were  completely  hors  de  combat.  Mean- 
while the  British  and  Egyptians  had  suffered  casualties, 
though  they  passed  unnoticed  during  the  absorbing 
interest  of  the  engagement  and  amounted  to  a  mere 
nothing  when  compared  with  Osman  Azrak's  and 
Sherifs  21 13  killed  and  about  6000  wounded.  These 
lay  strewn  over  an  area  of  a  square  mile,  and  so  fierce 
is  the  fighting  instinct  of  the  Mohammedan  warrior 
that  he  will  rise  wounded  from  the  ground  and  expend 
his  last  breath  in  using  his  rifle  or  spear  against  any 
enemy  who  passes  neghgently  near  him. 

We  had  not  wished  to  mow  them  down  as  they 
advanced,  nor  had  any  one  relished  the  process  of 
perpetually  loading  and  pressing  the  trigger  of  a  very 
hot  rifle,  but  there  was  no  other  method  of  dealing  with 
Dervishes  and  preventing  the  far  greater  slaughter 
which  would  have  occurred,  had  they  penetrated  our 
formation. 

Simultaneously  with  the  events  just  narrated  our 
mounted  force  in  observation  on  Kerreri  heights  became 
seriously  compromised  with  Sheik-el-Din's  contingent, 
and  the  action  which  ensued  was  to  have  a  direct 
bearing  on  the  principal  incident  of  the  day.  Broad- 
wood's  role  was  to  observe  and  co-operate  and  feint. 
He  had  no  intention  of  undertaking  a  separate  battle 
on  his  own  account,  nor  was  his  force  organised  for 
close  fighting  in  the  hills.  It  numbered  1800  men, 
trained  to  fight  on  foot  and  move  on  horseback  or  camel- 
back,  and  was  composed  of  nine  squadrons  of  cavalry, 
one  battery  of  horse  artillery  and  eight  companies  of 
camel-corps.     The    Kerreri    slopes    were    everywhere 


224  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

strewn  with  rocks  and  volcanic  boulders,  whereas  the 
level  plain  around  them  had  become  a  marsh  owing  to 
recent  heavy  rain.  On  such  ground  the  military 
mobility  of  Broadwood's  three  arms  may  be  compared 
with  that  of  a  hunter,  a  hansom-cab  and  a  milch-cow. 
The  desert-bred  camel  floundered  hopelessly  in  the 
marsh  or  stumbled  painfully  over  boulders  :  the  gun 
wheels  were  in  frequent  difficulties  :  the  cavalry  alone 
could  be  depended  on  to  move  quickly. 

When  Sheik-el-Din's  thousands  surged  rapidly  upon 
them,  Broadwood's  men  were  posted  on  foot  along 
some  ridges  with  their  animals  well  in  rear.  Their 
commander  had  but  a  moment  in  which  to  come  to  a 
decision,  and  a  moment  was  sufficient.  He  ordered 
the  men  to  retire  and  mount.  They  as  usual  supported 
one  another  by  a  covering  fire  and,  working  with 
deliberation,  sought  to  check  the  tide  of  the  enemy's 
attack.  Having  regained  their  mounts  the  retirement 
continued.  This  unequal  combat  was  observed  from 
Agaiga  with  some  apprehension,  and  the  batteries 
which  could  bear  on  Kerreri  Hills  diverted  their  fire 
from  Osman  Azrak  and  burst  shells  amongst  Sheik- 
el-Din's  men  at  3000  yards.  The  Sirdar  thought  it 
would  be  prudent  to  withdraw  the  cavalry  within  the 
main  lines,  but  Broadwood  sent  h'm  a  message  that  he 
was  too  closely  engaged  to  withdraw  to  his  flank  and 
proposed  to  continue  retiring  due  north  till  he  could 
shake  off  his  pursuers. 

But  the  pursuing  footmen  were  now  leaping  over 
the  boulders  quicker  than  the  camels,  so  Broadwood 
decided  that  he  must  at  any  rate  free  himself  from  the 
incubus  of  his  slow-moving  camel-corps,  and  accordingly 
ordered  it  to  make  for  the  Nile  whilst  he  covered  the 
movement  from  a  flank.  In  order  to  extricate  the 
camel-corps  and  get  it  safely  within  our  lines,  he  was 


OMDURMAN,  SEPTEMBER  1898  225 

prepared  to  make  a  desperate  charge  with  all  his 
squadrons.  Encumbered  with  forty  wounded,  the 
camels  made  towards  the  river  with  Sheik-el-Din's 
leading  men  in  hot  pursuit  and  only  300  yards  distant. 
It  looked  as  though  they  must  be  completely  over- 
whelmed. But  at  this  critical  moment  one  of  the 
gunboats  swung  down-stream  and  at  short  ranges 
plastered  the  Kerreri  hill-sides  with  shrapnel  and 
maxim  bullets,  checked  the  Dervish  pursuit,  obviated 
Broadwood's  charge  and  enabled  the  camel-corps  to 
gain  the  safety  of  our  lines.  The  infuriated  Dervishes 
baulked  of  their  prey  turned  upon  Broadwood  with 
renewed  vigour  and  pursued  his  elusive  squadrons 
three  miles  down  the  river  bank.  Their  appetite  was 
whetted  by  the  capture  of  two  of  the  horse  artillery 
guns,  which  stuck  in  a  bog  and  had  to  be  abandoned  ; 
but  meanwhile  Sheik-el-Din  was  led  four  miles  away 
from  the  battlefield  during  the  most  critical  hours  of 
the  day.  Broadwood's  squadrons,  handled  as  he  and 
his  bimbashis  knew  how  to  handle  them,  merely  played 
with  the  angry  Dervishes  and  ended  by  slipping  back 
along  the  river  bank  under  the  covering  fire  of  a  gun- 
boat. They  recovered  their  lost  guns  and  rejoined 
the  army  soon  after  10  a.m.  Sheik-el-Din  also  ralhed 
and  marched  back  his  scattered  command,  but  by  the 
time  it  rejoined  Ali  Wad  Helu's  contingent  the  moment 
for  its  most  effective  action  had  passed,  as  we  shall 
relate  by-and-bye.  Thus  ended  the  first  phase  of  the 
battle. 

We  have,  however,  anticipated  the  main  narrative 
by  two  hours  in  order  to  follow  Broadwood's  manoeuvre 
to  its  conclusion,  and  must  now  return  to  Kitchener  at 
Agaiga  after  the  frontal  attack  was  repulsed  at  8,15 
A.M.  The  Sirdar,  having  annihilated  two  contingents 
and  seen  a  third  quit  the  battlefield  in  pursuit  of  his 


226  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

cavalry,  determined  forthwith  to  reach  the  city  before 
the  two  remaining  contingents  could  get  there  to 
organise  street  fighting.  He  therefore  marched  out  of 
Agaiga  and  headed  for  Omdurman,  moving  in  Echelon 
of  brigades  from  the  left  (river  flank)  in  the  following 
order — 2nd  (Lyttelton's)  British  Brigade,  ist  (Wau- 
chope's)  British  Brigade,  Maxwell's  Brigade,  Lewis's 
Brigade,  MacDonald's  Brigade.  Collinson's  Brigade 
followed  along  the  river  bank  as  a  reserve,  to  protect 
the  hospitals  and  transport.  As  MacDonald's  was  the 
most  exposed  brigade  in  this  movement,  it  was  rein- 
forced by  three  batteries  artillery  and  six  maxim 
guns. 

To  interpose  your  own  army  between  the  enemy 

and  his  base  is  one  of  the  soundest  and  oldest  of  the 

maxims  of  good  generalship.     It  has  been  applied  in 

all  ages  and  in  all  campaigns  whether  by  sea  or  by 

land,  and  requires,  to  avoid  defeat,  that  the  force  which 

attempts  it  be  sufficiently  strong  to  maintain  itself 

against  counter-attack.     But  the  manoeuvre  is  by  no 

means  an  easy  one  to  execute  on  the  field  of  battle. 

In  the  Boer  War  we  accomplished  it  successfully  at 

Paardeberg,    but   failed   to    do   so    at    Poplar   Grove, 

Driefontein,  Johannesberg,  Pretoria  and  Diamond  Hill. 

The  Japanese,  though  successful  in  every  engagement, 

failed  to  interpose  between  the  Russians  and  their  base 

at  Liau-Yang  and  Mukden.     Even  Baron  Stackelberg, 

when  soundly  beaten  at  Telissu,  was  able  to  rejoin 

Kuropatkin's    army.     The    more    we    study    military 

history  the  more  we  are  impressed  with  the  fact  that  to 

gain  a  really  decisive  action  a  general  must  successfully 

interpose  between  his  opponent  and  his  opponent's  base, 

and   that    is    why   every    ambitious    commander   has 

attempted  to  do  it.     At  any  rate  those  who  feared 

the  risk  which  such  a  manoeuvre  involves  have  not 


OMDURMAN,  SEPTEMBER  1898  227 

won  the  victory  which  perhaps  their  tactical  successes 
have  deserved.  Therefore,  when  Kitchener  headed 
for  Omdurman  with  two  unbeaten  contingents  of 
Dervishes  hovering  still  on  his  flank,  he  was  merely 
taking  the  road  which  would  lead  to  the  most  decisive 
result — confident,  after  the  experiences  of  the  morning, 
that  he  could  beat  off  the  enemy's  attacks.  The 
sequel  justified  his  opinion  and  refuted  that  of  the 
critics,  who  perhaps  forgot  what  has  been  proved  a 
thousand  times  over — the  impossibility  of  bringing 
off  a  victory  without  running  some  risk. 

Thus  at  the  commencement  of  the  second  phase  of 
the  battle  we  find  Kitchener's  army  marching  south- 
wards by  brigades,  separated  from  one  another  by  very 
wide  gaps,  with  the  21st  Lancers  acting  as  advanced 
guard.  The  Khalifa  and  his  reserve  still  lay  behind 
Surgham  Hill.  Ali  Wad  Helu  remained  concealed  by 
the  Kerreri  heights.  Sheik-el-Din  was  pursuing  the 
Egyptian  cavalry.     The  time  was  about  8.40  a.m. 

It  was  at  this  interesting  climax  that  there  occurred 
an  episode  which,  owing  to  the  praise  bestowed  upon  it 
by  public  opinion  at  home,  proves  beyond  doubt  that 
England  is  the  paradise  of  amateurs .  I  refer  to  the  charge 
of  the  2ist  Lancers.  The  regiment  had  never  before 
been  in  action  and  every  one  sympathised  with  its  ardent 
desire  to  achieve  a  success.  After  passing  between 
Surgham  Hill  and  the  Nile  it  encountered  various  small 
parties  of  the  retreating  enemy,  for  by  now  a  steady 
stream  of  fugitives  from  the  beaten  contingents  were 
making  for  their  homes  in  the  city.  But  unfortunately 
for  the  Lancers  there  was  also  an  ambush  in  a  khor, 
into  which  the  regiment  deliberately  galloped.  They 
suffered  heavy  losses  without  inflicting  much  damage, 
and  then  retired  out  of  action.  Such  misfortunes  are 
not  uncommon  in  war,  but  this  one  was  magnified  by 


228  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

irresponsible  writers  into  an  Homeric  Feat  of  Arms, 
which  serious  soldiers  sincerely  deplore.  The  Lancers' 
charge  was  not  only  unnecessary,  but  had  the  greater 
disadvantage  of  incapacitating  the  regiment  from  the 
performance  of  the  particular  duty  it  was  brought  into 
the  Sudan  to  accomplish — namely  the  capture  of  the 
Khalifa — and  the  fact  that  both  officers  and  men 
behaved  with  great  gallantry  in  a  nasty  place  is  no 
excuse  for  a  blunder. 

Whilst  this  episode  was  taking  place  and  the 
Sirdar  was  leading  the  British  brigades  in  the  wake 
of  the  Lancers,  MacDonald's  brigade  took  ground  to 
the  right  between  Kerreri  and  Surgham  Hills,  pass- 
ing over  the  plain  on  which  Osman  Azrak's  attack 
had  been  shattered.  Vandeleur  in  the  9th  Sudanese, 
belonged  to  this  brigade,  and  my  narrative  of  what 
befell  it  is  derived  from  his  diary  and  letters,  which 
were  written  immediately  after  the  event  and  furnish 
a  clear  and  unvarnished  account  of  what  happened. 
Fortunately  the  men  were  fresh,  as  they  were  not 
in  action  during  the  first  phase  of  the  battle  ;  the 
brigadier,  MacDonald,  was  a  fine  fighting  soldier  who 
knew  how  to  train  and  command  a  brigade,  and 
Hunter,  his  immediate  superior,  had  cautiously 
strengthened  him  by  the  addition  of  all  the  artillery 
and  maxims  he  could  spare  from  his  other  brigades. 
Some  delay  had  necessarily  occurred  before  MacDonald 
could  start  to  take  his  allotted  place  in  the  Echelon, 
and  the  result  was  a  considerable  gap  between  him 
and  Lewis,  as  well  as  between  Lewis  and  Maxwell. 
Moreover,  these  gaps  tended  to  increase  as  the  foot  of 
Surgham  Hill  was  neared. 

When  MacDonald  approached  to  within  1200 
yards  of  its  western  slope,  he  became  aware  that  he 
was  in    for  a  stiff  fight   with   the    Khahfa's   reserve 


OMDURMAN,  SEPTEMBER  1898  229 

under  the  Black  Flag,  and  Hunter  accordingly  sent  a 
galloper  to  Kitchener  with  the  news.  Soon  after- 
wards fighting  was  renewed  along  the  whole  ''refused" 
flank  from  Kerreri  hills  to  beyond  Surgham,  a  distance 
of  four  miles,  and  the  march  on  Omdurman  was 
abruptly  postponed.  Wauchope  started  on  a  two- 
mile  tramp  back  towards  MacDonald,  Lyttelton 
wheeled  to  the  right  south  of  Surgham  slopes,  Maxwell 
wheeled  and  stormed  vSurgham  heights,  Lewis  became 
engaged  between  Maxwell  and  MacDonald,  and  firing 
was  reopened  by  the  Dervishes  all  along  the  line.  Each 
brigade  had  a  story  of  its  own  but  our  particular 
interest  in  Vandeleur  engages  us  to  follow  the  fortunes 
of  MacDonald's  men,  who  bore  the  brunt  of  two  such 
furious  attacks  as  have  rarely  been  repelled  in  quick 
succession  by  a  single  brigade.  When  he  saw  the 
first  onset  impending  from  behind  Surgham  Hill,  the 
brigadier  halted  and  made  preparation.  He  deployed 
the  9th  Sudanese  on  the  right,  the  nth  Sudanese  on 
the  left,  the  loth  Sudanese  in  the  centre — all  facing  the 
Khalifa's  Black  Flag — and  held  the  2nd  Battalion  in 
reserve,  closed  up  in  quarter-column  ready  to  pro- 
long or  strengthen  the  fine  as  required.  The  three 
batteries  and  eight  maxims  were  disposed  in  the 
intervals  between  the  deployed  battalions.  Just  as 
these  arrangements  were  completed  the  Baggara  horse 
charged  down  at  top  speed,  followed  by  solid  phalanxes 
of  riflemen  and  spearmen  on  foot.  It  was  the  pick 
of  the  Dervish  army  making  its  effort  to  retrieve 
the  disaster  of  the  early  morning,  and  might  fittingly 
be  compared  to  the  last  charge  of  Napoleon's  Guard 
at  Waterloo.  The  Emirs  rode  their  horses  with  desper- 
ate energy  and  reminded  Vandeleur  of  iocke3^s  finish- 
ing for  the  Derby.  Not  one  flinched  or  turned  tail 
when  met  by  the    storm    of  bullets    which   emptied 


230  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

many  saddles.  On  they  came,  and  single  horsemen 
almost  penetrated  the  line,  being  killed  a  few  paces 
from  it.  Covered  by  this  desperate  charge  the  body- 
guard (mulazamieh)  strode  forward  with  equal  bravery 
and  suffered  even  greater  loss.  Their  deep  ranks  were 
mown  down  with  frightful  slaughter,  especially  at  about 
200  yards  range,  though  individuals  got  within  fifty 
paces  and  less.  Vandeleur  wrote :  "What  a  revela- 
tion it  was  to  see  the  Dervishes  come  on  to  certain 
death  without  the  slightest  hesitation.  I  never  saw 
one  man  who  had  approached  anywhere  near  turn 
back.  If  he  could  no  longer  advance  he  lay  down 
and  fired." 

When  20,000  such  warriors  are  eager  to  die  in  order 
that  a  remnant  of  them  may  close  with  3000,  it  is 
merely  a  matter  of  time  as  to  when  the  clash  will  occur, 
and  then  the  smaller  force  will  perish.  But  at  this 
critical  period  Lewis  and  Maxwell  appeared  on  the 
Dervish  flank,  and  diverted  the  dense  masses  in  rear 
from  reinforcing  the  attack  on  MacDonald.  They  were 
compelled  to  turn  against  their  new  assailants,  and 
thus  the  pressure  on  MacDonald  was  greatly  relieved. 
The  roar  of  guns,  maxims  and  rifles  became  incessant 
all  over  and  around  Surgham  Hill,  and  the  Remington 
rifles  of  the  Black  Flags  spluttered  in  increasing  numbers 
as  the  Khalifa's  reserve  spread  out. 

The  battle  had  lasted  over  four  hours  without  many 
pauses,  and  was  being  more  hotly  contested  than  ever, 
when  MacDonald  was  suddenly  called  upon  to  face 
another  crisis.  This  time  it  menaced  his  right  rear 
from  the  direction  of  the  Kerreri  hills. 

The  Green  Flags  of  Ali  Wad  Helu  and  Sheik-el-Din 
— the  latter  only  just  returned  from  his  exhausting 
and  abortive  pursuit  of  Broadwood — were  descending 
upon  the  rear  of  the  9th  Sudanese  whilst  the  battahon 


OMDURMAN,  SEPTEMBER  1898  231 

still  confronted  the  Black  Flags.  It  was  a  question  of 
minutes  and  drill,  and  the  minutes  were  at  the  disposal 
of  one  man — MacDonald.  If  he  misused  them  his 
brigade  would  be  swept  away,  Lewis's  would  follow 
a  few  moments  later,  Collinson's  too  must  be  wiped 
out — together  with  hospitals,  transport  and  reserve 
ammunition.  Wauchope  was  moving  to  the  scene  of 
action  at  the  double  but  could  scarcely  have  saved  the 
situation  if  MacDonald's  brigade  had  been  over- 
whelmed. Thus  Mahdiism's  last  and  only  remaining 
chance  depended  on  MacDonald's  making  a  mistake, 
and  he  made  none.  He  saw  what  was  coming,  knew 
exactly  what  to  do  and  did  it.  It  was  a  matter  of 
drill  under  high  pressure,  and  he  had  been  drilling  his 
brigade  under  all  circumstances  during  several  years. 
He  had  risen  from  private  soldier  to  the  command  of  a 
brigade  and  was  now  to  justify  his  promotion.  With 
calm  precision  he  issued  his  orders,  and  in  a  few  moments 
all  his  battalions,  batteries  and  maxims  were  extricating 
themselves  from  their  engagement  with  the  Black  Flags 
and  threading  their  way  at  the  double  by  the  shortest 
route  into  a  new  alignment  facing  the  Green  Flags. 
The  change  of  front  had  barely  been  executed  when 
the  Baggara  horse  came  charging  home,  followed  by 
solid  masses  of  riflemen  and  spearmen,  just  as  the  Black 
Flags  had  done  before.  Only  this  time  there  was  only 
the  cavalry  and  camel-corps  to  come  in  on  their  flank. 
Vandeleur  writing  home  within  a  week  of  the  event 
said:  "  The  9th,  which  was  the  first  battalion  to  form 
up  on  the  new  front,  had  just  got  into  position  when 
down  came  another  charge  of  horse,  almost  a  better 
one  than  the  last,  followed  by  the  attack  of  the  foot- 
men. Laurie's  battery  on  our  left  soon  exhausted  its 
ammunition,  but  there  were  maxims  on  our  right  and 
the  noise  was  tremendous.     If  the  Green  Flags  had 


232  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

co-operated  with  the  former  attack  and  caught  us  in 
rear  when  we  were  engaged  in  front,  it  would  have  been 
extremely  unpleasant.  But  the  earlier  attack  had 
exhausted  itself  before  the  second  came  on,  so  we  beat 
them  in  detail.  The  ist  British  Brigade  (Wauchope's) 
could  be  seen  hurrying  to  support  us,  but  the  Dervish 
attack  was  done  for  before  they  came  up.  The  thing 
was  over  and  the  cease  fire  sounded,  so  I  rode  out  in 
front  of  my  men  to  stop  the  shooting — when  a  Baggara 
spearman  lying  down  unhurt  about  sixty  paces  from 
us  made  for  me.  He  ran  at  a  great  pace  and  my  horse 
being  nervous  interfered  with  my  aim.  His  first  spear 
whizzed  past  my  head.  I  hit  him  with  two  revolver 
bullets  but  still  he  closed  with  me.  I  then  warded  off 
his  spear  thrust  with  my  right  hand  and  revolver,  and 
he  fell  dead — finished  off  by  one  of  the  men's  bullets. 
But  in  doing  it  his  spear  wounded  me  in  the  hand 
cutting  the  third  finger  and  palm.  Smyth*  (who  had  a 
similar  experience)  and  I  both  agree  that  the  new  man- 
stopping  huWet  is  not  much  use  against  a  good  Dervish." 
Vandeleur's  simple  narrative  of  what  he  saw  and  what 
befell  him  is  more  graphic  than  some  of  the  word- 
pictures  which  have  since  been  printed  and  it  shows  how 
hotly  his  battalion  and  brigade  were  engaged.  The 
9th  Sudanese  had  48  killed  and  wounded  by  Dervish 
rifle-fire,  and  the  brigade  including  the  artillery  attached 
to  it  totalled  151  casualties  in  about  three-quarters  of 
an  hour.  Vandeleur's  wound  was  happily  a  slight  one, 
and  he  was  able  to  stay  on  his  horse  and  command  his 
men. 

Thus  ended  the  second  phase  of  the  battle. 

Before   resuming   his  march   to   Omdurman,    Kit- 

*  Bimbashi  Smyth  was  awarded  the  Victoria  Cross  for  this 
exploit.  He  saved  the  life  of  a  correspondent  who  was  similarly 
pursued  by  an  Arab.  Smyth  received  a  spear  wound  in  the  arm  the 
same  day  as  Vandeleur. 


REFERENCE 

British' Red/ 

D e-rvisKes  BVu^e, 


0  J}  e   Tf  D  e  s    e  T  -t 


BATTLE    OF   OMDURMAN 

2».*    Sept   1898. 

Scale    i^kia    or    1   5    Indies  —  1  Mile 


^.  ■rtu-m.-ickllaq" 


-^  o■^  -V-' 


V 


^3S^^\ 


Op'e,nj      jp>  ; 


^7^^    V'l  r\W=:^i==l 


tRERi  hills 


\ 


REFERENCE 
BritisK.  ..  Red, 
DerviaJves  Slu^ 


Stun/brd's  Geag^  Estoi'  LonAon, 


OMDURMAN,  SEPTEMBER  1898  233 

chener  moved  three  brigades  in  one  long  line  west- 
wards into  the  desert  and  drove  before  him,  with 
considerable  losses,  all  formed  bodies  of  Dervishes  who 
still  showed  an  inclination  to  fight,  and  it  was  amazing 
to  realise  how  much  punishment  they  required  before 
they  would  acknowledge  defeat.  At  last  the  weary 
troops  turned  from  the  field  of  slaughter,  marched  to 
Khor  Shambat — which  is  an  overflow  from  the  Nile 
just  outside  the  city — and  halted  to  rest  and  eat 
biscuits  and  drink  some  much-needed  water.  The 
heat  was  intense  and  very  little  shade  was  obtainable 
between  i  p.m.  and  5  p.m.,  when  the  bulk  of  the  army 
marched  into  Omdurman — which  had  meanwhile  been 
captured  by  Maxwell's  brigade. 

This  event  which  coincided  with  the  pursuit  of  the 
Dervishes  by  the  Egj^ptian  cavalry  for  thirty  miles 
south  of  the  city,  constituted  the  third  and  last  phase 
of  the  day's  operations. 

When  the  Khalifa  Abdullahi  saw  that  his  attacks 
had  failed,  that  his  brother  Yacoob  and  thousands  of 
his  best  troops  were  killed,  that  his  son  Sheik-el-Din 
was  carried  wounded  from  the  field,  and  that  the  13th 
Sudanese  were  descending  upon  him  from  the  top  of 
Surgham  Hill,  he  mounted  his  horse  and  rode  swiftly 
to  the  city  to  organise  its  defence  with  the  remnant 
of  his  army.  For  the  last  time  his  great  war-drums 
and  ombeya  of  elephant  tusk  resounded  from  the  top  of 
the  arsenal  and  boomed  forth  their  dismal  message 
to  assemble  the  faithful.  We  heard  them  at  Khor 
Shambat  three  miles  away  and  knew  what  they  meant. 
For  the  last  time  the  Khalifa  ascended  the  pulpit  of 
the  mosque  to  encourage  his  bodyguard  and  exhort 
them  to  defend  their  homes  and  his.  But  those  who 
were  present  and  unwounded  heeded  him  no  longer. 
Their  enthusiasm  was  dead. 


234  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

At  2.10  P.M.  Maxwell's  brigade  and  the  32nd 
Field  Battery  paraded  at  Khor  Shambat  and  marched 
into  the  city  to  reduce  it  to  obedience.  The  start  was 
so  quietly  managed  and  the  army  was  so  tired  that  the 
brigade  got  off  without  being  noticed  and  was  accom- 
panied by  no  war  correspondent  but  the  Hon.  Hubert 
Howard.  As  he  was  to  be  most  unfortunately  shot  in 
the  evening  no  account  by  an  eye-witness  of  the  fall  of 
the  city  has  appeared,  though  several  erroneous  state- 
ments have  been  printed.  The  Sirdar  and  his  staff — 
notably  Slatin  revisiting  the  scene  of  his  bondage — 
accompanied  Maxwell  and  the  Great  Black  Flag, 
borne  aloft  by  a  mounted  orderly,  followed  Kitchener 
wherever  he  rode — a  sign  to  the  civil  population  that 
the  Khahfa  was  conquered.  The  14th  Sudanese  acted 
as  escort  to  the  Sirdar  and  the  guns,  whilst  the  three 
remaining  battalions  moved  on  a  wide  front  clearing 
the  side  streets  and  guarding  against  ambuscades. 
Every  armed  man  met  with  was  ordered  to  throw  down 
his  weapon  in  the  street.  If  he  obeyed  he  was  let  off, 
if  he  disobeyed  he  was  shot,  and  the  news  that  the 
conquerors  meant  neither  to  sack  the  city  nor  massacre 
its  inhabitants  soon  produced  stacks  of  rifles  and 
spears  in  the  streets  we  occupied.  The  main  thorough- 
fare by  which  the  Sirdar  entered  was  fifty  yards  wide 
and  was  thronged  by  an  immense  population,  mostly 
women.  It  led  straight  to  the  corner  of  a  massive 
masonry  wall  surrounding  the  heart  of  the  town  and 
containing  the  Mahdi's  tomb.  Khalifa's  house,  treasury, 
arsenal  and  many  other  substantial  buildings — around 
which  were  the  soldiers'  quarters  occupying  an  area  of 
fully  one  square  mile.  Within  this  walled  enclosure 
were  also  immense  stores  of  grain  and  sohd  well- 
constructed  armouries,  in  which  the  precious  Remington 
rifles  and  cartridges  were  kept  under  lock  and  ke}^  except 


OMDURMAN,  SEPTEMBER  1898  235 

when  temporarily  issued  for  fighting  or  drill.  The 
twenty-foot  wall  had  been  erected  since  Slatin's  escape, 
and  he  was  therefore  unable  to  guide  us  into  the  interior ; 
in  fact,  besides  some  gates  on  the  river  face  protected 
by  forts,  there  were  only  two  entrances  to  the  great 
enclosure  which  was  practically  a  prison.  It  was  there- 
fore decided  that  the  13th  Sudanese  should  make  their 
way  down  to  the  Nile  and  break  in  under  cover  of  the 
gunboats,  whilst  the  remainder  of  the  brigade  held  all 
the  streets  leading  from  the  mosque  and  thus  protected 
the  flank  and  rear  from  surprise. 

Accordingly  the  13th — commanded  by  Smith- 
Dorrien — marched  to  the  river,  took  the  forts  in 
reverse  and,  after  skirting  the  great  wall  for  a  couple  of 
miles,  discovered  a  massive  wooden  gate  which  was 
barred.  They  heard  voices  within,  and  a  half  com- 
pany was  drawn  up  ready  to  shoot,  whilst  the  gate 
was  being  smashed  open  with  a  beam.  It  was  all  very 
interesting  and  very  exciting  for  those  who  took  a 
share  in  the  adventure,  for  no  one  could  guess  what 
might  occur  at  any  moment.  At  last  half  the  gate  was 
forced  open,  we  squeezed  into  the  enclosure  and 
beheld  numbers  of  the  Khahfa's  riflemen  bolting  up 
the  streets  and  alleys.  Only  one  body  of  Dervishes 
and  some  stray  individuals  showed  signs  of  fight  and 
were  promptly  shot.  The  majority  had  had  enough 
of  slaughter,  like  ourselves,  and  threw  down  their  arms 
when  ordered.  At  first  slowly,  then  quicker  and 
quicker,  the  piles  of  Remingtons  and  bandoliers  grew 
in  the  street — till  they  amounted  to  thousands,  guarded 
by  a  few  sentries.  Undoubtedly  our  air  of  confident 
assurance  and  habit  of  commanding  blacks  imposed 
on  the  enemy  and  prevented  them  from  reahsing  that 
only  one  battalion  and  some  guns  had  entered  the  en- 
closure. 


236  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

A  broad  thoroughfare  led  straight  to  the  Mahdi's 
tomb,  less  than  a  mile  from  the  gate  we  had  forced, 
and  all  around  covering  an  immense  area  of  ground  was 
a  squalid  medley  of  diminutive  hovels,  houses  and 
alleys — the  home  of  the  10,000  picked  Sudanese  who 
had  formed  the  Khalifa's  bodyguard.  Above  the 
roofs  appeared  the  tw^o-storied  abodes  of  the  Emirs  and, 
framing  the  picture,  the  solid  masonry  wall  which  for- 
bade ingress  or  egress  to  the  inhabitants. 

Our  objective  was  the  Mahdi's  tomb,  a  fine  structure 
whose  dome  had  been  shattered  by  the  third  shot  of  the 
howitzer  battery,  at  a  range  of  two  miles  from  across 
the  river.  The  battalion  advanced  cautiously  towards 
it,  dropping  sentries  at  the  side  streets,  for  experience 
had  taught  its  officers  to  be  alert  and  leave  nothing  to 
chance.  Around  the  tomb  and  other  public  buildings 
unexploded  howitzer  shells  were  lying  about  in  the 
streets,  where  they  remained  a  serious  danger  until 
removed  and  sunk  in  mid-Nile.  Near  the  tomb  were 
the  Khalifa's  house  and  the  great  Mosque  Square  where 
a  miserable  sight  met  our  gaze — hundreds  of  wounded 
Arabs  and  blacks  sitting  or  lying,  quite  impassive 
beneath  some  shade,  attended  by  their  wives  who 
brought  them  water.  They  informed  us  that  the 
Khalifa  had  just  left  the  Mosque  to  go  into  his  house, 
adjoining  it.  The  13th,  having  been  so  near  him  at 
Surgham,  were  desperately  keen  to  catch  AbduUahi 
and  hurried  at  once  to  his  door.  It  was  bolted  and 
had  to  be  broken  open.  A  labyrinth  of  courtyards, 
passages  and  doors  puzzled  our  blacks  who  failed 
to  find  him  in  the  front  rooms,  but  a  turning  to  the 
right  led  into  the  Mosque  Square  whence  an  open 
gateway  gave  access  to  the  back.  Quickly  we  took 
this  line  and  were  provided  with  a  dramatic  incident 
which,  at  sunset,  terminated  an  eventful  day. 


OMDURMAN,  SEPTEMBER  1898  237 

A  low  wall  surrounded  the  Mosque  Square  into 
which  the  faithful  flocked  daily  for  prayer  through 
several  wide  entrances — one  of  which  was  near  the  back 
door  of  the  Khalifa's  house.  When  we  approached 
this  entrance  from  the  mosque  side,  six  horsemen  were 
observed  galloping  across  it  from  behind  the  Khalifa's 
house,  and  their  long  spears  remained  visible  just  above 
the  wall  as  they  rode  on.  They  saw  us  making  for  the 
entrance  and  only  thirty  yards  from  it,  whereupon  two 
of  their  number  stopped  and  waited  behind  the  wall. 
One  dismounted  and  could  no  longer  be  seen,  the  other 
sat  on  his  horse  and  poised  his  spear  above  his  head — 
ready  for  action.  Their  four  companions  galloped 
away  as  fast  as  they  could.  Evidently  something  was 
up,  so  a  section  of  the  leading  company  of  the  13th 
Sudanese  was  drawn  across  the  entrance  with  bayonets 
fixed  and  rifles  loaded.  A  pause  ensued,  during  which 
we  all  watched  the  spear  poised  above  the  wall  in  the 
Baggara's  hand.  Then  suddenly  like  a  flash  of  light- 
ning the  two  desperate  men  charged  home,  one  on  foot 
the  other  mounted.  The  man  on  foot  threw  one  spear 
before  he  started  from  behind  the  wall,  then  closed 
with  another  in  his  hand  and  wounded  one  of  our  blacks. 
The  horsemen  made  good  his  point  and  transfixed  a 
Sudanese  corporal  through  the  skull  with  his  spear, 
pinning  him  against  the  mosque  wall  and  instantly 
kilhng  him.  Both  the  Baggaras  then  fell  dead  at  the 
feet  of  our  men  riddled  with  bullets,  as  was  also  the 
horse. 

It  was  a  gallant  act  gallantly  performed  in  order  to 
gain  a  few  moments  time  for  the  Khalifa  to  escape  us. 
He  was  one  of  the  four  horsemen  we  had  seen,  and  the 
sacrifice  of  their  lives  which  his  two  men  so  willingly 
made  delayed  us  just  enough  to  prevent  our  shoot- 
ing at  Abdullahi  as  he  rode  down  the  street.     Then 


238  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

suddenly  the  battalion  and  staff  assembled  round  the 
Khalifa's  house  felt  shells  bursting  above  their  heads 
and  shrapnel  bullets  whizzing  about  them.  These  were 
most  accurately  aimed  and  very  unpleasant.  Obvi- 
ously we  had  come  under  the  fire  of  the  two  British 
guns  which  had  been  posted  outside  the  great  enclosure, 
and  our  musketry  had  attracted  their  attention.  They 
knew  not  that  they  were  shooting  at  their  friends. 
Hunter  at  once  ordered  the  Khahfa's  house  to  be 
evacuated,  but  most  unfortunately  Mr.  Hubert  Howard 
— the  Times  correspondent — was  struck  in  the  head  by 
a  shrapnel  bullet  and  killed  on  the  spot.  It  was  a 
cruel  end  to  a  brilliant  young  life,  to  be  thus  sacrificed 
at  the  close  of  the  battle.  The  Sirdar  and  all  those 
present  ran  a  similar  risk,  but  it  would  be  foolish  to 
impute  blame  to  the  staff  or  the  gunners  who  had  no 
means  of  knowing  that  the  Khalifa's  house  was  already 
in  our  possession.  Such  accidents  are  unavoidable  in 
war,  and  must  be  risked  if  artillery  is  to  effectually 
support  infantry  assaults. 


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Slvtfards  Ctoa^Estab*  London, 


CHAPTER  X 
ANOTHER  YEAR  IN  THE  SUDAN 

See  map  facing  page  252 

On  Friday  September  2,  1898  the  Dervish  army  was 
shattered  and  dispersed  as  narrated  in  the  last  chapter ; 
on  Saturday  an  Egyptian  brigade  took  charge  of  the 
city  of  about  250,000  inhabitants ;  on  Sunday  at 
Khartoum  a  touching  rehgious  service  was  held  in 
memory  of  Gordon  on  the  ruins  of  his  palace,  over 
which  the  British  and  Egyptian  flags  were  hoisted  with 
due  ceremony  ;  on  Monday  some  semblance  of  law 
and  order  was  established  in  Omdurman  ;  on  Tuesday 
the  British  troops  began  their  return  journey  to  Cairo 
and  England ;  on  Wednesday  a  Dervish  steamer  arrived 
from  Fashoda  with  its  old  paddle-boxes  riddled  by  the 
French  bullets  of  Major  Marchand's  Mission  ;  and  on 
Thursday  the  Sirdar  steamed  up  the  White  Nile  with 
a  flotilla  of  gunboats  and  a  sufficient  military  force  to 
overpower  the  intruders,  if  necessary. 

As  Vandeleur  did  not  accompany  Kitchener  during 
the  episode  known  as  the  Fashoda  Incident,  we  need 
only  remark  that  it  was  settled  to  the  satisfaction  of 
both  England  and  France,  and  that  Major  Marchand 
was  cordially  entertained  by  every  British  officer  whom 
he  met  at  Omdurman,  Cairo  and  lastly  at  Fort  Nasser — 
our  furthest  post  up  the  river  Sobat — on  his  road  to 
France  through  Abyssinia.     All  who  had  the  pleasure 


240  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

of  meeting  him  were  most  favourably  impressed  by  the 
personahty  of  this  enterprising  French  officer. 

Meanwhile,  although  the  Khahfa's  adherents  had 
fled  from  the  stricken  field,  his  garrisons  in  outljang 
provinces  refused  to  disperse  and  had  to  be  separately 
dealt  with.  The  great  rivers  soon  came  under  our 
control  and  mihtary  posts  were  quickly  established  in 
the  chief  riparian  towns,  but  in  the  interior  the  well- 
disposed  populations  were  perpetually  harassed,  raided 
and  looted  of  their  grain,  flocks  and  herds.  In  fact 
the  battle  of  Omdurman  marked  the  beginning  of 
a  period  of  fifteen  months'  hard  work  by  the  Egyptian 
army.  So  long  as  the  Khalifa  remained  at  large,  this 
remarkable  man — notwithstanding  his  crushing  defeat 
— maintained  a  firm  hold  on  all  the  turbulent  elements 
in  the  land  and  rendered  any  peaceful  settlement 
impossible.  He  attracted  to  his  standard  the  leading 
Arabs  with  their  numerous  retainers,  who,  after  fourteen 
years  of  undisputed  sway,  were  naturally  averse  to 
submitting  to  the  new  regime. 

The  first  and  most  formidable  of  these  was  his 
cousin,  Ahmed  Fedil,  who  commanded  8000  well- 
disciplined  men  at  Gedaref  and  on  the  Blue  Nile.  To 
him  General  Hunter,  left  in  supreme  command  during 
Kitchener's  absence  at  Fashoda,  sent  two  emissaries  to 
announce  the  destruction  of  the  Omdurman  army  and 
the  fall  of  the  city,  at  the  same  time  offering  liberal 
terms  to  induce  the  Dervishes  to  disarm  and  disperse. 
But  Ahmed  Fedil  only  flew  into  a  rage,  declared  to  his 
followers  that  Omdurman  still  held  out,  shot  one  of  the 
messengers,  flogged  the  other,  and  sent  him  back  to 
tell  Hunter  that  he  meant  to  fight  it  out  to  the  bitter 
end.  And  he  kept  his  word  for  fourteen  weary  months. 
Hunter  saw  that  he  had  better  deal  with  him  before  the 
Blue  Nile  should  subside  to  unn:ivigable  dimensions,  and 


ANOTHER  YEAR  IN  THE  SUDAN    241 

accordingly  organised  river  reconnaissances  and  military 
garrisons  all  the  way  from  Omdurman  to  Rosaires  — 
400  miles  distant. 

Thus,  Vandeleur  in  command  of  eighty  selected 
men  of  his  battalion  was  again  on  the  warpath,  even 
before  his  wound  was  healed — as  he  started  within  ten 
days  of  receiving  the  injury  with  a  splint  still  on  his 
finger,  and  proceeded  to  Abu  Haraz,  140  miles  up  the 
Blue  Nile.* 

Hunter's  object  was  to  prevent  Ahmed  Fedil  from 
crossing  the  river  from  east  to  west  without  a  deci- 
sive engagement.  The  latter's  object  was  to  effect  a 
crossing,  march  to  the  White  Nile,  cross  it  also,  and 
so  join  forces  with  the  Khalifa  in  Kordofan.  But  the 
passage  of  a  wide  and  deep  river  patrolled  by  vigilant 
gunboats  was  more  than  he  could  accomplish,  so  after 
several  futile  attempts  he  retired  inland  towards 
Gedaref,  the  principal  town  of  his  district,  to  await 
the  fall  of  the  flood-water  and  the  consequent  disap- 
pearance of  the  pestilent  gunboats. 

The  distance  between  Abu  Haraz  and  Rosaires,  the 
extreme  limit  of  navigation,  was  no  less  than  260  miles 
by  river ;  and  Ahmed  Fedil  who  knew  the  country  well 
dodged  from  place  to  place  collecting  his  food  from 
the  unfortunate  inhabitants,  who  fled  for  protection  to 
our  military  posts  and  gunboats.  These  were  kept 
perpetually  on  the  alert  in  expectation  of  an  attempt  at 
crossing  at  one  spot  or  another,  and  Vandeleur  and  his 
gunboat  were  very  busy  between  Abu  Haraz,  Wad 
Medina  and  Sennar.  The  eastern  bank  of  the  Blue 
Nile  and  the  country  behind  it  were  densely  clothed  in 
tropical  vegetation,  almost  impossible  to  operate  in 
with  success.  In  fact  the  campaign  seemed  as  if  it 
might  drag  on  for  an  indefinite  time  without  decisive 

*  See  map  facing  page  252. 

Q 


242  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

result,  whilst  the  peoples  of  several  rich  provinces 
bordering  the  tributaries  of  the  Blue  Nile  and  Atbara 
were  unable  to  gather  the  harvest,  now  almost  ripe. 
Fortunately,  however,  Ahmed  Fedil  could  be  attacked 
in  rear  as  well  as  held  in  front  and  the  period  of 
uncertainty  was  greatly  reduced  by  two  brilliant  little 
actions,  which  reflected  more  credit  on  the  Egyptian 
army  than  has  yet  been  recognised.  I  refer  to  the 
battles  at  Gedaref  on  September  22,  and  near  Rosaires 
on  December  26,  1898.  Their  merit  has  not  yet  been 
fully  appreciated  even  by  the  small  public  which 
interests  itself  in  such  matters. 

It  will  be  within  the  recollection  of  the  reader  that 
Kassala  was  handed  over  by  the  Italians  to  the  Egyptian 
army  on  Christmas  Day,  1897,  and  had  since  been  held 
strictly  on  the  defensive.  The  moment  was  now  at 
hand  for  its  garrison  to  act.  As  soon  as  authentic 
news  arrived  concerning  the  Battle  of  Omdurman,  its 
commander  Lieut. -Col.  Parsons,  who  was  well  informed 
regarding  Ahmed  Fedil's  movements,  organised  the 
following  field  force  and  started  with  it  for  Gedaref — 

Half  16th  Egyptian  Battalion  (Capt.  McKerrel  and  Capt. 

Dwyer)      ........  500  men. 

Half  an  Arab  BattaUon  (formerly  Italian,  now  commanded 

by  Capt.  Wilkinson)  ......  450      ,, 

Irregulars  (Major  Lawson)     .  .  .  .  .  .  350      ,, 

Sudanese  Camel-Corps  (Capt.  Hon.  A.  Ruthven)       .  .  80      ,, 


Total  .  .       1,380 

This  force  had  no  artillery  or  maxims  and  only  seven 
British  officers,  including  the  doctor,  Captain  Fleming, 
who  greatly  distinguished  himself  and  was  awarded 
the  D.S.O. 

Parsons'  object  was  to  capture  Ahmed  Fedil's  base 
of  supply  whilst  this  chief  was  engaged  with  Hunter  on 
the  Blue  Nile.     The  column  accomplished  the  difficult 


ANOTHER  YEAR  IN  THE  SUDAN    243 

march  of  107  miles  to  Gedaref  in  excellent  style, 
crossing  the  flooded  Atbara  in  boats  of  their  own 
construction.  On  September  22,  they  arrived  soon 
after  sunrise  within  four  miles  of  the  town,  but  their 
approach  was  discovered,  and  the  Emir  Saadulla  at  the 
head  of  3400  Dervishes,  detached  from  Ahmed  Fedil's 
mainbody,  was  ready  to  dispute  their  further  progress. 
Parsons,  reconnoitring  in  front  of  his  marching  column, 
beheld  this  body  of  men  advancing  in  three  lines  straight 
for  his  force,  and  knew  that  a  colhsion  must  occur  within 
half  an  hour.  He  also  noticed  from  the  hill  on  which  he 
stood  that  a  mile  to  his  right  front  a  small  ridge  rose 
well  above  the  plain  and  offered  a  favourable  position 
if  only  he  could  get  his  men  on  it  before  the  Dervishes. 
He  therefore  deflected  their  march  to  the  right  and 
ordered  them  to  move  at  the  double.  In  good  order 
but  breathless  they  gained  the  ridge  before  the  enemy 
reaUsed  their  object  ;  but  the  transport  camels  and 
hospital  lagged  dangerously  in  rear  and  attracted  the 
attention  of  a  large  body  of  Dervishes  who  detached 
themselves  from  the  main  force.  Meanwhile  the  Arab 
Battahon  and  i6th  Egyptians  were  hning  the  crest  of 
the  ridge,  which  the  Dervish  columns  immediately 
attacked.  They  came  boldly  up  in  their  usual  way, 
some  riflemen  getting  within  200  yards  of  the  top.  But 
the  Egyptians,  Arabs  and  Irregulars,  standing  in  high 
grass  on  the  ridge,  poured  out  such  a  destructive 
fire  that  the  attack  held  off,  though  our  losses  were 
numerous.  Then,  when  the  attacking  hne  wavered  and 
individual  Dervishes  even  ran  back,  our  hne  advanced 
upon  them  from  the  ridge  and  completed  their  dis- 
comfiture. 

But  at  this  moment  Parsons  became  aware  that  his 
transport,  seeking  cover  behind  the  rising  ground,  was 
in  danger  of  being  overwhelmed  by  a  Dervish  attack 


244  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

in  his  rear.  He  was  between  two  fires;  and  the 
situation  was  critical.  His  only  chance  lay  in  launching 
the  Arab  Battalion  boldly  at  the  Dervishes  in  his  front, 
whilst  the  steady  i6th  was  brought  back  to  the  ridge, 
to  shoot  in  the  opposite  direction.  It  turned  about  at 
once  and  did  its  duty  splendidly.  Already  the  enemy 
were  right  in  amongst  the  camels,  hamstringing  and 
killing,  when  they  received  at  lOO  yards'  range  the 
appalling  fire  of  the  i6th  Egyptians  who  treated  them 
to  continuous  independent  shooting.  This  settled 
the  question.  Both  parties  of  Dervishes  fled  in  confu- 
sion, pursued  by  our  Arabs  and  Irregulars  for  a  short 
distance.  Our  loss  was  53  killed,  61  wounded  and  many 
camels  gone.  The  Dervishes  lost  over  450  killed  and 
wounded.  There  were  several  gallant  deeds  performed 
during  the  short  sharp  encounter,  notably  by  Captain 
the  Hon.  A.  Ruthven  who  was  subsequently  decorated 
with  the  Victoria  Cross. 

At  12  noon  Gedaref  surrendered  together  with 
Nur  Angara — one  of  Gordon's  old  warriors — two  guns 
and  200  blacks,  who  took  service  with  the  victors.  The 
place  was  at  once  put  into  a  proper  state  of  defence,  as 
the  Dervishes,  encamped  within  a  few  miles,  might 
probably  attack  and  would  certainly  cut  off  convoys 
from  Kassala.  Within  a  week  they  did  attack  in  great 
strength,  but  the  intervening  days  had  been  so  well 
spent  in  clearing  the  ground  and  loopholing  the  walls 
of  the  largest  houses  that  it  was  unlikely  they  should 
succeed  against  the  troops  who  had  so  recently  defeated 
them  in  the  open.  Their  three  attacks  only  resulted 
in  a  loss  of  over  500  to  themselves.  The  garrison  was 
cut  off  and  practically  besieged  but  no  impression  could 
be  made  on  its  defences.  Being  without  artillery 
the  captured  Dervish  guns  were  turned  upon  their  late 
owners  with  satisfactory  results,  and  from  start  to  finish 


ANOTHER  YEAR  IN  THE  SUDAN    245 

the  diminutive  Kassala  column  proved  a  remarkable 
success.  It  would  not,  however,  have  been  prudent  to 
launch  it  against  Ahmed  Fedil  in  his  chosen  position, 
so  General  Rundle  organised  another  column  at  Abu 
Haraz  in  which  Vandeleur  commanded  a  half-battalion 
of  the  9th  Sudanese.  This  column  reached  Gedaref 
on  October  21,  and  on  October  24,  Ahmed  Fedil  and 
his  army — much  reduced  in  size — departed  for  the 
almost  impenetrable  forests  through  which  flows  the 
Binder  River.  His  progress  was  slow,  and  he  made 
frequent  halts  to  enable  him  to  raid  the  neighbourhood 
for  grain  and  cattle,  as  well  as  to  patrol  the  Blue  Nile 
and  learn  where  he  might  cross  it.  But  everywhere 
he  found  gunboats  within  hail,  so  at  length  he  made  up 
his  mind  to  a  long  march  south  in  order  to  cross  above 
the  Rosaires  cataract  and  avoid  them.  Thus  the 
game  of  hide-and-seek  continued  through  December 
and  only  came  to  an  abrupt  end  at  the  beginning  of 
1899. 

For  some  time  Lieut. -Col.  Lewis  had  been  patrolling 
with  cavalry  along  the  left  bank  of  the  river  and  had 
kept  himself  well  posted  as  to  Ahmed  Fedil's  move- 
ments. He  therefore  betook  himself  to  Rosaires  in 
anticipation  of  events  and,  when  reports  reached  him 
that  the  Emir  was  actually  crossing  the  river  twenty 
miles  to  the  south,  he  at  once  marched  to  attack  him 
with  the  following  force  : 


loth  Sudanese  (Lieut. -Col.  Nason  and  Major  Fergusson) 
9th  Sudanese  (Capt.  Sir  H.  Hill)     .... 
Two  maxims  (Sergeants  Lambert  and  Trowbridge). 
Irregulars  (Sheik  Abu-Bakr)  .... 

Medical  Corps  (Capt.  Jennings)      .... 


510  men. 
30      „ 
10      ,, 

400      ,, 
4      ., 


Total.  ,         954      ,, 

This  was  on  Christmas  Day,  1898.  After  a  halt  to  sleep 


246  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

^n  a  village  half-way,  the  march  was  resumed  at  3  a.m. 
the  following  morning  and  continued  till  eight,  along 
the  eastern  bank  through  a  forest  of  thick-set  bush. 
Then  suddenly  the  advanced-guard  encountered  a 
Der\ash  outpost  which  it  drove  in  :  and  the  column 
debouched  on  the  edge  of  the  water,  opposite  a  bare 
island  of  sand  and  shingle  in  the  middle  of  the  Blue 
Nile.  On  this  island,  a  mile  long  and  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  wide,  the  Dervish  camp  and  a  large  force  were 
plainly  visible.  Beyond  the  island,  the  western  bank 
of  the  river  rose  in  a  cliff  forty  feet  high,  on  the  summit 
of  which  Ahmed  Fedil  himself  and  several  hundreds  of 
his  rifle-men  were  already  posted.  In  fact  Lewis  had 
caught  the  Dervish  force  in  the  act  of  crossing  ;  their 
strength  was  divided  between  the  island  and  the  chffs^ 
and  the  deeper,  broader  and  swifter  arm  of  the  river 
separated  their  two  parties.  They  were,  however,  in 
much  greater  strength  than  he  had  been  led  to  expect 
and  the  situation  looked  nasty.  Of  the  two  bodies, 
that  on  the  island  was  clearly  the  stronger,  and  Lewis 
had  to  make  up  his  mind  how  to  deal  with  it. 

If  he  did  not  attack  quickly,  the  Dervishes  certainly 
would  either  attack  him  or  escape  across  the  river  to 
their  friends,  so  with  the  bold  instinct  of  a  true  soldier 
he  made  up  his  mind  to  attack  at  once.  He  realised 
the  hazard  but  had  no  alternative,  and,  having  counted 
the  risk,  he  launched  his  little  column  against  3000  men. 
The  brunt  of  the  fighting  which  ensued  fell  upon  that 
magnificent  battalion  the  loth  Sudanese,  and  if  an\^  of 
my  readers  should  still  doubt  the  value  of  our  Sudanese 
regulars,  surely  the  action  above  the  Rosaires  cataract 
— 400  miles  from  Khartoum — will  convince  them  of 
their  mistake. 

On  the  further  edge  of  the  island,  opposite  the  cliffs, 
a  hne  of  low  sand-hills  afforded  the  Dervishes  a  strong 


ANOTHER  YEAR  IN  THE  SUDAN    247 

position,  with  level  shingle  between  themselves  and 
Lewis.  He  therefore  opened  the  fight  \vith  long-range 
volleys  and  maxims,  which  could  by  no  means  dislodge 
the  enemy,  but  did  elicit  a  hot  rejoinder  and  so  enabled 
him  to  mark  the  exact  position  they  occupied.  He 
then  ordered  the  maxims  to  maintain  their  fire  whilst 
he  sent  the  Irregulars  across  by  a  ford,  with  instructions 
to  attack  from  the  south  end  of  the  island  and  hold  the 
enemy  in  position  till  they  could  co-operate  with  the 
regulars.  At  the  same  time  he  crossed  over  with  the 
loth  Sudanese  by  another  ford,  in  order  to  reach  the 
north  end  of  the  island  and  assault  the  enemy's  flank. 
When  the  loth  reached  the  place  in  full  view  of  the 
cliffs  they  deployed  rapidly  into  line  and — with  that 
mixture  of  dash  and  discipline  which  was  the  character- 
istic of  the  battalion — advanced  across  the  open  against 
the  sand-hills.  They  immediately  became  the  target 
of  a  furious  musketry  fire  from  both  sand-hills  and 
cliff,  and  nearly  a  quarter  of  their  numbers  lay 
strewn  over  the  ground — killed  or  wounded.  But  the 
five  companies  led  by  their  two  British  officers  never- 
theless charged  forward,  increasing  their  pace  as  they 
went  till  they  reached  the  sheltering  foot  of  the  nearest 
sand-dunes,  where  they  were  ordered  to  pause  and  take 
breath.  Thereupon  the  enemy,  deceived  by  appear- 
ances, rose  with  a  confident  shout  from  behind  knolls 
and  hillocks,  and,  encouraged  from  the  cliff  by  war- 
drums  and  yells  of  triumph,  advanced  against  their 
hesitating  foe  to  demolish  him.  But  they  had  mis- 
understood the  loth  Sudanese,  who,  in  compliance  with 
their  officers'  orders,  quietly  lined  the  tops  of  the  sand- 
dunes  and  poured  forth  upon  their  attackers  a  con- 
tinuous and  deadly  fire  at  short  range.  The  effect  was 
immediate.  The  Dervishes  wavered,  then  broke  and 
fled,  pursued  by  our  exulting  blacks  from  sand-ridge 


248  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

to  sand-ridge.  Some  made  for  the  river  and  attempted 
to  swim  it,  others  escaped  to  the  south  of  the  island  and 
were  attacked  by  the  Irregulars.  The  loth  moving 
in  one  long  irregular  line  swept  over  the  ground,  driving 
their  adversaries  before  them  over  hillock  and  down 
dale,  roUing  up  the  Dervish  line  from  end  to  end,  till 
they  held  the  survivors  at  their  mercy  on  the  south 
corner  of  the  island — with  a  deep  river  running  at  seven 
miles  an  hour  at  their  backs. 

The  action  was  over.  By  three  o'clock  2100 
Dervishes  had  surrendered  to  the  victors,  who  had  been 
marching  and  fighting  for  fully  twelve  hours.  The 
losses  of  the  loth  Sudanese  included  Major  Fergusson 
wounded,  30  men  killed  and  117  wounded.  The 
Irregulars  had  40  casualties.  The  Dervish  killed  were 
computed  at  600,  besides  those  drowned  in  the  river. 
Ahmed  Fedil  escaped  with  the  party  which  had  previ- 
ously crossed  the  Blue  Nile.  He  marched  over  to  the 
White  Nile  at  Renk  where  a  gunboat  met  him.  The 
majority  of  his  force  at  once  came  in  to  tender  their 
submission  and  were  sent  to  Omdurman.  But  the  Emir 
himself  and  his  most  trusted  retainers  managed  to 
cross  the  river  in  the  night,  and  made  their  way  to  the 
Khalifa  in  Kordofan — a  broken  band. 

There  we  will  leave  them  for  the  present.  Peace 
at  last  reigned  in  the  Blue  Nile  provinces,  and  the 
weary  populations  and  soldiery  enjoyed  a  period  of 
rest  and  quiet. 

Many  details  of  interest  have  necessarily  been 
omitted  in  the  foregoing  narrative,  in  order  to  concen- 
trate attention  upon  active  operations  which  led  to 
definite  results.  But,  although  successful  skirmishes 
and  battles  are  more  attractive  topics  than  records  of 
sickness  and  failure,  it  should  not  be  supposed  that 
soldiering  in  the  Sudan  was  devoid  of  dull  months  and 


ANOTHER  YEAR  IN  THE  SUDAN        249 

keen  disappointments  to  individual  officers.  Whilst 
a  few  were  taking  part  in  the  actions  at  Gedaref  and 
Rosaires  the  majority  were  coping  with  an  epidemic 
of  fever  on  the  Blue  Nile  which  seriously  incapaci- 
tated the  force.  I  find  in  Vandeleur's  diary  a  copy  of 
the  daily  sick  report  for  the  garrison  of  Karkoj  on 
November  21  which  states  that  343  were  in  hospital  out 
of  a  total  of  408  men  in  the  place.  It  is  not  therefore 
surprising  that,  after  Ahmed  Fedil  had  been  dealt  with 
and  the  Khalifa's  Kordofan  gathering  had  been  recon- 
noitred by  Colonel  Kitchener,  the  Sirdar  (now  Lord 
Kitchener  of  Khartoum)  deemed  it  wise  to  grant  the 
Egyptian  army  a  period  of  rest  in  comfortable  quarters, 
after  their  harassing  campaign. 

Leaving  small  but  sufficient  garrisons  at  Fort 
Nasser,  Sobat,  Fashoda,  Rosaires,  Sennar,  Kassala 
and  a  few  other  places,  he  withdrew  the  scattered 
army  and  concentrated  it  at  or  near  Omdurman  for 
recuperation  and  training.  Meanwhile  a  liberal 
Gazette  of  Honours  and  Rewards,  of  which  the  Egyp- 
tian army  obtained  a  full  and  well-merited  share, 
showed  that  England  appreciated  the  work  of  her 
sons  on  the  Nile.  Lieutenant  Vandeleur  received  an 
honourable  "  mention  in  official  despatches  "  and  was 
decorated  with  the  Order  of  the  Medjidie.  Subse- 
quently he  was  promoted  captain  in  the  Scots  Guards 
and  Brevet  Major  in  the  Army,  the  latter  as  a  recogni- 
tion of  his  services  in  Nigeria.  He  thus  obtained  Field 
rank  before  the  age  of  thirty. 

Early  in  1899,  Kitchener  selected  him  for  the 
appointment  of  Inspector  in  the  soldi  r-civilian  service 
which  was  destined  to  start  the  Sudan  on  its  new 
career  of  regeneration  and  prosperity,  and  he  com- 
menced his  task  in  March  under  Lieut. -Col.  Mahon  in 
the  Khartoum  province.     There  was  an  immense  work 


250  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

to  be  done  and  it  could  only  be  accomplished  very 
gradually,  for  the  populations,  however  friendly,  were 
so  inured  to  oppression  that  they  could  not  believe  in 
the  possibility  of  what  we  call  Justice.  The  first  and 
most  urgent  step  was  to  put  a  curb  on  flagrant  cases 
of  murder  by  individual  ruffians,  and  to  bring  these 
malefactors  to  book  in  open  court.  Egyptian  mamours 
were  appointed  to  the  various  subdivisions  of  the 
province,  police  posts  were  arranged  in  the  towns  and 
villages,  and  it  was  the  Inspector's  duty  to  constantly 
visit  all  these,  both  on  the  White  and  Blue  Niles,  and 
to  keep  in  touch  by  personal  intercourse  with  whatever 
occurred  within  his  jurisdiction.  Vandeleur  was  in  fact 
the  outward  and  visible  emblem  of  British  civilisation 
to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Khartoum  province  and  had 
a  steamer  at  his  disposal  for  his  necessary  journeys. 

But,  as  the  months  rolled  by  and  our  soldier- 
civilian  officers  came  to  identify  their  interests  with 
those  of  the  peoples  whom  they  governed,  it  became 
more  and  more  evident  that  the  Khalifa,  though  still 
withdrawn  into  the  province  of  Kordofan,  was  a 
serious  hindrance  to  the  progress  of  adjoining  districts. 
Between  Duem  and  Fashoda  for  a  distance  of  300  miles 
the  left  bank  of  the  White  Nile  and  its  vast  hinterland 
remained  at  the  mercy  of  his  followers,  and  Vandeleur's 
journal  contained  numerous  entries  concerning  the 
raids  and  murders  which  came  to  his  notice.  The 
Khalifa's  armed  force — instead  of  diminishing  as  had 
been  confidently  hoped — increased  with  the  lapse  of 
time  and  immunity  from  attack.  Far  from  being  an 
outlaw,  he  was  actually  the  ruler  of  the  province  from 
which  he  and  his  Baggara  had  sprung.  Such  a  fire- 
brand in  the  midst  of  emotional  and  warlike  tribes 
could  not  be  tolerated  by  a  government  which  aspired 
to  bring  about  the  peaceful  regeneration  of  the  Sudan, 


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ANOTHER  YEAR  IN  THE  SUDAN        251 

so  in  October  1899  ^^^  Sirdar  organised  a  military 
expedition  to  deal  with  the  nuisance. 

At  that  time  the  Khalifa  and  his  army — 4000 
fighting  men — were  located  at  Gebel  Gedir  in  the  hinter- 
land of  Fashoda,  100  miles  from  the  Nile.  The  diffi- 
culty of  getting  at  him  was  very  great,  chiefly  owing 
to  the  arid  nature  of  the  belt  of  country  between  the 
river  and  his  camp.  For  fifty  miles  the  troops  had  to 
carry  their  water  for  the  march,  and  it  was  impossible 
to  conceal  their  departure  from  Abdullahi's  spies,  who 
swarmed  between  Omdurman  and  Fashoda.  The 
attempt  was  worth  making,  but  it  failed.  Two  days 
before  our  cavalry  reached  Gebel  Gedir  the  Khalifa 
and  his  whole  force  with  women,  children  and  baggage 
disappeared  into  the  recesses  of  southern  Kordofan. 
As  it  was  no  use  pursuing  this  elusive  army  from  camp 
to  camp,  and  more  definite  results  would  be  obtained 
by  striking  at  the  head  than  by  following  the  tail, 
Lord  Kitchener  at  once  ordered  the  whole  expedition 
to  return  to  Omdurman  and  wait  for  another  and  a 
better  opportunity.  It  was  a  great  disappointment  to 
the  officers  and  men  of  the  Egyptian  army,  and  with 
sad  hearts  we  returned  to  garrison  duty  on  Novem- 
ber I,  finding  no  consolation  in  the  gloomy  telegrams 
which  reached  us  from  the  seat  of  war  in  Natal  and 
Cape  Colony. 

But  the  Sudan  is  and  always  has  been  a  land  of 
surprises,  and  its  people  are  unaccountably  credulous. 
Rumours  reached  the  bazaars  of  Omdurman  that  the 
Khalifa  was  coming  to  attack  us,  that  his  friends  in 
the  city  were  inciting  the  populace  to  rise  against  the 
soldiers,  that  arms  (lying  buried  in  the  desert)  would 
be  available.  That  he  intended  to  march  400  miles 
through  Kordofan  to  attack  the  army  from  which  he 
had  just  escaped  at  Gebel  Gedir  was  more  than  we 


252  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

could  pretend  to  believe,  but  the  bazaars  believed  it, 
and  the  bazaars  were  right.  He  was  preaching  a  holy 
war  in  the  same  country  and  at  the  corresponding  date 
to  that  preached  by  the  successful  Mahdi.  Did  they 
not  all  recollect  the  glories  of  those  Kordofan  victories, 
which  culminated  in  Hicks'  disaster  on  November  5, 
1883  ?  Next  we  had  definite  news  of  him  by  telegraph. 
He  had  marched  200  miles  north,  his  advanced-guard 
under  Ahmed  Fedil  was  encamped  near  Abba  island 
and  had  actually  fired  at  our  gunboats. 

Next  morning,  November  13,  the  9th  and  13th 
Sudanese  battalions  left  for  the  scene  of  action  and 
occupied  Ahmed  Fedil' s  camp  without  resistance.  He 
was  evidently  on  a  grain-looting  expedition,  preparing 
food  depots  for  his  uncle's  march  on  Omdurman.  Lord 
Kitchener  hurried  from  Cairo  whither  he  had  gone 
to  consult  Lord  Cromer  on  the  Sudan  budget,  and 
appointed  Colonel  Sir  R.  Wingate  to  command  the 
following  field  force  for  operations  in  Kordofan  : 

Cavalry,  one  troop  (Capt.  Bulkeley  Johnson)  ...  30  men- 
Artillery,  one  battery  (Capt.  Simpson-Baikie).  .  .  120  ,, 
Maxims,  six  guns  (Capt.  Franks)  .....  40  ,, 
Camel  Corps  (Lieut.-Col.  Henry)  .....  450  ,, 
9th  Sudanese  (Major  Doran)  .....  800  ,, 
13th  Sudanese  (Major  Maxse)  .....  800  ,, 
2nd  Egyptians,  one  Company  (Egyptian  Captain)    .          .  100  ,, 

Total    .  .       2,340      ,, 

Colonel  Lewis  commanded  the  infantry  of  the  above, 
and  900  irregulars  under  Major  Gorringe  were  added  to 
the  force,  whose  transport  consisted  of  870  camels. 

Starting  from  the  Nile  on  November  21,  the  column 
marched  sixty  miles  in  sixty-one  consecutive  hours, 
fought  two  successful  actions,  destroyed  the  Khalifa^ 
his  principal  Emirs  and  the  last  remnant  of  Dervish 
power,  and  returned  on  the  29th  with  3000  prisoners 
of  war. 


troops  to  austioive.  shownythus. 


E  GYP'J 


Shabluks  C 


2^  Sep^  ^S98^ 

Oradurman 


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EGYPTIAN      SUDAN    N?  2 


March  ofEgyptianf 
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Fort  Nasser 


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Miles  9        25        50 


ANOTHER  YEAR  IN  THE  SUDAN    253 

The  Khalifa  and  all  his  chiefs — men  whom  we  had 
sometimes  called  cowards — died  at  the  head  of  their 
faithful  followers,  charging  home  with  the  bravery  of 
despair  against  out  disciphned  blacks.  Their  deaths 
were  more  glorious  than  their  hves  and  certainly  more 
beneficial  to  the  Sudan,  which  has  since  made  surprising 
strides  on  the  path  of  progress  and  prosperity.  The 
action  is  known  as  the  battle  of  El  Gedid  where  it  was 
fought. 

But  Vandeleur  was  not  to  see  the  results  of 
peace ;  for  on  November  30,  he  started  for  Cairo  and 
London,  on  his  way  to  the  Boer  War  in  South  Africa 
and  said  good-bye  to  the  Egyptian  army  in  which  he 
had  spent  two  happy  and  successful  years. 


CHAPTER  XI 

IN  THE  BOER  WAR 

Travelling    with    five    other    officers — the    first    to 
leave  the  Sudan  for  the  Boer  War — Major  Vandeleur 
embarked    at    Alexandria    for    Marseilles,    where    he 
arrived  on  December  13,  1899,  ^^^  heard  of  Gatacre's 
disaster    at    Stormberg.     Passing    through    Paris,    he 
learnt  of  Methuen's  misfortune  at  Magersfontein,  and, 
on  reaching  London,  of  Buller's  defeat  at  Colenso  and 
the  appointment  of  Lord  Roberts  as  Commander-in- 
Chief  in  South  Africa.     He  spent  six  days  in  London, 
which  was  steeped  in  the  gloom  of  Black  Week,  and 
was  then  very  glad  to  embark  at  Southampton  on 
the  first  outgoing  troop-ship.     Indeed  England  at  that 
time  presented  a  sorry  spectacle  of  impotent  disappoint- 
ment and  was  no  place  for  an  officer  who  knew  some- 
thing of  the  actualities  of  war.     All  classes  were  over- 
come by   the   unreasoning   despair  which   a   military 
reverse  must  always  engender  in  a  people  who  con- 
sistently refuse  to  face  war  as  a  serious  business.     This 
was  not  realised  at  the  time  and  is  not  generally  reahsed 
now,   but  many  thinking  men   are  aware  that  it  is 
futile  to  rely  upon  the  patriotism  of  individuals  whose 
personal  service  is  not  recognised  as  a  Duty  to  the 
State. 

Our  first  and  only  Army-Corps,  instead  of  marching 
as  proposed  from  Cape  Colony  to  Pretoria  "  in  a  few 
months,"  lay  inert  along  a  front  of  500  miles  from 
Modder  River  to  Natal  checked  at  every  point.     Eng- 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  255 

land  indulged  in  no  recrimination  against  individuals 
but  cried  aloud  that  "  something  must  be  done  " — 
the  usual  British  formula.  The  fate  of  Ladysmith, 
Kimberley  and  Mafeking  depended  upon  fresh  troops 
being  sent  out,  but  these  were  not  immediately  avail- 
able. We  had  never  contemplated  a  big  war  and 
therefore  possessed  no  plan  or  scheme  for  organising 
either  a  large  professional  army  or  a  nation  in  arms. 
There  was  no  sufficient  reserve  of  trained  officers,  or 
even  of  horses,  guns,  saddlery,  ammunition  and  equip- 
ment. Since  Waterloo  we  had,  in  a  military  sense, 
lived  from  hand  to  mouth — fed  on  theories  about  the 
wickedness  of  all  wars,  lulled  into  false  security  by 
contemplating  our  wealth  and  our  area,  satisfied  with 
the  smug  conviction  that  we  are  not  as  other  men. 
Even  the  tattered  "  corner-boy  "  loafing  up  the  Strand 
had  been  taught  that  his  precious  existence  was  more 
valuable  than  that  of  any  private  soldier  of  the  Queen. 
Yet  in  spite  of  all  these  drawbacks  the  heart  of  the 
British  people  beat  sound  during  the  crisis  of  Black 
Week,  or  we  should  not  have  carried  through  the  South 
African  War.  The  rough,  untutored  patriotism  of  the 
nation  was  even  in  the  mood  to  respond  to  any  demand 
which  might  have  been  made  upon  it  by  persons  in 
authority.  But  unfortunately  our  public  men  failed 
to  rise  to  the  occasion  and  grasp  the  elementary  notion 
that  it  is  the  citizen's  privilege  to  serve  the  State  in 
defence  of  its  liberties  and  its  existence.  Thus  the 
new-found  national  spirit  was  frittered  away  instead 
of  being  crystallised  into  a  permanent  factor,  and  the 
great  bulk  of  the  people  did  nothing  more  than  cheer 
the  patriotic  action  of  the  few  who  voluntarily  came 
forward  with  definite  offers  of  personal  service.  These 
were  forthcoming  in  all  parts  of  our  wide  dominion, 
but  no  one  had  previously  thought  out  the  best  method. 


256  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

or  indeed  any  method  of  organising  emergency  troops  ; 
so  the  matter  was  left  to  the  private  enterprise  of  a 
Small  number  of  energetic  and  generous  men.  Our 
existing  Yeomanry  and  Volunteer  Forces  had  never 
been  called  out  and  could  not  be  put  on  a  war  footing 
— even  for  home  defence.  We  were  therefore  largely 
dependent  on  newly  raised,  scratch  corps,  equipped  on 
the  spur  of  the  moment.  Thus,  by  dint  of  the  unlimited 
enthusiasm  of  a  few  civilians,  a  number  of  armed  men 
were  hustled  on  board  ship  in  England,  Australia,  New 
Zealand  and  Canada,  and  despatched  to  the  seat  of 
war.  The  fact  that  many  of  these  excellent  volunteers 
had  to  learn  to  shoot,  cook  and  ride  in  the  presence  of 
the  enemy  in  no  way  lessens  the  gratitude  we  owe  them 
for  the  assistance  they  rendered  so  promptly.  But 
nevertheless,  an  Empire  which  remains  content  to 
entrust  its  defence  to  private  enterprise  is  certain  to 
fare  very  badly  in  conflict  with  a  trained  nation  on  the 
field  of  battle. 

On  the  present  occasion  we  fortunately  had  to  deal 
with  only  two  small  republics  whose  people,  though 
better  organised  for  war  than  ourselves  owing  to  their 
system  of  universal  service,  were  averse  to  discipline  and 
therefore  incapable  of  driving  home  concerted  attacks 
or  embarking  upon  a  vigorous  initiative.  They  en- 
joyed the  advantages  of  being  on  the  spot,  in  their 
own  country,  and  six  months  ahead  of  us  in  their 
preparations  for  war.  But  they  failed  to  benefit  as 
they  should  have  done  by  their  own  initial  successes 
and  our  original  blunders. 

On  January  lo,  1900,  Lord  Roberts  and  Lord 
Kitchener  landed  at  Capetown,  where  they  found  an 
immense  task  awaiting  them  before  an  army  capable 
of  leaving  a  railway  line  could  be  put  into  the  field. 
Yet  it  was  essential  to  Lord  Roberts'  plan  of  campaign 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  257 

to  have  such  an  army  at  his  command,  and  that 
quickly.  It  does  not,  however,  come  within  the  scope 
of  this  chapter  to  give  even  a  brief  outhne  of  the  Boer 
War,  as  it  may  fairly  be  assumed  that  my  readers  are 
acquainted  with  those  volumes  of  The  Times  History 
of  the  War  in  South  Africa  which  have  already  appeared. 
Yet  some  indication  of  the  general  situation  in  Cape 
Colony  at  the  time  of  Major  Vandeleur's  landing, 
January  17,  must  be  given,  if  we  are  clearly  to  under- 
stand the  work  he  was  called  upon  to  perform. 

Methuen  was  holding  on  at  Modder  River  with  the 
1st  Division  and  a  force  safeguarding  the  single  line  of 
railway  connecting  him  with  De  Aar  and  Capetown. 
Gatacre  was  similarly  holding  Sterkstroom  and  the 
railway  to  East  London.  Between  these  two  distant 
bodies,  French  had  for  two  months  been  playing  a 
most  skilful  game  against  superior  Boer  forces  near 
Colesberg,  and  had  succeeded  by  a  policy  of  bluff  and 
bold  tactics  in  preventing  the  invasion  of  the  southern 
districts  of  Cape  Colony.  At  Naauwpoort  he  held  the 
railway  line  to  Port  Elizabeth. 

The  6th  Division  under  General  Kelly-Kenny  landed 
early  in  January.  The  7th  Division  under  General 
Tucker  was  due  to  reach  Capetown  later  in  the  month, 
as  also  several  artillery  and  other  units.  The  9th 
Division  was  in  process  of  formation.  In  fact  there 
were  plenty  of  regulars  at  or  hurrying  to  the  theatre  of 
operations,  but  they  could  not  yet  be  called  a  field  army. 
The  Cavalry  Division  was  gradually  collecting,  but 
there  was  still  a  sad  dearth  of  mounted  troops — owing 
to  the  policy  which  had  dictated  the  famous  telegram 
to  the  colonies,  ''  infantry  preferred."  Lord  Roberts 
therefore  set  to  work  to  make  good  this  deficiency  by 
converting  4000  regular  infantry  soldiers  into  eight 
battalions  of  mounted  infantry.     These  men  were  at 

R 


258  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

first  as  untrained  as  their  recently  landed  horses,  but 
in  process  of  time  developed  into  an  admirable  force. 
He  likewise  raised  a  number  of  South  African  Colonial 
Corps  during  January.  But,  to  enable  his  army  to 
move  through  an  inhospitable  country  without  a  rail- 
way, the  greatest  necessity  was  a  service  of  mobile 
transport,  and  this  he  directed  Lord  Kitchener  to 
prepare  the  very  day  after  they  reached  Capetown. 

The  Commander-in-Chief's  plan  was  to  strike  at 
Bloemfontein  in  the  heart  of  the  Free  State  from  the 
western  railway  between  Orange  River  and  Modder 
River,  with  30,000  men — his  object  being  to  interpose 
this  force  between  Cronje's  9000  Boers  at  Magersfontein 
and  Kimberley  and  their  base.  The  march  to  Bloem- 
fontein, 100  miles,  would  also  place  him  in  rear  of  7000 
Boers  near  Colesberg  and  give  him  possession  of  the 
railway  through  the  Free  State.  To  be  successful,  this 
flank  march  within  striking  distance  of  Cronje  must  be 
sprung  upon  the  Boers  as  a  complete  surprise  and  then 
be  carried  out  with  the  utmost  rapidity.  To  move 
slowly  to  a  flank  and  give  the  enemy  time  to  concen- 
trate upon  it  at  leisure  was  the  very  thing  which  Lord 
Roberts  meant  to  avoid  :  and,  contrary  to  other 
experiences  in  the  campaign,  he  did  avoid  it.  The 
result  was  complete  and  altogether  dramatic.  In  a 
single  week  (February  11  to  18)  the  whole  face  of  the 
war  was  altered  to  our  advantage.  Cronje's  flight  was 
arrested  at  Paardeberg,  where  4141  Boers  subsequently 
surrendered  as  prisoners  of  war  :  Bloemfontein  was 
captured  :  and  all  the  Commandos  south  of  the  Orange 
River  retreated  north  in  a  panic. 

The  story  of  this  success  is  so  simple,  so  obvious 
and  so  natural,  when  narrated  at  this  distance  of  time 
and  in  the  light  of  our  present  information,  that  we  are 
apt  to  forget  the  situation  as  it  presented  itself  before 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  259 

Lord  Roberts  took  command.  But  the  fact  is  that  the 
Battle  of  Paardeberg  could  not  have  been  won  by  him 
or  by  any  one  else  until  the  army  in  Cape  Colony  was 
fundamentally  re-organised,  and  this  was  particularly 
the  case  with  regard  to  the  transport.  Therefore,  as 
Vandeleur  was  one  of  the  first  officers  selected  for  this 
special  duty,  we  will  revert  to  the  beginning  of  January 
and  consider  the  condition  of  this  service. 

Just  as  the  heterogeneous  assemblage  of  battalions, 
batteries  and  squadrons  did  not  constitute  an  efficient 
field  army,  so  likewise  a  quantity  of  waggons,  mules, 
oxen,  harness  and  "  boys  " — scattered  over  a  wide  area 
— did  not  produce   mobile  transport.      The  fault,   if 
any,  lay  with  the  erroneous  conception  with  which  we 
started  to  fight  the  Boers  at  the  outset  of  the  war,  not 
with  the  Army  Service  Corps  whose  work  throughout 
the   operations   was   admirable.     The   original   Army- 
Corps   sent    out    from   home    was   provided   with   an 
adequate  transport  for  the  campaign  it  was  intended  to 
undertake — involving  a  march  up  the  central  railway 
from    the   coast   to    Bloemfontein   and   Pretoria.     Its 
transport,  as  well  as  the  Supply  Department  was  placed, 
in  accordance  with  the  carefully  planned  system  of  the 
British  Army,  under  the  senior  Army  Service  Corps 
officer  attached  to  the  General's  staff.     Thus  supply 
and  transport  were  twin-brothers  working  hand-in-hand 
which  in  a  small  force  is  an  excellent  arrangement. 
The  scheme  was  elaborate  in  detail  and  carried  out  the 
principle  of  decentralisation  to  its  logical  conclusion. 
Each  battalion,  brigade  and  division  was  allotted  a 
separate  set  of  vehicles  for  its  own  exclusive  use.     The 
waggons    when    handed  over   to  a  battalion    became 
practically  its  property  during  the  campaign,  and  were 
looked  after  by  one  of  its  officers.     Hence  the  system 
came  to  be  called  the  regimental  system,  and  was  much 


26o  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

favoured  by  regimental  officers.  The  waggons  accom- 
panied the  battahon  wherever  it  went  but,  as  they  only 
carried  food  for  two  days,  required  constant  replenish- 
ing. This  was  provided  for  by  supply  columns  which 
accompanied  the  brigade  or  division,  carrying  rations 
to  the  regimental  waggons  from  the  real  carriers  of  the 
army's  food  and  forage — namely  the  supply  park.  The 
latter  moved  in  rear  and  drew  upon  the  railways. 

The  merit  of  the  system  was  that  battalions  always 
had  waggons  at  their  disposal,  that  the  personnel  of 
these  waggons  was  in  charge  of  the  battalions  which 
employed  it,  and  that  the  officers  in  most  cases  took 
a  pride  in  the  well-being  of  the  animals.  But  it  also 
had  grave  defects.  It  frittered  away  a  quantity  of 
vehicles  in  supply  columns  and  much  time  was  spent 
in  loading  and  unloading  ;  it  wasted  the  waggons  of  the 
numerous  battalions  and  brigades  which  have  to  remain 
stationary  during  long  periods  in  any  campaign  ;  and 
it  was  practically  inapplicable  to  South  Africa  where 
one  part  of  the  army,  holding  railways,  bridges  and 
lines  of  block-houses  could  do  with  only  a  few  carts, 
whereas  another  part,  being  perpetually  on  trek  in 
pursuit  of  Boers,  required  more  than  the  regulation 
allowance  of  transport.  Thus,  the  regimental  system 
provided  for  a  set  of  conditions  which  it  was  hoped 
would  prevail  but  was  too  inelastic  to  cope  with  the 
actualities  of  the  war. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  system  favoured  by  the  new 
Commander-in-Chief  and  his  Chief  of  the  Staff  was  no 
copy  of  either  Indian  or  Egyptian  methods,  but  was 
dictated  solely  by  the  necessities  of  the  situation.  They 
found  their  transport  squandered  about  the  country, 
fixed  to  diminutive  units  and  incapable  of  being  rapidly 
concentrated  for  the  surprise  march  on  Bloemfontein 
which  they  were  determined  to  carry  out.     Yet  success 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  261 

in  war  so  largely  depends  upon  strategic  surprise  that 
a  system  which  impedes  it    must    be    fundamentally 
faulty.     It    was    therefore    decided    to    impound    the 
regimental  waggons,  except  the  First  Line  Transport — 
viz.  :    water-carts,  ammunition-carts,  ambulances  and 
the  technical  vehicles  of  engineer  and  other  units,  all 
of  which  are  part  of  their  indispensable  equipment. 
The   supply  columns  were  hkewise  impounded  from 
brigades  and  divisions,  and  the  whole  of  the  mule- 
waggons  thus  withdrawn  were  reformed  into  companies 
of  forty-nine  each,  under  a  major  or  captain  specially 
detailed  to  command  them.     Thus  the  mobile  transport 
was  amalgamated  into  one  service  under  the  Director 
of   Transport,   who   also   controlled   the   supply-park, 
consisting  of  ox-waggons.     Such  a  serious  change  on 
the  eve  of  a  campaign  could  only  be  justified  by  con- 
siderations of  paramount  weight,  which  were  not  at 
the  time  understood  by  the  regimental  officers  whose 
waggons  were  taken  from  them,  or  by  those  depart- 
mental officers  who  were  wedded  to  the  system  which 
they  knew.      But  Vandeleur  and  others   qualified  to 
judge  by  service  in  the  Transport,  soon  became  con- 
vinced   that    the    elasticity    of     the     newer    system 
outweighed    the   inconveniences   of    the    change    and 
justified  —  on    active     service -^t lie     principle     upon 
which    it    was    founded.      For,    when    shorn    of    its 
highly  technical  details,  a  mobile  transport  is  merely 
the  carrier  of  food  and  forage  from  the  nearest  avail- 
able depot  to  the  mouths  of  the  soldier  and  the  horse 
in  the  lighting  hne.     The  ownership  of  the  waggon  is 
of  minor  importance  provided  the  soldier  is  fed,  and 
fed  he  was  throughout  the  war  with  remarkable  regu- 
larity, in  spite  of   numerous  difficulties,  by  the  new 
companies  which  combined  the  duties  of   regimental 
transport  and  supply  column  under  one  officer.     The 


262  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

latter's  business  was  to  maintain  touch  with  the  men  he 
had  to  feed,  however  scattered  they  might  be  ;  to  be 
posted  with  the  latest  information  regarding  probable 
moves  and  the  position  of  the  supply-park ;  to  replenish 
empty  waggons  wherever  possible;  to  feed  and  care 
for  his  mules  (ten  to  each  waggon) ;  to  pay  his  non- 
commissioned officers  and  Cape-boys  ;  and  to  know 
exactly  where  all  his  waggons  were  when  detached  on 
odd  jobs.  It  meant  plenty  of  work  for  an  active  man 
during  such  a  campaign  as  we  were  engaged  in,  and 
necessitated  an  intelligent  appreciation  of  coming 
events. 

In  the  middle  of  January  1900  Vandeleur  was  posted 
to  the  command  of  one  of  these  companies  at  De  Aar 
during  the  process  of  its  formation,  and  we  will  now 
follow  his  fortunes  to  Bloemfontein  and  beyond. 

De  Aar,  a  horrible,  dusty,  wind-swept  railway 
junction,  connecting  Kimberley,  Naauwpoort  and 
Capetown,  one  of  those  necessary  camps  on  the  lines 
of  communication  which  every  officer  and  man  is 
always  longing  to  leave,  was  the  scene  of  feverish 
activity  during  the  reorganisation.  A  mule  company, 
complete  with  animals,  equipment  and  personnel 
takes  time  to  create,  and,  as  forty  of  them  were  in 
process  of  formation  in  various  places  and  in  a  great 
hurry,  Vandeleur  had  to  keep  alert  to  avoid  being  left 
out  of  the  scramble  for  essential  necessaries.  By  the 
end  of  January  his  company  was  ready  to  march  to 
Orange  River  Station.  Several  of  the  American  and 
Italian  mules  died  on  the  journey  though  the  waggons 
were  empty,  but  Seymour  reached  his  destination  in 
good  time  and  found  himself  in  the  vortex  of  the  great 
concentration  early  in  February.  Troop-trains  from 
Capetown,  Naauwpoort  and  other  places  were  per- 
petually passing  through  and  depositing  their  loads  at 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  263 

various  camps  between  Orange  River  and  Modder.  At 
last  the  Headquarter  Staff  arrived,  Vandeleur  was 
hurriedly  ordered  to  Graspan  thirty  miles  north,  and 
on  February  11  found  himself  attached  to  Kelly- 
Kenny's  6th  Division  as  its  senior  transport  officer  for 
the  march.  Next  day  the  army  of  30,000  combatants 
quitted  the  railway  in  an  easterly  direction  to  Ramdam, 
and  Vandeleur  noted  in  his  diary  the  impressive 
spectacle  which  it  presented  on  the  move. 

As  far  as  the  eye  could  see  the  veldt  was  alive  with 
troops.  Thin  clouds  of  dust  some  miles  in  front  marked 
the  progress  of  the  cavalry  division,  screening  the 
movement  with  its  widely  extended  squadrons  ;  thicker 
dust-clouds  denoted  infantry  brigades  toihng  slowly 
behind  ;  whilst  the  thickest  and  blackest  were  raised 
by  loaded  mule  waggons  straining  in  rear.  Ramdam's 
lake  afforded  ample  water  for  the  night's  bivouac,  and 
next  day  the  army  moved  on  across  the  Riet,  where 
Vandeleur  had  his  first  experience  of  the  difficulty 
attending  the  passage  of  a  "  drift "  by  a  crowd  of  waggons, 
one  by  one.  South  African  rivers  are  mostly  deep, 
wide  ditches  along  the  bottom  of  which  flows  a  few 
feet  of  water ;  they  are  very  rarely  bridged,  and  a  drift 
is  merely  a  place  where  the  steep  bank  has  been  cut 
down  to  a  ford.  These  are  few  in  number  and  cannot 
be  negotiated  by  more  than  one  vehicle  at  a  time.  Thus 
at  Waterval  Drift  Vandeleur  had  to  work  all  night  to 
get  his  baggage  across  the  Riet  and  on  to  Wagdrei, 
where  it  bivouacked  on  the  14th.  The  same  night  at 
11.30  his  Division  started  for  Modder  River  to  reheve 
the  cavalry  at  Khp  Drift  and  enable  French  to  make 
his  dash  for  Kimberley.  On  the  15th  Kimberley  was 
relieved  and  Cronje  bolted  from  Magersfontein,  in  a 
panic,  across  our  front  to  reach  his  base  at  Bloem- 
fontein.     On  the  i6th  we  fought  his  rearguard  all  day. 


264  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

Throughout  the  17th  we  pursued  him  in  hot  haste  and 
continued  the  pursuit  through  most  of  the  night  to 
Paardeberg  Drift.  On  the  i8th  we  pinned  him  to  his 
laager  by  a  desperate  infantry  attack,  simultaneously 
heading  him  off  with  a  cavalry  brigade  from  Kimberley. 
During  this  strenuous  week  neither  troops  nor 
transport  had  a  decent  sleep  or  a  square  meal ;  but 
Kimberley  was  relieved,  Cronje  surrounded,  the  British 
had  gained  their  first  real  success,  and  Roberts  stood 
by  till  his  foe  should  be  compelled  to  surrender.  This 
occurred  on  February  27,  the  anniversary  of  our 
Majuba  defeat,  and  as  Vandeleur  was  an  eye-witness 
of  the  event  an  extract  from  his  diary  will  be  of 
interest — 

"...  A  great  deal  of  firing  was  heard  at  3  a.m. 
which  proved  to  be  the  Canadians  attacking  the 
trenches.  They  got  within  sixty  yards  and  the 
Engineers  dug  a  trench  which  enfiladed  the  Boer  lines. 
I  rode  out  at  dawn  to  our  first  line  on  Battery  Hill  and 
joined  Colonel  Higson  commanding  the  13th  Brigade 
and  his  aide-de-camp,  who  were  meeting  a  flag  of  truce 
brought  out  by  two  Boers.  Their  letter  of  surrender 
was  at  once  sent  on  to  Lord  Roberts,  who  directed 
Cronje  himself  to  appear.  The  two  Boers  on  rather 
nice  ponies  rode  back  to  the  laager,  and  in  some  excite- 
ment we  awaited  Cronje' s  arrival,  at  a  point  about  a 
thousand  yards  from  his  lines.  In  about  half  an 
hour  P.  Cronje  and  another  appeared.  He  was  rather 
fat,  red-faced  above  his  beard,  a  hard-looking  man 
in  blue  serge  trousers,  brown  boots,  yellow  overcoat  and 
big  felt  hat  with  orange  ribbon,  riding  a  grey  pony.  He 
only  spoke  Dutch  and,  after  a  hurried  '  good-morning  ' 
rode  off  with  a  staff  officer  to  Lord  Roberts,  with  whom 
he  breakfasted.     All  details  of  the  surrender  were  left 


THE  BOER   LAAGER   AT    PAARDEBERG    ON    THE 
MORNING   OF   THE   SURRENDER 

From   a    Photograph  H^  Seymoik  Vandeli  ik 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  265 

with  Commandant  Wolmarans  and  General  Kelly- 
Kenny  with  whom  I  returned  to  breakfast.  Then  I 
rode  down  with  him  to  the  drift  where  the  Boers  were 
collected,  carrying  their  blankets  and  a  few  necessaries. 
The  Buffs,  acting  as  guard,  formed  up  in  line  some 
distance  from  them.  The  Boers  were  distributed  in 
parties  and  counted.  Result — Free  Staters  1131, 
Transvaalers  2620,  Passed  down  the  river  (not  counted 
by  us)  250,  wounded  140.  Total  =  4141.  It  was  a 
great  sight  and  they  were  a  fine-looking  lot  of  men." 

During  the  operations  which  culminated  in  this 
result  the  6th  Division  had  suffered  its  full  share  of 
casualties  ;  Vandeleur's  transport  had  come  under  a 
very  accurate  and  disagreeable  pompom  fire  from  the 
Boer  laager,  and  was  only  saved  from  a  stampede  by 
his  promptitude  and  presence  of  mind. 

The  day  following  Cronje's  capitulation  the  Boers 
in  Natal  also  gave  way,  Ladysmith  was  relieved  and 
Roberts'  army  began  to  look  wistfully  towards  Bloem- 
fontein.  But  a  disaster  to  half  the  supply-park  at 
Waterval  Drift,  where  170  loaded  ox-waggons  were 
destroyed  or  captured  by  De  Wet  on  February  15, 
had  curtailed  the  available  rations  and  forage  and 
rendered  a  delay  imperative.  Moreover,  heavy  rains 
turned  the  veldt  into  a  quagmire  and  seriously  impeded 
the  reduced  transport  service  plying  from  both  Modder 
and  Kimberley  to  Paardeberg,  and,  though  the  troops 
were  put  on  half-rations  and  the  animals  on  a  quarter 
of  their  forage  allowance,  no  sufficient  accumulation 
of  supplies  had  been  made  to  warrant  an  immediate 
advance.  Meanwhile  the  Boers  were  concentrating 
at  Poplar  Grove  to  dispute  our  progress ;  the  Presi- 
dents of  the  two  Republics  were  in  the  field  with 
their  commandos,  exhorting  them  to  stand  and  defend 


266  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

the  capital  ;  and  everything  pointed  to  a  stubborn 
encounter  when,  on  March  7,  the  army  deployed  for  a 
carefully  planned  attack  on  the  Boer  flank.  But,  owing 
to  various  tactical  delays  which  Lord  Roberts  deplored 
more  than  any  one,  the  enemy  were  merely  manoeuvred 
out  of  their  position  and  permitted  to  retreat  unscathed 
— pursued  by  us  at  a  leisurely  pace.  At  Driefontein, 
however,  on  the  loth  we  again  came  up  with  them,  and 
this  time  a  vigorous  attack,  driven  home  with  great 
spirit  by  the  6th  Division,  inflicted  a  loss  of  over 
100  killed  and  more  wounded,  and  pushed  the 
Boers  in  headlong  flight  from  their  kopjes  to  Bloem- 
fontein  and  beyond.  Vandeleur  was  with  his  divisional 
staff — the  proper  place  for  the  senior  transport  officer 
in  an  action — and  remained  under  fire  most  of  the  day. 
His  waggons  also  received  the  unwelcome  attentions  of 
a  certain  Creusot  gun,  which  burst  shells  over  them  at 
6000  yards  range  and  caused  them  to  shift  with  con- 
siderable alacrity. 

Next  day  the  army  continued  its  march,  and 
Bloemfontein  was  occupied  wdthout  further  opposition. 
At  six  in  the  evening  the  Guards  Brigade,  having 
covered  thirty-seven  miles  in  twenty-six  consecutive 
hours,  entered  the  town,  and  next  morning  Pole-Carew 
with  the  Grenadiers,  Scots  Guards  and  four  guns  moved 
by  train  100  miles  to  Springfontein,  where  he  met 
Gatacre's  scouts  from  the  south.  This  feat  was  made 
possible  by  the  daring  of  Major  Hunter- Weston,  who 
with  a  party  of  ten  mounted  sappers  blew  up  a  culvert 
on  the  railway  north  of  Bloemfontein  before  the  Boers 
evacuated,  and  thus  secured  eleven  engines  and  100 
trucks  which  were  of  the  utmost  value. 

During  the  pause  of  six  weeks  which  occurred  before 
Roberts  was  ready  to  begin  his  great  march  to  Johannes- 
burg and  Pretoria  a  number  of  minor  engagements 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  267 

took  place  in  the  south  of  the  Free  State.  Ladybrand 
was  occupied  by  our  cavalry  :  Karree  Siding,  north  of 
Bloemfontein,  was  taken  possession  of  by  the  7th 
Division,  which  ousted  the  Boers  :  Sauna's  Post  was 
the  scene  of  an  unfortunate  surprise,  in  which  we  lost 
eight  guns  and  much  transport  :  Reddersburg  was  a 
most  "  regrettable  incident,"  in  which  400  of  Gatacre's 
men  surrendered  :  Wepener  was  strenuously  attacked 
but  gallantly  held  by  Brabant's  Colonials.  Meanwhile 
the  bulk  of  the  army  remained  at  Bloemfontein,  railway 
communication  with  Cape  Colony  was  re-opened, 
reinforcements  of  men,  horses,  mules  and  supplies  were 
brought  up,  and  all  was  made  ready  for  the  next  stage 
of  the  campaign. 

During  his  stay  in  Bloemfontein  Vandeleur  was 
much  gratified  by  hearing  from  Kelly-Kenny  that  he 
had  been  mentioned  in  despatches,  and  the  general 
added  a  warm  tribute  of  congratulation  on  his  manage- 
ment of  the  transport  throughout  the  previous  opera- 
tions. Then  Lord  Erroll,  who  was  appointed  to  com- 
mand a  brigade  of  the  Yeomanry  on  its  way  out  from 
home,  offered  him  the  post  of  Brigade-Major,  but 
Kitchener  declared  that  transport  was  a  far  more 
important  service  and  refused  to  sanction  the  proposal- 
On  the  same  day  the  following  official  telegram  from 
the  War  Office  was  put  into  Seymour's  hands — "  Will 
you  accept  transfer  as  senior  captan  new  Irish  Guards 
Regiment  ?  "  This  meant  promotion  from  junior 
captain  in  the  Scots  Guards  at  once  and  a  certainty  of 
further  advancement  in  the  near  future,  but  he  hesitated 
a  great  deal  before  replying,  on  account  of  his  affection 
for  his  old  regiment  and  his  dislike  of  leaving  it.  It 
was,  however,  a  compliment  to  be  selected  for  transfer 
and,  as  an  Irishman,  Seymour  was  very  proud  of  the 
honour — so    he    telegraphed    his    acceptance    on    the 


268  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

condition  that  he  should  continue  on  special  service 
during  the  remainder  of  the  war. 

Meanwhile  Kitchener  had  another  post  in  view  for 
him,  that  of  Senior  Transport  officer  on  the  staff  of 
Major-General  Hutton,  just  appointed  to  command  the 
1st  Mounted  Infantry  Brigade.  It  was  in  process  of 
formation  and  was  to  consist  of  the  following  troops  : 

ist  Brigade  Mounted  Infantry 

15^  Mounted  Infantry  Corps  {Lieut. -Colonel  Alder  son). 

ist  Battalion  Mounted  Infantry  ;  ist  Canadian  ^lounted  Rifles  ; 

2nd  Canadian  Mounted  Rifles  ;  Strathcona's  Horse. 

2nd  Mounted  Infantry  Corps  {Lieut. -Colonel  De  Lisle). 
6th    Battalion    Mounted   Infantry ;  New    South    Wales  Mounted 
Rifles  ;  West  Australian  Mounted  Infantry. 

yd  Mounted  Infantry  Corps  {Lieut. -Colonel  Pilcher). 
3rd  BattaUon    Mounted  Infantr\- ;    Queensland  Mounted  Rifles  ; 
New  Zealand  Mounted  Infantry^. 

4ih  Mounted  Infantry  Corps  {Lieut. -Colonel  Henry). 
4th    Battalion    Mounted    Infantry  ;     South   Australian   Mounted 
Rifles ;     Victorian    Mounted    Rifles ;     Tasmanian    Mounted 
Infantry. 
Also  a  Battery,   R.H.A.  ;    four  sections  Pompoms.   R.A.  ;    twenty 
Machine  Guns  ;  one  company  Australian  Pioneers  ;  a  Bearer  Company, 
N.S.W.  Army  INIedical  Corps. 

Total  =  303  of&cers,  6076  men,  6347  horses. 

A  volume  might  well  be  devoted  to  the  organisa- 
tion of  Mounted  Infantry  and  another  to  the  services 
rendered  by  the  various  corps  which  were  pitch-forked 
into  the  middle  of  this  campaign,  because  Britons  do 
not  give  personal  service  to  the  State  until  a  war  is 
half  lost.  Everything  had  to  be  initiated  in  a  hurry, 
with  a  consequent  loss  of  efficiency,  driving-power  and 
hardness  in  officers,  men  and  horses.  Starting  with 
such  a  handicap,  it  is  remarkable  that  the  two  mounted 
infantry  brigades  were  as  good  as  they  undoubtedly 
proved  themselves,  and  we  are  led  to  the  inevitable 
conclusion  that  if  four  such  units  as  the  one  detailed 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  269 

above  had  been  raised,  equipped  and  trained  for  one 
year  instead  of  for  one  week,  their  mobihty,  dash  and 
disciphne  would  have  averted  our  ignominious  perform- 
ances at  Stormberg,  Magersfontein  and  Colenso,  and 
might  have  reduced  the  duration  of  the  war  by  a  half 
and  its  cost  by  £100,000,000  to  ;f20o,ooo,ooo.  This, 
however,  is  not  the  place  to  dilate  upon  the  permanent 
weakness  of  the  British  Empire ;  nor  do  I  deem  it  neces- 
sary to  pursue  Vandeleur  from  bivouac  to  bivouac- 
there  were  no  tents — with  Hiitton's  Brigade  which, 
together  with  French's  cavalry,  manoeuvred  and  fought 
as  the  left  wing  of  Roberts'  army  (39,000  men)  through- 
out its  march  from  Bloemfontein  to  Pretoria.  The 
start  was  made  on  May  i.  The  Boers  were  never  once 
seriously  tackled  during  this  memorable  invasion  but 
were  adroitly  manoeuvred  out  of  all  their  positions  ; 
and,  as  the  old  saying  goes,  "  they  lived  to  fight  another 
day." 

On  May  18  the  situation  was  roughly  as  follows — 
Roberts  at  Kroonstad  ;  Buller  at  Newcastle,  Natal ; 
Ian  Hamilton  at  Lindley  ;  Methuen  at  Hoopstad ; 
Hunter  at  Christiania  :  Maf eking  just  relieved.  The 
country  was  bare,  the  railway  line  was  wrecked,  and 
the  progress  of  the  columns  depended  on  the  carrjdng 
capacity  of  the  transport,  whose  officers  will  all  their 
lives  retam  a  vivid  recollection  of  nights  of  struggle  in 
almost  impassable  drifts  and  days  of  anxiety  to  replenish 
their  waggons  at  the  supply-park.  Meanwhile  on  May  3 
the  mounted  force  under  the  able  leadership  of  Hutton 
turned,  by  a  wide  circling  march,  all  the  Boer  positions 
about  Brandfort  and  the  Vet  River,  and,  after  a  stiff 
fight  on  their  flank,  forced  the  enemy  into  a  confused 
retreat  towards  Kroonstad.  It  was  during  such  move- 
ments that  the  organising  capacity  of  Vandeleur  became 
apparent  and  that,  through  his  energy  and  resource- 


270  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

fulness,  the  troops  were  fed  as  soon  as  they  reached 
their  bivouac  after  an  action.  To  him  therefore  is  due 
a  great  deal  of  the  credit  which  the  mounted  men  got 
for  their  mobihty,  for  without  the  prompt  supplies  with 
which  he  continually  furnished  them  no  wide  turning 
movements  would  have  been  possible.  On  the  9th 
Hutton's  brigade  was  joined  by  the  cavalry  under 
French,  and,  thenceforward  to  the  Battle  of  Diamond 
Hill  on  June  12  the  two  were  practically  united  into 
one  command  under  the  latter  general.  Their  flank 
movement  on  the  left  of  the  enemy  included  the  action 
of  the  Zand  River,  the  taking  of  Kroonstad,  the  turning 
of  the  Vaal,  the  occupation  of  Johannesburg  and 
Pretoria  and  materially  contributed  to  Lord  Roberts' 
successful  advance.  On  the  right  Ian  Hamilton 
circling  even  further  from  the  centre  fought  many 
engagements,  brushing  aside  all  opposition  at  Winburg, 
Lindley  and  Heilbron  :  whilst  at  the  Battle  of  Johannes- 
burg his  Gordon  Highlanders  showed  that  quality  of 
stolid,  enduring  pluck  which  makes  the  British  soldier 
such  a  hard  man  to  beat  in  a  protracted  campaign. 
Johannesburg  and  the  gold-mines  were  found  intact, 
notwithstanding  Boer  threats  of  destruction  and  the 
problem  of  the  future  was  to  guard  the  265  miles  of 
railway  back  to  Bloemfontein  from  the  depredations 
of  the  unbeaten  Free  Staters.  Nevertheless  Lord 
Roberts  determined  to  push  on  at  once  and  occupy 
Pretoria  which  he  did  on  June  5 — five  weeks  after 
leaving  Bloemfontein. 

After  this  success  most  men  in  England  and  in  the 
army  in  South  Africa  believed  the  war  was  practically 
over,  and  so  it  certainly  would  have  been  in  any 
organised  community  in  Europe.  We  held  the  capitals 
of  the  two  Repubhcs,  the  main  line  of  railway  and  all 
the  towns  on  it  ;   the  mines,  whose  wealth  had  enabled 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  271 

the  Boers  to  prepare  for  the  war  and  keep  it  going,  were 
in  our  possession  ;  Kruger  and  Steyn  were  fugitive 
presidents,  the  one  in  a  railway  carriage  on  the  Lorenzo 
Marques  Hne,  the  other  in  the  eastern  districts  of  the 
Free  State  ;  the  Hollander  officials  and  other  hostile 
foreigners  had  no  more  stomach  for  fighting,  and  were 
leaving  the  sinking  ship  after  clamouring  for  arrears  of 
pay  and  "  legalising  "  the  monopolies,  securities  and 
shares  which  some  of  them  had  plundered  from  the 
Rand.  But  the  back-country,  agricultural  Boers,  the 
men  who  held  the  Mausers  and  required  neither  govern- 
ment pay  nor  government  rations,  had  not  once  been 
properly  beaten  in  a  fight  to  a  finish,  had  rarely  seen 
many  of  their  dead  comrades  lying  about  as  mute 
evidence  of  disaster,  had  not  yet  realised  what  the 
newspapers  call  the  "  horrors  of  war."  They  had  been 
out-manoeuvred  by  superior  forces  and  compelled  to 
abandon  positions  which  they  rfieant  to  hold,  but  had 
ridden  away  with  whole  skins — fortified  by  practical 
experience  in  the  field  and  not  much  lowered  in  morale. 
Being  of  a  stubborn  race  and  having  become  hardened 
and  proficient  in  war  now  that  the  weak  and  incom- 
petent were  eliminated,  they  found  themselves  still 
amply  provided  with  food,  horses  and  ammunition  and 
unable  to  see  why  they  should  give  in  voluntarily  to  an 
invader  merely  because  he  held  the  railways  and  towns 
which  they  had  always  disliked.  On  the  contrary,  their 
opportunity  had  at  last  arrived,  and  this  they  proved  by 
two  long  years  of  incessant  guerilla  warfare  under  the 
new  and  able  leaders  whom  the  war  had  thrown  up. 
From  Pietersburg  in  the  northern  Transvaal  to  Graaff 
Reinet  in  southern  Cape  Colony  their  raids  spread 
gradually  east  and  west  and  occupied  our  army  without 
pause  or  respite.  From  month  to  month  and  from 
year  to  year  the  scene  shifted  from  place  to  place  ; 


272  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

the  commandos  dodged,  countermarched,  disappeared 
in  the  night  to  reappear  elsewhere  ;  British  columns — 
as  obstinate  as  their  opponents — pursued,  surrounded 
and  harried  them,  successfully  and  unsuccessfully, 
suffering  occasional  reverses  but  steadily  gaining 
ground  till  they  finally  compelled  a  satisfactory  sur- 
render and  the  complete  disarmament  of  every  Boer 
with  a  rifle.  It  entailed  a  long  and  tedious  cam- 
paign which  could  only  be  successfully  terminated  if 
the  grit  of  the  British  people  remained  uncompromising 
and  enduring.  Fortunately  it  never  wavered  or  failed 
in  spite  of  Pro-Boers  and  others  who  counselled  peace 
at  any  price,  and  thus  we  at  last  reached  a  solution 
which  promises  permanent,  beneficial  results  to  the 
future  South  African  Nation. 

But  we  must  revert  to  the  first  days  of  the  occupa- 
tion of  Pretoria  in  order  to  follow  Vandeleur's  personal 
experiences  in  the  guerilla  war.  He  remained  on 
Hutton's  staff  and  was  present  at  the  Battle  of  Diamond 
Hill,  east  of  Pretoria,  where  Botha  made  a  gallant 
stand  before  retiring  to  Middelburg.  He  states  that 
until  remounted  his  brigade  together  with  the  two 
cavalry  brigades  under  French  only  mustered  1300 
horses  fit  for  duty  between  them,  at  the  end  of  their 
arduous  march  from  the  south.  Meanwhile  commandos 
and  bands  of  Boers  hovered  round  Pretoria,  Johannes- 
burg and  other  towns  and  De  Wet  in  the  Free  State 
had  captured  a  battalion  of  the  Derbyshire  Militia, 
had  firmly  established  himself  on  the  railway  and  had 
destroyed  several  trains  carrying  three  weeks'  mail 
for  the  whole  army.  Hutton  was  first  sent  to  the 
Magaliesberg  Hills,  west  of  Pretoria,  to  disperse  Boer 
bands  and  join  hands  with  Baden-Powell,  on  his  way 
from  Mafeking ;  then  to  the  south-east  of  the  capital 
where  for  three  weeks  he  was  daily  in  touch  with  and 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  273 

fighting  commandos  under  Botha  to  keep  the  railway 
intact.  During  the  second  week  of  July  occurred  the 
unfortunate  defeat  and  capture  of  one  of  our  detach- 
ments at  Zilikat's  Nek,  where  some  companies  of  the 
Lincolnshire  Regiment,  a  squadron  of  the  Greys  and 
two  Horse  Artillery  guns  surrendered.  Minor  successes 
of  this  kind  were  always  magnified  by  the  Boers  into 
victories  of  first-rate  importance  and  had  the  incon- 
venient result  of  encouraging  their  resistance  and  con- 
siderably prolonging  the  war.  Hutton's  command 
had  proof  of  this  in  a  fight  the  following  week,  when 
a  strong  force  of  Boers  under  Viljoen  made  a  desperate 
attempt  to  break  through  to  Pretoria  but  were  re- 
pulsed all  along  the  line.  Towards  the  end  of  the 
month  we  find  him  at  Middelburg  with  more  Boers  all 
round,  but  the  news  of  Prinsloo's  surrender  with  4800 
men  to  Hunter  in  the  Free  State  had  a  discouraging 
effect  on  the  enemy,  keeping  them  quiet  in  their  laagers 
and  very  wary  against  surprise. 

Meanwhile  in  Pretoria  a  plot  was  hatched  by 
Lieutenant  Cordua — a  regular  officer  of  the  Staat's 
Artillery  and  a  naturalised  German — to  capture  Lord 
Roberts  in  the  night  and  carry  him  off  to  the  enemy's 
camp.  It  was  a  mean  and  dastardly  enterprise,  for  the 
Commander-in-Chief  had  exercised  special  clemency  in 
permitting  Cordua  to  remain  in  the  town  on  parole  and 
his  men  to  revert  to  peaceful  citizenship,  on  condition 
they  took  no  further  part  in  hostilities.  The  reason 
given  for  this  lenient  treatment  was  that  the  Staat's 
Artillery  and  Zarps,  from  whom  the  conspirators  were 
drawn,  had  represented  themselves  as  the  paid  servants 
of  the  Republic  with  no  means  of  livelihood  when  the 
Boer  government  decamped.  Cordua  was  tried  in  open 
court,  found  guilty  and  sentenced  to  be  shot.  His 
confederates  to  the  number  of  300  were  deported  to 

s 


274  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

Ceylon.  Throughout  August  and  September  opera- 
tions on  a  considerable  scale  were  carried  out  between 
Middelburg  and  Komati  Poort,  as  also  in  the  Lyden- 
burg  and  Barberton  Districts  on  both  sides  of  the  rail- 
way to  Lorenzo  Marques.  Lord  Roberts  himself  moved 
to  Belfast  where  the  Guards  Brigade  was  in  bivouac  ; 
Buller,  advancing  through  Ermelo^  at  last  reached  the 
railway  and  attacked  Dalmanutha,  driving  away  the 
Boers  with  heavy  loss  ;  Ian  Hamilton  with  a  strong 
division  of  mounted  men  and  infantry  arrived  at 
Belfast,  and  Vandeleur  was  transferred  from  Mutton's 
Brigade,  now  much  reduced  in  strength,  to  Ian 
Hamilton,  as  staff  officer  in  charge  of  his  numerous 
mule-transport.  This  was  not  only  promotion  to  a 
bigger  command,  but  also  involved  Seymour  in  the 
active  operations  which  culminated  in  the  capture  of 
Lydenburg  and  occupation  of  Komati  Poort,  on  the 
border  of  Portuguese  East  Africa.  Here  a  parade  was 
held  by  Pole-Carew,  in  honour  of  the  birthday  of  the 
King  of  Portugal,  to  which  a  special  train  conveyed 
Portuguese  officers  and  a  number  of  ladies  from  the 
coast.  After  this  Vandeleur  obtained  two  days'  leave, 
bought  a  white  duck  suit  at  a  store  and  paid  a  surrepti. 
tious  visit  to  Lorenzo  Marques,  where  he  saw  ex- 
President  Kruger  emerging  from  the  Governor's  house, 
where  he  was  living,  to  go  for  a  drive  in  the  town.  The 
place  was  full  of  Hollanders,  Frenchmen,  Italians  and 
Irish — lately  in  the  service  of  our  enemies,  now  strolHng 
about  with  nothing  to  do.  The  bay  struck  Vandeleur 
as  quite  beautiful  and  the  whole  place  impressed  him 
favourably. 

In  October  Hamilton's  force  was  broken  up  in 
Pretoria  and  Seymour  was  granted  a  few  months' 
leave  to  recuperate  in  England.  He  selected  the  Dur- 
ban route,  in  order  to  visit  the  battlefields  of  Natal. 


"ON    TREK      IN    SOUTH    AFRICA 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  275 

Several  days  were  thus  spent  in  riding  round  the  Lady- 
smith  Defences  and  exploring  Spion  Kop,  Pieters  Hill, 
Colenso  and  Majuba,  but  on  reaching  Durban  early  in 
November  he  was  met  by  a  telegram  ordering  him  back 
to  Pretoria,  in  order  to  take  command  of  a  contingent 
of  Australian  Bushmen  serving  under  General  Paget  in 
the  Rustenburg  district.  He  was  delighted  at  the 
prospect,  for — like  every  ambitious  soldier — he  was 
longing  to  obtain  an  independent  command  in  the 
field.  He  well  knew  how  great  a  difference  there  is 
between  the  work  of  the  highest  staff  officer,  respon- 
sible for  carrying  out  the  orders  of  another,  and  that  of 
an  independent  commander  acting  on  his  own  initiative. 
Moreover,  Vandeleur  was  thoroughly  fitted  by  training, 
experience  and  his  own  natural  aptitudes  for  the 
command  he  desired,  and  we  may  therefore  judge  how 
bitter  was  his  disappointment  on  learning  at  Pretoria 
that  the  G.O.C.  on  the  spot  had  already  filled  the  post. 
This  was  perhaps  the  greatest  personal  disappointment 
Se5miour  ever  had  to  face,  and  he  faced  it  with  the 
equanimity  and  sound  good  sense  which  distinguished 
him  throughout  his  career  and  gave  to  his  character  a 
touch  of  sublime  composure,  whenever  difficulties 
arose.  Instead  of  again  starting  on  his  homeward 
journey  as  nine  out  of  ten  other  men  would  have  done 
under  similar  circumstances,  he  made  up  his  mind  to 
stay  quietly  in  Pretoria  and,  as  his  real  value  had 
been  appreciated  and  reported  upon  by  all  the  generals 
under  whom  he  served,  he  had  not  long  to  wait  for  re- 
cognition and  employment. 

At  the  end  of  November  Lord  Roberts  made  over  the 
army  in  South  Africa  to  Lord  Kitchener  and  returned 
to  London,  to  take  up  the  appointment  of  Commander- 
in-Chief.  On  the  29th  Kitchener  sent  for  Vandeleur 
and  offered  him  the  command  of  the  2nd  Mounted 


276  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

Infantry  Battalion,  which  happened  to  be  the  first  to 
fall  vacant.  It  formed  part  of  the  6th  Mounted 
Infantry  Corps  and  was  at  that  time  engaged  with 
Major-General  Clements'  force  against  several  com- 
mandos under  De  la  Rey.  Hopes  were  held  out  to 
Vandeleur  that,  after  a  period  of  duty  with  this  batta- 
lion, he  might  expect  promotion  to  the  command  of  a 
Mounted  Infantry  Corps  or  possibly  an  independent 
column  of  all  arms.  But,  before  he  could  join  from 
Pretoria,  Clements  was  surprised  at  Nooitgedacht, 
suffering  a  loss  of  400  casualties  and  of  most  of  his 
horses  and  mules.  Out  of  190  men  of  the  2nd  M.L 
present  in  the  action  no  less  than  90  were  killed  and 
wounded,  and  the  officer  acting  as  its  commander  was 
shot.  It  was  under  these  depressing  circumstances  that 
Seymour  took  over  its  command  in  the  Magaliesberg 
Hills,  near  the  scene  of  the  recent  fight,  and  found  he 
could  muster  but  250  men,  including  the  recruits  who 
had  just  joined  from  Krugersdorp.  Our  reverse  in 
this  district,  occurring  so  soon  after  the  capture  of 
five  infantry  companies  and  two  guns  by  De  Wet  and 
Steyn  at  Dewetsdorp  in  the  Free  State,  fanned  the 
flame  of  guerilla  warfare  into  renewed  activity,  and 
Vandeleur  was  almost  daily  in  action  right  up  to  the 
end  of  the  year  1900.  One  description,  however,  will 
suffice  to  give  the  reader  some  insight  into  the  work 
which  constantly  engaged  the  Mounted  Infantry.  On 
December  19  Clements'  force  marched  to  attack  a  Boer 
position  which  stretched  across  a  valley  from  Nooit- 
gedacht to  Hekpoort,  in  the  Rustenburg  District. 
The  6th  Corps  started  at  3.30  a.m.  as  advanced  guard 
to  the  main  column  and  crossed  the  Magalies  River, 
with  the  2nd  M.I.  in  front,  followed  by  four  field  guns 
and  the  14th  M.L  The  Boers  opened  fire  from  a  kopje 
as  soon  as  our  men  were  over  the  drift.     The  guns  and 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  277 

14th  were  brought  up  to  assist,  and  Vandeleur  with 
the  2nd  M.I.  pushed  on  through  some  trees  under  an 
increasing  fire.  When  he  emerged,  he  saw  that  his 
forward  scouts  were  already  chmbing  one  of  the  lower 
knolls  and,  being  a  believer  in  rapid  movement  under 
fire,  he  decided  to  make  a  dash  for  the  crest-line.  A 
mile  of  open  ground  separated  him  from  the  foot  of  the 
kopje,  and  across  this  he  and  his  M.I.  galloped,  fired  at 
from  two  distant  hills  on  the  flanks.  Two  horses  were 
shot  whilst  fording  a  boggy  stream,  but  his  troops 
lined  the  crest  without  losing  a  man,  just  in  time  to 
forestall  150  Boers  coming  up  from  the  opposite  direc- 
tion. These  were  routed  with  considerable  loss,  one  Boer 
being  killed  at  only  twenty-five  yards'  range.  At  this 
point  Seymour  was  obliged  to  await  reinforcements,  as 
the  enemy  were  known  to  be  in  strength  and  French 
required  time  to  cut  them  off.  When  the  main  column 
came  up  the  Boers  were  hustled  and  pursued  for  seven 
miles  across  country,  but  as  usual  they  escaped  in  the 
dark. 

Similar  engagements  were  the  order  of  the  day  with 
our  elusive  enemy  throughout  his  native  land,  and  we 
who  are  now  privileged  to  look  back  on  the  event  can 
reahse  how  mistaken  was  our  impatience  because 
progress  was  slow.  For  we  had  much  to  learn  when 
the  war  opened,  and  much  more  to  take  to  heart  when 
it  was  at  last  concluded.  Great  Britain  began  by 
expecting  her  sons  to  beat  the  enemy  without  hurting 
him ;  to  gain  \dctories  without  suffering  casualties 
and  to  obtain  these  remarkable  results  in  a  few  months' 
time  and  at  a  moderate  price.  The  lesson  of  Majuba 
had  apparently  been  forgotten.  But  the  back-country 
Boer  was  not  nurtured  on  the  mawkish  sentimentality 
which  sometimes  masquerades  as  "  magnanimity  "  in 
London.     He  called  it  by  the  plain  Dutch  word  which 


278  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

signifies  "  funk  "  ;  and,  when  England  really  meant 
business,  he  regarded  it  as  bluff.  If  therefore  a  peace 
had  been  hastily  patched  up  as  soon  as  Pretoria  fell, 
that  is  before  the  war  had  been  carried  into  the  home 
of  the  farmer,  he  would  have  remained  in  ignorance  of 
its  penalties  and  a  standing  menace  to  peace.  Whereas, 
through  the  prolongation  of  hostilities  and  the  multipli- 
cation of  our  mobile  columns,  the  whole  country  was 
fought  over  and  occupied  from  end  to  end.  It  was  a 
disagreeable  and  hateful  task  for  both  officers  and 
men  and  was  by  no  means  lightened  by  the  false 
accusations  of  cruelty  which  a  few  stay-at-home 
Englishmen  levelled  at  the  troops  in  the  field — with  no 
shred  of  evidence  to  support  them.  All  through  igoo 
the  war  continued,  but,  as  we  are  only  concerned 
with  Vandeleur's  work,  further  reference  need  not  be 
made  to  the  general  situation. 

In  January  1901  his  M.I.  Battalion  mustered  493  men 
and  527  horses  and,  still  under  Clements,  was  engaged 
in  safe-guarding  convoys  marching  to  and  from  Rusten- 
burg  through  a  country  infested  by  De  la  Rey's  com- 
mandos. As  a  rule  they  contented  themselves  with 
sniping  from  a  distance,  but  ever}'  now  and  then  assem- 
bled for  a  surprise  attack  either  on  a  railway  Hne,  a 
camp  or  a  column  of  marching  ox-waggons.  Thus 
on  January  24,  two  days  after  the  death  of  Queen 
Victoria,  Seymour  was  out  reconnoitring  beyond  the 
lines  at  5  a.m.  when  he  became  aware  that  more  Boers 
than  usual  were  on  foot,  evidently  concentrating  to 
close  on  the  camp.  He  at  once  placed  his  men  in 
position  to  check  them,  for  already  their  shots  were 
inflicting  losses  on  the  tethered  transport  animals. 
When  later  it  became  necessary  to  reinforce  the  advance 
picquets,  Seymour  and  his  Sergeant-Major  rode  forward 
to  a  hill  in  order  to  dispose  the  men  to  the  best  advan- 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  279 

tage.  Bullets  were  spattering  the  rocks,  so  he  cantered 
on  to  take  cover  when,  suddenly,  he  had  an  impression 
of  a  noise  and  a  blow,  then  a  tremendous  blow  and 
concussion  on  the  left  thigh  and  he  realised  he  was 
hit.  The  Sergeant-Major  got  him  off  his  horse  and 
bandaged  him  with  the  puggaree  of  his  hat  ;  but  he 
had  to  He  behind  some  boulders  in  very  great  pain  for 
nearly  three  hours,  under  constant  fire.  Eventually 
he  was  carried  back — a  perilous  journey  still  under  fire 
— and  placed  in  a  house  around  which  bullets  con- 
tinued singing  all  day.  The  one  which  hit  him  in  the 
morning  had  penetrated  the  right  hip,  travelled  down 
the  left  leg,  missing  the  femoral  artery  by  a  fraction 
of  an  inch  and  emerged  in  front  of  the  left  thigh. 
Mercifully  the  thigh  bone  was  not  broken,  but  the 
wound  was  a  very  serious  and  nasty  one  and  was  not 
improved  next  day  when  he  and  an  officer  with  enteric 
were  jolted  in  an  ambulance  along  a  bad  road  to 
Krugersdorp  Station,  en  route  for  the  Wanderers  Club, 
Johannesburg,  in  use  as  an  officers'  hospital. 

After  thus  trekking  for  sixty  miles  it  was  indeed  a 
comfort  to  poor  Vandeleur  to  find  himself  in  a  hospital 
where  every  attention  was  paid  to  his  wants  and  the 
best  medical  science  could  be  bestowed  on  his  wound. 
His  general  health  was  so  good  that  at  the  end  of  a 
month  he  was  well  enough  to  be  moved  to  Capetown, 
where  his  father  met  him  from  England.  They  sailed 
early  in  March  and,  by  the  time  Seymour  landed 
at  Southampton,  he  was  able  to  get  about  without 
assistance.  At  home  in  Ireland  he  mended  apace,  as 
the  weather  was  fine  and  his  days  were  mostly  spent 
on  a  yacht.  When  the  ''  Honours  Gazette  "  appeared, 
and  he  saw  his  promotion  to  the  rank  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  at  the  age  of  thirty-one,  his  w^ound  was  for- 
gotten and  he  insisted  on  going  before  a  Medical  Board, 


28o  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

with  a  view  to  returning  to  active  service  at  once 
He  accordingly  sailed  on  July  13,  reached  Pretoria  on 
August  II  and  dined  the  same  evening  with  Lord 
Kitchener,  whose  columns  were  at  last  producing 
an  appreciable  effect  on  the  Boers  still  under 
arms. 

I  append  one  among  many  letters  in  my  possession 
showing  how  Vandeleur  was  appreciated  by  those 
under  whom  he  served.  It  is  from  Major-General  Sir 
Edward  Hutton  : 

"  Dear  Colonel  Maxse, — It  was  with  mutual 
pleasure  to  us  both  that  Seymour  Vandeleur  reported 
himself  to  me  at  Bloemfontein  early  in  April  1900  as 
officer  in  charge  of  the  Transport  belonging  to  the 
large  force  which,  under  Lord  Roberts'  orders,  I  was 
then  organising.  It  is  not  easy  to  do  full  justice  to 
Vandeleur' s  remarkable  success  as  Transport  ofhcer 
to  such  a  cosmopolitan  brigade  as  mine.  It  was  in 
itself  nearly  always  twice  and  at  one  time  nearly  three 
times  the  size  of  a  Cavalry  Division,  composed  of 
militia  troops  from  our  over-sea  self-governing  Colonies 
as  well  as  of  regular  Mounted  Infantry,  selected  from 
twenty-eight  British  regiments.  This  Force  was  one 
especially  difficult  to  handle  and  doubly  difficult  to 
administer  as  regards  transport  and  supply. 

"  It  was  Vandeleur's  able  and  quick  powers  of 
organisation  and  his  ready  tact  in  dealing  with  those 
under  him  which  enabled  him  to  meet  all  the  demands 
made  upon  his  administrative  capacity.  Personally, 
I  never  had  to  give  him  a  single  order  or  to  tax  him 
with  a  single  oversight  during  the  whole  time  he  was 
Chief  Transport  Officer.  Living  with  me  at  the  head- 
quarter mess  and  in  constant  personal  touch  with  me, 


IN  THE  BOER  WAR  281 

he  knew,  as  by  instinct  and  almost  without  actual 
orders  from  my  Chief  Staff  Officer,  what  was  required 
of  him  and  his  transport. 

"  His  capable  arrangements  for  the  evacuation  of 
sick  and  wounded  from  the  Field  Hospital  were  not 
the  least  noteworthy  of  his  services,  and  the  only  time 
I  had  a  difference  of  opinion  with  Vandeleur  was  at 
the  commencement  of  the  critical  action  upon  May  28, 
1900,  at  Oliphants  Vlei,  before  the  taking  of  Johannes- 
burg, when  his  fighting  instinct  brought  him  into  the 
firing  line  and  prompted  him  to  abandon  for  a  few 
brief  moments  his  important  charge,  in  order  to  join 
me  in  the  action. 

"  You  will  realise  from  what  I  have  written  how 
much  I  owed  to  Vandeleur  for  his  management  of  my 
transport.  The  Mounted  Force  with  which  he  played 
so  leading  a  part  had  no  Press  correspondent  to  chronicle 
their  work,  and  the  splendid  service  which  was  rendered 
by  them,  one  and  all,  has  never  been  realised  by  the 
Pubhc. 

"  I  have  said  nothing  of  Vandeleur' s  personal 
character,  which  I  perhaps  had  better  opportunities  of 
knowing  than  many  of  his  friends.  He  was  of  those 
highest  and  noblest  types  of  British  officer  whom,  it 
has  been  said,  '  Britain  has  never  failed  to  find  amongst 
her  sons.'  The  recollection  of  the  high-minded  ideal 
cherished  by  Vandeleur  of  his  mission  in  life,  the 
modesty  and  the  moral  strength  which  were  peculiarly 
his  characteristics,  will  ever  remain  a  sacred  memory 
to  his  friends. 

"  Believe  me, 

"  Yours  very  truly, 

"  Edward  H.  Hutton,  Major-General. 

"London,  Nov.  3,  1905." 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE  END 

The  war  was  dragging  on  to  its  inevitable  conclusion. 
Some  tenacious  commandos  fighting  gamely  to  the  end 
took  every  opportunity  of  pouncing  upon  insufficiently 
guarded  convoys  or  wrecking  trains  for  the  loot  they 
might  contain,  but  many  burghers  were  growing  tired 
of  the  precarious  and  detestable  existence  to  which  they 
were  reduced  by  Kitchener's  combination  of  sweeping 
columns  and  lines  of  block-houses.  During  Vande- 
leur's  first  week  in  Pretoria  884  Boers  surrendered  or 
were  captured  ;  whilst  north,  south,  east  and  west 
they  were  being  relentlessly  harried  by  our  officers  and 
men — now  hardened  and  experienced  campaigners. 

North  of  Pretoria  the  Boer  who  gave  most  trouble 
was  Commandant  Beyers  in  the  difficult  and  rugged 
country  known  as  the  Bush- veldt,  and  against  him  a 
strong  column  under  Lt.-Col.  Harold  Grenfell  was 
operating  from  Nylstroom,  having  its  base  on  the 
railway.  This  force  was  composed  of  the  2nd,  12th 
and  2oth  Mounted  Infantry  Battalions,  Kitchener's 
Fighting  Scouts,  four  field  guns  and  a  half  battalion 
of  infantry.  Grenfell,  who  had  been  fighting  inces- 
santly since  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  stood  in  need  of  a 
rest,  and  the  Commander-in-Chief  was  looking  about  for 
a  really  good  man  to  succeed  him.  After  carefully  con- 
sidering all  other  claims.  Kitchener  selected  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Vandeleur  for  this  post  and  directed  him  to 
join  the  column  at  Nylstroom  when  next  it  came  in 


KREVKT   LT.. COLONEL    SEVMOlk    VANDELKIK.   D.S.O. 
IRISH  GUARDS.    1901 


THE  END  283 

touch  with  that  station  ;  then  to  accompany  it  on  one 
trek  as  Grenf ell's  subordinate  in  order  to  acquaint 
himself  with  the  force,  the  country  and  the  circum- 
stances ;  and  then  to  take  command  directly  Grenfell 
went  home  on  leave.  Thus  the  strenuous  work  of  his 
whole  life  was  to  meet  with  the  only  reward  which 
could  satisfy  Seymour's  legitimate  ambition.  It  came 
to  him  at  the  age  of  thirty-two,  when  he  was  young 
enough  to  feel  that  his  future  still  lay  before  him  yet 
experienced  enough  to  act  with  the  ripe  judgment  of 
an  old  hand  !  He  had  seen  much  of  war  and  knew  its 
difficulties,  but  to  overcome  them  he  possessed,  beneath 
a  quiet  demeanour  and  never-failing  cheerfulness,  the 
stern  quality  of  grit  without  which  officers  cannot 
successfully  command  in  action.  Indeed  he  was  so 
full  of  hope  and  delight  at  the  prospect,  that  the  friends 
who  were  with  him  before  he  started  from  Pretoria 
felt  his  enthusiasm  to  be  contagious  ;  and  those  of  us 
who  best  appreciated  his  character  and  brain-power 
were  convinced  that  he  would  prove  himself  a  brilliant 
commander  in  the  field. 

But  our  belief  in  him  was  not  to  be  tested  and  con- 
firmed, for  he  never  reached  his  destination. 

On  Friday,  August  30,  1901,  he  lunched  and  dined 
with  Colonel  Romilly  of  the  Scots  Guards,  and  went 
down  to  the  railway  station  at  11  p.m.  to  sleep  in  the 
train,  which  was  to  start  at  dawn  next  morning  for 
Nylstroom.  After  a  disturbed  night  spent  in  shunting, 
the  train  of  three  open  trucks  and  one  ordinary  corridor- 
coach  left  Pretoria  with  its  passengers  asleep  in  fancied 
security.  They  included  two  ladies  returning  with 
their  children  to  Pietersburg,  Vandeleur,  Major  Beatson 
and  an  escort  of  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  in 
the  armoured  truck  next  the  engine.  Besides  baggage 
and  stores  there  were  also  ^f  20,000  in  cash,  the  pay  of 


284  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

the  troops  in  the  northern  district.  The  train  reached 
Watcrval  North,  sixteen  miles  from  Pretoria,  in  safety 
and  should  have  waited  there  until  the  local  com- 
mandant had  definite  news  that  the  hne  to  the  next 
station,  Haman's  Kraal,  thirteen  miles,  was  reported 
clear.  The  arrangements  made  for  the  protection  of 
the  railway,  in  addition  to  the  block-houses  and  the 
defence  of  each  station,  were  that  two  native  "  boys  " 
started  at  midnight  from  Waterval  North  and  two 
others  from  Haman's  Kraal.  They  were  to  meet 
half-way  between  the  stations,  exchange  passes  to 
prove  they  had  met  and  return  to  their  respective 
commandants  to  report  on  the  safety  of  the  line. 
Telegrams  were  then  to  be  exchanged  between  the 
commandants,  and  no  train  ought  to  have  been  per- 
mitted to  start  until  all  these  preliminaries  were  duly 
completed.  Unfortunately  on  the  date  in  question 
the  train  left  \A'aterval  North  before  any  report  or 
telegram  had  come  to  hand. 

Meanwhile  the  notorious  train-wrecker  Jack 
Hindon,  an  Irishman,  had  reached  a  cutting  three 
miles  beyond  Waterval  North  with  fifty  to  sixty  Boers  at 
midnight,  and  had  placed  a  dynamite  mine  beneath 
the  rails.  He  and  his  party  then  concealed  themselves 
in  some  bushes  fifty  yards  off,  leaving  a  few  of  their 
number  to  watch  the  cutting.  When  the  two  scouts 
from  Waterval  North  approached  they  were  imme- 
diately set  upon  in  the  dark,  taken  prisoners  and 
flogged.  The  two  scouts  from  Haman's  Kraal  reached 
their  destination  half-way,  waited  as  usual  for  the 
others  to  arrive,  and  then,  suspecting  miscliief,  pluckily 
advanced  along  the  railway  almost  as  far  as  the  cutting- 
Here  they  saw  the  Boers  actually  in  position  on  both 
sides  of  the  line  just  as  the  train  was  approaching  from 
the  opposite  direction.     The  engine  panted  slowly  up 


THE  END  285 

the  steep  gradient  towards  the  trap,  whilst  on  top  of 
the  cutting  the  Boers  lay  concealed  by  heaps  of  exca- 
vated earth,  ready  to  fire  down  on  the  open  trucks. 
The  two  scouts  ran  towards  the  engine  holding  up 
their  hands  to  try  and  stop  it,  but  the  driver  did  not 
understand,  and  the  brave  "  boys  "  were  shot  just  as 
the  mine  was  exploded  beneath  the  engine — over- 
turning it  and  the  armoured  carriage.  At  the  same 
instant  a  fierce  musketry  fire  was  poured  into  every 
part  of  the  train  before  its  occupants  could  seize  their 
rifles.  Both  the  ladies  were  wounded.  Vandeleur, 
in  the  adjoining  compartment,  sprang  from  his  seat  and 
rushed  out  into  the  corridor — similar  to  those  on  our 
English  railways — shouting  as  loud  as  he  could 
"  Ladies  and  men,  lie  down  flat."  When  he  reached 
the  door  to  get  out  of  the  carriage  and  take  command 
of  the  men  he  was  confronted  by  a  Boer  named  Uys 
with  a  loaded  rifle  at  his  shoulder,  and  was  instantly 
shot  dead  at  two  yards'  range.  Nine  non-commis- 
sioned officers  and  men  were  killed,  two  officers,  four- 
teen non-commissioned  officers  and  five  civilians  were 
wounded.  Another  mine  was  exploded  some  distance 
behind  to  prevent  help  arriving,  and  the  wreckers 
proceeded  to  loot  and  burn  the  train  before  they  rode 
off. 

Hindon  and  his  gang  are  branded  as  murderers  and 
robbers,  not  only  for  this  shameful  deed  but  also  on 
account  of  other  similar  massacres.  They  were  reputed 
as  marauders  who  feared  to  fight  in  the  open,  but  took 
advantage  of  the  state  of  war  to  pillage  and  plunder 
belligerents  and  civilians  alike. 

The  survivors  of  the  disaster  were  soon  succoured 
from  Pretoria,  and  Vandeleur's  body  was  reverently 
carried  to  the  capital.  On  Sunday,  September  i,  it 
was  laid  to  its  last  rest  in  the  cemetery  of  the  Enghsh 


286  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

church,  with  full  mihtary  honours.  It  happened  that 
on  this  day  yandeleur's  old  battalion,  the  2nd  Battalion 
Scots  Guards,  was  moving  by  train  from  Springs  to 
Potchefstroom  and  was  thus  within  reach  of  Pretoria. 
In  obedience  to  a  telegram  from  Lord  Kitchener  the 
Right  Flank  company,  under  Major  Godman,  was 
brought  up  by  special  train  to  attend  the  funeral. 
And  so  it  came  to  pass  that  the  final  volleys  over  his 
grave  were  fired  by  the  very  comrades  whom  he  would 
have  wished  for  and  that  the  regiment  of  which  he 
had  been  so  bright  an  ornament  had  at  least  the  mourn- 
ful satisfaction  of  paying  its  last  tribute  to  his  memory. 
The  Commander-in-Chief,  who  loved  his  subordinate, 
was  present  with  the  headquarters  staff  and  all  the 
officers  of  the  garrison  ;  and  a  more  impressive  cere- 
mony, or  one  tinged  with  a  deeper  sorrow  and  a  truer 
regret  it  would  be  difficult  to  conceive. 

Men  of  Seymour  Vandeleur's  stamp  do  not  die  in 
their  beds  and  it  is  in  accordance  with  the  life  they  have 
chosen  that  they  should  meet  death  in  the  discharge  of 
duty,  and  in  the  service  of  their  country.  But  in  Van- 
deleur's case  it  is  bitter  to  think  that  when  the  end 
came  he  did  not  fall  in  the  fair  field  of  battle,  where 
his  life  had  been  risked  on  so  many  occasions.  To 
be  the  victim  of  a  pitiful  highway  robbery,  murdered 
in  cold  blood  without  the  chance  of  reprisal  by  a 
dastardly  scoundrel  who  wrecked  trains  for  loot — such 
is  not  the  kind  of  death  which  his  friends  can  contem- 
plate without  a  feeling  of  vengeance  in  their  hearts. 
Yet,  after  all,  it  is  a  man's  life  not  his  death  that 
matters,  and  the  memory  of  Seymour  Vandeleur  as  he 
was — a  bright,  ambitious,  happy  companion — still 
lingers  with  those  who  follow  his  calling  and  sympa- 
thise with  his  spirit.  To  them  he  will  ever  remain  an 
example  of  straight,   young  manhood  and    of    a  life 


THE  END  287 

spent  in  the  pursuit  of  that  which  is  best  and  highest 
in  the  profession  he  loved,  heedless  of  any  notoriety 
it  might  happen  to  bring  him.  To  those  who  have 
read  this  memoir  of  his  short  career  it  will  be  obvious 
that  he  possessed  a  tenacious  purpose  through  life, 
that  he  was  rapidly  developing  along  the  natural  lines 
of  his  character  and  that  he  had  emerged,  a  distinct 
personality,  from  the  junior  ranks  of  the  army.  But 
by  those  who  worked  with  him  for  years  in  different 
places  and  had  the  best  opportunities  of  judging  his 
strength,  Vandeleur's  death  is  recognised  as  a  distinct 
loss  to  his  country.  Viewed  in  this  light  it  was  a 
public  calamity,  though  this  was  known  to  few  outside 
his  profession. 

In  these  pages  I  have  endeavoured  to  place  before 
my  readers  the  story  of  his  life,  not  in  the  form  of  a  bio- 
graphy but  rather  by  narrating  the  events  in  which  he 
took  part  and  discussing  the  problems  which  absorbed 
him.  This  I  feel  sure  is  what  he  himself  would  have 
preferred  to  a  more  personal  narrative,  dwelling  less  on 
the  work  than  on  the  man.  Indeed  one  purpose  of 
this  book  is  to  afford  to  Vandeleur's  countrymen  a 
glimpse  of  what  is  being  done  by  hundreds  of  picked 
officers,  who  are  the  real  builders  of  the  Dependencies 
and  Crown  Colonies  of  our  Empire.  They  long  ago 
laid  the  foundations  upon  which  our  Indian  Dominion 
was  reared;  they  are  now  toiling  ceaselessly  and  suc- 
cessfully in  such  places  as  Somaliland,  Uganda,  East 
Africa,  Nigeria,  The  Egyptian  Sudan — in  fact  wherever 
the  Union  Jack  flies.  Sometimes  recognised  but  more 
often  snubbed  by  official  England,  their  names  are 
unknown  to  the  British  Public  and  rightly  so,  because 
men  should  not  acquire  notoriety  for  merely  doing 
their  duty  well.  Their  reward  is  in  the  knowledge 
that  they  are  sowing  seed  which  will  ripen  into  an 


288  SEYMOUR  VANDELEUR 

abundant  harvest  whose  true  value  will  be  appre- 
ciated by  future  generations  of  Britons.  When,  how- 
ever, one  of  their  number  is  cut  off  in  the  prime 
of  •  his  manhood  and  with  his  promise  unfulfilled,  it 
is  meet  that  the  story  of  his  life  should  be  recorded 
— as  an  instance  of  the  toll  exacted  by  Empire  and  a 
reminder  to  us  who  sit  at  home  that  there  still  are  men 
whose  pride  it  is  to  render  service  to  the  State. 


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Tavistock  Street,  London 


UNIVERSITY  ALIFORNIA 


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UNIVERSITY  of  CALIFORNiA 


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